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Abstract 
This study delves into the crucial question of why and how, despite a 
constitutionally guaranteed representative system of government in Kuwait, the 
past four decades of experimenting with democracy produced a model of 
democracy that is characterised by only a very small number of citizens being 
eligible to participate in the political system and a National Assembly whose 
effectiveness is undermined by its frequent suspensions and its inability to 
check and balance the power of the executive. In order to answer this question 
the study focuses on analysing the functioning of the National Assembly 
covering the period between 1963-1996 and its relations to al Sabah and the 
executive. The objective of this will be to present the manner and the 
mechanisms which al Sabah have used in order to maintain their dominance 
over society in Kuwait and, subsequently, over the National Assembly. 
Another point assessed will be whether al Sabah have created an elite 
institution that is accessible to only the very few, through citizenship law, and 
also where the representative system is fragmented along traditional lines of 
affiliations which are promoted through the election law. It will be seen whether 
it is through these two legal frames that al Sabah have been able to control and 
undermine the democratic experience in Kuwait. Kuwaiti citizenship is 
considered to be among the most restrictive system in the world, making 
Kuwaiti nationality a very "special status" and limiting who are those eligible to 
participate in the political system down to an extremely small percentage of the 
entire population. 
The study acknowledges the centrality of oil in facilitating the dominance of al 
Sabah and the executive branch of state power over the legislative branch. 
However, the study aims to go beyond the rentier approach emphasis on oil, by 
highlighting the specifics of the given situation in Kuwait, by focusing on the 
mechanisms of control; whether legal or political. The study concludes that 
several major changes are required - in particular in the citizenship law and 
election law - if the path true of democracy is to be followed as it is stipulated in 
the Constitution of Kuwait in 1962. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Problem 
The development of Kuwait, from a small-unsettled nomadic pastoral area 
located between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, to one of the richest states in the Gulf 
region is considered, by all measures, a success story. This small Shaikhdom 
has been able to meet the challenges of building a state, developing, and 
establishing legitimacy. It has strengthened and survived against the odds and 
has beaten back all the predictions about its potential demise due to its fragile 
nature. It has also survived the external aggression and invasion by the Iraqi 
regime in 1990 and regained its international legitimacy and status within a very 
short period of time, with the assistance of the American led coalition of 
countries and their armed forces. 
However, despite Kuwait's massive socio-economic transformations, they were 
not accompanied by a similar level of development for its democratic institutions 
and its democratic life. Although Kuwait has adopted a democratic Constitution 
and is among the most open and liberal governments in the Gulf state, the 
workings and the par8:r:neters of public political space is, to a great extent, 
determined by the ruling family. On two occasions, in 1976 and 1986, al Sabah 
dismissed the National Assembly and suspended constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. The press is censored, subsidised and controlled by the state; public 
gatherings are restricted by government approval; and voluntary associations 
1 
are not fully autonomous; clubs, guilds and professional associations are 
regulated by the state and depend on it for a substantial part of their budget. 1 
Thus, four decades of parliamentary experience produced a model of 
democracy that is characterised by an extremely small number of citizens who 
are eligible to participate in the political system; prolonged periods of 
suspension of the National Assembly; immense restrictions on individual and 
public freedoms and where ultimate power resides in the executive, namely, 
with al Sabah family. The major task of this study is to analyse why and how 
this situation developed, despite a constitutionally guaranteed representative 
system of government, and the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of 
expression and association. Subsequently, is there a possibility for Kuwait to 
widen the political rights available and to develop a better functioning 
representative system of government? 
The context in which this problem has developed is very important for the 
investigation of this study and this is related to the historical process of state 
formation and the development of an oil based economy. The establishment of 
central rule on territorially defined boundaries was directly linked to the rise of 
power for al Sabah as the ruling family and the most influential political force in 
the area. Thus, the political system that developed has been underpinned by 
very personal rule and, as an attachment to this, the population's loyalty and 
allegiance to the ruling family rather than to the state per se. In fact, the 
development of the state and its organs followed the establishment of the rule of 
al Sabah. This signified the patriarchal nature of the state. Patriarchal authority 
and domination, as indicated by Weber, is based on personal loyalty and on the 
sanctity of tradition and allegiance towards the ruler.2 Although it is a voluntary 
submission to the ruler, the relationship is still heavily laden with tension. The 
ruler and the ruled are engaged in an implicit struggle for power, in order for 
each to maintain or augment its influences while adhering to the imperatives of 
1 Mary Ann Tetreault. "Civil Society in Kuwait: Protected Spaces and Women's Rights," The Middle 
East Journal. .+7(2) Spring 1993: p.276. 
~ Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. (ed). Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). p.1007-1015. 
tradition. 3 This type of dynamics is clearly seen in Kuwaiti politics. Various 
political groups exert pressure and place demands on the government and can 
be extremely vocal and critical, yet all of this goes on within a context of loyalty, 
allegiance and acceptance of al Sabah's authority. 
The government's adoption of the concept of al usra al wahida (the united 
family) as a symbol of Kuwaiti nationalism, augmented the patriarchal nature of 
the state.4 The media, in popularising the concept has: depicted the nation as a 
collective family characterised by reciprocal relations of rights and obligations, 
al usra al wahida, with the Amir at its head.s The Amir is the father figure and 
the patron of the Kuwaiti family. Loyalty to the patriarchal family and loyalty to 
the ruling family became associated. The Constitution also emphasises the 
family as the basic unit of society rather than the individual. Thus, a hierarchical 
structure of heavily personalised relations and channels permeate the society 
making kinship and traditional affiliations the more acceptable forms of identity 
and are deemed as essential for anyone to be able to access to the political 
system. The expression of divisions and forms of identity and loyalty based on 
the sect, tribe, and family etc ... facilitate al Sabah's control and dominance over 
the political process, since it can play these diverse groups against each other, 
in order to maintain its relevance. 
What strengthened and maintained this personal autocratic rule was the 
development of the oil economy in Kuwait. The incredible wealth generated by 
the oil gave al Sabah the power to allocate and distribute the huge revenues 
that were accruing for the state, to receivers chosen for their own advantage, 
whether by increasing the wealth and influence of members of the ruling family 
or by rewarding loyal groups, individuals, families and by expanding benefits to 
the ordinary Kuwaiti citizen. That behaviour has tied all the different social 
groups within the society very close to al Sabah and their rule, and has 
emphasised the importance of traditional lines of affiliations and identify. 
3 Frank Parkin. Max Weber. (Chichesters: Ellis Horwood Limited, 1982).p.81. 
4 Mary Ann Tetreault and Haya al-Mughni. "Modernization and its Discontents: Gender and Politics in 
Kuwait" The Middle East Journal. (VoI.49. No.3 Summer 1995) p. 407. 
5 Ibid., p.407 
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1.2 Main Argument of the Study 
The main contention of the study is that the constitutionally guaranteed 
representative system of government, and subsequently the realisation of a 
genujne process of democratisation, has been thwarted by the determination of 
the ruling family to preserve its power. The concentration of economic power in 
al Sabah hands, due to their control of the oil revenues, plus their ability to 
distribute and allocate that wealth through state structures and the private 
sector facilitated the ruling family's pursuit of this aim. Other structural factors in 
the political economy of Kuwait also helped such as the presence of a large 
migrant community and the persistence of a number of traditional features of 
the society. 
On one level this argument fits within the rentier approach that has been used 
as a method of study of the Gulf states.6 However, the focus of this study is to 
go beyond the descriptive parameters of the approach by analysing the manner 
and the mechanisms that allowed al Sabah to maintain its dominance and 
undermine the democratic experience of Kuwait. The centrality of oil to Kuwait 
is indisputable but there is a need to look into the specifics of the situation and 
bring out the dynamics of the relationship between the state and society. In this 
context the ruling family has adopted specific strategies in limiting any 
challenges to its authority which the study shall focus on analysing. These 
include: 
1. The control of the legal frame of political participation through citizenship 
and election laws. The citizenship law separates some segments of the 
population of Kuwait and grants them full political rights while the election 
law fragments the population along traditional lines of differing affiliations 
and identities. The combined effect of these two laws is the particular 
model of parliamentary democracy that developed in Kuwait; highly 
fractured and ineffective in curtailing executive power. 
6 See Hazem Beblawi "The Rentier State in the Arab World" and Giacomo Luciani" Allocation vs. 
Production States: A Theoretical Framework" in Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (ed.). The 
Rentier State (London: Croom Helm. 1987). 
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2. The use and emphasis of traditional forms of affiliations and loyalties as 
being the primary source of identity, drastically reduces the importance of 
having a general atmosphere and a 'universal' feeling of citizenship, as well 
as the different class status. 
3. The ban on the formation of political parties which acts as an obstacle on 
the elaboration of political agendas and programmes which would be based 
on policies that transcend the segmental interests of the different groups. 
4. The skilful use of the National Assembly to contain, curb and exploit 
differences among the various groups in society, in order to enhance the 
relevance of the ruling family as the only possible unifying force for the 
society. 
5. Combining the two roles of ruling and governing provides al Sabah with a 
huge leverage over the SOCiety by the mere virtue of controlling the state 
revenues and the key ministries of Information, Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Interior. In addition to this, al Sabah combines the two posts of Prime 
Minister and Crown Prince. 
The study will also show that within these constraints there are, nevertheless, 
areas where civil society has been able to carve out some room for manoeuvre 
which under certain circumstances has allowed it to force concessions from al 
Sabah. This proves that the dynamiCS of the power relation between a rentier 
state and the society is much more complicated than a simple client-patron one. 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
The objectives of this study can be summarised as follows: 
1. To show the complexity and difficult nature of developing a representative 
system of government in a state that is underpinned by very personal rule, 
with the personal/traditional attachments and loyalties linked together. 
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2. To show that, although oil has been a major factor in facilitating the 
dominance of the executive branch of state power over the legislative 
branch of state power, it has not made the society passive or separated from 
the state, as the rentier approach would emphasise. 
3. To show the conflict and tension between society and the state as 
expressed in the debates of the assembly and the tenuous relation between 
the executive and legislative and the Kuwaiti diwaniwas. 
4. To contribute to the debate about democracy and citizenship in the Gulf 
state region. 
5. To investigate the impact of the citizenship law and the election law on the 
development of parliamentary life in Kuwait in terms of the 
inclusion/exclusion of certain groups in society and also in terms of dividing 
Kuwaitis along traditional forms of their affiliation. 
6. To show how traditional divisions and traditional forms of identity and loyalty 
have been manipulated by al Sabah for the advantage of maintaining their 
autocratic power and their dominance as the only relevant political force in 
the cou ntry. 
7. To discuss the role of the diwaniwah (a private meeting place for men only, 
which is particular to Kuwait) in providing an alternative channel of 
communication between citizens and the government especially in times of 
protracted political public space. 
1.4 The Conceptual Frame of the Research 
The conceptual frame for investigating the particular model of a representative 
system of government that has developed in Kuwait rests on the citizenship 
concept and the liberal model of democracy. The citizenship concept is pivotal 
for this research because it can be argued that Kuwait defines itself and its 
parliamentary experiment by its exclusive citizenship law. Another reason is 
6 
that in order for Kuwait to have a better functioning parliamentary system, then 
to introduce a less restrictive citizenship law to achieve this is essential; one 
that will fall more in line with the Kuwaiti Constitution. Thus, in using this 
concept, it can serve this research in two main ways: firstly, by understanding 
the limitation of the parliamentary experience in Kuwait and secondly, to 
Improve on that experience. As to the model of democracy, the Kuwaiti 
Constitution adopted the liberal model of democracy by stipulating for a 
representative system of government with checks and balances between the 
executive and the legislature, and upholding the principle of separation of state 
powers. Thus, it is clear which path Kuwait needs to take in order to establish 
democratic practices in the country. However, the difficulty lies in the lack of 
commitment of al Sabah to support that path and also the inability of Kuwait's 
political groupings to force a change in the balance between the executive and 
legislative in order to achieve such a better functioning representative system of 
government. 
1.4.1 Citizenship 
T. S Marshall in the 1950s re-examined the concept of citizenship in his work 
Citizenship and Social Class, by tracing its development in Britain from the end 
of the seventeenth century until the twentieth century.7 He showed how the 
principle of equality, embedded in the concept of citizenship, is set against the 
principle of inequality of classes inherent in the capitalist system. Accordingly, 
citizenship helps to guide progress into the path of reducing social inequalities. 
In addition, it has an integrating effect; a bondage and membership of free men 
endowed with rights and protected by a common law.B The development of 
citizenship, especially in the twentieth century, did influence social inequality 
and led to the birth of the welfare state, which guaranteed minimum standards 
of living to the people, plus free education and free health services, and housing 
for low income people, etc. These benefits ameliorated some of the inequalities 
7 T. H. Marshall. Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1950) 
~ T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore. Citizenship and Social Class. (London: Pluto Press. 1992).p.24. 
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innate in the capitalist system. Although, nowadays, it is possible to see an 
attack on the welfare state across the capitalist world, many of the rights that 
are guaranteed by citizenship are still preserved. Marshall defines citizenship 
in the following manner: 
Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a 
community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the 
rights and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no 
universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall 
be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create 
an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be 
measured and towards which aspirations can be directed. The urge 
forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller 
measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the status is 
made and an increase in the number of those on whom the status is 
bestowed. 9 
Marshall divided citizenship rights into three elements: civil, political and social. 
The civil element includes: the rights necessary for individual freedom-liberty of 
the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and 
to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice.10 The institutions most 
associated with civil rights are the courts of justice. Marshall defines the 
political element as: the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as 
a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the 
members of such a body.11 The institutions corresponding to this issue are the 
parliament and the local councils. As for the social element, Marshall includes a 
whole range of rights provided by the social services and the educational 
services that guarantee the citizen a civilised life according to the standards 
prevailing in the society. These rights include the right to economic welfare and 
9 Ibid., p.18. 
10 Ibid., p.8. 
11 Ibid .. p.8. 
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security, to share in the social cultural heritage and the ability to lead a decent 
life.12 
He maintained that: political reform in each of these domains can modify the 
worst aspects of economic inequality and can, therefore, make the modern 
capitalist system and the liberal polity more equal and just, without revolutionary 
activity.13 The development of social rights through the expansion of the welfare 
state in the post-war period were vital for reducing inequalities in the capitalist 
system and an essential tool for mitigating class tensions. 
The significance of Marshall's analYSis is acknowledged by many scholars. 
However, criticism and reservations have been levied against his concept. 
Essentially, this criticism focuses on the evolutionary element of his analysis, 
especially when related to the historical development of citizenship through the 
three stages of civil, political and social rights. His analysis is also seen as 
being an over-simplification of the role of states and politics. 14 Moreover, 
despite Marshall's acknowledgement that capitalism and citizenship are at odds 
he maintained that social rights and reforms in civil and political rights can 
mitigate and reduce these inequalities. 15 
The debate within the Marxist theory assesses this concept and criticises the 
idea of bourgeois social rights while challenging the liberal theory of the free 
and independent citizen enjoying universal privileges. Marxism developed an 
alternative theory, that of the civil society. Therefore, in Marxist discourse civil 
society is specifically: the state guaranteed realm of commodity production and 
exchange - of private property, market forces and private rights. 16 The 
development of capitalism meant that the civil society - the realm of private 
interest, waged labour and private rights - is emancipated from political control 
12 Ibid., p.8. 
13 David Held. Political Theory and the Modern State. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).p.190. 
14 Ibid., p.193. 
15 Mary Ann Tetreault. Stories of Democracv: Pubtics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000).p.~3. 
16 John Keane. Democracy and Civil Society. ( London: Verso, 1988). p.32. 
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and becomes the basis and presupposition of the state. Thus, the state is a 
coercive institution that reflects and reinforces the particular, historically specific 
int~rests of civil society. This separation of state and society is considered to 
be transitory and human emancipation occurs only with the withering of the 
state and establishment of a communist society.17 
However, while citizenship for Marshall is a buffer zone between the state and 
civil society, Marxists see the state as being subservient to the conflicting forces 
of the civil society. The extension of citizenship does not lead to justice and 
equality, because economic life is not sufficiently under the control of citizens to 
affect the unequal status and the treatment of people.18 It is the absence of 
discussion over economic rights and workers control over the capitalist 
enterprise - which would have made inroads into the autonomy of capitalist 
property - that the Marxists found as a fundamental problem with the liberal 
notion of citizenship precisely because market economy cannot guarantee 
equality among individuals. 19 True freedom of the individual, therefore, can be 
attained only in ending this negation between state and civil society through the 
unification of civil and political society.20 Marx stated: 
Only when man has recognised and organised his 'forces propres' as 
social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power 
from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human 
emancipation have been accomplished.21 
However, the experience of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have proved 
the immense difficulty it is to achieve the unity that Marx perceived as being the 
ultimate solution for resolving the inherent contradictions of the capitalist 
system. 
17 Ibid., p. 57-64 
18 Iris Marion Young. "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." 
Ethics Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy. (VoI.99. No.2 January 1989). p.l76. 
19 Adam B. Seligman. "The Fragile Ethical Vision of Civil Society" in Bryan S. Turner (ed.). Citizenship 
and Social Theory. (London: Sage, 1993). p.156. 
20 Ibid., 154-155. 
'I· 1 ') 
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Regardless of its shortcomings, the citizenship concept, as indicated by Turner, 
is valid mainly because citizenship has become an indispensable component of 
modern social theory as a perspective on social rights, welfare issues, political 
membership and social identity.22 In addition to that, it provides an ideal type 
that can be utilised to analyse a variety of actual cases.23 The usefulness of the 
concept to analyse a wide range of cases is evident by the recent focus on 
citizenship in a number of studies on Middle Eastern states. Such as the 
collective volume edited by Butenschon, Davis and Hassassian "Citizenship and 
the State in the Middle East,,24 the work of Mary Ann Tetreault "Stories of 
Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait,£5 and the work of Anh 
Nga Longva, especially her book" Walls built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and 
Society in Kuwait".26 
As pointed by Longva citizenship can be viewed not merely as a legal status 
entailing a set of formal rights and responsibilities, but as a vehicle for 
nationalism and a focus for defining national identity.27 Citizenship law in Kuwait 
is not used or practised in order to guarantee equality of the members of the 
community and guarantee their political, civil and social rights. Its primary 
function is determining who is included and/or excluded from being active in 
political life. In this sense, it emphasises, in contrast to the conventional 
meaning of the concept, not universality but particularistic criteria of social 
membership. 
22 Bryan S. Turner. " Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship" in Bryan. S. Turner (ed.). 
Citizenship and Social Theory. (London: Sage, 1993). p.6-16. 
23 Tetreault, 2000, op.cit. p.23. 
24 Nils A. Butenschon. (ed.) Citizenship and the State in the Middle East; approaches and Applications. 
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000). 
25 Mary Ann Tetreault. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. op.cit. 
26 Anh Nga Longva. Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion. and Society in Kuwait. (Boulder. 
Colorado: Westview Press. 1997). 
'27 Long\,J. Anh Nga "Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice." In Nils A. 
Butenschon. (ed.) Citizenship and the State in the Middle East; approaches and Applications. (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2000).p.179. 
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Citizenship concept in Kuwait takes on a very important function as a unifying 
force among those considered by law Kuwaitis and those who are excluded. 
Also citizenship law from the start emphasised social rights of Kuwaitis over 
their political rights. The political rights that the Kuwaitis enjoy are severely 
restricted by the state, while their entitlement to social benefits is extensive. 
However, these are provided by the state as part of the unwritten contract, 
whereby the state provides huge benefits in return for loyalty to al Sabah. This 
is also underpinned by the fact that Kuwaitis do not pay taxes. They enjoy huge 
benefits without any formal obligations except allegiance to the ruling family. 
These benefits include free education, free health care, free housing, generous 
subsidies to essential services such as water, and electricity as well as to basic 
foodstuff. In addition, there is also employment of its citizens in the public 
sector. To some scholars, this unwritten contract provides the basis for the 
adoption of the concept of a "rentier" state to describe the Gulf States and to 
connect the lack of democracy to oil wealth.28 These Gulf States were seen as 
being separated from society and their autonomy was greatly enhanced by their 
access and control of huge oil surpluses.29 Despite the popularity of the concept 
it fails to account for pressures from below and demands for political 
liberalisation, as well as it fails to explain the high levels of regulation, 
repression and control by the state in these societies. Thus, this contract is not 
a simple, straightforward, exchange of loyalty for benefits. However, as this 
study will show, it did help to maintain the dominance of al Sabah over the 
legislative and limited the scope of action of the opposition to a great extent. 
In this context Butenschon's emphasis on the significance of citizenship with 
regard to the distribution of power and the nature of political institutions in a 
country, and how the founding principles of states are expressed more widely in 
certain patterns of citizenship policies is very useful to understanding Kuwaiti 
political process than the rentier approach.3o Butenschon explains that 
citizenship approach 
28 Rex Brynen and Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble. (ed). Political Liberalization and Democratization in 
the Arab World. ( Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). 
~9 Ibid. 
30 Nils A. Butenschon. "State. Power, and Citizenship in the Middle East, a Theoretical Introduction." In 
Nils A. Butenschon. (ed.) Citizenship and the State in the Middle East; approaches and Applications. 
(New York: Syracuse University Press. 2000).p.5. 
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allows us to unveil important aspects of the architecture of power-
relations between rulers and ruled and to analyse the logic of these 
relations... Citizenship is a major institutional control mechanism 
that regulates the distribution of rights and obligations in a society, 
including access to decision making arenas and state-controlled 
economic resources. 31 
The strategy adopted by Kuwait towards building state identity depended on 
limiting the acquisition of citizenship by migrants and differentiating between 
"original" and naturalised citizens. The naturalisation process is rigorously 
controlled, in addition to restricting the rights of naturalised citizens. 
Naturalisation grants the individual rights, including civil service employment, 
property ownership and access to welfare benefits, but simultaneously they are 
not allowed the right to vote for any representative body until twenty years after 
the acquisition of their citizenship. They are also ineligible for any nomination or 
appointment to a representative body or a ministerial position.32 Democracy in 
Kuwait is dubbed as the "democracy of the few", where nationals represent only 
30 percent of the population and only a mere ten percent have the right to full 
political participation.33 
The result of this particular legal frame of political participation, after four 
decades of experimenting with parliamentary democracy, emphasises not on 
citizens' allegiance to the state and a sense of common citizenship among all 
Kuwaitis, but on sub-statal affiliations, loyalties, and attachments with serious 
consequences on the development of democracy and establishing the genuine 
unity of society. These divisions exist along-side the major sharp division 
between the migrant community, who represent the majority of the labour force 
in Kuwait, and the whole Kuwaiti community. The Kuwaitis for fear of losing 
their prominence and dominance have resisted the integration and 
31 Ibid. 
:12 Heather Deegan. The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1993).p.ll. 
3:1 Khaldun Al-Naqib. (al-Naqeeb. Khaldhun). Sira' al-gabila wa al-dimugratiya: halat al-kuwavt. (The 
Conflict between Tribalism and Democracy: the case of Kuwait). London: Dar al-saqi. 1996).167. 
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naturalisation of the migrants who are treated socially, economically and 
politically as a totally separate community. 
The presence of this very large migrant community has made the question of 
identity and citizenship become very central to the politics of Kuwait and has 
been used to provide the Kuwaitis with a special sense of being "Kuwaitis". 
However, that special Kuwaiti identity is mostly manifested in relation to the 
migrant community, while the Kuwaitis firstly identify with their traditional 
affiliations, so this actually fractures the cohesion of their community along 
several lines. The badulhadhar, the SunniIShi'ite, Arab/Persian and lastly, but 
not least, is the division between the rulers and the ruled; al Sabah versus the 
rest of the Kuwaitis. Divisions in the Kuwaiti community also run along gender 
lines. Women are still excluded from formal political participation through the 
denial of their right to vote. Economic divisions along class lines are naturally 
present and a huge gap exists among the various social groups and between 
these and the al Sabah family. Nonetheless, some of these economic 
inequalities have been mitigated by the welfare state with its very generous 
benefits for Kuwaiti citizens. 
The I raqi invasion in 1990 accentuated the major division between the two 
sharply contrasted communities; the migrant community and the natural Kuwaiti 
community, which lead to the expulsion of a large community of Arab workers. 
They were accused, especially the Palestinians were targeted for siding with 
Saddam Hussein. In addition, the differentiation among the Kuwaiti community 
of the hadhar and the badu has become deeper. The Kuwaiti hadhar has 
accused tribal Kuwaitis of abandoning the country and seeking exile elsewhere, 
thus reinforcing the hadhar's claim that the badu have no loyalty to Kuwait itself, 
but only want to use the welfare state to their advantage. In light of the flight of 
the ruling family itself from Kuwait, during the occupation such a claim appeared 
to be totally unjustified. 
Historically, the hadharlbadu division stems from the very different life-styles 
and economic activities of city dwellers and nomads. The political relevance of 
this difference has been on the decline in light of the active involvement of the 
Kuwaiti state in the settlement and integration of the badu as a significant 
1.+ 
economic, social and political actor, by granting them citizenship and citizens 
rights. However, the political relevance of tribal affiliations and loyalties is still 
considerable, especially with their impact on the state structures and functions. 
Today's division of badu/ hadhar does not refer to the two different life styles but 
to the two specifically separate types of electorate. The term badu directly 
pOints to the elected representatives of constituencies with an exclusive tribal 
population, while the term hadhar refers to the old urbanite constituencies. 34 
The integration and incorporation of Kuwaiti badu into state structures and 
functions, with the objective of boosting the legitimacy of al Sabah, led to the 
pOliticisation of this division which was manifested by the persistence of Kuwaiti 
hadhar in denying the Kuwaiti identity of the badu. The mass naturalisation of 
the badu has been perceived as having been motivated primarily by the 
purpose of undermining and keeping in check the urban commercial 
opposition.35 This very perception from the onset, created conflictual relations 
between the newly naturalised badu and the old urban power structure. 
The reluctance of Kuwaiti hadhar to accept the application of Kuwaiti identity 
and nationality for the badu, also relates to the fact that the actual term Kuwaitis 
was used to refer exclusively to the inhabitants of the town of Kuwait, while the 
Bedouin tribes were known by the names of their individual tribes or their tribal 
subdivisions. 36 The hadhar consider themselves above the badu and the 
leading social force in the development of Kuwait. This sense of importance 
and superiority is accompanied by a very specific attachment to the city of 
Kuwait, which stems from events that occurred in 1920. In that year, Ibn-Saud 
attacked Kuwait and for a period of two months, the Kuwaitis worked to build a 
wall around their city. For those Kuwaitis and their descendants who were 
involved in the protection of the city, an explicit "Kuwaiti awareness" emerged 
and they are the ones that today are considered as being fully fledged first-
category citizens. Their loyalty to Kuwait has never been disputed, while the 
34 Longva, op.ciLp.187. 
35 Shafeeq Ghabra. "Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-economic Change." Middle East Journal. 
(Vo1.15. No.3. 1997). p.366. 
36 Longva. op.cit. p.187. 
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loyalty of the Kuwaiti badu is constantly questioned and they are not seen as 
being equal.37 This factor, combined with the perception that al Sabah has used 
and manipulated the badu in order to control urban Kuwaitis, explains the partial 
and distorted view that is prevalent in the literature on Kuwaiti about the tribes' 
participation in Kuwaiti political life, which is indicated by much generalised 
statements which include: 
• "The badu are not real Kuwaitis. ,,38 
• "Giving citizenship to the badu in 1967 was a mistake.,,39 
• "Because of the badu, the progress of Kuwaiti democracy was held Up.,,40 
• "The badu are very loyal to the royal family, because of their cultural 
background which - as they claim - entails loyalty to the Shaikh of the 
tribe.,,41 
• "AI Sabah used the badu to attack the Kuwaiti national opposition.,,42 
• "The Islamists used the badu to attack the liberal opposition.,,43 
37 Ibid., p.187. 
38 Ahmad Daher and Faisal aI-Salem. "Kuwait's Parliamentary Elections." Journal of Arab Affairs. 
(Vo1.3.1984) p. 87. 
39See 'Abdullah AI-Nifisi. Al-kuwayt: al-ra'y al-'akhar. (Kuwait: the Other View). (London: Taha 
Advertising, 1978). p.28; and Shafiq AI-Ghabra. (Ghabra, Shafeeq). Al-kuwayt: dirasat fi a'liyat al-dawla 
al-qutriya wa al-sulta wa al-mujtama '. (Kuwait: a Study of Mechanism of the State, Government and 
Society). (Cairo: Markaz ibn khaldun, 1995). p.58. 
40Jasim Muhammad Karam. "Intikhabat al-majlis al-watani Ii'am 1990: dirasa fi al-jughrafiyha al-
siyasiya." (The Kuwait National Assembly 1990: a Study in Political Geography). Annals of the Faculty 
of Arts. V. 7 N. 150. (Kuwait: Kuwait University, 1996). p. 32. and see AI-Nifisi, op.cit. p. 7.+ 
41 See Karam, op.cit. p.66. and Daher, op.cit. p.93 . 
.j~ See AI-Ghabra op.cit.p.84. and Abdullah Kalifah AI-Shayeji. "Democratization in Kuwait: The 
National Assembly as a Strategy for Political survival." Ph. D, thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 
1988. p.208. 
43'Abdulmalik AI-Timimi. 'Abhath fi tarikh al-kuwayt. (Researches in Kuwait History). (Dar al-qurtas, 
1998). p.124. 
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Such statements and claims are a simplification of a very complex political 
environment where modern and traditional sets of values and systems of social 
relations interact and political divisions cut across the vertical (traditional 
attachments and ties) and horizontal stratification (ideology and class) of 
society, producing a political system governed by what al Naqeeb terms 
"political tribalism.,,44 This system ensures the domination of al Sabah by implicit 
control of society's major groups, especially by linking traditional groups to the 
state which deepens on the one hand the patron-client relation and on the other 
weakens loyalty to the state as a whole, and the nation/people at large.45 
The significance of such differentiations in Kuwaiti society can be witnessed in 
its effects on the development of political participation and democratic 
institutions in the country. In other words, it is the political implication and how 
the state overplays or underplays differentiations and/or manipulates them 
when is it important to do so, rather than just absorbing the mere presence of 
them. Societies of today are very complex and rarely homogenous thus, the 
question of how the various groups in a society, whether they are divided along 
tribal, racial, religious, ethnic or linguistic lines, participate in the politics and the 
running of the state becomes exceedingly important when dealing with Kuwait. 
Differentiations and divisions, in highly complex plural societies, can become so 
intense and so deepened that this can lead to violence and long term damage 
to that society. Examples of this include Lebanon, former Yugoslavia, and 
some African countries, where ethnic and tribal affiliations have led to civil wars 
and the killing of thousands of people. The situation in Kuwait is incomparable 
to these countries, but the tensions that might lead to violence are still present, 
just as they are in other Gulf States. Sometimes external factors playa major 
role in forcing dormant tensions into the open in a violent manner. The Iranian 
revolution in 1979 had such an impact that Kuwait suffered from a spout of 
political protests and violent attacks. The Shitite of Kuwait were galvanised by 
44 AI-Naqeeb. op.cit. p.18-20 . 
.j'i Nazih N Ayubi. Over-Stating the Arab World: Politics and Society in the Middle East. (London: LB. 
Tauris Publishers, 1995).p.240-::;·H. 
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the Iranian revolution into action against the prejudices and political 
marginalisation which they had suffered over many years. 
The same effect took place in Bahrain where it had suffered from the eruption of 
many riots and much violence due to the long-standing frustration and isolation 
of the Shi'ite population. To resolve that, Bahrain embarked on an ambitious 
movement of reforms, led by the Amir of Bahrain. He released all of Bahrain's 
political prisoners in preparation for a national referendum on a series of 
Significant political reforms. In addition, scores of opposition figures that lived in 
exile returned to Bahrain, foremost among them was Majeed al Alawi, who 
founded the Bahrain Freedom Movement in 1985.46 He is now part of a 12-
member committee dedicated to implementing the reforms. These reforms 
where approved by 99 percent of the population. They included the introduction 
of a two-chamber parliament by 2004 and an independent judiciary. In addition 
to this, women in Bahrain have been given the right to vote. Nevertheless, 
political parties remain banned and cabinet appointment is still authorised by 
the Amir.47 AI Khalifa's Sunni rule over a population of which 70 percent is 
Shi'ite is slowly taking a more partiCipatory path, aiming at reducing inequalities 
among the various social groups of the society. These reforms are very 
significant to occur in Bahrain, after many years of civil strife, which has definite 
implications to other Gulf States in the area. 
The useful manipulation of traditional affiliation and society's diversity to 
enhance the relevance of the ruling families to state power has not been 
exclusive to al Sabah in the Arab region. Other Gulf monarchies, such as the 
Saudi monarchy, manipulate a number of internal cleavages. There are 
regional divisions between the Najdis and the Hijazis, the fraternal divisions 
within the extended Saudi royal family and the presence of a large migrant 
community.48 As in Kuwait, immigration is the greatest political challenge facing 
Saudi Arabia. This is not only because of severe economic dependency on 
46 Robin Gedya. The Sunday Telegraph. July, 22, 200l. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Alan Richards and John Waterbury. A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class, and 
Economic Development. (Boulder: Westview Press. 1990). p.320-322. 
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foreign workers, but because of the legitimacy problem of denying citizenship 
rights and benefits for these migrants, especially the Arabs and Muslims among 
them. 
Outside the Gulf, the late King Hussein of Jordan was extremely successful in 
using the cleavage between the majority of the Palestinian population and a 
largely Bedouin minority in order to perpetuate his rule.49 This cleavage has 
dominated the politics of the state of Jordan and played a huge role in 
undermining the development of democracy in the country. The monarchy in 
Morocco has, over the years, succeeded in representing itself as the final 
protector of the variety of interests in the country; political parties against 
military intervention, the military against civilian ineptness, the Berbers against 
the Arabs and the Jews against the Muslims.50 
In Arab states, although the rhetoric over the years has focused on creating 
unity and solidarity, the result has been the persistence and promotion of 
socially familiar and divisive forms of association such as the family, the clan, 
tribe and sect. What these authoritarian states have been successful in is 
breeding social particularities and segmenting the cleavages to the detriment of 
the potential development of democratic institutions and by avoiding any 
meaningful political participation. 51 This makes the restructuring of the 
modalities of governance very difficult, since the chances of arriving at a 
consensus and/or cooperation and accommodation in such a fragmented 
political environment is very limited in the short term. A case in point is the 
inability of Kuwait to do this, after the liberation of Kuwait and the rallying of 
Kuwaitis behind the ruling family that was unable to protect its citizens and the 
country. 
49 Ibid .. p.320. 
50 Ibid., p.320. 
51 Augustus Richard Norton. (ed.) Civil Society in the Middle East. (New York: E. 1. Brill. 1995).p.6. 
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1.4.2 Model of Democracy 
There are varied conceptions and models of democracy with their underlying 
ideologies and implications on the state, society, and citizen. These different 
models can be summarised as being direct democracy, radical democracy, 
guided democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy, and Constitutional 
democracy.52 
Constitutional democracy has been adopted in countries where intense and 
deep divisions exist and where an overarching loyalty to maintain the cohesion 
of the society is absent. Lebanon is an example from the Arab region where 
Constitutional democracy was practised with relative success since its 
independence in 1943 until the outbreak of civil war in 1975. The Lebanese 
society is divided between Christians and Muslims who, in turn, are divided into 
Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians and Sunni and Shiite Muslims, in 
addition to smaller sects most of which are either Christian or Islamic. The 
principles of Constitutional democracy were in operation during that period 
(1943-1975) through a grand coalition of all segments of society, proportional 
representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto. The major weakness 
was the inflexibility of the system, by its preset segmental allocation of high 
offices and electoral proportionality which did not allow for an adjustment in the 
workings of the system to take into account the loss of the majority status of the 
Christians in favour of the Muslims.53 
The social, confessional and economic divisions of the Lebanese society were 
further aggravated by the presence of Palestinian refugees and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation. Thus a highly complex domestic, regional and 
international environment intensified forces of divisiveness and led to a total 
break down of the regime in 1975. The system today, in recovery of nearly two 
decades of civil war, still operates on a confessional basis, representing all 
major segments: The 128 parliamentary seats are allocated to all of the 
5~ Robert Pinkney. Democrac\' in the Third World. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).p.5. 
53 Arend Lijphart. Democrac\' in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration. (New Heaven: Yale 
University Press. 1977).p.l'+7-150. 
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confessional groups. The only difference is that, based on the al Ta'if 
agreement of 1989, there is parity in the confessional formula between Muslims 
and Christians. 54 
It is, thus, crucial to deal with ethnic divisions through developing appropriate 
democratic practices and democratic institutions in order to accommodate and 
to mitigate them, before they erupt into violence and war. The factors that affect 
the eruption of cleavages into violence and war, include cleavage structure, a 
large number of cleavages, the degree of fragmentation that they cause, the 
types and intensities of cleavages, the counter effects of overarching loyalties 
and more so, the manner in which segmental cleavages and the political system 
relate. 55 In many cases it is this last factor that can be divisive. 
Although the situation in Kuwait may not be comparable to Lebanon, Rwanda, 
former Yugoslavia etc .. the divisions and differentiation among the Kuwaitis has 
been manipulated and overplayed by the rulers in order to maintain their 
dominance. The political system reproduces differences and inequalities and 
emphasises them, hence the persistence of the tension between the Kuwaiti 
badu and the Kuwaiti hadhar, the Sunni and the Shi'ite, the merchants and 
labourers, and last but not least, between the ruling family and the ruled. The 
politics of citizenship has been the mechanism through which traditional 
loyalties and inequalities among the members of the community have been 
maintained. 
The definition that this study adopts for democracy stems from the liberal 
democracy model that Kuwait has adopted since its independence in 1962. In 
attempting to define this type of democracy one can say it provides: a 
functioning participatory political system in which people vote regularly and 
meaningfully, where the freedom to speak is protected and where the rights of 
the individual enjoy significant respect. 56 
S4 Saad Eddin Ibrahim. "Crises, Elites. and Democratization in the Arab World." Middle East journal. 
Voll7. Spring 1993. p. 298. 
SS L" h . 71 IJP art, Op.Clt. p. . 
56 . 1 
. Norton. Op.Clt. p.~. 
21 
Despite the limited success of Kuwait's adoption of a liberal democracy it 
remains the model that Kuwaitis can build on to limit the autocratic nature of the 
rule of al Sabah, partly because some of the necessary elements for the 
functioning of this model already exist, albeit in a limited and controlled form. A 
parliamentary tradition guaranteed by a Constitution and an experience in 
elections, as well as a variety of civil associations actively involved in promoting 
a democratic life. If anything, liberal democracy offers a contrast to 
authoritarian autocratic rule and provides a check on the excess of corruption, 
and involves the absence of political repression.57 Kuwaitis have shown that 
they are committed to liberal democracy and have understood its benefits. 
However, the fear of al Sabah of losing dominance and control has been a 
major obstacle that needs to be overcome if the representative system of 
Kuwait as it is envisioned in the Constitution is to become established in the 
political life of the country. 
The desire of Kuwaitis for representation and accountability has been a major 
feature of political life in Kuwait and this desire is one that is shared with Arabs 
across the region. The nineties had brought certain changes in the region and 
as indicated by Nonneman there is a concesus emerging among a number of 
academics writing on the Middle east that 
1. the discourse of democracy and pluralism has become widespread, 
although a clear distinction have been made between dimuqratiyya 
(democracy) and ta'addudiya (pluralism) with the latter becoming more 
prevalent. 58 
2. that there is no such thing as an overarching Arab-Islamic political 
culture that prevents the emergence of democracy.59 He stresses that 
there is no inherent reason why Islam and social system should be 
57 p' k . 3 In ney. Op.Clt. p .. 
58 Gerd Nonneman "State of the Art. Rentiers and Autocrats. Monarchs and Democrats. State and 
S(h:iety: the Middle East between Globalization. Human 'Agency', and Europe." International Affairs. 
( 77.1,2001) p.144. 
59 Gerd Nonneman (ed.) Political and Economic Liberalization, Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative 
Perspective. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).p.58. 
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incompatible with a political system that incorporates the essence of a 
democratic system: representation and accountability.50 
3. Significant changes took place in the Middle east either driven by 
pressure from below due to state failure, financial crisis and effects of 
globalisation-induced economic reform or external pressures and in 
some cases due to voluntary reform from above to maintain or establish 
legitimacy. 51 
These observations illustrate a gradual move away from the authoritarian 
regimes that have dominated the Arab region, although the path is still long and 
unpredictable. Nonetheless, as noted by Nonneman there is certain optimism 
associated with the contrast between increasing economic burdens and political 
aspirations on the one hand and regimes' relative declining resources and 
international pressures on the other to permit more space for liberalisation in the 
region. 62 
1.5 Methodology of the Study 
The study shall focus on analysing the functioning of the National Assembly and 
its relations with al Sabah during the period between 1963-1996 in order to 
illustrate the mechanisms used by al Sabah to maintain their power vis a vis the 
Kuwaiti society and the tensions and dynamics between the various political 
groups in society and al Sabah. The analysis shall be divided into the historical 
periods of the life of the National Assembly starting with the first stage of 
parliamentary life covering the period of 1963-1976. That period was 
interrupted in 1976 by the first suspension of the National Assembly which 
lasted until 1981. The second stage is concerned with the period between 
1981-86, which started with the restoration of the National Assembly and ended 
with its second supension. The third period focuses on the post-liberation 
period and the restoration of the National Assembly in 1992. In addition, further 
60 Nonneman. State of Art, op.cit, p.14.+. 
61 Ibid. p.l.+.+- 1.+). 
62 Nonneman, Political and Economic Liberalization, op.cit. p.59. 
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analysis will cover the periods when parliamentary life was suspended and how 
politics was pushed into the protected spaces, such as the diywaniwa, which 
has a particular valve in the political life of Kuwaiti as a substitute to public 
political space. 
This research is a historical/political investigation that was aided by consulting 
three types of primary sources of information and data, the proceedings of the 
National Assembly, Kuwaiti Newspapers such as al Watan, al Qabas, and al 
Seyassah and conducting interviews with several key people. The interview is 
a practical method of collecting information that allows access to many different 
groups and different types of information. Its major benefits are summarised as 
follows: 
Using as data what the respondent says about himself or herself 
potentially offers the social researcher access to a vast storehouse of 
information. The social researcher is not limited to what he or she 
can immediately perceive or experience, but is able to cover as many 
dimensions and as many people as resources permit.63 
There are some disadvantages in using the interview method, such as 
information may be neither valid nor reliable and respondents may give 
inaccurate information or may lack the information that is required. The 
researcher himself may influence the situation and the direction of the interview. 
However, despite such limitations, the method still remains to be a very 
important source of data that provides access to what people know and how 
they account for their problems, experiences, etc. 
There are two types of interviews: the structured interview, and the unstructured 
interview. The structured interview is more like a questionnaire. The 
interviewer reads a list of questions, which the interviewee answers. The 
unstructured interview is more like a conversation, with no pre-set questions. In 
social research most interviews fall in between these two extremes and are 
classified as semi-structured interviews.54 The semi-structured interview style 
was used in this research, since it allows flexibility and has the ability to gather 
63 Michael Haralambos and Marin Holborn. Sociology: Themes and Perspectives. (London: Collins 
Educational. 1991).p.737. 
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information that is more detailed while, at the same time, it provides an overall 
frame for the questions that need to be asked. 
The list of interviewees included Dr. Abdul-Muhsan al Mad'aj, a member of the 
National Assembly and previous Minister of Oil, Dr. Rashid al Sana' and Dr. 
Ghanim al Najjar, lecturers at Kuwait University, 'Aaydh al Barazi, editor in al 
Dosstor newspaper, Abdulhadi al Ajmi, a Kuwaiti historian, and Mohammad al 
Hajeri, Abdulaziz al Mansor, Mutib Falah, Sultan al Nasser and Faheed Nasser 
and others. 
Other sources of information, were also consulted, which included secondary 
sources, such as Arabic and English books that relate to the topic as well as 
unpublished material including doctoral theses. 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
This study consists of eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the research 
problem, the main contention of the research and the research objectives. 
Research methodology and the conceptual frame that underpins the work are 
also discussed, in addition to the structure of the research. Chapter Two 
provides a historical background to the development of the Kuwaiti state with 
the objective of highlighting the issues that are of relevance to the investigation 
of the research. These issues include the three main factors that contributed to 
the emergence of Kuwait becoming as a significant state in the Gulf area: the 
rise of al Sabah, the early merchants of Kuwait and the extension of the British 
protectorate over Kuwait. 
Chapter Three analyses firstly the main features of the representative system in 
Kuwait, as it is stipulated in the Constitution. The work then moves on to 
discuss, in detail, the citizenship law and its implications in terms of 
inclusion/exclusion and also how the very restrictive nature of the law serves to 
bolster the legitimacy of al Sabah by giving Kuwaiti nationality a very special 
status granted only to the very few. Within this context, the mass naturalisation 
of the badu aimed at widening the base of al Sabah's legitimacy, became a 
64 Ibid .. p.73~-735. 
controversial subject and led to the politicisation of the Kuwait division of the 
hadhar/badu sections of society. This process and its implications on the 
political process in Kuwait shall be analysed. It will be followed by a discussion 
that contrasts the inclusion of the badu in the political process with the exclusion 
of a large segment of the population of Kuwait, which is categorised as Bidoon 
(without nationality), from acquiring full citizenship - although they are employed 
in state structures: mainly in the army, security forces and the police. The 
Chapter will also deal with the election law and how it distributed election 
districts in accordance to religious, ethnic and tribal lines, which produced a 
fragmented assembly with deputies who are tied to very restricted interests. 
This situation gives the ruling family an ability to play one group against off the 
other, in order to prevent the emergence of any viable and effective opposition. 
Chapter Four deals with the first stage of the parliamentary experience of 
Kuwait, covering the period of 1963-1976, during which time four National 
Assemblies were elected. The functioning of these assemblies will be assessed 
with their relationship with al Sabah. The various political groups that emerged 
during that period and their impact on political life in Kuwait will also be 
assessed. 
The year 1976 saw the first suspension of the National Assembly, which lasted 
for five years. This event shall be discussed in Chapter Five with the objective 
of investigating the failure of the Constitutional mechanisms of checks and 
balances between the executive and the legislature which should be at the 
heart of the proper functioning for any parliamentary system. The discussion 
shall include analysing the regional and domestic political context of the 
suspension and its aftermath. The Chapter will also analyse the role of 
Diwanniyya during the absence of the assembly, and its significance to general 
political life in Kuwait. 
Chapter Six deals with the second phase of the parliamentary experience, 
between 1981-1986. The Chapter analyses the decision of al Sabah to restore 
the assembly and call for election against the background of its failed attempt to 
amend the Constitution in a manner that would have further undermined the 
legislative body. However, al Sabah managed to revise the election law and the 
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new amendments seemed to bolster the support of al Sabah in the assembly 
and weakened the representation of any opposition group. This, and the 
election for the fifth assembly shall be analysed. In addition to the relationship 
between the assembly and the executive the research will focus on the issues 
that dominated the debates of the assembly. Despite the rising tension 
between the assembly and executive, the election for the sixth assembly was 
held as scheduled. However within a short period of time, this relationship 
deteriorated to the extent that al Sabah opted for a second indefinite 
suspension of the entire assembly. 
Chapter Seven deals with the period following the second suspension of the 
assembly until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. After the end of the Iran-
I raq war in 1988 a struggle ensued between al Sabah and what developed into 
a pro -democracy movement, in order to restore the National Assembly. 
Despite the strength of this movement as the discussion shall reveal, al Sabah 
opted to create a consultative council to replace the constitutionally guaranteed 
assembly, and they were successful in holding the elections for that council. 
The Iraqi invasion on August 2, 1990 put a halt to this attempt by al Sabah to by 
- pass the National Assembly. 
Chapter Eight focuses on the period of post-liberation and includes a discussion 
of the assembly that was elected in 1992. This period is of particular interest to 
the study since it confirms that al Sabah, despite their inability to protect the 
country and the Kuwaiti citizens, were still considered a legitimate political force 
that Kuwaitis could rally behind. Although al Sabah returned to Kuwait to face 
a new reality and answer many questions, and were forced by the demands of 
Kuwaiti citizens to restore the Constitution and the assembly, their desire to 
retain power remained unchanged. The discussion will show how the power of 
the National Assembly vis a vis al Sabah, is still limited and no coherent and 
responsible opposition has materialised. Opposition politics is still fragmented 
on both vertical (segmented loyalties and attachments) and horizontal (ideology 
and class) lines. It can be argued that this only serves the autocratic durability 
of the al Sabah family's rule. The prospects of the development of true 
democratic practices and institutions in Kuwait will be assessed in the 
conclusion of the study. 
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Chapter Two 
Historical Background of the Development of the Modern State of 
Kuwait 
2.1 Introduction 
The development of Kuwait from the second half of the eighteenth century until its 
independence from Britain in June 1961, has been determined by three main 
factors. These are the settlement of the area by al 'Utub, a group of families that 
are known to be derived from the 'Aniza tribe; the emergence of the merchant 
community as the most significant economic social group, and the extension of 
l 
British protectorate over the area. The aim of this chapter is to analyse these 
determining historical factors and assess the roots of the present day debate 
concerning problems of identity, citizenship and the relation between the state and 
the different social groups of the Kuwaiti society. 
The prevalence of traditional forms of identity: tribe, family, religion and kinship are 
deeply rooted in the political system due to the underdevelopment of state 
democratic institutions since Kuwait's early formative years. This differentiation 
and segmentation of the society along traditional lines serves mostly the al Sabah 
family, since that increases their relevance to the system and makes them the 
unifying force of the society and the source of stability. Moreover, the protection of 
the interests of al Sabah and Britain meant setting limits on the political demands 
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of the other social groups in the society while maintaining a political system whose 
essential features stem from traditional-tribal forms of political organisation. That 
entailed using namely the open maji/s (council) as the point of contact between 
ruler and ruled, and the recognition of the Ruler as the father figure who mediates 
between the various groups but remains above them all. When the merchant 
community attempted to challenge and change this organisation, it was dealt with 
swiftly and autocratically by al Sabah. The situation remained unchanged until the 
independence of Kuwait and the promulgation of a Constitution that guaranteed a 
representaive system of government. 
The first section of this chapter concentrates on discussing the rise of al Sabah as 
the dynastic family that have ruled Kuwait since al 'Utub settled in Kuwait around 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. In essence the development of the polity 
of Kuwait is synonymous with the growth in power and wealth of al Sabah family 
supported by the 'Utub merchant families, and Britain. The second section 
discusses the power of the merchants and their two attempts in 1921 and 1938 to 
curtail the power of al Sabah and establish a formal political process where power 
is shared between them. The traditional method of consultation became 
unsatisfactory to these merchants and they aspired towards a more direct 
participation in running state affairs. The discussion will show the resistance of al 
Sabah to such a change and a willingness to fight to prevent such an eventuality. 
Section three deals with the badu, their settlement and relation to al Sabah. The 
tribes of the area were a major source of support for al Sabah since the 
recruitment of the personal guards of the ruling family and the core of the security 
force and men in arms came from among these tribes. Thus from the onset, the 
badu were heavily dependent on al Sabah and their loyalty was a useful protection 
against any possible activism on the part of the influential merchant community. 
However, they were excluded from the political system and had no rights to run or 
elect for government councils. That situation only changed in the 1960's. 
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The role Britain played in the consolidation of al Sabah rule and the maintenance 
of a territorially independent Kuwait especially from I raq and Saudi Arabia is very 
relevant to this historical background. Thus section four focuses on this issue in 
particular, while section five deals with the initial impact of oil on the rule of al 
Sabah and the development of Kuwait. Oil revenues not only changed the 
dynamics of the relation between al Sabah and the merchant community, but 
changed the whole dynamics of Kuwaiti society by creating a minority status of 
Kuwaitis within their own county with the huge influx of Arab and foreign migrants, 
thus making the issue of identity and citizenship central and detrimental in the 
maintenance of al Sabah rule. 
2.2 The Rise of AI Sabah 
The exact date of the founding of Kuwait is not an established historical fact due to 
the lack of any reliable histortcal sources on the matter. The only available source 
is some local narratives, which indicate its being founded in the late 17th century 
and early 18th century. Furthermore, the dates mentioned are some times 
contradictory and controversial. The Kuwaiti historian, al Rashid, believes that 
Kuwait was founded toward the end of the seventeenth century without specifying 
a date. 1 On the other hand Sheikh Yusuf al Qana'i states that Kuwait was settled 
in 1688.2 Others, such as the Bahraini historian al Nabhani and the Iraqi historian 
Ibn Sanad, specify other dates. The Bahraini claims it was settled in 1611 while 
the Iraqi reports that it was in 1800.3 Therefore, no final date has yet been agreed 
upon by all historians. 4 
I, Abdul'aziz AI-Rashid. Tarikh al-kuwayt. (The History of Kuwait). (Kuwait: Maktabat aJ-saJasil, 1995). 
p.lO. 
2Yusuf AI-Qana 'i. Safahat min tarikh al-kuwayt. (pages from the Kuwait History). ( Kuwait: Maktabat al-
salasil, 1987).p.ll. 
3 Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima. Tarikh al-kuwayt. (The History of Kuwait). (Kuwait: Maktabat hukumat al-
kuwayt, 1967). p.100. 
4 Ibid., p.1 00. 
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Although the exact date of Kuwait's foundation is not known, historians agree that 
it was founded by the Bani Khaled tribe, who had dominated eastern Arabia from 
the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century. Kuwait was built as a summer 
resort for the Bani Khaled Sheikhs. Thus, when al Sabah arrived in Kuwait the 
Sheikh of Bani Khaled was able to provide them with protection and gave them the 
fort and surrounding areas. 
AI Sabah belonged to the al 'Utub clan who emigrated from Najd in central Saudi 
Arabia during the first half of the eighteenth century and settled in Kuwait. The 
emigration of al 'Utub was part of the great emigration of al 'Aniza tribe due to the 
continuous drought and lack of food that brought them first to Qatar. Then they 
scattered in different parts of the Gulf before they eventually settled in Kuwait. AI 
Qana'i indicates that their migration to Kuwait was gradual because after leaving 
Qatar, they were dispersed in different lands .... they then began arriving in Kuwait 
and were followed by a lot of other people, Arabs and Persians. 5 It is during this 
period of migration that al 'Utub families shifted their economic activities from 
nomadic to sedentary ones and learned fishing, pearling and other trades. 
The historian Abu Hakima attributes the rise of al 'Utub and their successful 
building of a new settlement in Kuwait to three main reasons. Firstly, Kuwait was 
located on the trading caravan road between central Arabia, Iraq, and the 
Mediterranean. The commercial activities of the European trading companies in 
the Persian Gulf encouraged Kuwait to engage in maritime trade. Secondly, all the 
big powers were absent while Kuwait's neighbours, Persia and Ottoman Iraq were 
too weak to disrupt its growth. Persia was pre-occupied with internal strife and 
external intervention, while the Ottomans in Iraq had constant warfare with Persia 
and other Arab tribes in the area. Thirdly, the power and protection of the Bani 
s AI-Qana'i. op.cit. p.15. 
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Khaled provided al Sabah and their relatives with the opportunity to rise and grow 
without interruption from other tribal powers in the area. 6 
Kuwait also benefited from the Persian occupation of Basra between 1775-1779 
by the opening of close relations between Britain and Kuwait. The mail of the 
British East India Company from the Gulf to Aleppo began to be sent from Kuwait. 
In addition the company transferred its regional offices to Kuwait and its trading 
activities passed through Kuwait. Another major benefit was the migration of a 
number of Basra merchants whose trading activities were undermined by the 
occupation. 7 
The weakening of the authority of Bani Khaled over Kuwait gave al 'Utub the 
opportunity to cement their power in Kuwait. Inter-tribal disputes about succession 
as well as its continued disputes with al Saud slowly undermined the authority of 
Bani Khaled. In addition their main office which was at al Hasa (east of Riyadh) 
was subjected to a series of tribal and Ottoman incursions. In 1795 Bani Khaled's 
power ended after a decisive battle between them and al Saud at al Hasa.8 
The manner in which the al 'Utub organised themselves to establish their new 
settlement has helped immensely in the rise of al Sabah as the undisputed Ruler 
of the area. The three main divisions of the al 'Utub: the al Sabah, the al Jalahima 
and al Khalifa agreed to divide between them the responsibilities of administering 
the new settlement. AI Sabah were given the functions for government, al Khalifa 
the responsibility for commercial affairs and al Jalahimia the control of maritime 
affairs. This division reflected the strength of each one and facilitated the growth 
of the area. AI Sabah are believed to have had good relations with the tribes of the 
area and were known for their skills in negotiation and mediation, essential 
6 Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima. History of Eastern Arabia: The Rise and Development of Bahrain and 
Kuwait. (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), p. 26. & Ahmad Abdullah Saad Baz. "Political Elite and Political 
Development in Kuwait." Ph. D thesis, George Washington University, 1981. p. 39-40. 
7 Abdulrasoul Al-Moosa. "Bedouin Shanty Settlement in Kuwait" Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1976. 
p.8. 
8 Baz, op.cit. p. 37, 
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ingredients for the building of their new settlement. Thus, it appeared expedient 
that the 'Utub families chose Sabah bin Jabir, leader of al Sabah family, as the 
Sheikh of the new settlement. As aptly put by Ismael: 
Irrespective of the personal qualities attributed to him, however, the 
importance of relations with the tribes in the area must be considered as 
primary in the light of the eclipSing role of the Bani Kh a lid. The very 
survival of Kuwait depended upon relations with the tribes. First, the 
community depended upon the tribesmen for the production of basic 
necessities, second, Kuwait required protection against perennial tribal 
raiding. No longer protected by Bani Khalid power, Kuwait required a 
sheikh both respected and feared for the number of tribesmen he could 
call into arms in an emergency. Third, the labour for pearling, fishing, 
and commerce was supplied by the tribes. Apparently, unlike many of 
the 'Utubi families whose interests turned toward the sea (and whose 
ties with the Bedouins consequently diminished), the al Sabah family 
remained oriented toward the desert, apparently based on their interest 
in the active caravan trade between Aleppo and the Gulf. They 
continued an active relationship with the Bedouin tribes, camping out 
with them regularly and marrying from among them.9 
By the middle of the eighteenth century the authority of Sheikh Sabah was well 
established. It was he who in the early 1760's ordered the building of a mud wall 
around the town of Kuwait to protect it against outside attacks. 10 This event 
became a watershed in the definition and the debate over citizenship and the 
hadhar/ badu subdivisions. Those outside the wall were primarily the badu of the 
area, who have been seen by those who lived within the boundary of the wall that 
they are outsiders not and entitled to gaining a Kuwaiti nationality. Adding to this 
9 Jacqueline S Ismael. Kuwait, Social Change in Historical Perspective. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1982). p. 27. 
10 Suhail K Shuhaiber. "Political Development in Kuwait, Continuity and Change in an Arab Independent Gulf 
State." Ph. D thesis, University of Oxford. 1981. p.8. 
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problem is the attribution of the name of the original town of Kuwait to the state of 
Kuwait. This increased the feeling of the alienation of the badu from their being 
unable to identify with the name; while aggravating the possessiveness of urban 
Kuwaitis towards what they considered their own city with their active exclusion of 
the badu. 11 The fact that al Sabah saw the badu as a counter-force to the 
merchant community fuelled further the antagonism of urban Kuwaitis towards the 
badu being incorporated into the political system of Kuwait and treated as full 
fledged Kuwaitis in the later years. 12 
After the death of Sabah, his youngest son Abdullah was elected by the other 
'Utubi families as their leader mainly for his sense of justice, intelligence and 
readiness to consult the community on important matters. From then on al Sabah 
became the established rulers of Kuwait and began a tradition of electing the most 
suitable member of the family to rule, rather than choosing the eldest. 13 After a few 
years into the rulership of Abdullah the division of labour among the 'Utub 
community ended. In 1766 the AI-Khalifa family decided to leave Kuwait and settle 
in Zubara. Their departure has been attributed to two main reasons. The first was 
their desire to pursue wealth and become rich on a settlement of their own. The 
second was due to their dispute with Bani Ka'ab and their refusal to come to terms 
with the tribe as al Sabah's policy required. 14 
The departure of al Khalifa reduced the revenues of al Sabah who refused to 
share it with al Jalahima and eventually expelled them from the port and town of 
Kuwait. AI Sabah remained affiliated with other 'Utub merchant families, namely al 
Ghanim, al Saqar, al Khaled, al Badir, al Rumi, and al Saif. The cooperation of the 
Ruler and these merchants was vital to the growth and development of the area as 
well as the continuation of the al Sabah rule. Evidence to support this view is 
11 Interview with Abdulhadi AI-Ajrni, Kuwait, November, 2002 
12 Interview with Saltan AI Nassar. Kuwait, November, 2002 
IJ Shuhaiber. op.cit. p. 8. 
14 Ibid .. p.9. 
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illustrated by the fact that al Sabah following the departure of the al Khalifa family, 
al Sabah stopped sharing revenues with the merchants and instead collected a 
small duty of about one per cent on all imports. This shows the high value they 
placed on their authority and their willingness to forfeit economic for political 
power. 'S Keeping on good terms with the merchants was essential since the 
acceptance of the 'Utubi families of the Ruler was the basis of his legitimacy. In 
addition, the ruling family and the wealthy influential merchants were Sunni of 
'Utubi lineage and were dependent on each other. The merchants provided the 
funds and al Sabah and also the stability and security for the area. Therefore, the 
acceptance of the merchants and the Ruler's 'Ahd (promise) to rule justly and in 
accordance with the Islamic principle of Shura (consultation) became the two 
"essential elements" of rule in Kuwait. AI Rashid describes the way of governance 
in Kuwait at that time: 
From the day of Sabah the First until the time of Mubarak al Sabah, al-
hukm (the rule) continued to be one of shura. The ruler consults the 
notables on the important issues at hand particularly on how to 
safeguard the country against unexpected outside attacks, and has no 
choice but to accept their decisions since real authority rested with them 
and not with the ruler whom they only allowed to be their chief out of 
courtesy. 16 
The Sheikh based his decisions on both turf (Customary rules) and on shari'a 
(Islamic law) as well as seeking advice from a qadi (judge).17 Accessibility and 
public open discussion were carried out through the daily holding of the majilis. 
This political organisation is a reflection of the tribal organisation that was 
prevalent, whereby the tribal Sheikh is the head of the tribe and who is chosen due 
to certain necessary characteristics and qualities such as bravery, leadership, 
15 Ibid .. p.ll. 
16 AI-Rashid. op.cit. p.90. 
17 AI-Qana'i. op.cit. p. 31. & AI-Rashid. op.cit. p.90. 
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good mediation skills, and for being the fatherly figure to the whole tribe. The tribal 
Sheikh can not rule without consultation with the elder and more experienced 
tribesmen. The same applied to al Sabah ruler, the difference is the that Ruler, in 
this instance, needs to consult primarily the merchant community, which provides 
him with essential funds, while he in turn provides them with the stability and 
security to conduct their economic affairs. 
This way of governance characterised the early years of al Sabah rule until 
Mubarak al Sabah succeeded to take the rulership in 1896 by force after he 
assassinated his two brothers. Incidentally, two main tribes provided him with 
personal protection during this critical time, namely the Ajman and Rashaidah. This 
shocking incident of shedding family blood by a family member was never 
repeated in Kuwaiti history. The interesting thing is that the Kuwaiti prominent 
merchant families accepted Mubarak rulership in return for his promise that he will 
uphold justice and never take a decision without any consultation. 18 That indicates 
how essential the issue of power sharing and the stability of the Rulership were. 
Under Mubarak strong rule, Kuwait flourished and the population of the City 
doubled, and the wealth of its merchants increased substantially. The men-in-
arms grew to 25,000 tribesmen at the disposal of the Ruler protecting caravan 
routes and kept social order.19 However, Mubarak proved to be an autocratic ruler 
who departed from the al Sabah traditional manner of consultation with the 
merchant families and also departed from the mild level of taxation. He raised 
taxes substantially by raising customs duties on all imports and duties on exports 
as well as imposing a new tax on property.20 Mubarak's autocratic rule and 
extensive taxes made the merchants aware of their lack of political power and in 
1921 and 1938 they acted in order to change that position. Before discussing 
18 AI-Rashid, op.cit. p.149. 
19 Shuhaiber, op.cit. p.25. 
20 Ibid., p.25-26. 
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these two major events a brief analysis of the merchant community will be 
warranted. 
2.3 The Early Merchants of Kuwait 
The merchant community of Kuwait until the 1950's was dominated by about thirty 
or so of the al 'Utub families and their descendants. These merchants are a 
homogenous group; urban, Sunni and consider themselves the asil, the original 
settlers of Kuwait. 21 They intermarry and sometimes marry from the al Sabah 
family. Most importantly they see themselves on equal footing with al Sabah. The 
growth of the merchant community is attributed to several factors. Most important 
among them is Kuwait's strategic geographic position on a commercial caravan 
route between the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and Aleppo on the Mediterranean. 
Also the flourishing of maritime industries contributed significantly to the 
enrichment of the merchant community.22 In the pre-oil era these merchants were 
essential to the al Sabah family since they provided them with an income in the 
form of taxes and custom duties, and provided employment for the other social 
groups.23 
The economic power of the merchant families was also expressed in political terms 
since their acceptance of the Ruler was essential and the Ruler was bound to 
confer and consult with them on all major issues. The Councils of 1921 and 1938, 
in addition to the various governmental committees, were dominated by these 
influential families. Their pressing for political formal participation in the decision-
making process reveals an early political consciousness as an economic group as 
well as a socially and religiously cohesive community. From the early days they 
21 Jill Crystal. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). p. 37. 
" . 97 
-- Baz .. Op.Clt. p. . 
2.' Ibid., p. 98. 
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were differentiated from the rest of the social groupings of Kuwait, especially the 
Shi'ite and the badu. Both the Shnte and the badu were excluded from the 
electorate. However the relation between al Sabah and the badu was very close 
and they were the recruitment force for the leading families as labourers and for al 
Sabah as men in arms and the core of the security force. The Shi'ite on the other 
hand, had no direct access to the Ruler, only through his Secretary and were 
engaged mostly in local water-carrying trade. 24 The historical roots and the 
shaping of present day societal divisions and tensions can be clearly seen as early 
as the 1920's. 
Despite the privileged position of the merchants in the society, they became 
dissatisfied with informal consultation with the Ruler especially that Mubarak rule 
brought with it more taxation and less consultation. They began to press for a 
more formal institutionalised political participation to voice their concerns, limit the 
powers of al Sabah and protect their interests, as the following discussion shall 
show. It will also show the early appearance of the dilemma of al Sabah rule 
between maintaining an autocratic rule and opening up formal channels of political 
participation to its citizens. Similarities can be drawn between the early experience 
of the merchants in their two attempts to create Councils for sharing power with al 
Sabah and the post-independence experience of Kuwait for establishing a 
functioning representative system of government. These similarities can be 
summarised as the resistance of al Sabah to establishing and developing a formal 
and proper channel for effective sharing of power and the resort when under 
pressure to dissolution of such power sharing channels. 
2.3.1 The Consultative Council of 1921 
The sudden death in 1921, of Sheikh Salam, the successor of Mubarak, caused a 
succession problem. A group of prominent merchants seized the opportunity and 
submitted a handwritten petition to the ruling family that addressed the succession 
~~ Crystal. op.cit. pA0-41. 
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issue and pressed for political reforms. The petition included five main 
suggestions which were: 
1. The reform of the house of al Sabah so that no differences may occur in 
appointing the Ruler. 
2. The naming of three nominees for the office of Ruler: Sheikh Ahmad al 
Sabah, Sheikh Hamad al Mubarak and Sheikh 'Abdullah al Salim. 
3. Once the ruling family agrees on one of these three nominees, the decision 
then should be presented to the government (the British) for its 
endorsement. 
4. The appointed Ruler becomes the president of a Consultative Council, 
majlis shura. 
5. Members of the Council shall be elected from among al Sabah family and 
the people to administer the affairs of the country, with justice and fairness. 25 
The merchants with the last two suggestions evidently aimed at creating a formula 
for sharing power with al Sabah in a formalised form. AI Sabah became aware of 
the implications of these suggestions and rejected them. Nonetheless, a Council 
was formed of twelve members, headed by a leading merchant instead of the 
Ruler. In addition, Council members were restricted to wealthy elders who were 
chosen rather than elected and there was no representation from the ruling family. 
In other words al Sabah were willing to revert to the traditional way of allowing the 
merchants to advise but not to be directly involved in the government. The new 
Ruler, Sheikh Ahmad (the one chosen from among the three nominees by al 
~5 Shuhaiber. op.cit. p.52. 
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Sabah) during the offer of allegiance gave the people his word that he would not 
decide on any important issue without the Council's approval. 26 
According to al Qana'i, Sheikh Ahmad continued to hold consultation with the 
Council on important issues but these consultations were fruitless. That is 
because every member was convinced he was right, and no majority rule was 
enforced.27 The Council consequently rarely met and the Ruler reverted to the 
traditional practice of unorganised consultation just as his forefathers had done. AI 
Baz argues that: 
The demise of the 1921 council had not dissuaded Kuwaiti political 
activists from exerting more pressure upon Amir Ahmed. Over the 
years leading merchants became more and more dissatisfied with mere 
informal consultations with the Amir and at his own discretion, they once 
again directed their criticism against his autocratic rule and demanded 
some type of formal participation. Consequently, the 1930s witnessed 
more political activities and challenges to the regime than before.28 
J. Ismael confirms this point of view by noting that the previous pledge of Sheikh 
Ahmad to consult with the people gave opposition the basis on which to press on 
with their demands for formal political participation in running the affairs of the City. 
Ismael states that: 
The Amir1s pledge became the basis of the demand for parliamentary 
government as the society edged toward bankruptcy in the thirties as a 
result of process of underdevelopment. Bankruptcy, widespread poverty, 
government maladministration and corruption and the monopoly of the al 
2(1 Yusuf AI-Qana'i. Multaqatat al-hukm wa-al-fiqh wa-al-adab wa-al-tarikh. (The Collection: Rule, Doctrine, 
Literature, and History). (Kuwait: Maktabat al-salasil, 1970).p.20. 
27 Ibid., p.20. 
28 Baz. op.cit. p.116. 
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Sabah family on capital accumulation in a declining economy resulted in 
anti-government agitation and growing demands for social reform. 29 
Thus the unsuccessful attempt of leading merchants to be become formally 
involved in the running of the affairs of the City caused further tension and conflict 
between them and al Sabah and this led to the events of 1938. 
2.3.2 The Consultative Council of 1938 
The opportunity for Kuwaiti merchants and influential figures to press again for a 
formal channel of participation in the administration of the affairs of the formative 
state came about in 1934 when the first election for a municipal council took place. 
Elections for other councils such as the councils for education, health and awqaf 
also took place. However, disagreement and tension over the functions of this 
council surfaced between the ruling Sheikh and some council members. 30 These 
disaffected members formed in 1938 a secret society called The National Bloc, a/ 
Qut/ah al Wataniyah. Another reason that contributed to the wide spread 
disaffection among the merchant families was the prevalence of corruption, which 
was becoming evident in all areas of economic activities, at a time of severe 
economic decline.31 This was caused by the Saudi blockade, imposed since 1922, 
following the failure to reach an agreement on transit and import duties in addition 
to the decline of the pearl industry due to competition from Japanese cultured 
pearls and world economic depression. 32 The reforms in other parts of the Gulf 
especially in Bahrain and Dubai and the level of social and political development 
being achieved in Iraq motivated the Bloc to want to pursue a similar path in 
Kuwait. 
29 Ismael, op.cit. p.73. 
30 Baz, op.cit. p.117. 
31 Ibid .. p.1l7. 
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The programme of reforms of the National Bloc, which incidentally was printed in 
the Iraqi newspaper al Zaman, included demands for improvement in the provision 
of education and health, a stop to immigration of non-Arabs particularly Persians 
and the encouragement of the immigration of Arabs, and greater cooperation with 
Iraq.33 The National Bloc was approached by the British to ascertain their view and 
position on the rule of al Sabah. The Bloc assured the British that their intention is 
not to challenge the rule of al Sabah but they were seeking a representative 
government. After that the Bloc decided to act publicly and approached the 
Sheikh and requested the formation of a legislative council, to be made of the 
people of this country in order to supervise its affairs. 34 The British played a role in 
convincing the Sheikh to be flexible and accept the formation of the Council since 
they were initially in favour of some political reforms and the creation of a more 
representative government as long as it does not undermine their power. Also the 
regional context of emerging Iraqi and pan-Arab nationalism and Iraqi claims over 
Kuwait played a role in convincing the ruling family to allow for this partial opening 
up of political participation. 
An electorate was drawn from the heads of the top 150 most influential families. 35 
However, it excluded the Shi'ite sect of the population, the Persians and the badu. 
Consequently, the election for the Council resulted in the selection of twelve well-
established merchants and two well learned men. It is interesting to see that from 
the onset of formal political participation, there was a definite segmentation of the 
Kuwaiti society, dividing between those eligible to share in the state power and 
those were excluded from it. 
The Council's first task was the drafting of a Constitution. This draft was borrowed 
from the 1923 Egyptian Constitution. It included five articles, which gave the 
33 Ibid., p.56. 
34 Ibid., p.58. 
35 Crystal, op.cit. p.4 7. 
Council considerable rights in the administration of domestic and foreign policies. 
These articles state that; 
Article One: the people are the source of power represented by the Council of their 
elected representatives. 
Article Two: This enumerates the areas that the Council has to establish their laws: 
Law of the Budget, Law of Justice, Law of Public Security, Law of Education, Law 
of Public health, Law Improvements which basically deals with the infrastructure of 
the country, Law of Emergency which ensures public security in the event of an 
emergency. 
Article Three: The Council is the place of reference for all treaties, concessions, 
monopolies, and agreements, both internal and foreign. If any of these (Le. 
existing ones) have to be renewed, it shall not be considered to have become legal 
unless seen and approved by the Council. 
Article Four: As the state has no court of appeal, the powers of such a court will 
rest temporarily with the Council until such time as a special court is established 
for that purpose. 
Article Five: The president of the Council represents the executive authority in the 
State. 36 
As can be seen from the above mentioned articles this draft Constitution 
undermines the power of al Sabah by basing the source of political power in the 
hands of the people through their elected Council and by giving the Council wide 
ranging powers. Sheikh Ahmad refused to sign the document and did so only 
under due pressure from the British and his cousin Sheikh Abdullah al Salim who 
supported the idea of the Council from the very beginning. Abdullah's support of 
the National Bloc is attributed to his lack of support among the al Sabah family 
because of his control over al Sabah salaries. His brother Fahad, who 
)(> Shuhaiber. op.cit. p.60. 
monopolised the market during his father's rulership was also unpopular. Sheikh 
Abdullah was hoped that the support of the National Bloc would help him achieve 
his ambition of becoming the next Amir. 
The Constitution also undermined the power of Britain by placing all foreign affairs 
into the hands of the Council, an area that had been primarily a British concern. 
The British political agent in Kuwait met with the Council to remind them of that 
prerogative by indicating: 
The Council will of course understand that no such change can effect 
the existing arrangement based on treaty and long practice, under 
which his Majesty's Government are responsible for the conduct of 
foreign relations of Kuwait with other powers and states, and control 
through the Sheikh matters affecting these relations or foreigners in 
Kuwait. 37 
The dissatisfaction of Britain at the involvement of the Council in foreign affairs 
was due to the fact that Britain considered foreign affairs its prerogative. In later 
years AI Sabah were to develop a similar attitude to the National Assembly 
involvement in foreign affairs, which led frequently to antagonism and 
confrontation between the government and the Assembly and was considered part 
of the reasons for the second suspension of the National Assembly in 1986. 
The Council during its short lived existence achieved some significant reforms in 
the economic and administrative fields. It cancelled many of the taxes imposed on 
the people such as export duties and some import duties; the 10 percent of duty 
paid by Kuwaiti villagers on purchases from town; taxes on meat and fish markets; 
taxes charged on bakers and the pearl fishing tax, thus making trade free to all. In 
addition to this the Council lowered the heavy rents of shops and allowed the 
public to build shops, an activity that had been exclusive to the ruling family. At 
37 A. H Al-Rumaihi. "Political Refonn Movement in the History of Kuwait". Paper Presented at the BRISMES 
Annual Conference (12-15 July 1987). p.7. 
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the same time the Council improved the salaries to all the members of the ruling 
family. Other areas that they tackled included the formation of a disciplined police 
force; dismissing many corrupt officials; opening new schools; improving roads; 
new government buildings were built and the council began to reorganise 
immigration procedures by improving the neglected passport department and 
reinforcing Kuwait's coastal villages and border posts against illegal entries. 38 
However, opposition to the Council gathered from three main sides leading to its 
dissolution by Sheikh Ahmad on the 21 December 1938, only five months after its 
formation. First there was the group of people whose influence had been 
undermined by the economic and administrative reforms of the Council including 
members of the ruling family. Second, Britain, which at the beginning was in 
favour of the Council, realised that the extension of the Council's authority to 
foreign affairs jeopardises its interested in Kuwait. One of the major issues that 
particularly annoyed the British was the interference of the Council in the Kuwait 
Oil Company. The British wanted the company to deal exclusively with Sheikh 
Ahmad and wanted the cheques from the Company to continue to go to the Ruler. 
However, the Ruler according to the new Constitution was required to submit that 
to the money Council as state income, which in effect he did. The continuation of 
this was seen by the British as a way of undermining the authority of the Ruler and 
giving more power and influence to the Council, a development Britain did not 
want to see happening. Moreover the Council wanted to bring the customs 
income within the general budget of the Council. Baz states that: 
At the beginning the British had favoured the creation of a council in 
order to deflect the growing opposition in the merchant community 
against the Amir, but they wanted it to be advisory only. After its 
formation the British became gradually unhappy about its performance-
especially its interference in Kuwait's foreign affairs because they were 
reserved to them according to the provisions of the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti 
agreement. The British had preferred to maintain the status quo by 
38 Shuhaiber, op.cit. p.62. 
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conducting their business with the Amir directly, but the council insisted 
on playing an active role in all decisions. What worried the British most 
was the council's attempt to conduct negotiations with the oil companies 
operating in Kuwait and then to re-examine the oil concessions signed 
previously with the Amir 39 
Lastly, opposition to the Council came from the Shi'ite sect who formed more than 
a quarter of the population40• As mentioned before they were excluded from both 
electing and running for the Council and subsequently reacted by applying for 
British citizenship. This move angered the Council and those seeking British 
nationality were threatened with deportation and were deprived of any rights in 
Kuwait. Sheikh Ahmad, encouraged by this opposition, announced the dissolution 
of the Council. 
Initially the members of the Council did not accept the dissolution and showed 
readiness to use force to maintain it. They gathered with their supporters and 
guards at a fortified building. On the other hand, Sheikh Ahmed's supporters 
gathered in the Palace ready to fight. Among them was a significant number of 
Bedouins, the traditional supporters of al Sabah. This show of force and readiness 
to fight combined with the negotiation headed by Sheikh Abdullah resulted in a 
peaceful surrender of the supporters of the Council. 41 
In an attempt to amend the relation between the Ruler and the people, new 
elections were held and a new expanded Council was formed. Twelve members 
of the old Council were re-elected. Sheikh Ahmed al Jaber submitted a new 
Constitution to the Council, which gave the Ruler the power to veto the Councils' 
decisions. That in effect transforms the Council into an advisory one with the Ruler 
having ultimate power. The Council rejected the draft and the Amir reverted once 
39 Baz, op.cit. p.122-123. 
40 Fahd 'Abdullah Al-Mudyris. (al-Mdairis). Al-haraka al-shi'iya fi al-kuwayt. (The Shi'a Movement in 
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more to dissolving the Council. The Council responded by refusing to accept the 
dissolution. The Kuwaiti merchant Muhammad al Manays, called on the Kuwaitis 
to resist the ruling family. He was arrested and when two of his supporters 
attempted to free him, one was shot dead and the other was wounded. AI Manays 
was tried, convicted and executed immediately.42 Some of the members of the 
Council were jailed, while others ran to Iraq. The jailed members were not freed 
until 1944 when the Sheikh declared a general amnesty, which also allowed those 
who were living abroad to return.43 Perhaps this incident can explain the 
reluctance, in later years, of Kuwaiti opposition groups to bring matters that came 
to a head between them and al Sabah on to any collision course, and their 
frequent readiness to give in, as shall be seen in the forthcoming chapters. 
In the aftermath of the dissolution, the Amir formed an appointed Council (maj/is al 
shura) made up of four members of the al Sabah family and ten notables. The 
members of this Council gradually abandoned it and soon it ceased to function. 
The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Ahmad to end the Saudi 
embargo helped to turn the merchants towards their economic activity and 
concentrate more on trade. 
Subsequently, reform movements and political activities took on a different form. 
They were pursued through voluntary organisations with many of them assigning 
honorary chairmanships to members of the ruling family. Also, they were more 
broadly based than the 1938 Council, including young men who have been 
educated abroad, and Arabs working in Kuwait, including Egyptians, Lebanese, 
Iraqis and Palestinians, thus reflecting the changes that have been taking place in 
Kuwaiti society. 44 
42 Crystal, op.cit. p.50. 
43 Ibid., p.39. 
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By 1956 there were some seventeen such associations, the most important among 
them being the Teachers Club, the Graduate Club, and the National Culture Club 
(NCC) under the leadership of Ahmad al Khatib, who became a leading opposition 
figure in Kuwait. 45 The NCC membership was open to both Kuwaitis and other 
Arabs and its publications reflected the ideology of Arab Nationalism.46 The 
cooperation of these clubs was facilitated under the umbrella of the Committee of 
Clubs. All these organisations called for Arab unity, national independence, and a 
Constitutional government. 47 In the early 1950's the Kuwaiti nationalists asked the 
people of Kuwait to demand the following: 
... Ask for the formation of a Constituent Assembly which will prepare a 
Constitution and which will guarantee your natural freedom, put an end 
to despotic rule and bring forth a national independent government 
which will be formed by the people themselves. 48 
The first confrontation between these associations and al Sabah came in the 
height of the Suez crisis when they held their first demonstration to protest Britain's 
involvement. The police intervened and arrested many of the demonstrators while 
many Arab expatriates were deported. 49 The more serious challenge to al Sabah 
came in 1959 when a rally was held at the Shuwaikh Secondary School to 
commemorate the first anniversary of the creation of the United Arab Republic. 50 
The strong manner in which the reformists expressed their views on Arab unity and 
attacked the autocratic rule of al Sabah combined with their forceful demands for 
immediate reforms, especially on the issue of popular participation in the 
government, alarmed al Sabah. Jasim al Qatami, a leading Kuwaiti Arab 
45 Ibid., p.70. 
46 Haya AI-Mughni. Women in Kuwait: The Political of Gender. (London: Dar Al-Saqi Books 1993).p.151. 
47 Ibid., p.34. 
48 Ibid., p.34. 
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nationalist who resigned his post in the police department in protest at what 
happened during the Suez demonstration, announced that: 
The al Sabah became the Rulers of Kuwait 300 years ago. They ruled 
autocratically and arbitrarily then. They cannot expect to do the same in 
the latter part of the twentieth century. Either they grant the people the 
necessary reforms at once, or the people will take power for 
themselves.51 
AI Sabah realising the significance of this event resorted on the one hand to 
imposing very strict and repressive controls on political activities and all these 
voluntary organisations, not to be lifted until 1961, and cancelled the election of the 
administrative councils.52 On the other hand they also needed to deflect public 
criticism thus, to do this, the Supreme Council, consisting of ten members of al 
Sabah decided to enact some internal reforms against incompetence, 
extravagance and corruption especially in departments controlled by members of 
the family.53 
2.4 The Sedentary Badu 
The major Kuwaiti Bedouin tribes are composed of 'Ajman, 'Aniza, 'Awazem, 
Mutair, Rashaidah, Shamar and Bani Hajer, who tend to use their tribal name as 
their family names. 54 The onset of central rule and a territorially defined state set 
limits on their nomadic life but provided expanded economic opportunities that 
encouraged their settlement of the area and slowly eroded their nomadic life. In 
pre oil Kuwait most of the badu adopted a maritime life. Nearly 90 percent of pearl 
51 Smith, op.cit. p. 98 
52 AI-Mughni, op.cit. p.36. & Smith, op.cit. p. 70. 
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divers were Bedouins.55 The relations between al Sabah and the tribes of the area 
were extremely good. In fact it was this good relationship and their ability to 
associate with them that made the 'Utub clan decide to give al Sabah the political 
leadership. In turn al Sabah cemented this relationship by recruiting the badu to 
do the sensitive jobs of personal guards, men in arms and policemen. Loyalty to al 
Sabah came natural to the Bedouins since they considered al Sabah Amir as a 
patriarchal figure who like their own tribal leaders must be respected. 56 
The unquestionable loyalty of the badu to al Sabah combined with being the 
instrument of force and order augmented the division between townspeople and 
the badu. The townspeople also saw the badu as being uncivilised people 
belonging to the desert, while they in turn had very little respect urban people, and 
maintained being separate from the rest of the society.57 However, the division 
between the badu and the townspeople has not been as sharp as the one 
'between the merchants and the Shi'ite. This division was sectarian, economic, 
social, and political in its nature.58 Shi'ite were mostly labourers and they 
organised social services such as schooling separately and they did not 
intermarry. Their only link to the Ruler was through his Secretary and even that, in 
the 1930's, came under attack by leading merchant families. 59 
Exacerbating these social divisions is the fact that the pattern of urban settlement 
in Kuwait followed a distinct segregation of the society according to social and 
economic background and a pattern of relatively autonomous social communities, 
which reinforced the elite status of the Sunni merchant community. In Kuwait town 
in the Jeblah side (north east of the town) most of its people were traders and 
owned and financed trading and pearl-diving ships. The Sharq side (south east of 
55 Ibid., p.102. 
56 Ibid., p.101. 
57 Shuhaiber. op.cit. p. 20-21. 
58 Crystal. op.cit. p.40. 
59 Ibid .. p.40. 
50 
the town) most of the settlers came from al Hasa in Saudi Arabia and Persia and 
were boat-builders, pearl divers and fishermen. In the Murqab side, in between 
the two sides, most of the people there worked for traders as labourers. 60 
Settlements outside Kuwait town had a concentration of Bedouins. For instance, 
al Jahra was a settlement for the Mutair tribe while the coastal settlement of 
Salmiyha had a concentration of settlers from the 'Awazem. The population of 
other settlements such as Fantas, Fahaihil, Abu Halaifah and Shiaibah was also 
mostly Bedouins who practised pasturage and cultivation. 61 
With the discovery of oil other Bedouins began to settle near oil fields and were 
employed by oil companies as labourers. That was the start of what is commonly 
known in Kuwait as "shanty" areas. These shanty areas became more widespread 
in the 1960s and the government was forced to address the issue. Further 
discussion of this will be included in the following chapter. The numbers of these 
Bedouins swelled and their ambition for Kuwaiti citizenship was motivated by the 
ownership of a house, guaranteed employment, free health and education services 
as well as other social privileges. The government on the other hand encouraged 
this swelling of the numbers of Bedouins for political reasons. Its major aim was to 
offset the number of non-Kuwaitis, in addition to offsetting the challenges from 
opposition groups in the assembly by increasing Bedouin participation in political 
life. 62 
The manoeuvres by the government in order to increase the involvement of the 
badu in Kuwaiti politics resulted in a distinction being made between the Bedouins 
who settled in Kuwait before 1930 and those that came later attracted by the oil 
economy and the opportunities associated with it. The identity and nationality of 
these Bedouins became a critical subject to both al Sabah and those who consider 
60 AI-Musa, op.cit. p.56-57. 
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themselves, in particular the old merchant community, and the original settlers 
hence they believe that the entitlement to citizenship must be exclusive to them. 
2.5 Britain and the Consolidation of the Rule of al Sabah 
The discussion of the rise of al Sabah to power and prominence in Kuwait is not 
complete without analysing the role played by Britain during the crucial formative 
years of Kuwait. Britain's interest in Kuwait was part of its overall imperial interests 
in the Gulf area and the result of inter-imperial rivalry. This rivalry was motivated 
by the strategic location of Kuwait. The Germans had a plan for the Berlin-
Baghdad railway system that links Anathol in Turkey to Baghdad-Basra-Kuwait 
and have increased their trade in the Middle East as well as their influence in 
Istanbul. 63 The Russians on their part also had several plans to provide 
themselves with access to the Far East. Among these plan's was one to connect 
Tripoli on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean with Kuwait. 64 It was these plans 
that in effect increased the importance of Kuwait to Britain and galvanised it to 
decide its position on Kuwait. This coincided with the rulershipship of Mubarak 
who was very keen on developing a cooperative relation with Britain in order to 
thwart any challenges to his rule and also to lessen the Ottoman influence. He 
approached the British and suggested making Kuwait a protectorate. The British 
were very cautious about an agreement with Mubarak lest they disturb their 
relation with Istanbul, as was indicated by the British ambassador to Istanbul in 
1898: 
Though strongly in favour of the maintenance of British supremacy in 
the Persian Gulf, I am of opinion that it will be advisable to proceed 
cautiously and as quietly as possible with regard to the establishment of 
a British Protectorate over Koweit. Any formal declaration to this effect 
63 Ismael. op.cit. p.52. 
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at the present moment would be considered little short of a hostile act 
by Turkey, and in any case it would be sure to produce very serious 
diplomatic complications, not only with this Government, but probably 
also with Russia. 65 
Therefore a secret agreement was arrived at between Mubarak and Britain in 
1899. In it Mubarak pledged and bound his heirs and successors 
not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government 
at Koweit, or at any other place within the limits of his territory without 
the previous sanction of the British Government ; and further binds 
himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or 
give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory 
to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous 
consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes.66 
Accompanying this agreement was a letter that stipulates that the condition of its 
execution is that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and not divulged or made public 
in any way without the previous consent of the British Government. 67 However in 
1900 the British informed the Ottomans about the Agreement who protested 
against it and made many attempts to assert their sovereignty over Kuwait. All 
these efforts were thwarted by Britain's naval protection of Kuwait. Eventually and 
in accordance with the Gulf Agreement (Anglo-Turkish Convention) signed on 29 
July 1913, Britain agreed that Kuwait would be an autonomous qadha (district) of 
the Ottoman Empire, while the Ottomans recognised the validity of the 1899 
agreement. In addition, the borderlines of Kuwait were delineated and the islands 
of Warbah and Bubiyan - later to become the subject of contention between 
Kuwait and Iraq - fell within the inner zone where complete autonomy of the Kuwait 
65 Ismael, op.cit. p.49. 
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Sheikh was recognised. 68 This Agreement reflected the success of the British 
policy in limiting the extension of the influence of the Ottoman Empire to the Gulf. 
The San Remo Conference in 1920, following the end of the world war one, 
continued to recognise Kuwait as a principality under British protection, as set out 
in the declaration of 1914 between the British government and Sheikh Mubarak. 
During the period between the two world wars the involvement of the British in the 
politics of the area was extensive and its agreement with Kuwait of utmost 
importance in securing Kuwait's independent status. The borders between Kuwait 
and Najd as we" as Iraq and Najd were settled by the Uqair Conference on 2 
December 1922. Accordingly, the frontiers between Iraq and Kuwait remained in 
1923 as they had been initially derived in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention. 
The boundary issue between Kuwait and Iraq kept the British busy throughout their 
period of protectorate over Kuwait. Iraq recognised the independence and 
complete sovereignty of Kuwait only in October 1963 in the Agreement entitled 
"The Agreed Minutes Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition 
and Related Matters". Despite that agreement the conflict over the demarcation of 
the borders persisted leading to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 
Britain's support for al Sabah was crucial for the continuation of the autocratic rule 
of al Sabah. Britain, for fear of losing its dominant status in Kuwait, preferred 
keeping the autocratic from of government and threw away the opportunity of 
establishing a system of formal political participation as early as 1938. The 
discovery of oil in Kuwait and the start of the production in late 1940's increased 
Britain's involvement and expanded its role into direct participation in the economic 
field through the employment of British experts in the administration of Kuwait. 
More importantly, oil production changed the situation of al Sabah by substantially 
giving them a strong economic basis for their political power and its concentration 
to be kept in the hands of the al Sabah family members. 
68 E. Lauterpacht. (ed.). The Kuwaiti Crisis: Basic Documents. (UK: Grotius Publications, 1991). p.49. 
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2.6 Oil and al Sabah 
The discovery of oil was to playa significant role in the development of Kuwait. Oil 
exploration began in 1930 but it was not until 1947 that the first shipment of oil 
took place. The re-negotiations of the Oil Concession with the Kuwait Oil 
Company, in line with the 50/50 profit sharing agreement secured by Saudi Arabia, 
meant that Kuwait's oil revenues increased at a phenomenal rate. They increased 
from 16.8 million dollars in 1951 to 168 million dollars in the following year and by 
1961 it reached 467.4 million dollars.69 The sheer size of the increase within a very 
short period of time reveals the vast extent of the changes that such an increase in 
the funds available to the state can induce in a society. The 1950s and early 
1960s saw rapid and unprecedented transformation of Kuwait and its people. 
For al Sabah, that meant the augmentation of their political power and extracting 
themselves from their dependency on the merchant community. This augmentation 
of political and economic power made their rule very powerful. The differentiation 
between al Sabah and the rest of the society, which Mubarak desired during his 
rulership, was to be established and a new division emerged between the ruling 
family and the rest of the society exemplified by the sheer size of the wealth and 
power oil revenues gave al Sabah. 
The government embarked on a massive developmental programme to distribute 
this wealth focusing on infrastructure projects and the provision of social services. 
The expansion in schools, hospitals, roads, power and water distillation plants, 
public buildings, telecommunication and housing was huge. This was 
accompanied by a large growth in the public sector and government agencies due 
to the great expansion and diversification in government functions and 
responsibilities. It was this massive development effort that opened the way for a 
new breed of merchants to emerge and to become as rich as the old merchant 
69 Shuhaiber. op.cit. p.70. 
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community. They were helped by the law that made it mandatory for foreign firms 
to take a Kuwaiti partner before they can do business in Kuwait.70 
The massive increase in real estate prices also played a role in creating lucrative 
opportunities for landowners and entrepreneurs. The exaggerated land prices was 
seen by the government as an appropriate way to transfer some of the wealth of 
the country to the private sector, despite the recommendation of the World Bank to 
use other ways that benefit the whole economy, rather than just a few.71 Thus, old 
and new merchants became the major beneficiaries of the accumulation of huge 
funds in the hands of al Sabah. Since the merchants were the only educated 
Kuwaiti social group at that time they benefited also by filling the entire state's top 
level positions. A non-Kuwaiti could only fill such a position when a suitable 
Kuwaiti was not able to be found. 72 The presence of al Sabah family became also 
pervasive in the private sector pursuing very lucrative businesses and in the public 
sector by filling ministerial jobs and other important state positions. 
Other social groups benefited too but not to the same degree. Unskilled Kuwaiti 
labour found jobs in the oil field and in the lower levels of government 
administration. In fact this was a government policy which regarded employment 
in the lower echelon as a means of channelling a certain amount of the wealth to 
the average citizen. 73 In addition they were provided with a variety of benefits 
including free housing and social security benefits. The other government policy 
that benefited all Kuwaitis employed in the civil service was the lack of a clear cut 
distinction between public duty and private interests, thus allowing those in the civil 
service to pursue commercial and private activities. This situation prevailed until 
the 1978 when stricter applications of rules were adopted. 74 The badu, as part of 
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the unskilled labour of Kuwait benefited from these policies as well as from the 
government's settlement policy. They continued to be employed, in increasing 
numbers, in the oil sector and also in the army and police. 
Another significant development that accompanied the expansion in state 
revenues and state's development role is the influx of foreign labour. This was to 
further complicate the demographic politics of the country and the issue of identity 
and citizenship. Kuwaiti society began to take shape along the lines of a minority 
of Kuwaitis and a majority of non-Kuwaitis engaging in all aspects of the economy. 
Foreign labour, primarily Arab, supplied Kuwait with its teachers, doctors, 
engineers, and architects, administrative and managerial personnel. However, 
despite their huge contribution to the development of Kuwait these migrants were 
not allowed to integrate into the social and political fabric of Kuwaiti society and 
were treated as a distinct and separate group. The nationality law of 1959 and its 
amendment in 1960 were motivated by the protection of the minority status of the 
Kuwaiti community from this influx which in addition, opened up the channels of 
political participation for the badu. The development of Kuwait depended on this 
migrant labour which was attracted by the salaries offered by both the private and 
public sector, yet Kuwaitis feared about their total integration and assimilation 
because it potentially could dilute the special status that the exclusive system of 
citizenship and their right to vote gave them, in addition to a reluctance to share 
the massive benefits and privileges provided by the state to its own citizens. For al 
Sabah, the fear stemmed more from the possibility of undermining their autocratic 
rule and the possible loss of their control over the economic and political system in 
Kuwait. 
During this period Britain's role remained extensive. Although the loss of India in 
1947 undermined Kuwait's traditional strategic importance to the imperial system 
this was compensated by Kuwait's growing economic significance. Britain was 
concerned by the huge surplus revenue accruing to the state and the appropriate 
channels for investment without damaging the sterling; a major concern for Britain 
at the time considering the scarcity of the dollar. Hence, its interference with the 
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economic policy of Kuwait and the manner in which Kuwait dispensed with surplus 
revenues. This was evident firstly by the employment of British experts and 
personnel to the Kuwaiti administration. It began with the engagement of an 
expert for the finance department and another for the customs department in 1950. 
The engagement of British personnel was resisted over the years by the al Sabah 
family, partly due to fear of criticism from Arab neighbouring countries of allowing 
Britain to interfere in Intemal administration of Kuwait and because of 
disagreements among the ruling family over that matter.7li However after the 
accession of Sheikh Abdullah Mubarak as the new Ruler on 3f January 1950 
Britain approached the ruler again on the subject. Sheikh Abdullah asked the 
British to give him time to reconcile his family to the idea and carry the people with 
him on the issue. Subsequently in mid October 1950 Abdullah agreed to the 
appointment of two experts, one for the finance department and another for the 
customs department. 7li 
Beyond that, in 1953 Britain was able to convince Sheikh Abdullah to establish 
Kuwait Investment Board which was initially provided £27 million and consisted of 
four British members. The guiding principle of the manner of the investment was 
the safeguarding of British interests as expressed clearly by the Foreign Office: 
The expenditure of its (Kuwait's) large sterling revenue unless properly 
directed is capable of inflicting the most serious damage on the sterling 
area. Her Majesty's government can no longer afford to confine 
themselves to the role authorised by the treaties and agreements in 
force and sanctioned by usage but must interest themselves in all 
matters which affect the political and economic stability of Kuwait or 
which may affect the interests of the United Kingdom in the widest 
sense." 
75 Smith, op.cit p.21-24. 
76 Ibid., p.24. 
77 Ibid., p.43-4S. 
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It also became important to appoint a Senior British Advisor to the Ruler in order to 
coordinate the activities of British advisors and to supervise the introduction of 
necessary administrative reforms. 78 The British wanted the executive authority to 
rest with the Ruler but needed to influence him indirectly by surrounding him and 
Kuwaiti Administration with their own staff. Thus throughout the 1950's Britain was 
engaged in directing the economic policy of al Sabah to a great extent. 
However, by the mid 1950's the presence of the British in Kuwait was coming 
under increasing pressure. The Palestine question, the rise of Gamal Abdul 
Nasser and Arab Nationalism, and the overthrow of the Hashmite Iraqi regime 
caused strong anti-British feeling in the Arab region and Kuwait was no exception 
to that. Kuwait's increasing wealth made al Sabah more confident in conducting 
their own affairs starting with conducting direct relations with Arab countries and 
joining some international bodies. Consequently Sheikh Abdullah began discreet 
negotiations with Britain in the early sixties concerning the possibility of replacing 
the 1899 agreement with a new one that was more in tune with the emerging 
status of Kuwait. At the end of these negotiations the state of Kuwait gained its 
independence on 19 June 1961 by an exchange of notes between Britain and 
Kuwait. The following conclusions were reached in the course of these 
negotiations: 
1. The1899 Agreement shall be terminated as it was considered to be 
inconsistent with the independence of Kuwait. 
2. The relations between Britain and Kuwait shall continue to be governed by 
a spirit of close friendship. 
3. When it is appropriate the two governments shall consult together on 
matters, which concern them both. 
78 Ibid .. p.46. 
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4. Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's 
Government to assist the government of Kuwait if the latter requests such 
assistance. 79 
Resorting to this last clause of the new agreement came far sooner than expected. 
The Qassem regime following the abrogation of the 1899 treaty and the 
announcement of Kuwait's independence renewed Iraq's claims to Kuwait and 
threatened to annex it. Although there were no definite signs that Qassem was 
about to execute his threats, Sheikh Abdullah did not want to take any chances 
and subsequently requested formal British assistance. Their support came in the 
form of 600 British troops arriving in Kuwait on 1 July 1961, less than two weeks 
after declaring independence. The number of troops swelled to 7000 in five days.Bo 
The deployment of British troops brought criticism from the Arab region and to 
avoid further deterioration of the situation Kuwait was admitted into the Arab 
League on 20 July 1961. That paved the way for reaching an agreement on 12 
August for the provision of an Arab League Security Force to replace British 
troops.B1 Kuwait was successful in its second attempt to join the UN, because its 
first attempt to do so had been vetoed by the Soviet Union. On the 7 of May 1963 
it became the 111 th full member of the UN, guaranteeing its place In the 
international system and inaugurating the beginning of a new phase In the 
development of the modern state of Kuwait. With Kuwait joining the Arab League 
and the United Nations as a sovereign state these were Significant developments 
signalling the start of a new phase of its political development. 
79 Shwadran, Benjamin. "The Kuwait Incident". Middle East Affairs. (No.13. 1962). p. 10. 
80 S·tJ . 1"0 ml 1, Op.CIt. p. - . 
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2.7 Conclusion 
On the eve of its independence from Britain, Kuwait was already well into being a 
very rich state presided over by a ruling family that have been able through their 
leadership skills to build a state out of the small desert area of Kuwait. In that 
achievement the support and loyalty of the 'Utub merchant families and Britain 
were essential. Britain's most significant contribution has been the guaranteeing 
of Kuwait's territorial integrity, separate from either Iraq or Saudi Arabia. The 
merchant families were essential for the legitimisation of al Sabah's rule and also 
for the provision of much needed funds. However, their influence and power was 
disproportionate to their numbers, and in relation also to the other social groups 
emerging in Kuwait, especially the badu and the Shi'ite. Thus, when al Sabah 
moved from the accepted norm of consultation to autocratic rule, especially during 
the rulership of Sheikh Mubarak at the start of the twentieth century, they led two 
attempts to formalise political participation. Their efforts were thwarted by the 
resistance of al Sabah to gain such a change, which was supported also by 
Britain. 
With the lack of prospect of achieving formal channels of political participation, 
social clubs emerged in Kuwait as an alternative method to campaign and become 
active on social and political issues. However, even these clubs came under 
attack from al Sabah and strict controls were imposed on their activities. External 
factors, namely Pan Arabism and Iraq's claim to Kuwait, stopped al Sabah from 
allowing public political space to develop for fear of losing their dominance. That 
dominance has been assured through the acquiescence of the merchant 
community especially after the events of 1938, and the widening of their base of 
legitimacy through the incorporation of the badu as a strong ally. The dichotomy 
between the urbanised and wealthy merchants of Kuwait and the badu was 
~'Ib·d 1')11""11 1 ., p. __ - _'"to 
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evident from early years. It was mitigated by the closeness of the badu to al 
Sabah and their dependency on them for the maintenance of security and order. 
The sudden wealth that started to accrue to al Sabah due to export of oil in 
commercial quantities meant that they have the power to distribute the benefits of 
this new wealth among the society in general. That increased and further 
concentrated power in their hands on the expense of the rest of the society. 
However it allowed the widening in the commercial community to include members 
other than the traditional wealthy families. Also the unskilled labour primarily 
drawn from among the badu and Shi'ite began to reap some of the benefit of this 
new wealth. The Shi'ite had very little influence on the political system and were 
engaged in unskilled jobs. 
The growth of Kuwait induced an influx of foreign labour which was mainly Arab to 
fill the jobs that the expanded opportunities in the economy had provided. That set 
in motion a new dynamic of the relationship between the state and the Kuwaiti 
population bringing to the surface the question of "who is a Kuwaiti?" as we" as 
between the state and the migrants. The amendment of the Nationality Law in 
1960 must be seen within this wider picture and in particular about the Kuwaiti 
division of hadar and badu and how al Sabah manipulated that to their own 
benefit. That issue will be the focus of assessment in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Citizenship and the Representative System of Government in 
Kuwait 
3.1 Introduction 
Sovereignty and oil wealth gave al Sabah the opportunity to respond to the 
social and political changes that have been sweeping Kuwait at an accelerated 
rate during the fifties and early sixties. The expansion in education and social 
mobility, created new social groups and different demands on the autocratic rule 
of al Sabah. In addition to this the ideology of Arab nationalism exerted 
immense influence on the educated Kuwaiti elite, who were at the forefront of a 
reformist movement articulated through voluntary associations. AI Sabah 
needed to respond to all these changes and challenges to their rule, in addition 
to the threat Iraq exerted on the territorial integrity of Kuwait, despite the 
regional and international recognition of its independence. 
It is in this context that the promulgation of a Constitution and the reorganisation 
of state power through moving away from autocratic rule to the adoption of a 
representative system of government came about. In other words moving away 
from the traditional-informal origination to a formal-legal organisation of state 
powers. Thus, what has been resisted over many years eventually became a 
right guaranteed in the Constitution. AI Sabah, motivated by a desire to create 
a national Kuwaiti identify to thwart the aspirations of Iraq and undermine the 
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Pan Arab feelings that were sweeping the Arab region and influencing Kuwait 
opposition groups, hoped that such an organisation of state powers will both 
confirm the separate identity of Kuwait and Kuwaitis, and ensure their 
domination. 
Within this context of reorganising state powers, citizenship became a central 
issue in the development of the Kuwaiti state and the legitimisation of al 
Sabah's rule. The small size of the Kuwaiti population to the much larger non-
Kuwaiti population has posed some serious economic as well as political 
problems to the ruling family. The growing expatriate community has been 
contributing significantly to the growth and development of Kuwait, and Kuwait 
has become heavily dependent on them. However this economic dependency 
figures less significantly in Kuwait's ruling family concerns when compared to 
the political implications of the minority status of its own citizens. Thus, in order 
to protect their minority citizens and to maintain their dominance they opted to 
adopt a very restrictive definition of citizenship and limit political participation to 
a small segment of the population through citizenship and election legislation. 
This chapter will focus on analysing these two laws and their effect on the 
representative system in Kuwait. The combination of these two laws has 
produced a system of representation that limits the size of the electorate body 
to a great degree and deliberately gerrymanders the electoral districts in order 
to create favourable conditions for maintaining the dominance and power of the 
ruling family. One of the major groups in Kuwait that benefited from the 
manipulation of citizenship and electoral laws is the badu. The discussion will 
show how their political relevance has increased significantly since the 
governments' mass naturalisation of thousands of badu in the early sixties and 
seventies. AI Sabah in their search for new allies to offset the power of the old 
merchant class and widen the base of their legitimacy has strengthened tribal 
authority and tribal solidarity. This, in turn, emphasised divisions in the Kuwaiti 
community, in addition to further alienating the expatriate community by the 
ever increase in legal restrictions towards those who are legally eligible for 
naturalisation. 
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Before examining these two laws and their influence on the process of 
democracy in Kuwait, I shall first discuss the main features of the representative 
system of government in Kuwait, as it is stipulated by the Constitution. 
3.2 The Constitutional System of Government 
Following independence, the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah al Salim, issued 
an Amiri decree establishing a council of seniors consisting of several al Sabah 
family members and prominent members of the merchant community to draft 
the constituent assembly electoral law and to make preparations for an elected 
constituent assembly.1 Subsequently elections were held which produced 
twenty successful candidates out of seventy four representing the ten electoral 
districts of the country based on two representatives from each district. In 
addition, the assembly included eleven sheikhs from the al Sabah family 
appointed as members, which raised the total number of the assembly to thirty-
one.2 The elected members represented the different elements of the Kuwaiti 
society as well as reflecting the changes that have taken place in Kuwaiti 
society; especially the decline in the dominance of the merchant community to 
the benefit of new social groups. As seen from table 3.1, the badu accounted 
for 35 per cent of the elected members, the Shi'ite accounted for 10 percent, 
and the merchant community accounted for 40 percent while other urban 
members accounted for 15 percent. 
The task of the constituent assembly was restricted to drafting the country's 
permanent Constitution. 3 The assembly submitted the draft Constitution to the 
Amir who signed it on 11 November 1962. The Constitution came into being on 
I Kadhim Mahdi AI-Bahrani. "Factors Influencing Ruling Elites' Political Participation in the State of 
Kuwait. Ph.D. thesis. University of Denver. 1988. p.250. 
2 Abdullah Kalifah AI-Shayeji. "Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for 
Political Survival." Ph. D. thesis. University of Texas, Austin, 1988. p.75. 
3 AI-Bahrani. op.cit. p.66. 
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Table 3.1 Elected Members of the Constituent Council 
Name Social Group 
1 Abbas Munawir Badu 
2 Ali al 'adhina Badu 
3 Yusuf al Mutari Badu 
4 Abdullah Fahd al Shamari Badu 
5 Muhammad al Sudairan Badu 
6 Nayif al Dabbus Badu 
7 Khalifa al Jari Badu 
8 Abd al Aziz al Saqar Merchant 
9 Humud al zaid al khalid Merchant 
10 Ya'qub al Humaidi Merchant 
11 Abd allatif al Ghanim Merchant 
12 Ahmad al Fawzan Merchant 
13 Sa'ud al Abd al Razzaq Merchant 
14 Muhammad al Nisf Merchant 
15 Mubarak al Hasawi Merchant 
16 Mansur al Mazidi Shi'ite 
17 Muhammad Ma'raff Shi'ite 
18 Ahmad al Khatib Hadhar 
19 Abd al Razzaq Aman Hadhar 
20 Sulaiman al Hadda Hadhar 
Source; Calculated from data on election results available from the Kuwaiti National Assembly. 
15 January 1963. The articles of the Constitution which are concerned with the 
system of government and legislative power indicate a desire to create a 
democratic system and an accountable government while maintaining the 
power of the Ruler. The Constitution indicates in Article (6) that the system of 
government shall be democratic, under which sovereignty resides in the people. 
The source of all power and will be based according to Article (50) on the 
principle of separation of powers.4 
.j See Appendix A. Kuwait Constitution. 
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Legislative power, in accordance with Article (51), shall be vested in the Amir 
and the national assembly. The assembly shall be composed of 50 members 
elected in a secret ballot, as well as the non-elected cabinet members as being 
ex-officio members. The number of non-elected members shall not exceed one 
third of the assembly's members and individual ministers can be subject to a 
vote of no confidence. However, only the Amir has the right to demand the 
resignation of the prime minister or the cabinet as a whole. 
The promulgation of a Constitution and the stipulation for the election of a 
National Assembly on the eve of independence was an act in line with what 
other Arab states were undertaking. As suggested by Owen it was usual for 
Arab states to embark on their independence with a Constitution that called for 
the holding of regular elections! Other reasons pertaining to the Kuwaiti case 
include the desire of al Sabah to counterbalance the Pan-Arab political current 
and its influence on Kuwaitis, thus encouraging Kuwaiti identification and 
discouraging Arab nationalism. 6 Also this was seen as a means of offsetting 
I raqi claims to Kuwait by strengthening Kuwaiti national feelings and their 
identity through the creation of a national institution concerned with Kuwaiti 
affairs. 
The Amir has been given, through Article (107), the power to dissolve the 
assembly by a decree, in which the reasons for the dissolution are indicated. 
However, he is obliged to call for new elections within two months. In the event 
that the elections are not held, then the dissolved assembly shall be restored to 
its full Constitutional authority and shall meet immediately as if the dissolution 
has not taken place. It will continue to function until a new assembly has been 
elected. Despite the clarity of this article al Sabah have been able to suspend 
parliamentary life twice and for long periods of times. 
5 Roger Owen. 'The practice of Election Democracy in The Arab East and North Africa: Some Lessons 
from Nearly a Century's Experience." In Rules and Rights in The Middle East: Democracy, Law. and 
Society. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993). p.l8. 
6 1. E. Peterson. The Arab Gulf State: Steps toward Political Participation. (New York: Praeger. 1988). 
p.35. 
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Laws may be promulgated only after being passed by the assembly and 
sanctioned by the Amir. The assembly can override the Amir's veto by a two 
third majority. Nonetheless, Article (71) gives the Amir the power to issue 
decrees that have the force of law while the assembly is not in session or is 
dissolved, should a necessity arise for such urgent measures. This right can be 
argued to have been abused and also that also that many Amiri decrees have 
been issued that did not have any urgency.7 Considering the long periods of 
suspension of the assembly in the seventies and eighties, al Sabah have been 
able to liberally misuse this right. 
The accountability of the executive to the legislative is dealt with in Articles 98-
102. The cabinet presents its programme to the assembly who can make 
comments and question the prime minister and ministers within their 
competence. A successful vote of no confidence against a minister means that , 
he must submit his formal resignation immediately. In the case of the prime \ 
I' 
minister, as mentioned before, only the Amir can dismiss him from office. The : 
presence of non-elected members in the assembly has undermined the function 
of the assembly and its ability to question the executive power. According to 
Owen the relation between the assembly and the cabinet, whose most 
important members belong to the ruling family, is a central problem for the 
Kuwaiti system of government.s Any criticism of the government can be 
interpreted as a criticism of the ruling family, which at times made the 
relationship between the assembly and the cabinet very disagreeable. AI 
Sabah tried to deal with that by making sure through the election legislative that 
the assembly is dominated by their loyal supporters. 
The difficulty of the relationship between the cabinet and the assembly has 
been exentuated with the expansion and formalisation of the political role of the 
al Sabah family in running the affairs of the state. The selection of brothers, 
cousins and other family members as advisors and heads of departments was 
limited in comparison to the period of post-independence and especially after 
the oil boom. The top posts in the ministries of foreign affairs, information, 
7 Inter\'icw with Faheed Nasser. Kuwait. ~ovember 2002. 
8 Owen. op.cit. p.33. 
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defence and interior have been exclusive to family members. 9 The ability of the 
Ruler to appoint and distribute important ministerial and other civil servant posts 
to family members have contributed to the cohesion of al Sabah. As long as the 
benefits are shared among family members, dissent can then be controlled to a 
great extent. 
As pointed out by Crystal, the ruling family functions politically as a unified 
institution, however divisions are still present.'o Therefore these need to be 
controlled and managed to the benefit of al Sabah as a whole. Division within 
the al Sabah family can be divided into four levels. The first level is the ruling 
line. The Constitution in accordance with Article (4) specifically states that the 
succession shall be in the descendants of the late Mubarak al Sabah. The 
descendants of Mubarak' sons, Salem and Jabir, have maintained their claim to 
the rulership of the country through the Constitution and this has been easier 
due to the absence of any credible claim or challenge to their rule from other 
branches of the family. The potential division and struggle over rulership 
between the descendants of the two sons has been solved by the informal 
alternation of rule between al Salim and al Jabir. This, in combination with the 
regulation stipulated in the Constitution that an heir apparent is designated 
within a year of the Amir's accession, has meant that there has been an 
assured smooth transition in accession." 
The third level of membership is through Sheikh Abdullah al Mubarak's line. 
His descendants have not posed any serious challenge partly because the 
ruling family keeps them in check. However, the tension and possible threat 
does exist. The fourth branches of the family are the descendants from Jarrah 
and Muhammad, the murdered brothers of Sheikh Mubarak. This part of the 
family was exiled after Mubarak's succession but returned in the 1950's at a 
time when al Sabah were interested in strengthening the ruling family and 
expanding family allies.'2 Therefore, the Constitution, tradition and lack of ability 
<)Al-Shayeji. op.cit. p.33. 
10 Jill Crystal. Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. (Boulder: Westview, 1992).p.93. 
II Ibid .. p.94. 
12 Ibid. 
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of other branches of the family to challenge the descendants of Mubarak gives 
al Sabah the ability to maintain their grip on power and establishes the cohesion 
of the family. Also, oil wealth increased their control over the distribution of 
economic benefits as well as ministerial and civil servant posts to the benefit of 
all family members. 
Despite the Constitutional guarantees for a partnership between the assembly 
and the Ruler, al Sabah have been able to hold the balance of power between 
the legislative and the executive. This is partly due to the expansion of their 
political role and also because of their willingness to suspend the assembly and 
for long periods of time when deemed necessary. Another important factor that 
allowed al Sabah to hold the sway over the assembly is Kuwait's citizenship 
law. According to Article (82) of the Constitution the member of the National 
Assembly shall be a Kuwaiti by origin in accordance with the law. That brings 
forth the crucial question of "who is a Kuwaiti?" and the need to define which 
Kuwaiti is allowed to nominate and vote or, in other words, participate in the 
representative system envisioned and guaranteed by the Constitution. 
3.3 Citizenship legislation: the 1959 law 
Nationality laws are very important in any given country since it regulates the 
relation between the state and the individual. 13 For Kuwait, nationality law 
carries further significance considering its huge migrant community and the 
limited number of Kuwaitis in their country. 
The first Kuwaiti nationality law was promulgated in 1948, Law no (2) 1948, 
attempting to establish a law whereby Kuwaiti nationals can be identified. 
However, that law was never put into practice and was unknown to the public. 
One reason can be attributed to the fact that at the time the British government 
did not approve of the law.14 Thus, the first nationality law to be put into 
13 R. H. Al- 'Anazi. (al-Anezi. R.) al- Budun fi al-kuwayt. (The Bidoon in Kuwait). (Kuwait: Dar al-
qurtas. 1994). p.164. 
14 :\bdulaziz Al-Fayez. "The N"ational Security of Kuwait: External and Internal Dimension". Ph.D thesis, 
University of t>.1assachusetts. 1984.p.164. 
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application has been Law no (15) 1959. It was in the Explanatory Note of this 
law that public reference was made to the 1948 law by stating that the Law was 
never applied and remained unknown.1S The 1959 law was issued by Sheikh 
Abdullah al Salim, marking the start of a legal distinction between Kuwaiti 
nationals and others. Prior to that loyalty to the Amir was the primary requisite 
for de facto citizenship and those who wished to travel were issued papers 
identifying their bearers as associates of the Amir, thus facilitating their travel to 
neighbouring countries. The British issued travel documents identifying their 
bearers as "British protected persons", and they were allowed to travel to all 
commonwealth countries, including Britain.16 
Interestingly Kuwaiti nationality laws were issued before the promulgation of a 
Constitution and before independence, which signifies the centrality of 
citizenship to Kuwait and reflect an early concern with the flow of foreign labour 
that accompanied the discovery of oil.17 Another peculiarity about Kuwaiti 
nationality law is the fact that it is among the most restrictive in the world. 18 This 
also reflects the concern over the migrant community as well as the need to 
maintain the dominance of al Sabah by controlling and limiting the electorate. 
The law in accordance to Article (1) defined those who came to be known as 
the founders of Kuwait or original Kuwaiti nationals as those persons who were 
settled in Kuwait prior to 1920. As mentioned before, the year 1920 has its own 
special historical significance and is chosen as the date where a sense of a 
Kuwaiti community and identity bonded those who have settled in Kuwait and 
who worked together to build a wall to protect their City from a Saudi attack. 
The original nationality is defined in international law as the nationality that the 
law grants the individual from the moment of birth.19 The birthright depends on 
15 Ibid., p166. 
16 Human Rights Watch. The Bedoons of Kuwait: Citizen without Citizenship. New York: Human Rights 
Watch. 1995). p.67. 
17 Abdo I Baaklini. "State and Citizenship in Kuwait." Al Bahath. 1982. p. 189. 
18 AI-Fayez, op.cit. p.139. 
19 Ahmad AI-Samdan. "AI-jinsiya al-kuwaytiya aI-'asliya". (The Kuwaiti Original Citizenship). \lajalla 
al-huquq. Issue?: 23. (Kuwait: Kuwait University, 1996).p.19. 
71 
two principles the jus sanguinis and jus soli. The first depends on blood ties 
and the second on the place of birth. Countries differ in their choice among 
these two principles. Some apply primarily the jus sanguinis principle while 
others apply jus soli. Britain and the US depend on the jus soli principle while 
Arab, African, European, and Asian countries depend on the principle of jus 
sanguinis. There is no absolute application of either principle; for those 
countries that use primarily the jus sanguinis, they also have room for the jus 
soil, whereas countries that use the jus soli also apply the other principle.20 
The Kuwaiti nationality law moves in line with the international legal principle of 
jus sanguinis to specify who is a Kuwaiti. Article (2) stipulates that any person 
born in, or outside Kuwait whose father is a Kuwaiti national shall be a Kuwaiti 
national himself. Thus original nationality is primarily recognised by virtue of 
settlement in Kuwait prior to 1920 and by virtue of descent from Kuwaiti fathers. 
However, according to a Kuwaiti legal expert, the government followed a flawed 
interpretation of Article (1), up until as recent as 1994, by considering the 
children of the original founders as founders and the children of naturalised 
people as being naturalised, which applies the stipulation in Article (7) on 
them.21 In current political language of Kuwaitis it has been common to refer to 
two types of Kuwaitis; first class citizens, meaning the founding fathers and their 
offspring, while other Kuwaitis are considered second class citizens. 22 
It can be argued that the proper legal interpretation should be that Article (2) 
applies to both children of the founders and naturalised Kuwaitis and treat them 
equally. After liberation this differentiation came ,under attack forcing the 
government of 1994 to amend Article (7) in order to treat the children of 
naturalised fathers as original citizens in law No. 44 (1994). However, 
reference is still made in their passports indicating that they aren't asi/, original 
Kuwaiti. 
20 Ibid .. p.19-22. 
, I . 
- Ibid .. p.14. 
'l" ~. Ibid .. p.14-16. 
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AI Sabah created and maintained the notion that being Kuwaiti is a special 
status which made the Kuwaiti citizens feel distinct from other less privileged 
non-Kuwaitis. 23 This unfair policy has been followed by the Kuwaiti government 
as to who is granted nationality, also when identity is confirmed on according to 
which article of the law is used has also further emphasised this special status. 
Another, what can be seen as an obvious inequity of the law, is the denial of 
women the right to pass on their Kuwaiti citizenship to their children. 
Concerning this issue Kuwait is not alone, as many other Arab countries deny 
that right to women and nationality is only passed through men. This is in 
violation of the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Inequity 
against Women (CEDAW), to which Kuwait is party of article 9 specifically, 
provides that states shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the 
nationality of their children. 24 
The restrictive nature of the nationality law has been further exacerbated by the 
successive amendments to deny qualified applicants in their right to citizenship. 
Most interestingly is that these amendments were promulgated by the executive 
power through the Decree-laws. This means that those laws have been 
enacted during the time when the assembly was not in session or was 
suspended. The power given to the Amir by the Constitution to enact such laws 
is for emergency situations only. Obviously, the amendments as shall be seen 
in the following section were not in answer to any emergency situation. Also, 
the question of nationality has been taken away from the hands of the judicial 
power. The courts have been forbidden to deal with matters relating to 
nationality according to Amiri Decree No. 19/1959 and Decree-Law No.20/1981. 
Article 2 of the former decree provides that: 
courts may not adjudicate in matters of supremacy. Nor may they 
nullify an administrative order, suspend its enforcement or interpret it. 
They may however adjudicate in civil and commercial disputes 
Z3 Interview with Dr. 'Abdulaziz AI-Mansor. London, July 2002. 
~4 Human Rights Watch, 1995. op.cit. p.99. 
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between individuals and the government except where the contrary 
may be provided by law.2s 
The Kuwaiti government has maintained that sovereign actions include 
citizenship questions. This position is confirmed by the opinion expressed by 
the office of legislation at the Council of Ministers that states; 
citizenship is a political and legal link between individuals and the 
state by which they are obliged to be loyal to the state and the latter 
is obliged to provide them protection. Therefore, any questions 
related to citizenship emanate from the very sovereignty of the state. 
By virtue of this sovereignty, the state alone determines who may be 
in its population. The state alone creates citizenship and determines 
the conditions for conferring citizenship or obtaining it ... It follows 
from this that questions related to citizenship are at the heart of the 
internal matters of the state. In addition, control of citizenship is a 
sovereign realm because it is closely related to public order. 
Therefore, under accepted general principles of law, domestic law 
has absolute freedom in regulating citizenship in the manner deemed 
appropriate to the welfare of the community.26 
This view means that citizenship issues are in fact determined by the executive 
branch of the government, while the judicial branch has no direct control and 
the legislative, by virtue of the use of decree-laws, have also had limited 
influence over the matter. Paradoxically the Kuwaiti government's view on 
citizenship as a sovereign domestic issue contravenes with the position of the 
International Court of Justice. The Court acknowledges that citizenship is a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction, but is not an exclusive jurisdiction: state actions 
are conditioned by binding international law. 
2~ :\miri Decree Number 19/1959. 
26 Human Rights \\' atch. 1995. op.cit. p.69. 
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Also according to law No 20/1981, dealing with administrative orders and 
decisions, the Administrative Court was given jurisdiction to nullify, suspend or 
interpret administrative orders and decisions, but matters relating to nationality 
has been specifically excluded.27 The government maintained its position that 
any matters relating to nationality belong to the realm of the "sovereign actions" 
of the state. This shows the concern of al Sabah about citizenship law and the 
need to control changes, interpretations and applications of the law. 
3.4 Naturalisation and the Limits on Eligibility and Political Rights 
This section will explore some of the important amendments to nationality law 
that further limited the eligibility of Kuwaiti citizenship and the consequences of 
that on the continued control of al Sabah of who participate and who is excluded 
from political life. It will also deal with the limitation of political rights set on 
those who acquire citizenship through naturalisation. 
In Articles (4), (5), (6) and (7) Kuwaiti citizenship law deals with acquired 
citizenship by virtue of continuous residency in the country. Article (4) specifies 
that a foreigner can be granted Kuwaiti nationality if he has normally and 
lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 15 consecutive years, or at least 8 
consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The years of 
the residency period are calculated preceding the submission of the application 
for naturalisation. Article (5) stipulates that persons who have rendered 
valuable services of great benefit to Kuwait can become naturalised Kuwaiti 
citizens. 
Reference to the children of a foreigner, who acquired the Kuwaiti nationality, is 
made in Article (7). Accordingly they shall ipso facto be considered Kuwaiti 
nationals. Thus the offspring of naturalised Kuwaitis has been treated not 
according to Article (2) as the proper legal interpretation of the law implies but 
as naturalised person in accordance with Article (7). This practice as 
mentioned before only ended in 1994. 
~' Al-Samdaan. op.cit p.14-71. 
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Amendments to the law extended the residency period and added more 
restrictions in order to limit the number of eligible persons. Amiri Decree No. 
211960 stipulated that citizenship may be granted to persons who resided in 
Kuwait for 15 years from the date of the publication of the Decree, or for at least 
ten years if they are an Arab. The second amendment is the restriction of the 
number of those who shall be granted naturalised citizenship to a mere 50 
persons in anyone year. 
Another important change was passed in Decree-Law No. 100/1980 stipulating 
that the number of people naturalised in anyone year shall be decided by 
resolution of the Council of Ministers. This was again amended in 1982 in 
Statue No. 7/1982 which stated that the citizenship is to be decided by an Act 
and that the naturalised citizen must be of the Muslim faith either by birth or 
conversion. A period of 5 years must have passed since the religious 
conversion. Another amendment in 1982 raised the period required for 
residency to 15 years for Arabs and 20 years for non-Arabs. 
Residency requirements in Kuwait far exceed the requirements of many other 
countries. For instance if Kuwait has applied the five year or more permanent 
residency requirement, as applied in the US, and naturalised all those who are 
eligible from the year 1975, it would have doubled the Kuwaiti population to a 
total of around 472,000 by adding 303,000 residents, of which 254, 000 would 
be Arabs.28 That gives a fair idea of the magnitude of the problem and the 
dilemma that faces the Kuwaiti government. There is a need for a gradual 
Iiberalisation of the naturalisation law if the major schism in the society between 
a small minority of citizens with full social, economic and political rights and a 
majority of expatriate community with no political rights and restricted economic 
and social rights is to be resolved. 
Despite the significance of all the above mentioned restrictions, the most 
important one remains the denial of political rights. According to Article (6) a 
28 Baaklini. op.cit. p.187. 
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foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of 
Article (4) and (5). 
Shall not have the right to vote in any parliamentary election or to 
stand as a candidate for or to be appointed to membership of any 
parliamentary body within ten years following the date of his 
naturalisation.29 
Moreover the law states that the provisions of this article shall apply to any who 
have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of naturalisation prior to the 
enactment of this law. And the ten-year period shall be deemed to start to run 
in the case of such persons from the date of the publication of this law. This 
denial is seen as temporary and no indefinite restriction was put on the 
provision of political rights. However, this article was amended and an indefinite 
restriction was put upon the capacity of a naturalised citizen to stand for election 
or to become a member of parliament by stating that a naturalised citizen: 
shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for or to be appointed 
to membership of any parliamentary body. 30 
The only political right naturalised citizens may have is voting, and even that 
has been restricted. Statue 70/1966 extended the period before they are 
eligible to vote until twenty years following and shall apply to those who have 
already acquired Kuwaiti nationality prior to the enactment of this law. The 
twenty years period shall be deemed to start to run in the case of such persons 
from the date of the publication of the amendment. This was amended in 1986 
by Decree law NO. 130/1986 and was raised to a 30 years period. That 
extension in reality meant (since the period is calculated from 1966) that 
2() See Appendix C. Kuwait Nationality Law. 
~o R. H. Al-Anezi. ":\ Study of the Role of Nationality in International Law with Special Reference to the 
Law and PractIce of Kuwait." Ph .D thesis. Uni \,crsity of Cambridge. 1990. p.2.+3. 
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naturalised citizens were allowed to vote for the first time in the 1996 elections. 31 
Such restrictions exaggerate divisions in the Kuwaiti society and gives 
prominence to the notion that being a Kuwaiti is a very special status. It also 
exposes the fear of al Sabah which is based on from the prospect of 
incorporating other Arabs as Kuwaiti citizens and the association of that with 
losing their total dominance and control. 
In this context of a very exclusive and restrictive naturalisation law, the mass 
naturalisation of the badu takes on a very specific importance and reveals the 
selective and unfair way that the Kuwaiti government pursued, in addition to the 
politicisation of the issue of naturalisation. 
3.5 Naturalisation of the Badu 
The discovery of oil and the accelerated socio-economic development of Kuwait 
was accompanied by a successive and continuous flow of Bedouin migrants 
who came primarily from the Arabian desert, mostly from Saudi Arabia, followed 
by I raq and Syria, as seen from table 3.2. They were attracted to settlement in 
Kuwait due to the new and expanded economic opportunities as well as the 
benefits offered by the welfare state. The Kuwaiti government pursued two 
different policies towards these Bedouin migrants. For some, it chose to 
naturalise them as full Kuwaiti citizens, while others were left without 
citizenship. This section will discuss the consequences of the naturalisation of 
those badu on the system of representation in the country, while the stateless 
badu will be dealt with in the following section. 
Despite the very restrictive and discriminatory nature of the Kuwaiti citizenship 
law, the Kuwait government began in 1961 to grant a large number of Bedouins 
the Kuwaiti citizenship, offering them the full advantages of citizenship; social, 
economic and political. 
31 Ib'd "')4-1 '. p,_ ). 
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Table 3.2 The Main Bedouin Tribes of Kuwait 
Tribe Tribal Unit Tribal Territory 
'Azmi Awazem Kuwait and eastern area of Saudi 
Arabian Gulf coast 
'Ajmi Ajman Southern and western Kuwait and 
eastern Saudi Arabia 
Mutairi Mutair North eastern Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait 
Rashidi Rashaydah Kuwait and North eastern 
Saudi Arabia 
'Anzi 'Anza Spread across northern Arabian 
peninsula from Syria/Jordan to 
Kuwait 
Shmmari Shammar North central Saudi Arabia and 
western Iraq 
Dhafiri Dhafir From Zubair in Iraq westwards and 
south into Kuwait 
Khaldi Bani Khalid Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia 
Fadhli Fadhul Southwestern Iraq and northern 
Kuwait 
Dosari Dawasir West central Saudi Arabia 
Murri Murra From the Empty Quarter north 
through eastern Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar 
Hajeri Bani Hajer Qatar and eastern central Saudi 
Arabia 
Qahtani Qahtan Central Saudi Arabia 
'Utalbai 'Utban Northern central Saudi Arabia 
Main Concentration in Kuwait 
Salmiya, Riqqa, Mangaf, Dhahar, 
Jaber-al-AIi, Qarin, Sahrq, Um-al-
haiman, Sabah-al-salim, Fahaleel, 
Rumaithiya, Salwa, Bayyan, Sabahiya. 
Jahra, Riqqa, Sabahiya, Hadiyya, 
Ahmadi,Fahaheel, Sabah-al Salim, 
Abu-halifa, Dhahar, Qarain, Fintas, Um 
al Hayam 
Jaleeb al Shuyoukh, Khetain, Omariya, 
Sabahiya, Farwaniya, Firdoas, 
'Aardhya, Andloss, Sabah al Nasser 
Farwaniya, Sulaibikhat, Jahra, Rabiya, 
Andloss, Omariyah 
Jahra, Fahaheel and dispersed 
throughout the country 
Jahra, Omariya, Sulaibiya, Sabahiya 
Jahra, Omariya, Firdous,Sulaibikhat 
Dispersed throughout the country 
Fahaheel, Sulaibikhat, Sabahiya, Jahra 
Sabaiya, Fahaheel, Riqqa 
Fahaheel, Mina -al-Zour, Ahmadi, 
Sabahiya, Riqqa 
Fahaheel, Ahmadi, Riqqa, Sabahiya, 
Qareen, Sabah ai-Salim 
Fahaleel, Sabahiya, Sabah ai-Salim 
Kheitan, Jahra, Sabah -ai-salim 
Fahaheel 
Source: Abdullah Khalifah al Shaayji. Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for Political SurvIval, Ph.D 1988. And updated by the 
Researcher of this thesis. 
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The naturalisation programme over the period 1965-1981 included 220,000, the 
majority of which were badu. 32 The incorporation of the badu into the Kuwaiti 
state aimed to strengthen the ruling family's base of support and to provide a 
counterweight to any opposition that might develop in urban centres; and to 
prevent a large shift in the demographic balance between the Kuwaitis and the 
expatriate population from going too far in favour of the latter as well as to 
lessen the influence of old trading elite.33 What al Sabah asked in return for all 
the advantages that citizenship brings with, as indicated by Crystal, is electoral 
loyalty. 34 
Before 1962 the badu were a marginal group in the political system of Kuwait 
especially in comparison with the merchant community. Only one badu, Hilal al 
Mutairi, participated in 1921 Consultative Council, while the 1938 elected 
legislative council had no representative from the badu community.35 Their 
migratory nature and lack of any economic power and being far from urban 
centres, made them less influential and their political role was essentially 
passive. 36 Still al Sabah depended on their loyalty and support. Their rise to 
eminence began with the elections for the constituent assembly, where they 
were able to account for 34 percent of the total elected members, nearing the 
share held by the merchant community. 
Thus with the introduction of a representative system in Kuwait in 1963, their 
political role and their significance to al Sabah began to unfold. On the one 
hand the National Assembly provided them with a channel to gain access to 
economic, political and social benefits while on the other they gave al Sabah the 
32 Shafiq AI-Ghabra. (Ghabra, Shafeeq), AI-kuwayt: dirasat fi a'liyat al-dawla al-qutriya wa al-sulta wa 
al-mujtama'. (Kuwait: a Study of Mechanism of the State, Government and Society). (Cairo: Markaz ibn 
khaldun, 1995) .. p.55. 
" AI-Fayez, op.cit. p.145-146. 
34 Crystal, op.cit. p.89. 
35 Jascm Mohammad Jerkhi. "The Electoral Process in Kuwait: A Geographical Study". Ph. D, thesis, 
University of Exeter, 1984. p.157. 
36 AI-Faycz, l)p.cit. p. lOS. 
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new allies they have been searching for outside the old merchant community. 
Crystal notes that: 
One forum for this search was the National Assembly. There the 
Amirs balanced the merchants with the Bedouins, Shias, and 
progressives, in turn politicising each community. Once politicised, 
however, these communities became harder to control. 37 
However, al Sabah have still been able during times of crisis to keep the upper 
hand by resorting to the ultimate method of control, namely the suspension of 
the assembly. The enhancement of the political status of the badu is reflected 
in the number of seats they captured in the National Assembly between 1963 
and 1975. In 1963 they captured 19 seats (38 percent). In the following three 
legislative terms they controlled 17 seats (34 percent) in 1967, 21 seats (42 
percent) in 1971, and 23 seats (46 percent) in 1975.38 
One of the major reasons that made the badu a reliable ally to al Sabah in the 
assembly is the ability of tribal leaders to use tribal solidarity to maintain a hold 
on their constituencies through the mechanism of "internal election".39 Before 
election, tribes call for a meeting in which all eligible candidates stand for 
election and the winners are declared as the tribal nominees and their followers 
are urged to vote for those chosen at the meeting. This ensures that 
candidates who do not conform to the political and social idea of the 
conservative tribal leaders will be excluded and the district remains under the 
tribe's control. 40 With the increase in the number of young educated badu, 
dissatisfaction with the traditional way of conducting election is emerging, albeit 
slowly and among a minority. This is manifested by the small number of 
37 Crystal. op.cit. p.83. 
38 Ahmad Abdullah Saad Baz. "Political Elite and Political Development in Kuwait." Ph. D thesis, 
George Washington University. 1981. p.21O. 
39 . Abdullah Al-Nifisi. Al-kuwayt: al-ra'y al- 'akhar. (Kuwait: the Other View). (London: Taha 
Advertising, 1978). p. 74-76. 
4°8 . "1" az. op.clt. p. __ . 
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candidates who run for election without winning In the internal election 
competition. Such defiance to the tribe helps to undermine the present system. 
The practice of internal election is not only resented by some badu, it has also 
been challenged by many Kuwaitis as unconstitutional. However the 
government does not question its legality.41 AI Nifisi sees the effect of the badu 
on democracy as negative because the increased influence of the badu as a 
group has fragmented popular participation, undermined opposition and allowed 
al Sabah to control the composition of the assembly. In his opinion all these 
factors limit the usefulness of the democratic experience and the role of the 
assembly.42 However, one must add that it is not only the badu who emphasise 
traditional loyalties and influence the selection of candidates, but also hadhar 
Kuwaitis use the diwaniyya to influence who will be nominated and then 
supported by the sect, family, etc .. 
One of the major criticisms levied at the government's policy of naturalisation is 
its failure to reverse the declining percentage of the Kuwaiti population in the 
expatriate community. The ruling family aim of influencing the demographic 
structure of Kuwait by increasing the number of Kuwaiti citizens and their ratio 
in the total population did not materialise. As seen in table 3.3 ratio of the 
Kuwaitis, in the total population was 36 percent in 1965 and remains 
approximately the same in 2001 at around 38 percent. The need for foreign 
labour remains very high and naturalisation had little impact on improving the 
unique demographic situation of Kuwait. 43 However, the policy succeeded in 
widening the support basis of the al Sabah rule and gave the badu a stake in 
the system. 
41 AI-Shayeji. op.cit. p.209. 
4~ AI-Nifisi. op.cit. p.74. 
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Table 3.3 The Population of Kuwait According to Nationality 
Year Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total Population % Kuwaiti 
1965 168,793 298,546 467,339 36.10% 
1975 307,755 687,082 994,837 30.90% 
1985 470,473 1,226,828 1,697,301 27.70% 
1995 653,616 921,954 1,575,570 41.50% 
2001 859,958 1,415,022 2,274,980 37.80% 
Source:Ministry of Planning In Kuwait 
The ability of al Sabah to embark on such mass naturalisation was made 
possible by the increased wealth of the country due to the unprecedented rise in 
oil revenues. As seen in table 3.4 oil revenues in 1968 stood at around $737 
million, jumping to nearly $2 billion in 1974. This massive accumulation of 
wealth allowed al Sabah to build a welfare state and to create a dependent 
state-citizen relationship. 
43 Ib'd '19 '19 I ., p._ -_ . 
83 
Table 3.4 The Oil Revenues of Kuwait During the Period 1968-2001 
Millions 
Year Revenues KD Revenues in US$ 
1968 263.10 736.68 
1969 243.00 680.40 
1970 280.40 785.12 
1971 297.70 833.56 
1972 254.10 770.95 
1973 505.90 1,565.24 
1974 543.90 1,856.64 
1975 2,056.50 7,063.11 
1976 3,458.00 11,852.30 
1977 2,598.30 8,973.69 
1978 2,575.40 9,149.04 
1979 3,036.00 11,068.63 
1980 5,940.50 21,662.16 
1981 4,434.20 16,301.03 
1982 2,764.10 9,737.54 
1983 2,334.60 8,027.65 
1984 2,923.50 9,997.93 
1985 2,493.80 8,268.04 
1986 2,094.70 7,146.44 
1987 1,483.90 5,208.45 
1988 1,991.40 7,175.64 
1989 2,035.10 7,102.05 
1990 2,935.70 9,958.86 
1991 246.10 848.73 
1992 495.90 1,708.16 
1993 2,085.30 6,977.97 
1994 2,324.30 7,784.94 
1995 2,784.80 9,370.01 
1996 3,113.50 10,384.23 
1997 3,935.90 13,072.58 
1998 3,208.40 10,527.02 
1999 2,254.40 7,410.58 
2000 4,794.50 15,705.41 
2001 4,528.00 14,746.00 
Source: Central Bank 01 Kuwait 
There is a sharp distinction in terms of the entitlement to rights and privileges 
between citizens on the one hand and non-citizens on the other. This policy is 
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aimed at strengthening the attachment of citizens to the country and the regime 
while at the same time increasing their sense of separation from the expatriate 
community. As indicated byal Fayez: 
The services and benefits enjoyed by the Kuwaitis have transformed 
them into privileged minority within the country's larger population, 
tending to maintain and reinforce their loyalty to the government and 
the ruling family. 44 
The Kuwaiti government provides a comprehensive welfare system that 
includes; free education, health and social services. It guarantees every 
Kuwaiti a job and provides housing for needy Kuwaiti families while it does not 
impose any sort of taxes on its citizens. In addition the government subsidises 
basic services, such as water, electricity and gasoline which are sold to the 
public at below cost prices. It also has a programme to keep basic food prices 
down. So, al Sabah has used their wealth to political advantage expecting 
loyalty and support from its citizens. 
AI Sabah certainly appreciates this connection and hence even at times of 
dwindling oil revenues they have been reluctant to cut expenditure on social 
services, subsides and even salaries. In the mid eighties the magnitude of the 
drop of oil revenues was significant. The combined oil revenues of the three 
principle Gulf exporters, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates fell 
from $186 billion in 1982 to $57.6 billion in 1985.45 These falling revenues are 
of huge significance since Kuwait's economy is heavily dependent on oil. During 
1981-1984 oil revenues dropped by 30 percent, 14 percent and 3 percent 
respectively.46 However the government's sensitivity to the political implication 
of drastic cuts in social spending limited the governments' ability to effect the 
necessary changes in the economy in response to these falling revenues. 
44 Al-Fayez. op.cit. p.139 
45 Shireen Hunter. "The Gulf Economic Crisis and its Social and Political Consequence. The Middle 
East Journal. V 40. N. 4. 1986. p. 593. 
46 Ibid .. p.597. 
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3.6 The Bidoons 
The government policy towards the segment of the population that has been 
designated as the "bidoon jinsiyya", literally meaning "without nationality" or 
"citizenship" because their qualification for Kuwaiti nationality is in doubt, 
actually stands in quite sharp contrast to the liberal and generous policy of 
mass naturalisation of other Bedouin migrants. 
Although the government did not grant the Bidoon full citizenship, they allowed 
them to claim the status of "stateless persons"; persons not belonging to any 
state, and the term has been commonly used in formal government statements 
and pronouncements.47 However, in the 1980s as part of a new policy of the 
government towards the Bidoon, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution by 
which the term "bidoon" was to be abandoned and a new term of "Non-Kuwaiti 
National" was introduced to be used in reference to that group of people.4B 
The change is meant to reduce pressure on the Kuwaiti government to respect 
human rights and international law by treating this group as stateless persons 
and hence the need for a solution. A "Non-Kuwaiti" or "Undetermined" can 
mean that a person has another nationality and is withholding it.49 Also and 
more importantly this change reverses the previous assumption that they may 
have belonged to Bedouin tribes of Kuwait and that many of them were not to 
be treated as non-nationals. 50 Despite the official change of language the 
phrase Bidoon is still very widely used. 
The Bidoon are long term residents in Kuwait who under Nationality Law 
15/1959 should be eligible to naturalisation but have not yet been granted it. 
They include the following categories: 
47 AI-Anezi. 1990, op.cit. p.263. 
48 Ibid .. p.263 
49 AI-Anezi. 1994. op.cit. p.6. 
~() AI-Anezi, 1990. op.cit. p.263. 
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• Those who were unable to prove continuous settlement in Kuwait prior to 
1920, as the law requires. 
• Those who could have registered but neglected to do so. 
• Those who applied for nationality and were accepted for consideration but 
whose case has never been acted upon by the Kuwaiti authorities. 
• Children of bidoon parents including children of Kuwaiti mothers and 
bidoon fathers. 
• Those who migrated from neighbouring countries for work and lost links to 
their country of origin. 51 
Several factors contributed directly to the emergence of the bidoon issue. One 
relates to the fact that thousands of Bedouins applied for Kuwaiti nationality 
following the promulgation of the law on the grounds that they lived within the 
territorial limits of Kuwait and not within a city or town. Other concerns the 
similarities between the badu of the Kuwait desert and the badu from the rest of 
the Arabian Desert, which made it difficult to distinguish between the two 
groups. Also ignorance of the law and its requirements as well as the scarcity of 
documentary records, made assessment of applications very hard. Thus, the 
nationality committee made subjective and discretionary decisions which led to 
an outcome that left many who considered themselves Kuwaitis without a 
nationality being granted.52 
These Bedouin immigrants unlike other immigrants to Kuwait believe Kuwait 
territory was part of their own widespread homeland but they are also eager to 
gain for Kuwaiti citizenship because of all the benefits it can bring them.53 That 
51 I luman Rights Watch. "Kuwait: Promises Betrayed, Denial Rights of Bidun, Women, and Freedom of 
Expression". Report 2000. Http://www.hrw.org. 
52 :\l-Anezi, 1990, op.cit. p.263. 
53 Abdulrasoul AI-f\loosa. "Bedouin Shanty Settlement in Kuwait" Ph.D thesis, University of London, 
1976. p. 68. 
87 
explains why the majority of them claim that they are genuinely Kuwaiti, whether 
they have such a citizenship or not. Also a large number of them are employed 
by the state and because of this have been extremely loyal to al Sabah. 
With the continuous flow of badu migrants, attracted by the expanded 
opportunities in Kuwait, their numbers have risen over time and they have 
managed to create a new difficulty for the government, through the appearance 
of shantytowns where most of the bidoon reside. During the 1960s shanty 
areas mushroomed and they were built on either government land or private 
land at the edge of urban areas as seen in figure 3.1. These areas lacked all 
kinds of service facilities: sanitation, roads, health centres, police and municipal 
quarters. As described by al Moosa: 
Shanty areas represent a Bedouin community, which has temporary 
characteristics from the physical point of view. The accommodation 
is built of poor material and the fact the occupiers do not own the 
land, means that they are liable to movement at any time by the 
government (or on the suggestion of a relative) from one area to 
another.$4 
Although the majority of those who live in shanty areas came from the desert 
some had lived within Kuwait villages before they settled in the shanty areas 
while a very small minority came from either Kuwait city or Kuwait suburbs. 
Non-Bedouins, who migrated to Kuwait for economic opportunities but either 
earn very low incomes or are unemployed, also live in these areas.55 Over the 
years, many of these shanty areas have disappeared due to government's 
action. 
Unlike some Arab countries, Kuwait's concern with badu migrants did not 
revolve around settlement schemes since they were already settled or semi-
settled. Their concern was to organise the settlement and to plan the conditions 
under which the Bedouins will/ive and the manner in which their relationship to 
54 Ibid., p.S7. 
"Ibid., p.61. 
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society and the state can be improved for mutual benefit.56 Consequently, 
extensive work was carried out by the state to expand state-built dwellings, and 
offer state loans and plots for house building . The state allocated huge sums of 
money for that purpose and subsequently shantytowns have disappeared and 
the living standards of middle to low income families have improved 
sign ificantly. 
Figure 3.1 Residential Patterns in Kuwait 
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Source: Nlcos Gavrleldles In Elections In the Middle East, ed. Linda Layne 
This was also part of the process of increasing the political legitimacy of al 
Sabah.s7 Such undertaking by the government also indicates that the state has 
formally recognised these bidoon as a legitimate part of the Kuwaiti community 
and has helped facilitating their integration. 
The specific number of Bidoon has not been accurately determined. Until the 
mid-eighties general estimations of their total number was included in the count 
of Kuwaiti citizens in the Ministry of Planning Annual Statistical Abstract. They 
were also issued with documents officially identifying them as bidoon. 
However, by 1988 this was changed and statistical data on bidoon was 
~6 Ibid ., p.269. 
7 bdulkaraim AI-Dekhayal. "The tate and Politi al Legitimating in an Oil Rentier Econom : Kuwait 
as a a e tud ." Ph. D th i, Uni er ity ofE eter, 1990. p.318. 
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transferred from the Kuwaiti category over to the alien population category.58 
Estimates of the number of Bidoon vary between 200,000 and 350,000.59 The 
government estimated their number to be 200,000, but this number has been 
reduced to 117,000 after liberation, since the government refused entry to large 
numbers of returnee Bidoon.60 The Ministry of Home Affairs established a 
special unit, the Central Committee (CC) to register, regularise and oversee 
Bidoon affairs. The CC has total control over the bidoon and can have the 
authority to issue deportation orders. 61 
Prior to the change of government policy towards the bidoon, they were treated 
as lawful residents of Kuwait and Kuwaiti officials have frequently promised to 
grant them citizenship. They were treated as being full citizens hired on a 
permanent basis, and granted all social services and access to employment by 
the government agencies etc. Moreover those working in the army and security 
forces were, in accordance with Article (17) of Kuwaiti Law on Passports, issued 
passports to facilitate travel when they were on an official business trip.52 
The change in the policy towards them was sudden. Overnight they were 
considered illegal residents unless they produced citizenship documents. This 
gave credence to the claim reiterated over the years by some Kuwaiti officials 
that the bidoon have a nationality that they have deliberately withheld on 
purpose of enjoying the benefits granted by the Kuwaiti state to its nationals. 
Sheikh Saud Nasser al Sabah, Minister of Information indicated: 
This bidoon phenomena started in Kuwait many years ago when 
people were smuggled here from outside. They would throwaway 
their documents passports and foreign identity cards and live In 
Kuwait, claiming that they were without any document. .. 63 
58 Human Rights Watch. 2000. 
59 AI-Shayeji. op.cit. p.174. 
60 :\1-' Anezi, 1994, op.cit. p.6. 
61 A. Shiblak. "Kuwait Bedoon Holder Passport Article IT', Http://www.shaml.org. p.2. 
61 Ib'd ') 1 .• p._. 
63 AI-sharq al-awsat Newspaper. Jan 9. 1993. 
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This Kuwaiti position was reiterated in a speech in 1994 before the foreign 
Press Association in London insisting that the bidoon 
... are benefiting from the social services. Many people come across 
the border and destroy their existing nationality papers and claim 
they are stateless. If they had to pay income tax and if there was no 
free medical care or education in Kuwait there would be no more 
bidoon. Some people from the Arabian Peninsula may have been 
denied citizenship unjustly; we will look into these cases and they will 
be granted citizenship. 64 
There are some who call themselves bidoon, but are not real bidoons, they 
infiltrated into Kuwait especially during the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 
1988 and claimed to be Bidoon to benefit from that status. But this small 
minority can be easily distinguished from the real Bidoon by referring to the 
census, in which they were registered, including the census of 1965. There are 
well-maintained records documenting who was in Kuwait and when. 65 
Some believe the underlying reason for the shift of the government's policy is 
due to consideration of domestic security especially in light of the Iran-Iraq 
war.66 AI Najjar suggests that the timing coincided with the discovery of a pro 
I ranian cell working within the Kuwaiti army consisting of around 78 members. 
Although he indicates that there has been no official confirmation of this 
discovery nor whether it was working for Iran or Iraq, the cabinet's discussion of 
the issue of the bidoon and its decision to shift its policy came in the wake of 
these rumours. 67 
Another possible explanation may be attributed to financial consideration 
especially that the change of policy happened with the recession in the oil 
64 Human Rights Watch, 1995, op.cit. p.56. 
65 AI-Anezi. 1990, op.cit. p.269. 
66 Interview with Dr. Ghanim AI-Najjar. Kuwait, November. 2002 
67 Ibid 
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market and dwindling of state revenues. The cost of naturalising large numbers 
of people is believed to be prohibitive in the government, due to the increase in 
demand for services, amenities and economic benefits from housing, 
employment, health care education, etc.58 An additional explanation may be the 
general apprehension that hadhar Kuwaitis hold against the bidoon. They see 
them as foreigners who conceal their original nationality in the hope of acquiring 
the very special Kuwaiti nationality.59 The most probable explanation is that the 
combination of all these factors together has pushed al Sabah to drastically 
change their policy towards the Bidoon. 
The anti-Bidoon policy intensified with devastating effects in post liberation 
Kuwait. Firstly, the military defeat in the face of the Iraqi invasion was blamed 
on the Bidoon since they represent a large proportion of the rank and file of the 
military. However as indicated by a former bidoon government employee, 
Kuwaitis ignored the sacrifices of the Bidoon, doubted their loyalty and used 
them as scapegoats. He emphasised that 
some Kuwaiti officials may say, and even believe, that most bidoons 
have Iraqi origins; but when Iraq invaded on August 2, the bidoons 
opposed Iraq. If they had felt loyal to Iraq, they could have fought 
with Iraq. But in fact, al/ Bidoons reported to their military bases on 2 
August and many of those killed or taken prisoners by the Iraqi were 
bidoons. The problem was that officers did not have orders to fight 
and that top officers, including Chief of Staff and his deputy, fled. 70 
Secondly, the Bidoon were accused of collaborating with the Iraqi regime. In 
September 1990 the I raqi occupation authorities ordered all non-Kuwaiti citizens 
to join the popular army, a militia founded to support the Iraqi army. The 
bidoons who joined were forced by either fear or lack of jobs, while others were 
motivated by the way they have been treated by the Kuwaiti authorities prior to 
the invasion. However, this has been used by Kuwait to brand all bidoons, as 
68 AI-Anezi. 1990. op.cit. p.272. 
69Human Rights Watch, 1995. op.cit. p.24. 
70 Ibid .• p.28. 
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being collaborators, even despite some of the obvious sacrifices many of them 
made. This accusation was also used returning to the country after liberation. 
There are suggestions that the number of bidoon stranded outside Kuwait was 
around 130,000-160,000, and mostly in Iraq, since it was the only country 
where they could flee to because of lack of citizenship documents, around 
130,000-160,000.71 
Since the independence of Kuwait, the Bidoon have formed the backbone of the 
military and police forces. The government actively sought the recruitment of 
Bedouins to serve in the police force, armed forces and the National Guard and 
in the 1950s and 1960s it recruited large numbers. Committees were set up by 
the Ministry of Defence to choose suitable and eligible Bedouins depending on 
the person's tribe. 72 Thus, the majority of those who serve in the security forces 
come from the tribes of the northern regions of the Arabian Peninsula, such as 
the Shamar, Mutayr, Utaybah, Awazim and the Rashaydah. Their loyalty to al 
Sa bah stems from their tribal loyalty: the mens' loyalty to the tribe and the 
tribe's loyalty to the Kuwaiti ruling family.73 
They were encouraged to join by the promise that such a route could lead to 
citizenship and was also one of the best available methods for upward social 
mobility. The Bidoon in the military and police were exempt from the strict 
measures the government adopted in the mid-eighties and they continued to be 
treated as citizens in terms of job security and benefits. In accordance with an 
earlier government's inclination to grant citizenship to the Bidoon, the Defence 
Minister announced in October 1976 that non-Kuwaiti defence, police and 
National Guard personnel would be considered for naturalisation. In July 1981, 
the Interior Minister, announced that every one who had served fifteen years in 
the security forces (army, police and national guard) would receive Kuwaiti 
citizenship, and that this citizenship would be confirmed upon the completion of 
twenty years of military service. Subsequently the government invited 
71 Ibid., p.28. 
n. Ibid., p.28. 
73 AI-Faycz, op.cit. p. 248-249. 
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applications to citizenship and over 100,000 persons applied. 74 Nonetheless 
little progress was made. 
As a result of the Iraqi invasion, this favourable position by the government for 
the Bidoon to serve in the security forces dramatically changed. They were 
dismissed en masse and only small fractions were allowed to rejoin their posts 
after liberation. According to estimations in for 1995, the bidoon constituted 
only 25 per cent of the rank and file as compared to the 85 percent at the pre-
invasion stage.75 The Kuwaiti government's which is to "Kuwaitize" the army, 
not by granting citizenship to the bidoon but by replacing them with Kuwaiti 
citizens. 76 
One can imagine the effects of this policy on thousands of bidoon who saw 
themselves deprived a livelihood and a place of residence and/or between 
illegally resident in the country they considered their "home". Ya'qoub al 
Mehaini - head of the Investigation Department at the ministry of interior, the 
main agency in charge with implementing policies towards the Bidoon, justifies 
the Kuwaiti policy on security grounds. He emphasises that 
Kuwait is passing through a very sensitive period. The presence of 
these people in Kuwait might produce dangerous influences on 
security and stability, especially since most of them are 
unemployed. 77 
The unemployment of the bidoon is ironically the result of the Kuwaiti 
government denying them the right to work since they have been considered 
illegal residents in the country. AI-Anezi an expert on the question of the 
bidoons puts the blame squarely on the government's inconsistent and 
changing policy towards the bidoon. He states; 
74 Ibid .. p.196. 
75 Nora Boustany. "Peace Has Sort Taste for Many Kuwaitis". Washington Post: May 25, 1995. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Human Rights Watch. 1995,op.cit. p.57. 
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The blame lies with the government, which gave bidoons the hope of 
becoming citizens. Kuwait officials at the highest levels repeatedly 
promised that the bidoons would be naturalised. In 1970, the 
National Assembly authorised the government to grant citizenship to 
all Bidoons born in Kuwait and who remained in the country until they 
completed high school. But that was enforced for one year only. In 
1985, the government adopted a totally different strategy: to get rid of 
the bidoons. This was implemented in the case of those who were 
not employed in the armed forces or the police. They were 
dismissed from their jobs, denied nationallD cards, denied the right 
to work or to send their children to school, denied the right to buy 
property - a drastic squeeze to force them to show their assumed 
real ltcitizenship". Only those who produced foreign passports were 
permitted to stay legally in Kuwait. Because some did in fact 
produce foreign passports, the government was encouraged to 
continue the squeeze. But in fact only a small number of them have 
foreign passports and identify cards. Now only those in the military 
or police get access to government schools or medical services. 78 
Some government officials and National Assembly deputies have questioned 
the government policy towards the Bidoon. However, few support granting 
citizenship in large numbers. On humanitarian grounds, most disagree with the 
way the government is dealing with the issue and support an end to the 
repressive policies and advocate the granting of temporary residence until a 
permanent solution is agreed upon. That will enable the bidoon to work, marry 
and lead a normal lifestyle contrary to the inhumane and restrictive situation 
they are now Iiving.79 The Bidoon who currently live in Kuwait are denied the 
right to employment, travel, free medical care, register of marriages or to have a 
driving license.80 
78 Ibid., p.61 
79 Ibid .. p.62-63. 
80 Hassan Ali. "The Plight of Kuwaiti bidoons People". Http://w\\'w.shaml.org. p.~. 
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The denial of citizenship to the bidoon contravenes the main principles of 
international law. The Convention on the Status of Stateless persons (1954) 
and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) were intended to 
recognise the status of stateless individuals and provide measures to protect as 
well as to reduce and/or eliminate statelessness.81 Article 31 of the Convention 
of Stateless Persons specifically banned expulsion save on grounds of national 
security or public order, provided it is made with the due process of law. The 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in Article (1) made it an 
obligation to grant nationality to those born within state boundaries or for those 
who have lived for long period in a state. It also limited the period of residence 
proceeding the lodging of an application to citizenship not to exceed five years 
immediately preceding the lodging of the application nor ten years in all. 82 
Although Kuwait is not a signatory to either of the two conventions, many of 
their principles make up the customary law binding to all nations especially in 
accordance of article 15 U.N. of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,(1948).83 Because of the inequity against Kuwaiti women in nationality 
law the question of the bidoon is aggravated since children of bidoon fathers 
and of Kuwaiti mothers are classified as Bidoon in Kuwait law. This also 
violates international law creating stateless persons. 
Of late the only progress made on the issue, is the approval of Kuwait's 
parliament and the issuing by the government of Law No 22 on 3 June 2000. 
The law allows the Bidoon registered in the 1965 population census to apply for 
citizenship, applicants number some 36,000. However the law limits the 
number of naturalised bidoons to not exceed 2,000 annually. Despite that, only 
1, 000 have benefited from the law in its first year and for the second year very 
few did or none-at al1.84 
81 Human Rights Watch. 1995. op.cit. p.93-94. 
8' . 
- Ibid .• p.94. 
83 Ibid .. p.95. 
84 H . 3 us san. Op.Clt. p. . 
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As for the bidoon whom the law excluded, they were given till June 27 to 
regularise their status with the authorities or face prosecution and deportation. 
The decision was meant to pressure those ineligible to come forward with their 
true nationality as Kuwait has always maintained that Bidoon are citizens of 
neighbouring countries like Iraq, Iran and Syria who have hidden their original 
papers. Only 8,000 Bidoon admitted a foreign nationality and renounced claims 
to Kuwait citizenship. They were, thus, eligible to a five-year residency permit 
and other related benefits. 85 
It is obvious that the government first of all needs to acknowledge the presence 
of this very serious problem and be prepared to fully implement the provision of 
the nationality law and allow the courts a far more general jurisdiction in the 
matter.86 A more just system based on international principles of law seems to 
be the most appropriate way in order to resolve this persisting problem. The 
politically motivated process of granting and/or withholding nationality meant 
that some critics of the government have been very concerned about exactly 
how "just" the process has been. As National Assembly member Hussayn al 
Qalaf notes nationality is granted by connections (wastat) and payments. 87 
Such perceptions increase the resentment of those excluded toward the 
unfairness of the Kuwaiti citizenship law. 
3.7 Election legislation: the law of 1962 
This section discusses the implication of the election law on limiting the 
electoral body as well as the government's manipulation of the boundaries of 
constituencies, through their redrawing, in order to ensure that each election 
retu rns a pliable and loyal parliament. 
Law No. 35 of 1962 and its following amendments regulate election in Kuwait. 
The most important articles of the law relate to the limitation of the electorate. 
8) Worldwide Refugee Information ... Country Report: Kuwait". Http://refugees.org. p.3. 
86 AI-Anezi. 1990. op.cit. p.274. 
87 Human Rights Watch. 2000. op.cit. 
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According to Article (1) the right to vote is only given to male Kuwaitis over 
twenty one yeas old, thus suspending suffrage among women and naturalised 
citizens. Also suffrage is suspended for military and police personnel, based on 
Article (3) considering that a large number of them are bidoon they are denied 
the right to vote, for that reason alone. 
The result of the restriction of the right to vote is that the percentage that are 
eligible to vote is extremely small, in comparison to the total population of 
Kuwait. That puts a definite question mark on the very nature of "democracy" 
and the representative system of government in Kuwait when such large 
numbers of people have no direct influence on the government and the political 
process.BB For instance, in the 1985 elections, the electorate was confined to 
57,747 male Kuwaitis over 21, which represents just 3.5 percent of a population 
of 1.7 miliion.B9 
Government control is also exercised over the drawing and redrawing of 
electoral constituencies. The boundaries have been an issue of contention 
between the government and its opposition .since the first drawing of these 
boundaries. The government and the nationalists reached a compromise 
agreement where Kuwait was divided into ten districts as opposed to the twenty 
that were desired by the government and the one district which was desired by 
the nationalists. Still these districts were drawn in such a way as to give 
strength to particular social groups and to match the geographic distribution of 
the socio-political groups. These ten districts, as shown in table 3.5, indicate 
that each district corresponds to a particular concentration of the population. 
For instance, the first district matches the Shi'ite distribution of the population. 
The second matches the distribution of the Sunni merchant community. The 
third, fourth, ninth and tenth districts are dominated by a variety of tribes. 
88 Jeremy Landor. "Kuwait: Democracy by Minority." Index on Censorship (VoI.22. No.2 ,February 
1993): p. 24. 
89 K. Celine. "Kuwait Living on its Nerves." Merip Report. Feb,1985. 
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Table: 3.5 Kuwait's Old Voting Districts and Social Groups 
District Name Social Group 
1 Sharq Shia 
2 Qiblah Sunni merchants 
3 al Shuwaykh Tribes of Shamar, Daffier, 'Ajman and Aniza 
4 al Shamiyah Tribes of Mutair and Rashaidah 
5 Kayfan Mixed merchants and Utaybah tribe 
6 al Qadisiyah Sunnis and a minority of Shia 
7 al Dasma Shia and Sunni evenly divided 
8 Hawalli Sunni majority 
9 al Salmiyah Awazem tribe and a shia minority 
10 al Ahmadi Tribes of Ajman, Awazem and Fudul 
Source: Nicos Gavrielides in Elections in the Middle East, ed. Unda Layne, p185 
In district five the constituency is divided between a majority of Sunni with the 
Utaybah tribe. In the sixth district a majority of Sunni is combined with a 
minority of Shi'ite while the seventh district includes an equal number of Sunni 
and Shi'ite. 90 
In 1980 and during the period of the suspension of the parliament the 
government amended the boundaries of the election districts by issuing Law 
No. 99 (1980). The government justified the new distribution by indicating that 
the distribution of the population had changed, new areas have 
appeared while old ones disappeared. In addition it was very 
difficult for the voters, in particular the illiterates, to choose five 
candidates (the number of candidates under the previous law) which 
caused too many mistakes. In the new system the voter has only 
two candidates to elect which decreases the possibility of error. 91 
90 Jerki. op.cit. p .. l49-350. 
91 National Assembly Proceeding No. 419. 21111/1981. 
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These appear to be rather lame excuses especially when one considers the 
impact of the amended law on reducing the representation of the Sh i'ite , the 
nationalists and liberals while increasing the power of the tribes. This was 
clearly evidenced in the results of the 1981 elections. This will be further 
discussed in the following chapters. Suffice it is to say that the increase in the 
number of districts up to 25 led to fragmentation of votes to the detriment of the 
nationalist and liberal votes while the redrawing of the election districts 
enhanced the power of the badu vote. It also enhanced the reliance to win a 
seat on family, sect and tribal support at the expense of political platforms and 
the merits of candidates.92 Thus, people put loyalty to traditional identities and 
personal affiliations before their national loyalty. This tendency is aggravated 
by the absence of political parties, which helps to concentrate campaigning on 
issues rather than on the nature of candidates' affiliations. The government has 
justified the banning of political parties on the grounds that they cause 
fractiousness and division. However, the democracy that Kuwaiti Government 
promoted has itself divided the Kuwaitis and fragmented their loyalties. 
As mentioned above the support of the badu came from district numbers 3, 4, 5, 
9 and 10. The new law expanded their support base and allowed them to gain 
more seats, as seen in table 3.6. The tenth district was divided into five 
constituencies allowing the badu to double their share of seats in the area. 
Moreover district number three was divided into three constituencies hence 
increasing their seats by one while the fourth district was divided into three 
constituencies which also added another seat to the badu. The division of the 
fifth and ninth districts into two constituencies meant that the strength of the 
badu in the area remained as it did under the previous law.93 Thus the 
government managed to achieve its aim of increasing the presence of loyal 
members on the expense of the opposition in order to maintain its hold on the 
national assembly. 
Q~ AI Sh" . "83 
- aye]!. op.CIt. p..... . 
'l' Nicolas Gavrielides. "Tribal Democracy: The Anatomy of Parliamentary Elections in Kuwait." In 
Linda Layne led.). Elections in the Middle East: Implications of Recent Trends, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1987). p.166. 
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Malapportionment and gerrymandering of electoral districts is not exclusive to 
Kuwait. Such practices take place even in election legislation of developed 
countries. However, in a country where democracy is fragile and limited and 
also traditional loyalties permeate through of the society, then purposely 
reverting to such practices has put further limitation on the development of 
democracy and maintains the division of the society to the detriment of its 
national integration. As Gavrielides aptly states: 
Such bold procedures tampered with democracy and undermined 
Kuwait's electoral procedures and laws.94 
Gavrielides maintains that the new election system was designed to - and 
indeed, succeeded in - enhancing the strength of the al Sabah's tribal 
supporters at the expense of the merchants and the Shia.95 However, the 
coalition of 27 tribal members of the National Assembly proved a powerful 
and outspoken group which may have been one of the reasons which lead 
to the suspension of the National Assembly.96 As pointed out by Owen the 
government - despite its efforts towards engineering a tame assembly 
through the redrawing of boundaries - ended up with a very vocal and 
critical assembly that led to its dissolution.97 This proves that the dynamics 
of the ruler/ruled is complex and absolute pliability and loyalty cannot 
always be guaranteed. 
94 Ibid., p.283. 
95 Ibid., p.169 
96 Ibid .. p.180. 
97 Owen. op.cit. p34. 
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Table 3.6 Kuwait's New Election Districts 
DIstrIct Name SocIal Group 
1 Sharq Shii'te & a minority Sunni 
2 al-Marqab Sunni merchants 
3 al-Qiblah Sunni merchants 
4 alD'ayyah Sunni and Shia 
5 al Qadisiyah Sunni and minority Shia 
6 al Fayha Sunni hadhar 
7 Kayfan Sunni hadhar 
8 Hawalli Badu/Awazem & mixed 
9 al Rawda Sunnihadhar 
10 al 'Addayliyah Sunni hadhar 
11 al Khaldiyah Sunnihadhar 
12 AISalmiyah BadulAwazem & a minority Shi'ite 
13 al-rumaythiyah Shia and Badu Awazem 
14 Khaytan Badu/Utaybah 
15 al-Furwaniyah BadulRashaydah 
16 al Umariyah BadulRashaydah 
17 Jaliib al Shuyukh BadulMutair 
18 al Sulaybikhat BadulAnza/Awazem and hadhar 
19 al Jahra al -Jadidah Badu mixed 
20 al Jahra al Qadimah Badu mixed 
21 al Ahmadi Badu Ajman 
22 al Riqa Badu Ajman and Awazem 
23 al Sabahiyah Badu Awazem 
24 al Fahaheel Badu Awazeml Bani Hajer/Fadhul 
25 um al Hayman Badu Awazem 
Source: Nicos Gavrielides in Elections in the Middle East, ad. Unda Layne, p186. And updated by the Researcher of this thesis. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
The Kuwaiti Constitution stipulated a framework for an effective functioning of a 
representative system, putting checks and balances on the authority of the 
legislative and the executive. However, al Sabah's motivation for accepting 
such a system of government was to secure their dominance in Kuwait rather 
than to develop a well functionillg representative system. This has been 
suggested by the adoption of a very exclusive and restrictive citizenship and 
election law. These two laws can be argued to have undermined the stipulations 
of the Constitution without actually breaching it, and also having allowed al 
Sabah to control the dynamics of the elected assembly and control all political 
participation. 
Citizenship law has given the right of political participation to an extremely small 
proportion of the population, making it a highly privileged right rather than an 
integral part of the very concept of "citizenship". Moreover, the demographic 
situation of Kuwait which makes Kuwaitis a minority in their own country, led the 
government to the adoption of an uneven and selective policy on naturalisation. 
This factor contributed directly to the segmentation of society into two essential 
parts the expatriate community and the Kuwaiti community, and also led to the 
emergence of the issue. Despite the persistent of the problem of the Bidoon, 
the government is still lingering in its efforts to find the appropriate solution to 
deal with thousands of residents that have been in Kuwait for many years. 
What is interesting about the Bidoon is the ability of the government to 
manipulate them for its own benefit. At first they were given all the rights that a 
Kuwaiti enjoys but without holding the citizenship, and were counted in 
government statistics as being Kuwaitis. However, when pressure mounted on 
the government to find an effective solution to the matter it did not hesitate to 
alter its policy and started to consider the Bidoon as technically being illegal 
residents. 
The election law was designed to achieve two things. Firstly, gerrymandering 
the electoral boundaries in accordance to the concentration of the different 
social groups helped to increase social division and maintain the badu/hadhar 
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rivalry and antagonism, while creating new allies to fend off any opposition 
groups and undermine the influence of the merchant community. Secondly, it 
rooted and augmented traditional forms of affiliations and identification, which 
helped to fragment and weaken opposition and also undermined popular 
political associations. It also limited suffrage to males over the age of twenty 
one, thus, totally excluding the other half of the Kuwaiti population. In the 
forthcoming chapters, many of these suggestions will be clarified in more detail. 
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Chapter Four 
The First Stage of Kuwait's Representative System of 
Government 1963-1976 
4.1 Introduction 
The practical implications of the parameters set by the Kuwaiti government, 
through citizenship and election laws, for the implementation of the 
constitutionally stipulated representative system of government, can be 
discerned from the early days of the creation of the national assembly. That 
assembly exemplified an elite institution, which was foremost accessible only to 
a very limited faction of the entire population; an elite which was represented 
along traditional lines of identity and affiliations. In addition, it presented 
different opportunities and served different purposes to the various interested 
social groups. As Sisson contends, legislatures can serve as agents of either 
national integration, or mobilisation of support for or against a ruling authority or 
as a symbol of national sovereignty.' The experience of Kuwait shows that the 
assembly was utilised depending on the interested parties, to serve all of these 
together. The opposition uses the assembly to expose the failures of the ruling 
authority, while the government uses its loyal supporters to mobilise support for 
al Sabah. Although the legislature has been successful in unifying Kuwaitis vis a 
vis the large migrant community, it has not acted as an integrating agent among 
Kuwaitis as whole. Sectarian, ethnic and tribal loyalties and identification are 
1 Sisson, Richard. "Comparative Legislative Institutionalisation: a Theoretical Exploration". In 
Comparative Perspcctiw (ed.). Allan Kornberg. (New York: David Mckay Company. 1973. 
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the most prevalent forms of social division. However, as a mark of sovereignty 
and legitimacy of the ruling family the assembly has been mostly successful, in 
achieving these factors. 
The Kuwaiti representative system reveals a noticeable similarity between the 
notion of democracy and fair elections. This equivalence is widespread in 
developing countries where the mere fact of holding an election is seen as 
enough evidence of the existence of a democratic system of government. The 
discussion in this chapter will reveal that forming a democratic system of 
government needs for more than just an election to happen. The election 
process itself must be seen as fair; a balance must exist in the relation between 
the executive and the legislative. In addition to this, a culture of open debates, 
individual freedoms and associations is essential. The first stage of 
parliamentary life in Kuwait reveals that all these factors appear to be lacking to 
a great degree. 
It will now be useful to assess the elections of four assemblies: 1963, 1967, 
1971 and 1975. The fourth assembly was suspended in August 1976 by an 
Amiri decree and was only restored in 1981. The chapter shall focus firstly on 
analysing these four assemblies in terms of the election results, the political 
groupings and the main issues debated at that time. The aim of this analysis to 
reveal the tensions that arise due to the lack of the above mentioned factors 
and from the different vision the rulers and ruled have had concerning what the 
essential function of the assembly should be. The ruling family can be accused 
of viewing the assembly as being a symbol of sovereignty and its legitimacy and 
a tool to placate, rather than an instrument for the advancement of democracy 
and political participation. They also use it as, an instrument to play the different 
social groups against each other in order to counterbalance the strength of each 
one. As opposed to that view, the ruled see the assembly as the guarantor of 
their participation in the decision making process and for limiting the power of al 
Sabah. Hence, it has been rather noticeable from the first assembly that the 
government is reluctant to accept any vocal opposition that has emerged and it 
has attempted to silence opposition by rigging the elections for the second 
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assembly. The ineffectiveness of the second assembly and the discontent of 
the people made al Sabah retract and attempt to compromise with the 
opposition. The third and fourth assemblies were examples of this attempt. 
However, despite the compromises they offered, al Sabah themselves, still 
suspended the fourth assembly. Detail of what led to this will be useful to now 
explain. 
4.2 The National Assemblies of the Period Between 1963-1975 
The four elections of the National Assembly held during the period of 1963-1975 
covered ten constituencies. This number of constituencies is disproportionately 
large in comparison to the small size of the population, especially when 
considering the more reduced size of the electorate body. This enabled the 
ruling family to playa more dominating and controlling role of the election 
process, while giving the badu a stronger influence and presence in the 
assembly.2 Six main features can be discerned from these elections, which are 
in many ways a reflection of the implication of the election and citizenship laws. 
These features are as follows; 
1. Sectarian and tribal affiliations were essential criteria for the elections 
especially in Shi'ite and badu areas, while in urban Sunni areas the 
candidate's qualifications and attitudes and knowledge of political affairs 
played a larger role in choosing a candidate. 
2. Campaigning issues reflected the composition of each constituency. In 
tribal constituencies, campaigning focussed on the provision of services, 
whereas in Shi'ite areas campaigning focused on the minority status of the 
Shi'ite while in urban Sunni areas the focus was on national issues. 
3. There was a steady increase in the number of voters, which more than 
tripled the number of registered voters. 
~ Ghanirn AI-Najjar. "Decision-Making Process in Kuwait: the Land Acquisition Policy as a Case 
Study." Ph. D thesis. University of Exeter. 1987. p.47. 
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4. The turn out of voters varied from one election to another but was 
consistently low. 
5. The government interfered in most elections either directly by attempting to 
rig the results of the election or indirectly, such as its selective policy of 
natu ralisation. 
6. The tension between the assembly and the government was clear from the 
first assembly due to the conflicting visions of the function of the assembly. 
The government wanted a debating chamber while the deputies wanted to 
debate and influence government policy and be an essential part of the 
decision making process. 
In the following discussion more details are presented for each assembly, In 
order to give a comprehensive picture of these assemblies. 
The First Assembly: Elections for the first National Assembly saw 205 
candidates compete for the 50-seat parliament with a total number of eligible 
voters of only 16,889.3 Those were male Kuwaitis over the age of 21. The 
seats were distributed as seen from Table 4.1. As such there were: nineteen 
seats for badu deputies, eight for merchants, six for Arab nationalists, five for 
Shi'ite and eleven for liberal Sunni and one for a Sunni Islamist. The badu as a 
group accounted for the largest share around 38 percent. 
Election issues reflected the sectarian distribution of electoral areas. Thus in 
the Shi'ite dominated areas the defence of the rights of the Shi'ite minority in 
Kuwait was the most important issue raised. Merchants won seats in areas 
populated by those that dominate the economy and where economic issues are 
of great importance. Nationalists and liberal Sunnis were returned to seats in 
areas where concern over public issues, democracy and participation in the 
decision making process were central. Tribal deputies were returned in the 
3Suhail K Shuhaiber. "Political Development in Kuwait, Continuity and Change in an Arab Independent 
Gulf State." Ph. D thesis. University of Oxford. 1981. p.128. 
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areas dominated by tribal loyalty and where the most important issue was the 
provision of personal services.4 
The presence of representatives of the nationalist movement with some liberal 
minded and vocal merchant deputies created a very active assembly debating 
sensitive issues such as the oil policy, and challenged many of the laws 
presented to the assembly that aimed to curtail individual and public freedoms. 
The anger of the nationalist deputies over these laws led them to resign from 
the assembly, accusing the government of turning the legislative authority from 
an instrument belonging to the people in order to enhance freedom ... to an 
instrument in the hands of the government to limit and suffocate individual and 
public freedom. 5 That increased the tension between the government and the 
assembly, and subsequently the government in the hope of having a more 
pliable assembly - interfered in the election of the second assembly. 
The Second Assembly: In comparison with the uneventful election of the first 
assembly, the election for the second National Assembly proved to be highly 
controversial. The election was held on the 25 January 1967 with 222 
candidates competing for the 50 seats. Eligible registered voters increased to 
26,796, however, only 17, 590 actually voted.s That means that around 66 
percent of eligible voters attended the ballot boxes. 
Initially the nationalists in Kuwait did not want to take part in the election of the 
second assembly. That was due to the issues surrounding the previous 
assembly and their desire to avoid appearing as if they are giving legitimacy to 
a government that attacks individual and public freedoms. However, they 
reassessed their position and decided that 
4 Jasem Mohammad Jerkhi. "The Electoral Process in Kuwait: A Geographical Study". Ph. D, thesis, 
University of Exeter, 1984. p.181-188. 
5 Fahad Abdullah AI-Mudiris. Al-harakath aI-shu 'yh fy al-kuwayt. (The Shi 'a Movement in Kuwait). 
(Kuwait: Dar al-qurtaas. 1999,b).p. 34. 
6 Abdullah Kalifah AI-Shayeji. "Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for 
Political survival." Ph. D, thesis, University of Texas, Austin. 1988. p. 2 .. 0. 
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our presence in the Assembly was a protection for the existing 
institutions like the unions, clubs, and press, and in our absence 
these institutions would be attacked so we decided to go ahead in 
the participation of the 1967 elections for the National Assembly. 7 
Following that decision the nationalists prepared for the general election by 
unifying the efforts of the opposition in a programme called al Jabha al Sha'biya 
(the Popular Front) focusing attention on particular issues, such as oil and the 
water sector, Arab policy and commitment to Arab causes and social justice. In 
addition they made a strong alliance with the liberal minded merchants and ran 
through joint lists under the banner of the "Parliamentarians of the Nation" with 
thirty-seven candidates. They also allied with the representatives of the trade 
unions. The expectation was that they should have a landslide win.B 
Thus when the election results showed that the opposition had lost to pro-
government candidates, the government was accused of falsifying the results, 
and demands were made for a new election. 9 There have been many 
allegations of procedural violations in the election of the National Assembly over 
the years but the one raised in the aftermath of the 1967 election has been the 
most serious. 10 
The government, nonetheless, denied any wrong doing, despite the clear 
irregularity that the government undertook during election day. As described 
by Jerkhi: 
According to Article No. 36 of the Election Law after polling finishes 
the ballot boxes must be locked and taken to the headquarters of 
7 Fahad Abdullah AI-Mudyris. "The Arab Nationalist Movement in Kuwait From its Origins to 1970. 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. p.278. 
8 Fahd . Abdullah AI-Mudyris.(AI-Mudyris). Al-mujtama' al-madani wa al-haraka al-wataniya fi al-
kuwayt. (Civil Society and National Movement in Kuwait). (Kuwait: Dar al-qurtas, 2000).p.147. 
9 Kadhim Mahdi AI-Bahrani. "Factors Influencing Ruling Elites Political Participation in the State of 
Kuwait". Ph.D. thesis. University of Denver. 1988. p.72. 
10 Jassim Muhammad AI-Khalaf. ''The Kuwait National Assembly: A Study of its Structure and 
Functions." Ph .D. thesis. State University of New York, Albany 1984. p. 203-204. 
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the Principal Committee where they should be opened and the 
votes counted in the presence of all the chairmen and members of 
the PrinCipal Committee and the sub-committees. However this did 
not happen. Armed policemen entered the polling stations and took 
the ballot boxes before they had been closed. Moreover, the 
pOlicemen refused to allow any member of the sub-committees to 
accompany them to the headquarters, a direct violation of the law11 • 
Despite the loss of the nationalist candidates, seven other candidates of the 
Popular Front coalition were elected: one Sunni liberal and six merchants. 
These merchants were 'Abd al Aziz al Saqar, Rashid al Farhan, 'Abd al 
Razzaq al Khalid, Muhammad 'Abd al Muhsin al Khourafi, 'Ali 'Abd al Rahman 
al 'Omar, and Muhammad al 'Adsani. However, in protest of the rigging of the 
election, they submitted their resignation and issued together with some other 
unsuccessful candidates, the following statement: 
Dear citizens, the parliamentary elections aim to send to parliament 
your representatives in order to protect you in the decision making 
process. However, the Government feared those who would work 
sincerely for the national interest of the country. Thus to prevent 
them from being elected, the Government rigged these elections. It 
is so ironic that those who protect the law are also those who violate 
it. ... We now inform you that the results of the elections are false 
and this parliament has been installed against your will. 12 
There was widespread anger especially within labour unions and professional 
associations and supporters of the nationalist movement against the apparent 
interference of the government. Statements of condemnation of the 
government's action were issued by the Lawyers Association, Journalists 
Association, Graduates Association, the Engineers Society, the Contractors 
II Jerkhi, op.cit. p. 188-190. 
12 Ibid., p.190. 
13 AI-Mudyris, 1987, op.cit. p. ~S~-283. 
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Union, and the Union of Kuwaiti Workers. Despite the strong anti government 
feelings the nationalists, in consultation with the merchants, decided to call for 
calm and abandoned mass protests against the rigging of the election for the 
sake of public interest and to maintain the unity of Kuwait. 13 Using the pretext 
of "national unity" became a pattern in Kuwaiti parliamentary experience 
employed by both opposition and al Sabah whenever matters reached a 
difficult point. Under that very general notion al Sabah can claim to suspend 
the assembly and Constitution for the sake of "national unity" while the 
opposition can retreat without loosing face under the same excuse. 
The assembly according to the official results of the election, show that thirty 
new members were elected to the assembly while none of the members of 
nationalist group were able to win a seat. The seats were distributed as can 
be seen in Table 4.2: ten seats for the Shi'ite, fourteen for Liberal Sunni, six for 
merchants, twenty for the badu and three for Sunni Islamists. 
Table 4.1 The Distribution of Seats In the National Assembly for the 1963 Elections 
District Badu Merchants Arab Nationalists Shi'ite Sunnl religious Groups Others Total 
1 st. 4 1 5 
2nd. 2 2 5 
3rd. 4 1 5 
4th. 5 5 
5th. 1 3 1 5 
6th. 1 4 5 
7th. 3 5 
8th. 2 3 5 
9th. 5 5 
10th. 5 5 
Total 19 8 6 5 1 11 50 
Source; Calculated from data on election results available from the Kuwaiti National Assembly. 
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Table 4.2 The Distribution of Seats In the National Assembly for the 1967 Elections 
District 8adu Merchants Arab Nationalists Shi'ite Sunnl religious Groups Others Total 
1st. 4 1 5 
2nd. 2 3 5 
3rd. 4 1 5 
4th. 5 5 
5th. 1 1 2 5 
6th. 3 1 5 
7th. 5 5 
8th. 5 5 
9th. 5 5 
10th. 5 5 
Total 20 6 10 3 11 50 
Source; Calculated from data available from the Kuwalt National Assembly 
The second assembly became famous for the controversy over government 
interference in the election and the absence of an opposition group, which 
resulted in an ineffective assembly dominated by badu representatives and new 
deputies that lacked the experience of parliamentary life. Consequently, there 
were many extended discussions, but little progress on the impending bills and 
issues. 14 Shuhaiber describes the assembly as follows: 
The work of the Second National Assembly proceeded in a slow and 
disorderly fashion. Overwhelmingly dominated by Bedouin 
representatives and ordinary middle class deputies with little 
professional training, most of the Assembly's time was taken up by 
prolonged discussions of very few bills introduced by the 
government. 15 
The only issue of significance that the assembly was able to decide upon was 
the ratification of the government's agreement with foreign oil companies on 
dispensing royalties, which the previous assembly had debated but did not give 
any approval. As a result of this apparent inefficiency and ineffectiveness, the 
14 Shuhaiber. op.cit. p. 166. 
15 Ibid .. p.166. 
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assembly proved to be unpopular and people saw it as exemplifying the 
government's ineptness. The view expressed by a leading Kuwaiti official best 
summaries the situation the government found itself in; 
The government inside the National Assembly is lost without 
leadership to guide it; leaving the defence of its pOlicies to individual 
ministers ... it is a cabinet without initiative which waits the ripening of 
problems instead of settling them at an early stage .. . it is a cabinet of 
several sides. Some of its members are moved by their own political 
ambitions, while others feel that the circumstances which had 
brought them to power may not recur. Others still will remain by 
force of the social conditions. 16 
Another reason that made the assembly unpopular relates to the widespread 
phenomenon of deputies soliciting personal favours for their constituencies and 
the exploitation of their parliamentary position to further the interests of their 
social group and their own pOlitical interest.17 The government is seen as being 
a partner in this, since these favours are carried out through government 
apparatus as indicated by Shuhaiber: 
The rendering of favours to their constituents by the deputies is 
always done through the government. The promises of employment, 
of low income housing, of land purchases, and of all other favours 
rendered through the good offices of the government which is 
suffering from such methods practised by those deputies, without 
doing anything to stop them. 18 
The circumstances of the assembly and the discontent among the people 
forced the government to rethink its position and to attempt to find a 
compromise with the national opposition and to reconcile differences. Firstly, 
the minister of foreign affairs, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad, met the editors of the 
16 Ibid., p.171. 
17 Ibid., p. 172. 
18 Ibid., p.172. 
114 
Kuwaiti press and spoke of the necessity of maintaining national unity and 
disregarding the past. Secondly, the crown prince and Prime Minister, Sheikh 
Jaber al Ahmad, took the unusual step of speaking directly to the people in 
order to announce the government programme. This was unusual because the 
government programme is normally just addressed to the assembly. Sheikh 
Jaber acknowledged the presence of a problem and blamed it on some 
individuals and came to the defence of the parliamentary system by saying: 
I [am] convinced there is a general feeling that it is high time we 
reconsider the path we are taking, and draw up specific domestic 
policy stemming from our experience and circumstances under which 
the government will exercise all its powers without 
hesitation ... Unfortunately, the Constitution and the freedoms it 
provides for, have been exploited by unscrupulous people who do 
not believe in the national interest and who have tried to turn freedom 
into chaos, aimed at subverting our values and beliefs, and at sowing 
the seeds of discord among uS ... this does not mean the 
parliamentary system is unsound or that it is unsuitable for our age. 
It only means that some have misunderstood it. 19 
The experience of the second assembly made it apparent that the ruling family 
needed the active participation and endorsement of the nationalists and the 
merchants in order to give the system genuine legitimacy. It is this function as a 
symbol of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait and legitimacy that most 
concerned and motivated al Sabah to maintain the assembly. The prime 
minister called on the merchants specifically to resume their participation in the 
running of the affairs of the government, hence acknowledging the need for 
their experience for the benefit of an effective assembly: 
There are many citizens who have participated in the building of 
Kuwait with their own hands and funds, but have chosen to stay 
away from legislative assemblies for certain reasons ... while the 
public good requires their presence in those assemblies in order to 
19 Middle East News Agency, NoA815, 25 June, 1970. 
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benefit from their experience, competence, and sincere devotion to 
their homeland. 20 
The election of the third assembly subsequently took on a particular importance 
and was a test to the government's intention of achieving reconciliation with the 
opposition. 
The Third Assembly: Elections for the third assembly were held in January 
1971 with 183 candidates competing for the 50 seats. Registered voters 
jumped to 40,649 as compared to 17,590 in the previous election.21 This 
massive increase was due to the naturalisation of the badu that the government 
embarked upon since the early sixties, whereby the number of enfranchised 
jumped from 20,000 to 43, 000.22 However the number of people who voted did 
not exceed 20,785; just over half of the registered voters. This indicates that 
there was a decrease of 15 percent in the turn out of voters, when compared to 
the previous election. The low turn out could be attributed to the debacle of the 
previous election and the citizens suspicion of the in effectiveness of the whole 
process. Subsequently the general main issue that dominated this election was 
democracy and the advocation of the Constitution.23 
The results showed a strong presence of the nationalists and liberals in the 
assembly. As seen in table 4.3, the election returned six Shi'ite, thirteen liberal 
Sunni, five Arab nationalists, five merchants, nineteen badu and two Sunni 
Islamists. In the tenth district, the al Ajman tribe was able to win all five seats. 
This was due to the fact that one of the members of the ruling family, whose 
mother was from the tribe, became deputy minister of the Interior Minister. The 
Interior Ministry is responsible for granting citizenship. The deputy was able 
20 Ibid. 
~1 Al Sh" . "46 
- aye]l. Op.CIt. p. - . 
22 AI-Mudyris. 1987, op.cit. p . .+19. 
23 Jerkhi, op.cit. p. 195. 
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during his time in office, to naturalise a large number of the tribe and hence 
directly influence the results of the tenth district.24 
Although the Amir had called on all the major groups of the Kuwaiti society to 
participate in the election, the nationalist opposition was divided over the issue. 
Ahmed al Khatib's group participated in the election, while Jassim al Oatami's 
group boycotted it and criticised the participation of the al Khatib group. The AI 
Oatami group objected to the government's interference in the electoral results 
and changing the "residents" in the constituencies through their mass 
naturalisation of the badu and wanted to expose the authorities and its lack of 
serious commitment to democracy. They claimed that the participation of the al 
Khatib group gave legitimacy of the authorities and gave the impression that 
democracy in Kuwait was moving along the correct path.25 They were also 
suspicious of the government and wanted certain guarantees and safeguards to 
be introduced into the election law.26 The presence of one group of the 
nationalist opposition in the assembly and the other nationalist group outside it 
further deepened the existing division within the nationalist movement.27 As 
expected, and considering its composition, this assembly proved to be much 
more animated than the pervious one with heated debates which posed many 
challenges to the government. 
24 'Abdullah AI-Nifisi. Al-kuwuvt: al-ra'y al-'akhar. (Kuwait: the Other View). (London: Taha 
Advertising. 1978). p.9. 
25 AI-Mudyris, 1987, op.cit. p. 410-420. 
26 Ghanim AI-Najar.(al-Najjar, G.). Madkhalli'l-tawr al-siyasi. ( Introduction to Kuwait Political 
Development). (Kuwait: Maktabat al-salasil. 1996).p. 95. 
27 Ibid .. p.95. 
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Table 4.3 The Distribution of Seats In the National Assembly for the 1971 Elections 
District 8adu Merchants Arab Nationalists Shi'lte Sunnl religious Groups Others Total 
1st. 4 1 5 
2nd. 3 2 5 
3rd. 3 2 5 
4th. 5 5 
5th. 1 2 5 
6th. 2 3 5 
7th. 2 3 5 
8th. 2 3 5 
9th. 5 5 
10th. 5 5 
Total 19 5 5 6 2 13 50 
Source; Calculated from data available on election results from the Kuwaiti National Assembly. 
The Fourth Assembly: In January 1975 the election for the fourth assembly 
took place with 255 candidates competing for the 50 seats. 52,993 voters were 
registered of whom only 31, 862 voted.28 Despite the low turn out, the number 
of voters constituted a 9 percent increase from the last election. In this election, 
all major groups participated; the merchants, the opposition with all its factions, 
the Shi'ite, the independents/liberal Sunnis, and the Sunni religious groups. 
The most important issue that dominated the election campaigns was political 
rights coming from the nationalist/liberal candidates, while the badu continued 
their focus on providing personal services.29 
The shape of the assembly, as seen in table 4.4, shows the nationalists 
maintaining their strength having won seven seats. The badu increased their 
share to twenty three seats, the Shi'ite also increased their share to ten, the 
liberal Sunnis decreased to six seats, Sunni Islamists were reduced to one and 
the merchants held onto three seats. The nationalists were able to maintain 
their position despite the fact that the two main groups, al Qatami and al Khatib, 
2R AI-Shayeji. op.cit. p. 256. 
~9 Jerkhi. op.cit. p. 198. 
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campaigned separately and competed against each other in the same districts.30 
Another feature of this assembly was that nearly half of the members were new 
and the resultant assembly was younger, better educated and much less 
conservative than its predecessor.31 
Table 4.4 The Distribution of Seats in the National Assembly for the 1975 Elections 
District 8adu Merchants Arab Nationalists Shi'ite Sunni religious Groups Others Total 
1st. 5 5 
2nd. 2 2 5 
3rd. 4 1 5 
4th. 5 5 
5th. 3 5 
6th. 2 3 5 
7th. 5 5 
8th. 1 2 2 5 
9th. 5 5 
10th. 5 5 
Total 23 3 7 10 6 50 
Source: Calculated from data available from the Kuwaiti National Assembly. 
However, the sectarian composition of the assembly was apparent as 
expressed in a commentary on the election results by a Bahraini weekly which 
stated: 
It is the first time that sectarianism has emerged in such a serious 
way within Kuwaiti society ... and when matters take on such a 
sectarian form the question is bound to take a wider dimension the 
likes of which Kuwait has not experienced before, particularly in view 
of the existing contradictions within Kuwaiti society. 32 
30 AI-Najaar, 1996, op.cit. p. 98-99. 
:11 Ahmad Abdullah Saad Baz. "Political Elite and Political Development in Kuwait." Ph. D thesis, 
George Washington University, 1981. p.194-196. 
32 Shuhaiber, op.cit. p. 241. 
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For the first time the alliance in the first district between the Shi'ite and the 
Sunni minority broke down. During the previous elections, the Shi'ite supported 
the Sunni candidate, Youse! al Rifaa'y, who held a seat in the second and third 
assembly. The alliance broke as a result of al Rifaa'y having invited a scholar 
from Pakistan who criticised the Shi'ite religious faith. The Shi'ite held onto the 
five seats of the area.33 That indicates the sensitivity of sectarian issues and 
how easily it can break alliances. 
A strong opposition existed through the cooperation of seven elected nationalist 
members and seven liberal deputies, making the assembly a forum for 
systematic criticisms and attacks on the government, particularly for policies 
favouring a growing gap between the haves and have not. 34 The 
unprecedented rise in oil prices although, on the one hand, provided huge 
revenues to the government and a fast growing private sector opportunities, on 
the other hand the income gap among the various segments of the population 
was widening. The relation between the government and the assembly became 
extremely strained especially because an increasing number of laws proposed 
by the government were turned down and the opposition was in effect in control 
of all the events in the assembly.3s Supporting this highly critical stance of the 
assembly was the Kuwaiti public and influential press. Subsequently, this very 
strong and promising assembly was suspended by al Sabah a year and half into 
its term. The reasons which led to the suspension of the assembly shall be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
33 Jerkhi, op.cit. p. 199. 
34 A.I Sh" . '57 , - ayeJI, Op.Clt. p. - . 
35 AI-Bahrani. op.cit. p. 47. 
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4.3 The Major Political Groups in the National Assembly 
The legal status of political parties in Kuwait is ambiguous. The Kuwaiti 
Constitution did not explicitly or implicitly give any recognition to political parties, 
nor the electoral law. However the explanatory note of the Constitution 
provided some insight into the status of political parties in Kuwait. It declares 
that: 
Article 43 of the Constitution does not insist on the necessity for the 
establishment of parties, neither does it prohibit them. The legal 
status of parties is left to the legislature to deal with. 36 
According to Moqatei, this means that any group has the right to establish a 
party unless other legal steps are taken towards a clear legal status of parties.37 
Despite the absence of a clear legal status on party formation, Kuwaiti 
parliamentary experience has been accompanied by the emergence of 
discernible political groups. To some, they are considered similar to pOlitical 
parties. As noted by al Kandari 
Different pOlitical powers inside Kuwait are like nonofficial parties 
practising their activities and spreading their ideologies ... these 
political powers have a party-like character with regard to 
organisation and coordinating work to support its various intellectual 
theories. 38 
The views of Kuwaitis on the establishment of political parties vary. The 
government position can be noted from the views expressed by cabinet 
ministers who reject the establishment of a party system in Kuwait. The 
nationalists believe that the establishment of parties is necessary to improve the 
performance of the National Assembly and develop democracy. The badu 
36 Muhammad AI-Moqatei ... A Study of the Kuwaiti Constitutional Experience: 1962-1986). Ph.D 
Thesis, University of Warwick. 1987. p.192. 
37 Ibid .. 192. 
38 Yagoob AI-Kandari. "The Social Function of al-Diwaniyah in Kuwait Society." ~1A. Thesis. Ohio 
State University. 1995. p.90. 
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reject the idea of parties while urban educated Kuwaitis are divided over the 
issue. Three field studies showed that an overwhelming majority of Kuwaitis 
reject the idea of parties because they believe it will destroy national interest, 
divide the county and lead to an unstable political regime. That belief is based 
on the experience of other Arab countries that adopted political parties such as 
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.39 
During this first phase of parliamentary experience several major political 
groups emerged in the National Assembly with varying degrees of organisation, 
coordination, and influence. These loosely organised and identified political 
groupings, in comparison to political parties, are more acceptable to both the 
government and Kuwaitis in general. They include the merchants, the 
nationalists, the badu, the Islamists, and the Sunni liberals/independents. The 
discussion in this research shall also include the members of the ruling family 
since they sit in the assembly by virtue of being members of the cabinet. 
Although they do not constitute a political group as such, their influences are 
immense and far outweigh their small numbers in the assembly. They are also 
open to allying themselves to the different groups in the assembly, hence 
influencing outcomes of bills and debates in the assembly. 
4.3.1 The Merchants 
Historically a small number of merchant families have been the most influential 
social group in Kuwait, and the most significant part of the ruling coalition. 
Ismael lists the most important families: al-Khalid, al-Zayid, al Ghanim, al 
Qatami, al Saif, al Rumi, al Shemlan, al Badar, al Jalil, al Saleh, Janaat, alissa, 
al Mutawa', al Sultan, al Saqar, al Mutayri, al Naqeeb, al Rushayd, al Humadhi, 
al Mudhaf, al Sulayman, al Marzuq, al Uthman, al Adsani, al Ebreheem, and 
Muhammad.40 
39 AI-Moqatei. op.cit. p. 194. 
40 Jacqueline S Ismael. Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State. Florida: Uni versity of Florida 
Press. 1993. p.83-84. 
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The status of this old merchant community is based on both economic and 
social criteria, as they have wealth and claim a social prestige equal to al 
Sabah. Historically and because of their wealth, they have been among the first 
to be educated abroad and they have been able to attain a high level of 
education for many members of their families. Thus, education among them 
was promoted well before the government was able to embark on programmes 
to educate the mass of the population and give opportunity for ordinary Kuwaitis 
to be educated abroad.41 
The oil wealth brought about changes in the ruling coalition in Kuwait by 
causing a breakdown in the old coalition that linked these trading families with 
the Amir and replaced it by setting up a new arrangement of the elite.42 Access 
to huge sums of externally generated revenues from the oil industry has 
liberated the ruling family from their dependency on the merchant community 
and gave them the economic power to use these revenues in a way that 
widened their base of legitimacy and established new political allies. The 
prominent families had to share their political influence with the new emerging 
groups. However, in doing that did not impact their economic power. 
State distributive policies benefited the old trading elites through the state by 
either excluding or offering encouragement to the old merchants in the fields of 
trade, construction and services. As Crystal points out: 
The mechanisms the state used were the preservation of an enclave 
(non-Oil) private sector, legitimated by a free enterprise ideology, and 
direct aid and protection to merchants through grants of land, money, 
and monopoly concessions. In time this arrangement was 
institutionalised through protective nationality and commercial laws 
that restricted property and business ownership rights to nationals. 43 
41 AI-Khalaf, op.cit. p. 104. 
4~ Jill Crystal. "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar." Comparative Politics. (Vol.2I. No . .+ 
1989). p . .+27-.+43. 
43 Ibid,. p.431. 
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Trade and commercial laws, since the early sixties, focused on promoting the 
interest of Kuwaiti nationals on the expense of expatriates, banning expatriates 
totally from the banking and finance sectors. Business ownership and property 
rights are exclusive to Kuwaiti nationals. The Chamber of Commerce acts as a 
major protector of the interests of Kuwaiti merchants by regulating the influence 
of their foreign competitors. This business environment, with the addition of 
monopolies, preferential treatment and dealerships have helped maintain the 
power of the old commercial elites of Kuwait and maintained their dominance on 
company boards and shareholdings.44 
In exchange for these benefits and inducements, the ruling family expects 
political acquiescence from the merchant community. Although as a group the 
historical demand of the merchants to participate politically and in the decision-
making process has declined, individual merchants have over the years 
maintained an interest in pOlitical participation, such as Yagoob al Humaidi, 
Jassim al Qatami, Abd al Razzaq al Khalid and Sulaiman al Mutawa. These 
young educated merchants adhered to Pan-Arab ideology, and allied 
themselves with the nationalist opposition. Together, they made up the core of 
the opposition in the first assembly and proved to be very effective.45 
The number of seats the merchants gained in the assemblies, between eight 
and then reduced to three, does not reflect their economic position and 
influence but reflects the desire of the business community to concentrate on 
their business interests and maintain a cooperative relation with the ruling 
family. It also reflects the increased importance of the badu and the middle 
class in Kuwait, which came into politics on their expense.46 The importance of 
Kuwait's middle class (the professional strata of doctors, engineers, lawyers etc, 
and mid-level state employees and small businesses) have increased. 
44 Ibid •. p.431-432. 
45 AI-Najjar. 1987. op.cit. p. 53. 
46 Kamal Osman Salih. "Kuwait: Political Consequences of Modernization. 1750-1986." Middle East 
Studies. Vol. 27. No.!. January 1991. p. 53. 
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However, their influence IS incomparable to that of the old merchant 
community.47 
The merchants maintained certain leverage in the assembly which is evident in 
the fact that all the presidents of the assembly during this period came from 
their ranks, including Abdul Aziz al Saqar, Sa'ud al Abdul Razzaq, Ahmad laid 
al Sarhan, and Khalid al Ghanim.48 The dominance of that office by prominent 
families express the influence of two major factors one is family background and 
the other is political experience. Their substantial political experience and close 
ties to the ruling family and economic prominence make them ideal for such an 
important leading role. As indicated, these families have been the backbone of 
building modern Kuwait; 
It was these merchant families, which provided the echelon of social 
and pOlitical leadership of the country and gave it the special brand of 
mental adroitness and financial astuteness, which characterises it 
today. 49 
Although the oil era freed al Sabah from their historical economic dependency 
on the old merchant class of Kuwait, the influence and prominence of these 
families remained high and they remained the major beneficiaries of the 
diffusion of oil wealth.50 They are still in control of a large portion of the private 
sector. They also remain an important source for the legitimacy of al Sabah, as 
their loyalty and support is extremely important. Through their own diwaniyyas 
they exert immense influence on the decision-making process of the 
government, without having to be directly involved in the National Assembly. 
47 Ali Z. Al-Zubi. "Urbanization, Tribalism, and Marriage in Contemporary Kuwait." Ph. D thesis, Wayne 
State University. 1999. p.42. 
48 A. M Oargash. "Political Participation in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates: 1938-1979". Ph. D 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 1990. p.173. 
49 Khouja. M. W. and P.O. Sadler (ed). The Economic of Kuwait: Development and Role in International 
Finance. (London: MacmiIlen, 1979). p. 14. 
50 SaIih, op.cit. p 53. 
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Another important channel for maintaining their influence is the cabinet. They 
contributed in the period between 1962-1976 twenty four ministers and most of 
these come from seven families, al Nusaf, al Ghanim, al Mudaf., al Hamad, al 
Khalid, al Rifaa'y and al 'Adsani.51 If the members of the ruling family are 
excluded from the cabinet (17 members), the merchant's share of the cabinet 
has been more than 70 percent. Although the cabinet in 1963 had only one 
minister from other groups of Kuwaiti society, this share rose to seven by 1976, 
representing around 30 percent of the entire cabinet. The incorporation of the 
wider segment of the population was due to increased education and a greater 
number of qualified Kuwaitis. 52 
4.3.2 The Arab Nationalists 
The Kuwaiti branch of the Arab nationalist movement was formed in 1952 by 
Ahmad al Khatib, a key figure in bringing Arab nationalist ideology into Kuwait 
and a symbol of this movement. During the fifties and sixties this movement 
grew and spread its influence among the merchants, students and labour 
movement. Their political platform focuses on socialist reforms on the domestic 
level while promoting Arab unity on the regional level.53 It has been the leading 
opposition group in the assembly against the government attempts to restrict 
freedom and individual civil and political rights as guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Although the government could muster the support from a large 
proportion of the assembly, the nationalists were able to raise and publicise 
critical issues and lead constructive debates in the assembly. Their ability to 
publicise certain issues constituted a mechanism of pressure and influence 
since the Kuwaiti government is inclined to avoid gaining any bad publicity.54 
51 Kamal AI-Munufi. AI-hukumat al-kuwaytiya. (Kuwaiti Governments). ( Kuwait: Dar al-ruby'aan, 
1985). p.27. 
~, . 
.. Gargash, Op.Clt. p. 166. 
53 Dubi AI-Harbi. Man yantakhib man wa-li-madha? wasa 'il wa- 'awamil al-ta'thir 'ala al-nakhib al-
kuwayti. (Who Elects Who and Why'? The Tools that Influence the Kuwaiti Voter.) (Kuwait: n.p. 1996). 
p. J9. 
54 AI-Najjar. 1987. op.cit. p. 65. 
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The 1967 Arab defeat hit the nationalists hard and split the Kuwaiti movement 
into two groups, the leftist al Tajmu' al Dimuqrati (The Democratic Bloc) led by 
Ahmed al Khatib and the more conservative al Tajmu' al Watani (The 
Nationalist Bloc) headed by Jassem al Qatami. The two groups also differ also 
in their economic policy, as the Democratic Bloc advocates greater role of the 
government in economic activities while the National Bloc favours the free 
market system.55 Despite these differences, the two groups share similar views 
centring on closer links with Arab states, support for the Palestinian cause while 
on the domestic front they advocate greater political Iiberalisation: formation of 
political parties, franchise of women, individual rights, Constitutional rights, 
better treatment for Arab workers in Kuwait and more efficient economic and 
bureaucratic policies.56 
Their loss in the 1967 election, although attributed to the government's irregular 
practices, forced them to improve their organisation and deepen their interaction 
with the masses, hence their success in the following two elections, 1971 and 
1975. However, the 1971 election deepened the rift among the nationalists 
since only the al Khatib group accepted participation in the election and 
accepted the national compromise that the authorities were offering. The 1975 
election witnessed the participation of the two groups signalling the complete 
transformation of the whole movement into a reformative one which regards 
parliamentary work as its only objective and not as means to create a popular 
revolutionary movement or to increase its pOlitical and organisational 
presence. 57 
The insistence of this group on the assembly's Constitutional rights, and on 
promoting democratic debate and practices in the country most irritated the 
government. The al Khatib's role in the assembly has been disproportional to 
their numerical strength due to the firm position they took against the 
government when its policies contravened with the spirit of the Constitution and 
55 Gargash. op.cit. p. 175. 
56 Baz. op.cit. p.202. & AI-Khalaf, op.cit. p. 118. 
57 7'-7 AI-Mudyris. 198 . Op.CIt. p . .) . 
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democracy and the national interests of both Kuwaitis and Arabs in general.58 
In addition to this, their political vigour and popular language and the support of 
the educated Kuwaitis gave them immense strength.59 Until the ascendancy of 
Islamic groups they were the only force equipped with a clear ideology. They 
have a consistent voting pattern in comparison with the merchants and 
independent deputies who vote according to the merit of each issue without 
having an overarching ideological frame of reference. 
Their firm belief in creating a democratic system in Kuwait was clearly 
expressed during the discussions of the draft Constitution in the constituent 
assembly. It is important to discuss in some detail the nationalist concern over 
two articles in particular, since it will reveal a very clear vision and a deep 
rooted desire to create a genuinely democratic system of government in Kuwait. 
It is also important to discuss because these two articles proved to have the 
problematic consequences anticipated by the nationalists. The problems lie with 
Articles 56 and 43. 
The nationalists feared that the adoption of Article 56 would make a mere 
rubber-stamp of the National Assembly and any actual authority would be in the 
hands of the government.60 The article was, however, adopted by a majority of 
17 votes out of 32. The objections of the nationalists revolved around four main 
points: 
1. The appointment of ministers 
Article 56 stipulates that ministers shall be appointed from amongst the 
members of the National Assembly and from others. The objection was based 
on the grounds that the assembly is an elected body and appointment would 
spoil the democracy, which we are seeking.61 Also, some of the ministers would 
58 AI-Najjar, 1987, op.cit. p. 66. 
59 Gargash, op.cit. p.l75. 
60 National Assemblv Proceedings, No.:20. 18/9/ 1962, P 18. 
61 National Assembly Proceedings. No.20. 18/9/ 1962. P 56. 
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be members of the ruling family and, therefore, would be subjected to criticism, 
accountability and even the withdrawal of any confidence in them by the 
assembly. To keep the ruling family above differences and conflicts, they 
suggested that the Constitution should exclude members of the ruling family 
from the cabinet.62 
2. The number of ministers in the assembly 
Differences emerged concerning the number of cabinet ministers in the 
assembly. In the end, it was decided that the number should not exceed one-
third of the total number of members in the National Assembly in accordance to 
the suggestion made by the legal advisor, 'Othman Khalil 'Othman. All the 
members accepted this compromise, except Yagoob al Humaidi. 
3. Traditional Consultation 
Article 56 stipulates that the Amir shall, after traditional consultation, appoint the 
prime minister and relieve him from office. The Amir shall also appoint 
ministers and relieve them from office, upon receiving the recommendation to 
do this by the prime minister. The nationalists wanted the prime minister to also 
consult with the president and members of the National Assembly before the 
formation of the cabinet was finalised. 63 
4. The voting rights of the unelected ministers 
The nationalists thought that the unelected members could actively participate 
in debates but not have the right to vote on the grounds that as the elected 
members of the assembly do not intervene in the affairs of the cabinet then the 
unelected members should not be able to intervene in the affairs of the National 
62 National Assembly Proceedings, No.20. 18/9/ 1962. P 6-9. 
63 National Assembly Proceedings. No.20. 18/9/ 1962, p. 6-9. 
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Assembly. They hoped that with this suggestion, it would protect the assembly 
from becoming a rubber-stamp legislature.64 
The nationalists concern about the Article has been justified. The presence of 
ministers, especially the ruling family members, in the assembly has 
undermined the effective functioning of the assembly and gave more weight to 
the Amir and the executive on the expense of the representatives of the people. 
As for the other draft Article, number 43, it guaranteed freedom to form 
associations, organisations and unions.65 However, the representative of the 
ruling family objected and demanded the deletion of the word "organisations" 
because it might be interpreted as permission to form political parties.66 The 
nationalists attacked the deletion on the grounds that it deprives the Kuwaiti 
citizens of having full political rights. The merchant's representative also saw 
the deletion as limiting individual freedom. In addition to this, the nationalists 
saw this as an important issue because the Constitution emphasised, in Articles 
36'and 37, the freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of publication and 
the freedom of expression but failed to mention political freedom.67 The word 
was in the end, deleted and the legal advisor, 'Othman Khalil 'Othman, 
explained that the Constitution was left silent on the issue of formation of 
political parties as this is left to the legislature to permit or to prohibit.68 
The fear of giving legal permission for the formation of political parties has, in 
fact, limited the development of the representative system in Kuwait and 
undermined the development of political platforms that reflect national interest 
rather than the narrow interests of constituencies divided along sectarian, tribal 
and ethnic lines. 
6-1 National Assembly Proceedings, No.20. 18/9/ 1962, p. 9-14. 
65 See Kuwait Constitution, Appendix A 
66 National Assembly Proceedings, No.24. 24/10/1962. p 32-35. 
67 National Assembly Proceedings. No.24. 24/10/1962. P 38-340. 
68 National Assembly Proceedings, :'\0.24. 24/10/1962. P 40-41. 
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4.3.3 The Tribal Deputies 
Prior to the introduction of the representative system in Kuwait, the badu had 
limited political influence and were marginal to the political system, although 
their loyalty and service has been extremely valuable to al Sabah. The reasons 
for that, as delineated by Baz, relate to their lack of a social base or economic 
power and their migratory mode of living, in addition to being far from urban 
centres.69 As a group they are more dependent on the ruling family than urban 
Kuwaitis, since they were less educated and occupied low working positions 
and earn low salaries, have settled more recently and their naturalisation, on a 
large scale, only began in the sixties. However, the expanded educational and 
economic opportunities offered by the state have benefited them immensely 
.,-... 
and many among them are university-educated and occupy important 
positions.70 The National Assembly, in particular, have provided them with a 
channel to enhance their status, improve their circumstances, and to be directly 
involved in the political process of Kuwait. 
The tribal deputies are used as an intermediary between the state and badu 
constituencies emphasising a patron-client relationship between the Ruler and 
""---~ 
the people. The government obliges the demands of these deputies in order to 
".--
provide tangible benefits to their constituencies because these deputies do not 
challenge the ruling family and its right to rule. 71 The balance of power in the 
assembly has been defined by the inclusion of the badu on such a large scale. 
Tribal leaders who sit in the assembly have a strong loyalty to the ruling family 
which is maintained through blood relation, marriage and mutu~ts.72 
--~--- -
Another important reason for their loyalty in the assembly stems from the fact 
that their concerns centre primarily on issues related to their districts socio-
69 Baz, op.cit. p.2l0. 
70 AI-Khalaf, op.cit. p. 110. 
71 Mary Ann Tetreault. "Patterns of Culture and Democratization in Kuwait." Studies in Comparal1\ l' 
International Development. ( Vo1.30. No.2 Summer 1995) p. 34. 
72 AI-Bahrani, op.cit. p. 304. 
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economic needs and infrastructural improvements issues, which of themselves, 
cannot be considered as threatening or challenging to the status quO.73 
Tribal deputies, in order to fulfil the basic function that voters elect them for 
must have close ties to ministers and other senior officials in order to solve the 
personal problems of their voters otherwise, without these connections they will 
not be elected in the following elections.74 Voters actually vote not only for 
those who can help them gain personal benefits but also vote for money. Cash 
bribes exchanged for votes are common among the badu. This takes also 
place among the urban Sunni and Shi'ite constituencies but on a much smaller 
scale.7s 
By mere virtue of their minimal numbers in the assembly, the tribal deputies 
have created a block in the face of the opposition. AI Nifisi argues that through 
the inclusion of the badu as a distinct group, the government has been able to 
control the shape of the assembly prior to election and limit the size and extent 
of opposition within the assembly.76 With the Shi'ite these badu deputies were 
the only two groups which demonstrated consistent loyalty to the government 
during votes and debates.77 The governments' generous socio-economic 
programmes and relaxing the naturalisation laws in favour of the badu, 
guaranteed the continued support of tribal deputies. Their conservative outlook 
and their respect to traditional authority - symbolised by the ruling family - made 
them a powerful ally to al Sabah in counter balancing the liberal wing of the 
assembly.78 
Another reason for the importance of having tribal deputies as a source of 
support for al Sabah is their ability to determine election results which is due to 
73 Mufid AI-Zaidi. AI-tayyarat al-fikriya fi al-khalij aI-'arabi,l938-1978. (Intellectual Trends in the Arab 
Gulf 1938-1971). (Damascus: Arab Unity Centre, 2000). p. 136. 
74 Jerkhi, op.cit. p. 247. 
75 Ibid., p.247. 
76 AI-Nifisi. op.cit. p.74. 
77 AI-Najjar. 1987. op.cit. p. 65. 
78 . 21 i Baz. Op.CIt. p. - . 
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two factors. The first relates to the concentration of the large and prominent 
tribes in particular districts; making these areas closed electoral districts in the 
face of other social groups, and even closed to some members of the tribe 
itself. The second relates to the conduct of primary elections (al entekhabat al 
tareya) in tribal districts to determine which candidates shall run for national 
election. A committee is formed by the contesting candidates to take on the 
duties of a polling station officer. The committee determines the Election Day 
usually two or three months before a national election and calls upon the 
eligible voters who appear in the register of the constituency electorate. A 
representative of each candidate attend the process of selection for each 
election.79 Once the candidates have been agreed upon, the competition 
ceases and tribal solidarity emerges to ensure the success of these chosen 
candidates. 
The role of tribal sheikhs and senior members of the tribe is extremely important 
in the selection process of candidates. 8o The most significant result of this habit 
has been the denial of some educated and more efficient candidates from being 
allowed to running in the national elections.81 That explains why tribal deputies 
have been the least active members of the assembly during debates and their 
lack of contribution to the various committees of the assembly.82 
One explanation offered for the adoption of this method is that no tribe enjoys 
an absolute majority in the 15 electoral districts which are considered to be 
tribal districts, except in three. Therefore, the tribes act to protect their vested 
interests by supporting tribal candidates.83 The defenders of this form of pre-
79 AI-Moqatei, op.cit. p.199. 
80 Ali Z. AI-Zubi. "Tribal Solidarity as Reflected in the Election of Kuwait Parliament". MA. Thesis, Ball 
State University, 1995. p.46-48. 
81 'Adil AI-Tabataba'i. "Al-sulta al-tashri'iya fi duwal al-khalij al-'arabi". (The Legislative Authority in 
Arabian Gulf Countries). Manshurat majallat dirasat al-khalij wa al-jazira al- 'arabiva. N.l..J.. Kuwait: 
1985. p.376-378. 
82 Ibid. ,p.381. 
83 . 45 AI-Zubi. 1995, Op.CIt. p. . 
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election see it as a being effective and acceptable method of achieving a 
political purpose.84 
Opponents of this form of pre-election, the majority of whom are urban Kuwaitis, 
see it firstly as an effective way of increasing the role of sectarian and tribal 
systems, while impeding national unity and social and political development.85 
Secondly, it makes sectarian bias the basis of competition instead of ideological 
parties, thus leading to an unfair representation of the people's will. Thirdly, it 
prevents qualified people from political participation because of its restriction to 
certain candidates, which is inconsistent with the spirit of competition and 
democracy.86 Some levy a more serious criticism at the practice by perceiving a 
conflict between the primary elections and the Constitution. AI Tabataba'i 
states that 
The preliminary election is in conflict with Article 80 of the 
Constitution which states that Assembly members shall be elected 
directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot. This means that 
election should be held in one stage. However, the "primary election" 
changes the election to two stages which is in conflict with the 
Constitution. 87 
Despite all these criticisms, the official attitude towards the practice is to accept 
it and participate in its operation.88 The practice has become a de facto system, 
.--
widely used. Even the urban Kuwaiti elite who strongly oppose the practice 
resorted to it in the election of the fifth assembly as shall be seen in the next 
chapter. Perhaps the necessity that arises for the badu and hadhar when this 
method is used, a consequence of the absence of a genuine party system. As 
indicated by al Rashidi: 
84 AI-Moqatei, op.cit. p. 201. 
85 Baz, op.cit. p.212-213. 
86 AI-Moqatei, op.cit. p. 202. 
87 AI-Tabtaba'y, op.cit. p.390-391. 
R8 .' "0" AI-Moqatel, op.CIt. p.- -' 
The unique environment in the Kuwait political system which 
prohibits parties and permits parliamentary elections, forced the 
people to create some organisations not prohibited by the 
Constitution and acceptable to society, to win an election by the 
backing of such a group. It is therefore, the primary election which is 
the best practical solution to this problem, whether it is based on 
tribal or religious grounds. 89 
One effective way of countering this system without infringing on neither the 
badu nor the hadhar various freedoms is by legalising political parties. Doing 
this will undermine the tribal and sectarian system and reform the electoral 
system without restricting public freedom. 
4.3.4 The Islamists 
This group comprises of Muslim fundamentalists who propagate their Islamic 
ideology and platform whether they are believers of Islam Sunni or Shia. The 
Sunni Islamists were very marginal in Kuwaiti political life and in the assembly 
during the period of the sixties due to the dominance of the Arab nationalist 
ideology in general, and the strength of the Kuwaiti nationalist movement in 
particular. Thus, it is possible to notice that they had seven candidates in the 
election for the first National Assembly and only one actually succeeded, 
Hashim al Rifaa'y, from the first electoral district which is incidentally a strong 
hold for the Shi'ite. His success can be attributed to the alliance he made with 
the Shi'ite in the area. 90 
The strengthening of their influence in the assembly and in the Kuwaiti society 
came after the 1967 war, as a result of the failure of the Nasserist project and 
bankruptcy of Pan-Arabism, as well as the split that took place in the nationalist 
movement in Kuwait. On its part, the government encouraged the revival of 
religious organisations in the hope of stemming the tide of nationalists and leftist 
89 Ibid., p.196. 
'XIpahd 'Abdullah AI-Mudyris. (Al-Mudyris). lama 'at al- 'ikhwan al-muslimin fi al-kuwayt. (The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Kuwait). (Kuwait: Dar al-qurtas, 1999,a).p.28. 
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groups and their influence on the assembly and society as a whole. Another 
reason that attributed to the extension of the influence of the Islamist groups 
was the financial resources that became accessible to these groups without any 
limitation in the whole Gulf area, due to the oil wealth which created such 
funding. In addition, many forums were available to them without any restriction 
from the government, and these included the mosques.91 The mosque is the 
centre of religious life, but also functions as a powerful institution to transmit 
information and mobilise opinion, while the sanctified nature of the place 
confers legitimate authority on religious leaders and prevent any direct state 
intervention.92 The Society of Social Reform, which was established in 1963 as 
the public front for the Muslim Brothers, became the force behind the expansion 
of Islamic fundamentalism among a large segment of the Kuwaiti population 
during the seventies.93 
The strategy of the Islamists was to campaign against the nationalists and leftist 
groups and take over the place they earned over the years in popular 
associations and labour organisations and professional associations, etc. They 
succeeded in taking over the Teachers Association and the National Union of 
Kuwaiti Students, marginalising in these two organisations the secular trend. 
They attempted to take over the Association of University Graduates, which is a 
stronghold for the Nasserists and nationalists, but they were without any 
success. They also failed to take over the General Confederation of Kuwaiti 
Workers. However, in the unions that relate to the oil sector they found more 
success because the majority of workers are of badu origin. However, that 
success was short-lived, because the leftist groups regained control over that 
sector. 94 
They managed success elsewhere here because their control over the 
cooperative sector has been complete permitting them to expand their grass 
91, Abdulmalik AI-Timimi. • Abhath fi tarikh aI-kuwayt. (Researches in Kuwait History). (Dar aI-qurtas. 
1998). p.47. 
9' . 3'1 
. Tetreault. 1995. Op.Clt. p. -. 
93 AI-Mudyris. 1999. op.cit. p.33. 
94 Ibid .. p.~3. 
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root support. The general manager of the Union of Cooperative Association 
has described the impact of that control on the sector as creating sensitivities in 
the Kuwaiti society and causing people to abandon the sector due to the control 
and manipulation of the various political trends over the associations.95 The 
number of seats they gained in the assembly has risen from only one in 1963 to 
three in 1967, while in the 1971 election they gained two seats and in the 1975 
one seat. 
In 1976, the Islamists acted contrary to the position taken by most popular 
associations, the nationalists and merchants, as they did not denounce the 
dissolution of the assembly. Their silence was rewarded by giving the chairman 
of the Society for Social Reform a cabinet position in the government that was 
formed following the dissolution. Their publication a/ Mujtam' (The Society) 
published the Amiri decree of the dissolution without any comment. 96 They also 
did not object to the amendments that the government was proposing to the 
Constitution that had wide implications for parliamentary life. However, in 1977 
the Isalmists organised a campaign of collecting signatures for a petition calling 
for the amendment of Article (2) of the Constitution in order to make the Shari'a 
the only source of legislation in the country, as opposed to being just a major 
source for legislation.97 In other words, they were more interested in furthering 
their ideological position concerning the application of Shari'a rather than in 
denouncing the proposed amendments of the Constitution which aimed at 
marginalizing the assembly and extending the power of the executive.98 
4.3.5 The Shi'ites 
As to the Shi'ites, their pOlitical role prior to the inauguration of parliamentary life 
was marginal. The assembly gave them the opportunity for formal political 
participation in a similar fashion to the badu. In the election for the first National 
Assembly they won five seats in the predominantly Shi'ite districts. The Shi'ite 
95 Interview in AI-Qabas newspaper, Kuwait, September, 3 1993. 
96 AI-Mudyris, 1999, op.cit. p.33. 
97 Ibid., p.33. 
98 Interview with Dr. 'Abdul-muhsan AI-!'.lad'aj. Durham, July. 2003. 
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deputies were loyal to the government and they supported cabinet bills 
including those that restricted individual freedom, public gatherings and press 
freedom. They also acted as a front against the opposition in the assembly. A 
long the badu deputies they both represented the government block in the 
assembly. 
The representation of the Shi1ite in the assembly increased to ten in the second 
assembly, while in the third they managed to gain six seats and in the fourth 
assembly they regained their previous strength of ten seats. In 1975, for the 
first time a Sh i'ite , Abdul al Mutalib AI-Kathimyi, was appointed to the cabinet. 
The Shi'ite deputies came from the most prominent and wealthiest families 
displaying conservative traditional views and were strongly pro-government.99 
However, this started to change by the mid-seventies when a group of young 
liberal Shi'ite ran for the first time for the election of the fourth assembly in 
competition with the old guard under the name the "Constitutional Nationalist 
Youth". Their programme was primarily geared towards protecting and 
maintaining the Constitution and democratic life, strengthening the separation of 
the authorities, and enhancing national unity through justice. The founder of the 
group was Khalid Khalaf who, during the fifties had played a leading role in the 
Arab nationalist movement, succeeded to win a seat in the assembly. Although 
his support for the Iranian revolution would later cost him his citizenship, after 
liberation his citizenship was fully reinstated. 1oo 
Although the Shi1ites elect on sect (a Shi1ite candidate would have little chance 
of winning if he did not depend on his sect votes) the quality of the candidate is 
very important thus their deputies are well educated and well qualified.101 The 
reaction of Shi1ites deputies to the dissolution of the assembly was mixed. Four 
out of the ten deputies signed the petition that called for the reinstatement of the 
assembly, which reflected a change taking place within the Shi'ite community.102 
The government continued to rely on the old loyal guard as can be seen from its 
99 AI-Khalaf, op.cit. p.113. 
100 Ibid .. p.1l3. 
101 J kh' . ')46 er' 1. op.Ctt. p. ~ . 
10' . b . 1 i ~ AI-Mudyrls, 1999, . Op.Clt. p._"t. 
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apPointment of eight Shi'ite in the 35 members committee studying the 
amendment of the Constitution. 103 
4.3.7 The Liberal Sunnis/lndependents 
This group comprises mostly of Kuwaiti professionals and they are the most 
educated and liberal minded group, adhering to no particular ideology and 
taking an independent stand on political and social issues.104 As a group they 
can be divided among pro-government, pro-nationalists or connected with 
particular ruling family members. However, they take the lead in the assembly 
mostly from the merchants and Arab nationalist groups. lOS Their presences in 
the assembly have been relatively strong, numbering as little as 6 and 
increasing to having of 14 deputies elected. Among them can be counted four 
of the most issue-oriented members of the assembly, Ahmad al Sa'doun, 
Mshari al 'Anjeri, Saleh al Fadhale, and Ahmad al Tukhaim. 106 
4.3.6 The Ruling Family 
A significant consequence of the oil wealth is the expansion of the political role 
of al Sabah the ruling family of Kuwait. As described by Crystal: 
This political role for the ruling family was an important break with the 
past. Until oil, the ruling families were not cohesive political 
institutions; rather, family members were largely excluded from the 
emir's decisions. With oil, successive emirs strengthened family 
network's to provide more reliable elite recruitment pools for the 
increasingly large and bureaucratic government catalysed by oil. 
The most distant family claimants were eliminated, the less distant 
103 Kuwait News agency, February 1981. 
104 h . -4 Sala ,Op.Clt. p.) . 
105 987' - 1 AI-Najjar. 1 , Op.Clt. p.)-t. 
I~ . 1'1 AI-Khalaf, Op.Clt. p. - . 
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received increased allowances, the nearer claimants sinecures, and 
the closest relatives high state posts. 107 
Members of the ruling family who are appointed as ministers become members 
of the National Assembly de jure. The cabinet, as seen from table 4.5, has 
changed its formation over time. However, one feature has always remained the 
same and that is that very few cabinet members came from the assembly. 
Table 4.5 The Composition of the Kuwaiti Cabinet 1962-1975 
Jan-62 Jan-63 Dec-64 Jan-65 Dec-65 Feb-67 Feb-71 Feb-75 
Assembly members 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 
Outside the assembly 12 14 11 11 11 12 12 14 
(of which) 
Ruling family 12 11 5 5 5 5 3 5 
Business men 3 4 6 4 4 5 6 
Others 2 2 3 4 2 
Total 15 16 15 14 14 15 14 16 
Source:: Ahmad Abdullah Saad Baz. "Political Elite and Political Development in Kuwait." Ph. D thesis, George Washington University, 1981. p.173. 
At the start of the period al Sabah family members dominated the cabinet, 
however with time their numbers declined in favour of both the merchants and 
members drawn from the wider community. They still manage to maintain a 
hold on key cabinet positions; the most important among them being the prime 
minister, foreign affairs, interior and defence. By providing them with 
government posts the Ruler, in effect, controlled members of the family as rivals 
against each other, therefore making them trusted allies for the Amir. 
Their influence in the assembly derives not from their numbers, since it is 
limited but from their posts and their belonging to the ruling family. Their 
alliance or cooperation with the other groups in the assembly such as the badu, 
merchants and independent deputies give them their legislative importance. 
However, the presence of al Sabah members in the assembly undermines 
107 Crystal. 1989. op.cit. p. 435. 
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parliamentary life by them combining both the ruling and governing roles. In 
addition, it makes the Constitutional right of the assembly to question the 
ministers much harder if a ruling family member is involved, which create 
tension and resentment between the two branches of government and this has 
often happened. 
Another factor that contributes to their strengthen and influence is the cabinet 
itself. The cabinet in Kuwait is one of the most powerful institutions of the state; 
through it the Amir exercises his powers. The cabinet controls the departments 
of the state, formulates government policy and executes and supervises the 
work of all government departments, in addition to the traditional appointment of 
the Heir Apparent as the prime minister. The cabinet as a whole cannot be 
subjected to a vote of no confidence in the assembly and only individual 
ministers can be subjected to a withdrawal of confidence and if such instances 
occur it may tender for their resignation. The ministers have the right to 
participate in the debates and they have the right to vote on bills, but they are 
not allowed to vote if it involves a vote of no confidence against one of their 
colleagues, or a vote of no cooperation in the prime minister. 
4.4 The Levels of Influence of the National Assembly 
The levels of influence available to the National Assembly comprises of three 
levels: attention drawing, warning and sanction as seen in table 4.6. For the 
first level the means of influence is used in expressing their wishes and 
discussing public issues. For the second level the means available are to 
question cabinet members, investigate committees and to request an 
interpellation. For the third level the means extends to include initiating bills, 
giving approval or disapproval, giving a no-confidence vote against a minister 
and, no provide cooperation with a minister. 
I -+ I 
Table 4.6 The Means of Influence of the National Assembly 
Levels of Influence Means of Influence 
Attention Drawing 1. Expressing wishes 
2. Discussing public issues 
Warning 1. Questioning Cabinet members 
2. Investigating committees 
3. Requesting an interpellation 
Sanction 1. Initiating bills 
2. Giving approval or disapproval 
3. Giving a no-confidence vote against a minister 
4. No cooperation with the prime minister 
Source: Jasim Muhammad Khalaf, The Kuwait National Assembly: A Study of its Structure and Function, PhD, university of New York, 1984. 
The assembly, as seen from table 4.7, has focused on using a low level of 
influence in its dealings with the government. Even in the fourth assembly, 
which regularly challenged the government, the deputies used only the method 
of questioning. However they used it frequently, hence 52 percent of the total 
number of questioning directed at cabinet ministers took place within one year 
of the life of that assembly. On the other hand, the fourth assembly saw the 
highest percent of bills approved, around 38 percent of total bills for the whole 
period 1962-1976. 
Table 4.7 The Frequency of the Use of the Different Means of Influence of the Assembly 
1st assembly 2nd assembly 3rd assembly 4th assembly Total 
Wishes 17 25 12 23 n 
Discussions 5 7 6 6 24 
Questions 111 74 123 336 644 
Bills initiated 28 26 30 32 116 
Bills approved 38 35 27 60 160 
Source: Jasim Khalaf. The Kuwait National Assembly: A Study of its Structure and Function. Ph.D, University of New York. 1984 p192.194.195.199.201 
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Thus, the accusation levied at the assembly by the ruling family of overstepping 
their limits does not correspond to the types of methods the assembly 
predominantly used to hold the government accountable. Assembly members 
have been restrained in their dealings with the government if one is to consider 
the range of mechanisms that they have had at their disposal to challenge the 
government. Deputies are aware that the Constitution has given the 
government more leverage over the assembly and strengthened its hand in its 
dealings with the assembly. The most important leverage is the right to dissolve 
the assembly, which the Ruler has used specifically in terms that violated the 
stipulations of the Constitution. Another level of influence is the appointment to 
the cabinet. Cabinet members are appointed by the Amir from among both the 
general public and the assembly. During the period under consideration most 
of the members of the cabinet came from outside the assembly. Those 
members are ipso facto members of the assembly in accordance to the Kuwaiti 
Constitution (see table 4.3). Their participation in the assembly deliberations is 
constitutionally guaranteed, in addition to participation in assembly committees. 
The most extreme level of influence of the assembly is the vote of non-
cooperation with the prime minister, which was used only once. That was, as 
mentioned before, in December 1964, when Sheikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah 
formed a cabinet that included several businessmen. The opposition of the 
assembly led to the resignation of the cabinet and the appointment of another 
one. One of the major reasons for the infrequency of the use of this device is 
the fact that Prime Minister is the Crown Prince, a very powerful and prestigious 
figurehead. 108 
4.5 The Issues that Dominated the Discussions of the National Assembly 
The four assemblies have witnessed some vigorous and competent debates 
causing discord with the government, which eventually led to the first 
suspension of the National Assembly in 1976. Many issues were discussed 
during the period between 1962-1976, but, two stands out as most significantly 
exemplifying the tension between the executive and the legislative over the 
108 . 10-AI-Khalaf. Op.Clt. p. ). 
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function of the assembly. These issues were Kuwaiti's oil policy and the 
accountability of the government. 
1. Kuwait's oil policy/ decreasing Kuwait's domination by foreign oil companies. 
This issue dominated debates throughout the period of 1963-75, which is 
understandable, when considering its centrality to the country. Four particular 
matters were scrutinised by the assembly: the principle of royalty expensing 
agreement, the utilisation of natural gas, the participation agreement, and the 
nationalisation of oil. 109 These debates reveal that the assembly took a serious 
stand towards challenging the dominant position that oil companies had in 
Kuwait and demanded a national oil policy that reflects the national interests of 
Kuwait. The debates also show that a group of deputies had significant 
understanding of the implication of oil and the oil policy towards the growth and 
development of Kuwait. Suleiman AI Mutawa', a nationalist member of the 
assembly, indicated that: 
it is clear that the public interest lies in the amendment of the 
concession of the oil companies ... if work is to be taken seriously, 
then the agreements signed in abnormal circumstances are not 
feasible now; if we are really concerned about protecting the public 
interest then we have to amend the agreements with the oil company 
which plundered the people's money without any control over it. 110 
Principle of Royalty Agreement.: The nationalist group introduced a proposal 
to the government to reconsider the agreements signed with the oil companies 
working in Kuwait and to give these concessions to the Kuwait National 
Petroleum Company (KNPC), which was established in 1960 with 60 percent of 
its capital owned by the government and the rest by public shareholders. The 
government claimed that the proposal contravened with its commitment to the 
109 Salih, op.cit. p. 55. 
110 National Assembly Proceedings, No. 85. 231111965. p.59. 
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Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, (OPEC) whereby Kuwait cannot 
take unilateral action against the oil companies. 
The first oil bill to be presented to the assembly was the agreement on royalty 
expensing that was reached between the foreign oil companies and the Kuwaiti 
government in December 1964. Foreign oil companies in Kuwait determined 
the price, quantity and where oil would be shipped in exchange for a royalty 
payment to the government. Since the early fifties, with the rise in the price of 
oil and an increase in its demand, oil-producing countries began to pressurise 
the companies for a larger share of the wealth by negotiating better terms for 
agreements of oil concessions. The debate in the assembly on the agreement 
revealed, contrary to its proclaimed aim of raising the share of the Kuwaiti 
government from the sale of its oil, that it worked against the government and in 
effect diminished government revenues. In the words of one deputy the new 
agreement is vel}' dangerous and constituting a new concession favourable to 
the oil companies. 111 
Subsequently, the assembly did not ratify the agreement when it was submitted 
for discussion, in January 1965, despite the request of the government to ratify 
it as soon as possible to meet the requirements stipulated by the oil companies. 
AI Khatib protested the way in which the assembly was requested to consider 
the agreement: 
within only a few days a complex agreement dealing with the vital 
question of oil, which is being put to the people's representatives for 
the first time in Kuwaiti's history and one which must have taken the 
oil companies months of preparation.' 112 
Another opposition deputy, Jassim al Qatami, argued that the limitation of time 
in debating the agreement was intended to put pressure on the assembly into 
ratifying the agreement without having enough time to study it. He also pointed 
to the fact that by ratifying it, the assembly is in effect lending Constitutional 
III AI-Shayeji, op,cit. p. 139. 
w Ibid., 139 
legitimacy to all the previous concessions cleverly embodied In that 
agreement. 113 
There was widespread concern among the deputies over the agreement that a 
vote over a proposal introduced by al Khatib's group to give the assembly a 
period of two months to study the agreement passed by a majority of 27 in 
favour to 13 votes against. The government felt obliged to concede to the 
demands of the assembly. The minister of finance and industry acknowledged 
the importance of the assembly's discussion that aimed at safeguarding the 
interests of the country, and indicated that the government had no intention to 
push the assembly to ratify an agreement as it was not convinced of its merits. 
However, in the second national assembly - where opposition groups were 
absent and the assembly was a more pliable instrument in the hands of the 
government, the agreement was ratified with very little discussion."4 
The absence of the nationalists from the second assembly transferred the 
conflict with the government and oil companies to the nationalist weekly journal 
al Tali 'a. The journal, from 16 January 1966 until its suspension 4 May 1966, 
kept publishing articles concerning the oil industry in Kuwait and focused on 
sensitive issues such as the attitude of the Kuwait Oil Company towards Kuwait 
national company, the cost of the production of oil, the debt of oil companies to 
the government and the methods of payments of foreign oil companies etc ... 115 
The detailed discussion of the oil industry and the workings of foreign 
companies led to an awakening in the public to oil affairs. The situation is 
described concisely in the following words: 
During the four months of the press attack by al Tali'a on the oil 
companies and the government, the average man in Kuwait in 
particular and in the Gulf region in general was becoming interested 
113 Ibid., p.140. 
114 Ibid .. p.167. 
lIS AI-Mudyris. 1987. op.cit. p.206. 
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in the writings of the journal on oil and gas affairs. In fact, it served 
as public seminar on vel}' important subjects. 116 
Utilisation of Gas: The assembly, on several occasions had been pressing the 
government to put pressure on oil companies to utilise the massive production 
of gas that is associated with the production of oil. Initially the oil companies 
were reluctant to do so and argued that the costs are too high for such an 
operation. However, in March 1971, an agreement was reached with the 
government to utilise the gas through the construction of an extensive facility for 
the production of liquefied natural gas and other derivatives such as propane 
and butane. The assembly expressed serious reservations concerning the 
agreement because it gave more benefits to the oil companies than to the 
Kuwaiti government. 117 Despite these reservations, the agreement was 
eventually ratified. 
Participation Agreement: When the participation agreement over oil, which was 
reached in January 1973 between the British Petroleum Company and the Gulf 
Oil Company, was referred to the third assembly for ratification, but criticisms of 
its stipulations were rife. During that assembly, the opposition was determined 
to put pressure on the government into adopting a more assertive oil policy 
aimed at ensuring Kuwait's control over its oil industry. Four members of the 
nationalist group and three young members of merchant families led the debate 
in the assembly. These seven deputies (al Khatib, Sami al Manays, Abd Allah 
al Naibari, Ali AI Ghanim, Abd-al Mutalib al Kathimyi and Salim al Marzuq and 
Badir al Ajeel) were educated and very knowledgeable and were able to argue 
their case effectively.118 In addition to that, extensive press coverage also 
helped to mobilise popular support for the hardening of the position of the 
assembly towards the agreement. 
Deputy Ali al Ghanim reminded the government that participation does not 
merely mean increasing in the share of revenues but also entails the 
116Ib'd '"'6'"' 1 ., p. __ . 
117 Salih. op.cit. p.64. 
118 Shuhaiber. op.cit. p. 192. 
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participation of the management and the control of oil production, industry, 
transportation and marketing. 119 Abdullah al Naibari pointed to the fact that the 
agreement had no stipulation that assures any future nationalisation of the oil 
companies. 120 These remarks indicate that the deputies viewed the issue of 
participation as including the control of the Kuwaiti government over its natural 
assets and the overall oil policy. 
Another major criticism levied at the agreement by the deputies was the 
agreement's legal vagueness and conceptual complexity. Deputy Badir al Ajeel 
took up specific articles in the agreement and exposed their difficulties which he 
argued, served to disguise the interests of the oil companies. 121 Other deputies 
pointed out some of the economic drawbacks of the agreement, especially in 
terms of the revenues generated by the government and control over the 
management of the country's most vital asset. They emphasised that it reflects 
the interests of Western countries, especially the US, rather than the national 
interests of Kuwait. Deputy Ahmad al Nifisi argued that the agreement fits US 
needs, since it guarantees the flow of oil at prices that will remain low, and 
ensures that Kuwait cannot, in the near future size the control of its oil 
production.122 Deputy al Khatib argued clearly this political aspect of the 
agreement, by indicating that: 
The only strategic importance of the region lies in oil and oil alone. 
The era of military bases of the parading of fleets or of hegemony is 
over. What America needs most today is oil, enough oil to satisfy its 
own needs and those of its Western allies and it wants it at 
reasonable prices in order to ensure Western industrial growth and 
development. In addition, the US wishes to see the oil producing 
countries keep the funds they receive for their oil in safe deposit 
119 National Assemblyly Proceedings, No 103. 13/2/1973. p.25-27. 
120 National Assembly Proceedings, No 103. 13n11973. p. 33. 
121Abdo 1. Baaklini. And Abdulwahab Alia. 4, The Role of National Assembly in Kuwait's Economic 
Development: National Oil Policy. In Legislatures in Development. Joel Smith and Lioyd Musolf (eds) 
Durham. N. C. Duke University Press 1979. p. 10. 
122 National Assembly Proceedings, No.293. 2/6/1973. p.117-118. 
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there in America. This is the main aim of American policy in the 
region ... The safeguarding of this vital interest to the West. 123 
The assembly's highly critical stand against the agreement forced the 
government to announce its intention to renegotiate the agreement and 
declared the agreement as suspended. The government to some extent 
welcomed the intense opposition coming from the assembly and used it as 
leverage in dealing with the oil companies.124 The crown prince, and prime 
minister, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, acknowledged the role of the 
assembly by declaring: 
We note the constructive discussions your honourable Assembly has 
held over the question of oil participation, which were aimed at 
realising the public good by safeguarding our natural resources and 
their proper investment. In light of these discussions, and as a result 
of basic changes, which have taken place in the world's oil situation, 
we have decided to take initiative in reconsidering the content of the 
agreement. 125 
The renegotiated agreement gave Kuwait a 60 percent share as opposed to the 
original 40 percent, with the right to acquire the remaining share by 1979 
instead of 1982. The new and more concise agreement, with only eight articles, 
was presented again to the assembly in 1974. The agreement tackled some of 
the concerns expressed by the assembly, although it fell short of attaining full 
national control over oil. Thus, some deputies remained unconvinced and 
maintained that nationalisation should take place immediately and indicated that 
the renegotiated agreement has not tackled its basic drawback centring on the 
restrictions of government's rights for the full management of its oil. 126 
Subsequently, 20 deputies abstained from voting while 31 voted for the 
agreement and two voted against it. The government continually resisted the 
1~3 National Assembly Proceedings, No. 110. 13/211973. p.25-26. 
124 Baaklini, 1979, op.cit. p. 40. 
12'i National Assembly Proceedings, No. 143.41711973. p. 67. 
126 Baaklini, 1979. op.cit. p. 32. 
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idea of naturalisation on the grounds that Kuwait lacked the trained local staff in 
the fields of oil production, marketing and distribution. 
Nationalisation of Oil: The issue of nationalisation was reactivated in 1975 by 
the opposition as they asserted that it was the only way to preserve Kuwait's 
national strategic commodity. Despite the improvement in the participation 
agreement, the oil companies remained in charge, since they controlled 76 per 
cent of the votes of the board of directors. The government, before the 
proposal of the opposition was submitted for discussion, introduced a bill calling 
for nationalisation. By doing that, it has been suggested that the government 
was motivated to prevent the opposition from taking credit for such a 
proposal. 127 The government also realised from the experience of Iraq and 
Libya that nationalisation does not produce any setbacks and subsequently 
embarked on nationalising its oil industry. Following an earlier proposal by the 
assembly and in recognition of the importance of oil to the national economy, 
the government took the decision in 1975 to separate the oil and finance 
sectors. The Ministry of Finance was subsequently divided into two ministries, 
one for finance and the other for oil. 
2. Accountability of the Executive to the Assembly 
Accountability of the government is one of the major functions of a legislative 
body and is most difficult to execute while maintaining a cooperative and 
effective relation with the government. The Kuwaiti case is further complicated 
by the fact that the ruling family wants a debating assembly with no real muscle 
or influence. Subsequently, there were clashes with the government over many 
issues and new laws characterised the first stage of parliamentary experience. 
Three examples shall be discussed, namely, cabinet formation, promulgation of 
anti democratic laws, and independence of the judiciary. 
Cabinet formation; One of the most interesting incidents, especially because it 
was instigated by loyal supporters of the ruling family, concerns what became 
known as "the crisis of Article 131" or "the first Constitutional crisis in Kuwait". 
1'7 'h ' 6-
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On December 6, 1964, a majority of 31 deputies, (mainly tribal and Shi'ite) led 
by Khalid al Mas'ud objected to the newly formed cabinet because it included 
businessmen whose membership of the cabinet was seen as a direct violation 
of Article (131) of the Constitution. The Article states that: 
While in office, a minister shall not hold any other public office or 
practice, even indirectly, any profession or undertake any industrial, 
commercial or financial business. Further, he shall not participate in 
any concession granted by the Government or by public bodies or 
cumulate the ministerial post with membership of the board of 
directors of any company. Further, during the said period, a Minister 
shall not buy or take on hire any property of the state even by public 
auction, nor shall be let, sell or barter any of his property to the 
Government. 128 
These ministers were Humid al Nisf, the Minister of Public health, 'Abd al Latif 
Thunayyan, the Minister of Public works, 'Abd al 'Aziz al Shafi, the Minister of 
Electricity and Water, Muhammad Ahmad al Ghanim, the Minister of Justice, 
and Abd al Aziz Hussein, the Minister of State. 
The debate over the Article became a very heated confrontation leading to the 
resignation of the crown prince, prime minister. According to al Najjar, the 
reasons for this collective action was a result of a diversity of intentions with 
virtually each member of the group having their own purpose for opposing the 
government, especially that only a handful of the group were in fact members of 
the opposition, while the majority were pro-government supporters. Some had 
a genuine grievance against the adequacy of the cabinet, while others were 
taking a stand for personal rivalries and finally others were connected with 
particular members of the ruling family - those opposed to the National 
Assembly. 
The Amir, Sheikh Abdullah al Salem, had two choices either to accept the 
recommendation of the prime minister and dissolve the assembly or form a new 
1~8 See Kuwait Constitution, appendix A. 
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cabinet taking into consideration the assembly's views. He opted to save the 
assembly and a new cabinet acceptable to the assembly was subsequently 
formed on 3 January 1965. Tabataba'i suggests that there was no 
Constitutional violation in either the appointment of the prime minister or in the 
appointment of the cabinet. Article (131) prohibits combining a ministerial 
position with a private sector position rather than not choosing individuals that 
are from the business community or who come from the private sector. 129 
Subsequent to this event a committee was formed to study the legality of private 
sector individuals participating in the cabinet. Their conclusion was that the 
Article does not prohibit such individuals from becoming cabinet members, but it 
is clear that a combined position in the executive and private sector may lead to 
conflict of interest; hence such an individual must suspend or resign his private 
sector activities while holding a government position. 130 
The nationalist members of the assembly considered that the cabinet "crisis" 
was contrived and had nothing to do with the interest of the people or the 
protection of the Constitution. They believed that rather was is conflict over 
power, influence and the distribution of cabinet positions. 131 They defended this 
view on fact that the new approved cabinet included leading merchants such as 
Khalid 'Isa al Salih, the minister of public works, 'Abdullah Mishari al Rodan, the 
minister of awqaf, Abduallah Ahmad al Sumait, the Minister of Electricity and 
Water, and 'Abd al 'Aziz Ibrahim al Fulaij, the Minister of Public Health. That led 
the nationalist member of the assembly, Jassim al Qatami pose, when the new 
cabinet members were taking their oath of office, the relevant question: 
Is the Article 131 of the Constitution preserved now? And does 
Article 131 not apply to the new cabinet? Or was the previous 
objection not because of applying Article 131? And are the new 
cabinet members not in business while in office ?132 
129 Al-Tabataba'i, op.cit. p.324. 
130 Ibid., p. 327-330. 
131 National Assembly Proceedings, No.671D, 5/2/1965. p.ll 
132 National Assembly Proceedings. No.88/65, 5/1/1965. p.5. 
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The crisis reflected dispute among the ruling family about representation of al 
Salim and al Jaber's faction in the cabinet, since more weight was given to al 
Jaber's faction on the expense of al Salim.133 The cabinet also included 
assembly members and other ordinary Kuwaitis which some members of the al 
Sabah family did not approve of.134 As a result of this debacle the president of 
the National Assembly 'Abd al 'Aziz al Saqar resigned while accusing some 
cabinet members of being behind the crisis cooperating with the group of 31 
deputies.135 AI Saqar represented the merchant group who sympathised with 
the nationalists. His resignation was a great loss to the nationalists - especially 
because the new president, Sa'ud al 'Abd al Razzaq was one of the 31 deputies 
who caused the resignation of the cabinet in the first place. 
Anti-democratic Laws: Another area of contention between the government and 
the assembly came after the death of Amir Abdullah al Salim, in 1965. A shift 
became clear in the ruling family attitude towards the issue of political 
participation and the assembly, increasing the influence of ruling family 
members who oppose the assembly. The appeal of the nationalist movement in 
Kuwait increased significantly, with its emphasis on creating democratic 
institutions and changes in the minds of the masses. Trade unions, student 
unions, social clubs and societies and the national press supported the 
nationalists in the assembly by issuing statements of support, holding seminars 
and leading demonstrations. 136 
This situation led the government to re-assess its desire to establish democratic 
institutions and widen democratic practices. Thus, before the end of the first 
legislative term the government introduced legal amendments in order to limit 
political activities and restrict individual rights. The nationalists in the assembly 
objected to these amendments and walked out of the assembly in protest 
133 National Assembly Proceedings, No.88. 5/1/1965. p.55. 
134 National Assembly Proceedings, No.67. 5/2/1965. p.57. 
135 National Assembly Proceedings, No.67. 5/2/1965. p.57. 
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describing these laws as "laws against freedom and democracy". 137 The 
government co-operated with the conservative group in the assembly and were 
able to pass these laws. All of which in some form or another undermined the 
Constitution by violating or restricting the freedoms guaranteed by its 
stipulations. The nationalists accused the government of turning the legislative 
authority from an instrument belonging to the people in order to enhance 
" freedom ... to an instrument in the hands of the government to limit and suffocate 
individual and public freedom. 138 
Moreover, the Union of Kuwaiti Workers which was dominated by the nationalist 
movement was attacked by the Interior Ministry, and its pamphlet was 
confiscated and banned. The movement's student organisation also came 
under attack and its pamphlet was again confiscated and banned, In addition, 
the editor of the al Tana, a non-Kuwaiti was deported. The government 
deported many of non- Kuwaiti members of the Arab nationalist movement and 
the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and imposed more restrictions on foreign 
workers in general. 
As a result of the government's intensified attack on the movement, the 
nationalist assembly members, Ahmad al Khatib, Rashid al Tawhid, Ali al 
'Omar, Suleiman al Mutawa', Jassim al Qatami, Sami al Manays, Yagoob al 
Humaidhi and 'Abd al Razzaq al Khalid submitted their resignation from the 
assembly. In their letter of resignation they stated; 
It is clear that the real objective behind the behaviour of the 
government and its supporters, and the preceding procedures is the 
attempt to abort the democratic experiment and to counterfeit the 
people's will and to get rid of every national element, which refuses 
to follow the government's orders ... and by this the National 
Assembly has been converted to a non-democratic institution and a 
resource for aggressive laws which do not satisfy the people's will. 
For this reason our continuity in the Assembly and our partiCipation in 
137 National Assembly Proceedings, No.9113 p.ll. 
138 AI-Mudyris, 1999,b. op.cit. p. 34. 
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its tasks is a participation in misleading the citizens and deluding 
them that democracy still exists while it is a forgery and that the 
Constitution is protected while its articles were attacked. 139 
These resignations were accepted by the National Assembly except by a 
number of deputies from the merchant group who backed the nationalists and 
accused the government of ignoring criticisms. 14o They include Abd al Aziz al 
Saqar, Rashid al Farhan, Yousef al Mukhlid, Humud al Nusaf, and Muhammad 
al Rashid. A statement made by the council of ministers about the resignations 
accused the nationalists of being guided by personal interests and their 
objective was to increase their public popularity.141 
The independence of the judiciary: Another important issue that caused a rift 
between the government and assembly was over the role of the judiciary. The 
assembly tried to pass a law that grants the Supreme Council of the Courts the 
right to review the Constitutional status of any government administrative order. 
The Amir fearing a reduction on his authority vetoed the law. With the kind of 
support the government mustered in the assembly it would have been very 
difficult for the opposition to have the two-thirds vote which was needed to 
override the Amir's veto. However to over come that, the assembly attempted 
to obtain a second vote during the new parliamentary session where only a 
simple majority would be needed.142 The dissolution of the assembly ruined the 
chance of a second vote. 
The four assemblies have witnessed some energetiC debates and at times 
strong confrontations with the government. However, the opposition remained 
weak and unable to prevent the government from implementing polices that 
restrict and undermine democratic practices in the country. Voting patterns 
showed that on economic and foreign issues, in general, the opposition was 
139 National Assembly Proceedings, No.l30. 21/9/1965 p.2-6. 
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able to get the support of the majority of the assembly, including the badu 
deputies. However, on other issues such as freedom of press, freedom to hold 
public meetings and processions or to form associations, the traditional view 
prevailed in support of the government. 
Another reason attributed to this failure is that deputies differed in their view of 
which authority the assembly needs to check. The opposition believed that they 
need to check the power of the government, while the deputies representing 
Kuwait's middle class and the badu believed that it was the power of the 
merchants to do that, and that the opposition's duty is towards upholding the 
rights of the low-income group in the society. The majority of the latter live in 
the badu areas in what is called the "out districts" of Kuwait. l43 The strong 
presence of merchant members in the opposition made it very difficult for the 
opposition to win the support of the badu and Kuwait's middle class. Another 
reason for the weakness of the opposition, as noted by Baaklini, is that: 
these groups were powerful in mobiliSing protests and adopting 
rejection positions, but to retain their adherents they tended to outbid 
each other with extreme pOSitions. When the situation demanded a 
positive program or the undertaking of compromises, as aI/legislative 
politics demand, these groups were incapable of organised col/ective 
action. It led to the polarisation of politics, confrontation, and 
eventual dissolution of the legislative assemblies. 144 
However, one must not forget that polarisation of politics in Kuwait and inability 
for unified action is caused by the very nature of the assembly. Its deputies are 
returned on a tribal, sectarian and ethnic basis representing narrow interests 
and therefore, restricted aspirations. Also, it is important to note that the 
manner in which the government attacked individual freedoms and restricted 
popular associations, press, unions etc ... does not allow for the society to 
develop democratic practices that will eventually be reflected in the assembly. 
143 Shuhaiber. op.cit. p.145. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The first phase of implementing the representative system of government in 
Kuwait as stipulated in the Constitution, exhibited several important features 
that show the limitations of this experience and the problems inherent in the 
process of establishing a democratic political process in the country. The most 
important issue includes firstly the dominant influence of tribe, sect and family 
affiliations due to legal structures; primarily the election law and also the 
banning of political parties. These two factors make politics become personal 
rather than institutional and when voting behaviour is based on sectarianism 
and it tribalism undermines a democratic electoral process by focusing debates 
within a parochial frame of serving the segmented interests of each group 
involved. The government is the major beneficiary of the sectarian and tribal 
vote to counteract the nationalist/secular opposition. More importantly it stunts 
the development of an alternative power well base that might pose a serious 
threat to the rule of al Sabah. 
Even when the opposition does not pose a threat, the ruling family felt the need 
to protect its autocratic power from the encroachment of the assembly. Thus, al 
Sabah during the first stage of Kuwait's parliamentary experience twice 
intervened in order to safeguard their own power. The first time they intervened 
was by rigging the 1967 elections of the assembly and the second time was by 
taking a more drastic measure of suspending the assembly on the grounds that 
it was supposedly undermining internal stability. However, it can be argued that 
in effect, the assembly was only exercising its Constitutional right and asserting 
its authority to the detriment of the authority of the executive. 
The rising power of the badu has been an important element in the 
consolidation of the authority of the Kuwaiti ruling family especially in the 
assembly. This mobilisation of the badu has its historical roots and it is an 
alliance that provides mutual benefits; the badu gain access to jobs, housing, 
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medical and educational service as well as infrastructure services, while in 
return, al Sabah enjoy their loyalty and support in the parliament. This 
increased influence of the badu in the parliament enhanced tension between 
hadhar and badu Kuwaitis because the hadhar see the badu being as a mere 
instrument in the hands of al Sabah, while the badu see the hadhar as 
immediate rivals. 
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Chapter Five 
The First Suspension of the Kuwaiti National Assembly and the 
Interlude of 1976-1981 
5.1 Introduction 
The Kuwaiti Constitution organises the relationship between state powers 
following the tradition that rejects the absolute form of the separation of powers. 
It advocates the control of the relation based on checks and balances. As 
Markesinis states: A complete separation of functions comes into direct conflict 
with the elements of unity that characterises the theory of the modern state. 1 
Thus, each power must be provided with a mechanism that enables it to check 
and balance the authority of the other. For instance, the Kuwaiti Constitution 
has provided the government with many devices in order to counter the power 
of the assembly. These devices includes the organisation of general elections, 
appointments to the cabinet, participation in the assembly deliberations, access 
to information that helps it dominate the policy process and also the balance 
between ministerial responsibility with the right of dissolution of the assembly. 
As indicated the theoretical justification for the dissolution - perhaps the only 
one the Constitution ever had - was obviously to maintain the equilibrium of 
functions and powers. 2 
1 B. S Markesinis. The Theory and Practice of Dissolution of Parliament: a Comparative Stud\' with 
Special Reference to United Kingdom and Greek Experience. (Cambridge: University Press. 1972). p. 25. 
~ Ibid .. p.27. 
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This specific device stands out as the most influential in the relations between 
the legislative and executive because if misused, it can be most damaging to 
the development of a democratic system of government. The appropriate use of 
this devise is of even greater importance in the context of a country such as 
Kuwait, where the representative system is still undeveloped and democratic 
practices have not yet been established. 
This chapter will discuss the first dissolution of the assembly against what has 
been set in the Kuwaiti Constitution, as well as assessing the political context of 
the dissolution. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal the existence of a 
structural problem in the relation between the assembly and the executive, 
which allows the executive to dominate and to even ignore the Constitution. 
This is primarily due to the immense power the ruling family have as a result of 
oil wealth that makes all social groups in the society highly dependent on the 
state, thus weakening any opposition and their activism against the executive. 
It is this factor that, in practice, gives the executive the huge leverage over the 
legislative and even over the Constitution and has been responsible for the 
limited success of establishing the representative system of government in 
Kuwait, as it was envisioned in the Constitution. 
5.2 The First Suspension of the National Assembly 
Dissolution means an act of the executive, which dismisses the legislative body, 
and refers a disputed case to the electorate, the supreme arbitrator of the state. 3 
Dissolution is devised to offer an escape route from a crisis by appealing to the 
political sovereign, to the popular will of the people.4 In other words, its purpose 
is to sound out public opinion by engaging them in a new election. The Kuwaiti 
Constitution is very clear on this. Paragraphs one and two of Article (107) of the 
Constitution stipulate that: 
3 Muhammad Al-Moqatei. "A Study of the Kuwaiti Constitutional Experience: 1962-1986). Ph. D Thesis, 
University ofWarwick,1987. p. 303. 
4 Ibid., p.304. 
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The Amir may dissolve the National Assembly by a decree in which 
the reasons for the dissolution shall be indicated. However, 
dissolution of the Assembly may not be repeated for the same 
reasons. 
In the event of dissolution, elections for the new Assembly shall be 
held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of 
dissolution. 5 
Further protection is given to the assembly in case the Amir does not abide by 
this safeguard and hold elections within a short period of time. Thus if the 
executive fails to carry new elections the dissolution is considered null and the 
assembly shall be restored and continue to function until new elections are held. 
Paragraph three of Article (107) states: 
If the elections are not held within the said period the dissolved 
Assembly shall be restored to its full Constitutional authority and shall 
meet immediately as if the dissolution had not taken place. The 
Assembly shall then continue functioning until the new Assembly is 
elected. 6 
Taking into account the above mentioned stipulations of Article (107), the first 
suspension of the National Assembly is noted by a clear breach of the 
Constitution. Amir Sheikh Sabah al Salim, in accordance with his Constitutional 
right, suspended the fourth National Assembly on 29 August 1976, following the 
resignation of the cabinet. However, he did not call for new elections but 
instead, announced the intention to revise the Constitution. In his message to 
the people of Kuwait explaining the reasons of the suspension, he accused the 
assembly of misusing its powers and causing divisions and instability in the 
country. To that effect he declared: 
5 See Kuwaiti Constitution, appendix A. 
6 Ibid. 
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I address you today with a great ache in my heart and a sense of 
overwhelming sadness over the deterioration in the situation of our 
dear country ... matters grew from bad to worse day after day until we 
almost reached a dead end. This state of affairs we reached in the 
name of the Constitution which was issued to protect the unity and 
stability of the homeland and to provide democracy for this loyal 
nation. True democracy is innocent of what has been happening, 
with the unity and stability of the homeland having been exposed to 
so many shocks. If we all fail to take a firm and stern attitude towards 
what has been happening, matters may take such a turn as only God 
would know the extent of. 7 
The Amir justified his order to revise the Constitution based on an obligation as 
the father figure and guardian of all Kuwaitis and the one who acts in their best 
interests. In other words, the Amir appears to be bound more by a traditional 
tribal duty rather than bound by the Constitution. He stated: 
As I am the head of responsibility in this good and loyal country and 
have taken an irrevocable oath to protect it against all that might 
threaten its unity, stability and existence, and as I consider myself a 
father to all of you whose duty it is to look after you and provide you 
with security and prosperity, I find myself compelled in these 
difficulties to issue an order for the revision of the Constitution so that 
we may be spared the state of affairs which has developed in the 
shadow of the Constitution of 11 November 1962.8 
It is interesting to note that the main reason the Amir gave for the revision of the 
Constitution is the safeguarding of democracy, despite his action being a 
breach of the Constitution, which is the ultimate guarantee of democracy. He 
maintained that: 
7 The Amir's National Address by the Sheikh Sabah al Salem al Sabah on 29/8/1976 
8 Ibid. 
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We all have faith in sound democracy and freedom upon which 
successive generations of our people have been nurtured and which 
stem from our very being. And so that we may not lose our 
democracy of which we shall always be proud and in order to allow 
freedom to continue in our country in a firmer and more stable basis 
and in order to enable all our people to enjoy this freedom and aspire 
to a better future, we have issued the aforementioned decision. 9 
The Amir's message to the nation gave general reasons for which he felt 
obliged to dissolve the assembly. However, the letter of resignation of the 
prime minister, Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, gave four specific reasons for the 
collapse of the relation between the cabinet and the assembly. These reasons 
include the assembly's procrastination on bills, false charges against ministers, 
regional circumstances, and the security of the country. The government 
subsequently, found itself in an impossible situation, described by the prime 
minister in the following terms: 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
It has become impossible for me and my colleagues to continue 
progress towards the fulfilment of the goal which you laid down for 
us. The reasons for that are manifold, including the failure to process 
draft laws which accumulated in the Assembly over a long period of 
time and most of which failed to see the light of day despite their vital 
importance to the interests of the citizens. Most of the meetings 
held by the Assembly were unproductive and the casting of 
unjustified and the levelling of false charges against the ministers 
and those in responsible positions became the main concern of many 
of the assembly members ... Furthermore, the delicate and critical 
circumstances through which our areas and the Arab world in 
general are now passing require quick decision-making on many 
critical issues and the promulgation of legislation which will safeguard 
the security and the economy of this country. 10 
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The inconsistency in the government's attitude is reflected in the dramatic 
change in the cabinet position over the assembly in a period of forty days, 
moving from extreme appreciation of the cooperative relation between the two 
organs of state power to discontent over the total lack of cooperation. At the 
closing session of the second session of the fourth National Assembly the 
deputy prime minister, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad Sabah delivered a speech in 
which he emphasised such an appreciation by noting: 
It is my pleasure at the last meeting of the second ordinary session of 
your venerable assembly, to thank all of you, for the continuous great 
effort given by you during this session. An effort that concluded with 
the marvellous achievement of the greatest number of bills, as 
mentioned and recognised by the Speaker of the Assembly. It is my 
pleasure, particularly to recognise the large degree of fruitful 
cooperation between the Assembly and the Government in 
establishing democratic methods in our country, the main objective of 
course for our insistence in respecting such principles was our belief 
that it is the best method of creating security, justice and welfare 
state for our dear people. 11 
These points raised suggest that the grounds given by the cabinet for its 
resignation and consequently the Amir's reasons for the dissolution appear less 
convincing to say the least. Combined with the five stipulations included in the 
Amiri decree for the revision of the Constitution, a very different picture 
emerges. Indeed, it is one that emphasises the desire to avoid accountability 
and to maintain the dominance of the executive while undermining the 
legislative branch of government. These stipulations specify: 
1. The suspension of articles 56(3), 107, 174, and 181 of the 1962 
Constitution. The dissolution of the assembly and the assumption of the 
functions vested in the National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, to 
the Amir and the Council of Ministers. 
11 National Assembly Proceedings. No. 19. 1Sn11976. 
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2. The issuing of laws as Amiri decrees and which may, if necessary, be 
issued by Amiri orders. 
3. The announcement that a decree shall be issued providing for the 
formation of a committee of experts to undertake the revision of the 
Constitution with the view of eliminating the shortcomings which appeared 
during the application of the Constitution, and ensuring sound democratic 
government and safeguarding national interest and stability. 
4. The Constitution committee shall submit its recommendations to the Amir 
after their approval by the Council of Ministers. The revised Constitution 
shall be then put, within a maximum period of four years, to a national 
referendum or submitted to the next National Assembly for approval,12 
The suspended articles are those that are designed specifically to keep the 
executive authority in check. Paragraph 3 of Article (56) limits the total number 
of ministers to one-third of the number of the National Assembly members. 
Article (107) stipulates that in the event of the suspension of the parliament, 
elections for the new assembly must be held within two months from the date of 
the dissolution. Article (174) gives the power of the right to propose the revision 
of the Constitution to both the ruler and one-third of the members of the 
assembly, and if the principle of the revision and its subject matter is agreed the 
assembly shall debate the amendments article by article. Article (181) 
stipulates that no provision of the Constitution can be suspended except when 
martial law was in force, and that under no circumstances may the sessions of 
the assembly be suspended. 
By suspending these articles the Amir has in effect removed all the essential 
controls provided by the Constitution on the power of the government and 
removed the mechanisms that are designed to prevent the Amir from 
intentionally dissolving the assembly for more than two months and from 
revising the Constitution without the approval of the assembly. It is apparent 
that these articles were designed to achieve a balance among the leading 
12 Middle East Economic Survey. Vol. XIX No. '+6. Sep. 6.1976. 
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political institutions in Kuwait, the ruling family, government and legislative. A 
breach in any of these articles creates a huge imbalance in the relation between 
the executive and legislative, sets a precedent and - most importantly -
completely undermines the assembly. 
The suspension, therefore, is both a political violation of the right of Kuwaiti 
citizens to participate in the decision making process and, more importantly, a 
Constitutional one. Despite the promise to restore the assembly within four 
years the very act undermines the legitimacy of the system and reduces the 
assembly's protection from the Amir's mandate. 13 The violation of the 
Constitution revolves around three major breaches. First, with regard to the 
form, the dissolution violated three articles of the Constitution: Article (54), 
Article (55) and Article (107). The Constitution specifies that the Amir must use 
the technique of an Amiri decree to dissolve the assembly (an Amiri decree 
needs to be countersigned by a competent minister) since the Amir is immune 
and inviolable and he exercises his authority through his ministers.14 It follows 
that an Amiri decree without being countersigned loses its legitimate form since, 
from a Constitutional point of view the action of the dissolution was taken by an 
unauthorised organ of the government, and therefore, lacks legitimacy.15 
Respect of the Constitution means respecting the source of government's 
power and acting outside the limitations set by that source leads to challenging 
the legitimacy of the government. 
Second, the suspension of some articles of the Constitution was also an 
illegitimate action, since the Constitution laid down the exceptional 
circumstance for that in article (181 ).16 That article stipulates that no provision 
of the Constitution may be suspended except when martial law is in force, and 
under no circumstances shall the meetings of the National Assembly be 
suspended, addea that, the immunities of its members shall not be interfered 
13 1. E. Peterson, The Arab Gulf State: Steps Toward Political Participation. (New York: Praeger, 
1988).p.40-41. 
14 Al-Moqatei, op.cit. p.345-346. 
15 Ibid., p.346. 
16 Ibid .. p.346. 
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with during such period. Third, the dissolution decree also violated the 
Constitution in terms of the procedures for amending. These procedures are 
complicated in order to safeguard against any abuse of the system. 17 Either the 
Amir or one-third of the National Assembly shall have the right to propose the 
revision of the Constitution. Then the principle of the revision and its subject 
matter must be approved by the Amir and the majority of the assembly. The 
assembly after that, can debate the bill article by article. Approval of a two-
thirds majority vote is needed to pass the bill, which can then be sanctioned and 
promulgated by the Amir.1B 
It is clear from the above discussion that the Amiri decree was unconstitutional, 
and undermined the legitimacy of the whole system of government in Kuwait. 
Such a bold decision was brought about by factors that neither the Amir, nor his 
prime minister mentioned. The following section shall focus on analysing these 
factors. 
5.3 Regional and Domestic Considerations for the Suspension 
Considerations, other than those officially acknowledged by the Amir and the 
prime minister, that played a role in the decision to suspend the assembly relate 
to a combination of regional and domestic factors. This section will elaborate 
on these issues and show how Kuwait has been extremely vulnerable to the 
absence of democracy in other Arab Gulf states and how its experiment with a 
representative system of government presented a threat to those states. The 
discussion will also show that al Sabah's resistance to accountability, which is 
the basis of the representative system, was a prime reason for the suspension. 
17 Mohammed AI-Moqatei. "The Amendment of the Constitution of Kuwait." MA thesis. University of 
San Diego. California. 1984. p. 97 
18 See Article (174) of the Kuwaiti Constitution for details of the procedures of amendment, appendix A. 
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5.3.1 The Regional Environment 
The threat that Kuwait posed as a model of democracy to other Arab Gulf states 
is not to be taken lightly. That is why some have suggested that the dissolution 
of the assembly actually happened because of external pressure on al Sabah 
especially from Saudi Arabia, which has been the biggest adversary of the 
Kuwaiti National Assembly. 19 AI Sa'ud felt vulnerable by the Kuwaiti experiment 
because of the country's lack of individual and public freedoms and the 
undemocratic nature of their regime. The increased criticism of al Saud in the 
assembly and the inability of al Sabah to check the rhetoric of the opposition in 
the assembly and in the press forced al Saud to step up pressure on Kuwait to 
curb its democratic experience.2o This is not the first time that al Sabah yielded 
to the pressure of al Sa'ud. The Kuwaiti Council of 1938 was partly dissolved 
due to pressure from Saudi Arabia because al Sa'ud were afraid that his own 
people would ask for a similar one. The reaction of al Saud to the dissolution of 
the fourth National Assembly was one of relief and full support to al Sabah's 
action.21 
Other Arab Gulf states were also openly discussed and criticised in the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly, the press and at public meetings and these states did not 
want Kuwait to become a model which would coerce them to grant their own 
citizens similar rights. Citizens of some Gulf states such as Bahrain and UAE 
have been demanding that their governments should follow the example of 
Kuwait and elect a National Assembly.22 Bahrain is a case in point, to mention 
in detail. 
The demands for political participation in Bahrain were strongly vocalised in the 
fifties. The Bahraini government ignored these demands and used repression 
in order to deal with them. However, in 1972, following independence, the 
19 Jasem Mohammad Jerkhi. "The Electoral Process in Kuwait: A Geographical Study". Ph. D. thesis, 
University of Exeter, 1984. p. 365. 
20 Ibid., p. 389-390. 
21 AI-Seyassah Newspaper, Aug. 31. 1976. 
22 Jerkhi. op.cit. p. 373. 
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Ruler promulgated Law No/12/ 1972, regarding the establishment of a 
Constituent Assembly to draft a Constitution for the country. There were 
similarities in the experience of Bahrain and Kuwait in terms of the formation of 
the constituent assembly being partly popularly elected and partly appointed 
and in some of the restrictions applied in the Constitution to naturalised citizens 
and women.23 The Kuwaiti legal advisor 'Othman Khalil 'Othman was sent to 
Bahrain to assist in the drafting of the Constitution. Bahrain had its first elected 
assembly on 7 December 1973 which consisted of 30 elected members with the 
cabinet, similar to the case in Kuwait in having ex officio membership, which 
brought the total number to forty four members.24 
Within two years, tension mounted between the government and the assembly 
over a new law issued in December 1974 giving the government the right to 
arrest and imprison for three years without trial any person suspected of 
disturbing national security. The assembly was furious and insisted that the law 
must be modified before its implementation. The law acted as a catalyst which 
opened up a wide debate in Bahrain about issues of security and the state of 
emergency. The government felt under pressure and weakened, so in May 
1975 it withdraws from the assembly session, effectively adjourning the 
meetings. In August of the same year the Ruler dissolved the assembly and it 
has remained that way since.25 
In the assessment of M. Herb, the short experiment of parliamentary life in 
Bahrain failed because al Khalifa did not want to pay the moderate cost of 
sharing some of their power with the parliament, and because of the 
encouragement by al Saud for them to close it.26 After the closure of the 
parliament, al Saud gave al Khalifa a grant of $350 million.27 The dependency 
23 Ibid., p.376. 
24 Emile A. Nahkleh. Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society. (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1976). p. 128. 
25 Jerkhi, op.cit. p. 379-380. 
26 Michael Herb. All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern 
Monarchies. (New York: State University of New York Press. 1999).p. 174. 
27 Abdeed I Dawisha. "Saudi Arabia's Search for Security." Adelphi Paper, (No. 158.) (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979). p. 20. 
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of al Khalifa on the Saudi subventions (Bahrain has less oil than other Gulf 
states and relies on Saudi Arabia to shore up its economy to the tune of 
hundred of millions of dollars annually) has maintained al Khalifa's aversion to 
liberalise and the reopening of the parliament.28 AI Sa'ud has been an 
impediment to the development of democracy not only in Kuwait but also in 
Bahrain. The resistance of ruling families in the Gulf states to concede some of 
their powers remains the most significant obstacle to the development of more 
democratic systems of government within all of these states. 
However, under the influence of the Kuwaiti experience, some Arab Gulf states 
were stimulated to introduce measures that open up channels for political 
participation of their citizens, such as the consultative councils that have been 
set up in Qatar, UAE and Oman. Although these councils were appointed with 
no real powers and only have an advisory function, they can at least provide a 
forum for public debate on key issues. Saudi Arabia remained immune to this 
pressure, although al Saud has recurrently promised to appoint a majlis. In 
1962, the first promise for this came after the revolution in Yemen, on the 
accession of King Khalid in 1975 and following that another came on the 
accession of King Fahad in 1982 and another in the wake of the seizure of the 
Grand Mosque of Mecca in November 1979.29 However, despite all of these 
promises, it was not until 1993 that al Sa'ud set up an appointed Majlis al Shura 
with a low public profile and a limited influence on policy.30 Its usefulness lies in 
maintaining contact between al Sa'ud and the people and a defence against 
those that advocate greater democracy along the Kuwait lines and those who 
favour the rule of the Wahabi ulema. 31 
28 Harb, op.cit. p.177. 
29Riad Najib EI Rayyis. Riyah al-sumum: al-su'udiya wa duwal aI-jazira ba'da harb aI-khalij 1991-1.994. 
(The Poison Wind: Saudi Arabia And Peninsula States After the Gulf War 1991-1994) (London: Raid El 
Rayys Book, 1994).p. 152. 
30 Herb .. op.cit. p.169-170. 
31 Ibid .. p.170. 
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5.3.2 The Domestic Environment 
Most of the friction between the executive and the legislative emanated from the 
assembly's attempt to carry its function of checking the authority of the 
executive and the accountability of the government. AI Sabah and cabinet 
members, whether from the ruling family or ordinary Kuwaitis, avoided and 
resisted being held accountable by the deputies. The fourth assembly 
witnessed an intense frequency of personal attacks against cabinet members; 
the accusation of ministers of using their posts purely for personal gains, and 
criticisms of the political and economic domination of Kuwait by the ruling family 
and a small influential circle of merchant families. 32 These were some of the 
major domestic reasons that the Amir took into consideration when deciding on 
the dissolution. A second reason is related to the increased opposition of the 
assembly on a number of domestic and foreign issues. The liberal and 
democratic experience of Lebanon with its freedom of expression, press and 
association has been seen as a source that contributed to the Lebanese civil 
war. Considering the increased freedom of expression in the assembly and the 
press in Kuwait, there was fear among the ruling family that it might lead to 
more fragmentation and total disorder in Kuwait. To that effect the crown 
prince, and prime minister, Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, claimed that; 
The freedom of press has no value if has is not been performed with 
a sense of responsibility ... The press deserves freedom if it proves 
capable of assuming responsibility. .. By responsibility we mean 
working for the national interest, promoting love and solidarity in the 
society, and preserving the pride and dignity of others and avoiding 
acts of blackmail ... The political, economical and social conditions of 
a beloved sister country (Lebanon) did necessitate the adoption of a 
democratic system. But this political system has been abused as it 
has been utilised by the various political factions to facilitate foreign 
intervention. The end result was a civil war, which wrecked the entire 
political system. There were attempts by some forces to transfer this 
conflict to Kuwait - by making use of the democratic atmosphere here 
32 Abdo I. Baaklini. Legislati\'e Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions. 
(Boulder. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1999). p.l81. 
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- and in turn to bedevil this peaceful country as they did that sister 
state. 33 
The closer ties developing between Kuwaiti opposition groups and opposition 
groups in the rest of the Arab world worried the Kuwaiti government because of 
its effect on complicating its relation with key Arab countries. Of particular 
concern to Kuwait was the resolution passed by the assembly condemning 
Syria's military intervention in Lebanon and calling for a severing aid to 
Damascus.34 Kuwait also feared that domestic opposition might be encouraged 
by foreign countries to disrupt the existing political order.35 The unabated 
criticism of the Kuwaiti press of some Arab countries caused huge 
embarrassment to the Kuwaiti government. That might explain the action taken 
against the press in Kuwait on the same day that the assembly was dissolved, 
as the main local opposition newspapers: a/ Watan, a/ TaWa, a/ Risa/a, and a/ 
Hadafwere also suspended.36 
For the first time sharp criticism was specifically levied at the ruling family itself, 
a development that al Sabah felt threatened by. One major reason for this is 
attributed to the increased involvement of al Sabah in business and their taking 
advantage of their position at the expense of other local merchants and 
businesses in general. 37 Another is the increased disenchantment with 
favouritism and the widespread corruption that was afflicting Kuwaiti society. 
The "assertion of parliamentary authority" had come to pose a serious threat to 
the al Sabah autocratic rule and they had the choice to either accept a reduced 
role in running the affairs of the country or dissolve the assembly.38 The al 
Jaber branch of al Sabah has not been strongly committed to democracy in 
33 Kamal Osman Salih,. "Kuwait: Political Consequences of Modernization, 1750-1986." Middle East 
Studies. (Vol. 27. No.1. January 1991). p. 57-58. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jill Crystal. Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. (Boulder: Westview, 1992). p.97. 
36 Kadhim Mahdi AI-Bahrani. "Factors Influencing Ruling Elites Political Participation in the State of 
Kuwait". Ph.D. thesis, University of Denver. 1988. p. 160. 
37 Baaklini, op.cit. 1999. p. 181. 
38 Avi. Plasco\,. Security in the Persian Gulf, Modernization, Political Development and Stability. 
(England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1982). p. 152. 
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Kuwait and has tried to undermine the assembly before by rigging the 1967 
election. Thus they looked at the situation as an opportunity to clip the wings of 
the assembly. 
AI Najjar suggests that three factors helped the Amir to take the decision of 
dissolving the assembly, without apprehension of serious repercussions. 
Firstly, the expansion in the stock market following the 1973 quadrupling of the 
price of oil, involved a large segment of the Kuwaiti population in making a lot of 
money, which caused them to become far less interested in the fate of the 
National Assembly. Secondly, the government did not expect any significant 
resistance or confrontation from the Kuwaiti opposition group because it has 
become divided. Thirdly, the change in the ownership of the al Anba daily 
newspaper to an ultra-right merchant in January 1976 significantly helped the 
government. The paper launched a consistent and continued attack on the 
assembly demanding directly and indirectly that it should be dissolved.39 AI Nifisi 
also pOints out that to the slandering of the National Assembly by the 
government and their blaming it for undermining the unity of Kuwaitis was one 
of the main reasons for the acquiescence of the Kuwaitis in any reaction to the 
suspension. He noted that: 
the regime put into the minds of the people ... that the majlis did not 
serve the public good and that it rent asunder the "united family" (a 1-
usra al-wahida) ... Many people on the eve of the suspension of the 
National Assembly were thinking in this way because they were 
victims of the campaign to smear the image of the National Assembly 
undertaken by the regime through the various means available to it. 
It was the regime who gauged out the eye of the assembly from the 
beginning and then ran behind it hurling insults, clapping its hands, 
and shouting: cripple ... cripple ... 40 
39 Ghanim AI-Najjar. "Decision-Making Process in Kuwait: the Land Acquisition Policy as a Case 
StUdy." Ph. D thesis, University of Exeter. 1987. p.68-70. 
40 'Abdullah Al-Nifisi. AI-kuwayt: al-ra'y al- 'akhar. (Kuwait: the Other View). (London: Taha 
Advertising, 1978). p. 117. 
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Thus, a combination of regional and domestic pressures forced al Sabah to take 
the decision to suspend the assembly, which was increasingly seen as an 
obstacle to maintaining good relations with other Arab states and maintaining 
the authority and absolute power of al Sabah. The confidence of al Sabah that 
Kuwaitis were too involved in making their own money and were not too mindful 
to the fate of the assembly eased their way forward for taking such a decision. 
The following discussion shall reveal that the government was actually right in 
its assessment of a mild opposition to the suspension of the National Assembly. 
5.4 The Aftermath of the Suspension 
The fourth National Assembly had in its hand a simple but powerful mechanism 
to counter the measure taken by the government by putting the provision of 
Article (107) into action. This article, as mentioned before, gives the assembly 
the power to restore its full Constitutional authority and meet immediately as if 
the dissolution had not happened if the elections for the new assembly were not 
held within the stated period of two months from the date of dissolution. 
However, the assembly, despite its illegal dissolution did not take that action, 
nor did the assembly - whether as an institution or as individuals - challenge the 
dissolution before the Constitutional Court, which has the power to revoke any 
unconstitutional act or regulation. 41 This is consistent with the attitude of the 
opposition in Kuwait of not escalating situations with the government into 
confrontation with possible serious consequences. The economic dependence 
on the state of all major social groups of the society is another significant factor 
contributing to this reluctance. The livelihood of the merchants, the badu and 
the middle class of Kuwait largely depends on the distributive function of the 
state with the oil revenues. That sort of leverage in the hands of the ruling 
authority gives it an immense scope of power without worrying too much about 
consequences. 
Thus, and as the government had anticipated, criticism and protests against the 
suspension of the assembly were very limited. Two major statements were 
41 AI-Moqatei. op.cit. 1987. P 352 
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issued denouncing the move. The first came from a group of professional 
associations including the Lawyers Association, Journalists Association, Literary 
Society, Independence Club, Teachers AssOCiation, the Kuwaiti National 
Student Union, and the General Confederation of Kuwaiti Workers. In their jOint 
statement they expressed: 
The way forward to achieving real reform of the Constitution and 
provide security and stability and good living to Kuwaiti people should 
have been carried through democratic means and by getting rid of 
the practices that undermine democratic life primarily the movement 
of voters from one district to another, the incitement of sectarian tribal 
and ethnic feelings, turning a blind eye to the widely accepted 
practice of bribery that corrupts and restricts public freedoms. 42 
As been seen, they shifted the focus onto the government and highlighted the 
fact that it was the government to blame for the state of parliamentary life, since 
it allowed the movement of voters from one district to another, turned a blind 
eye to bribery and used naturalisation for voting purposes. They criticised the 
illegitimacy of the procedures taken by the government that undermined 
Constitutional rights and democratic life and demanded a return to legitimacy 
and Constitutional rule, and safeguarding the democratic benefits that Kuwaiti 
people have gained over the years.43 
The second statement came few months later, signed by eighteen deputies of 
the dissolved assembly, and was addressed to the prime minister, Jaber al 
Ahmad al Sabah, and the content concerned the same issues. Their letter 
contained nine main points. The first five points focus on emphasising the 
government's violation of the articles of the Constitution by its dissolution of the 
assembly; the suspension of some articles of the Constitution and the 
promulgation of laws that contravene the Constitution. In addition, they 
reminded the government that the basic tenet of the political system as 
stipulated in Article (6) of the Constitution is democratic, under which 
-I~ The Statement of Kuwaiti Civil Associations Concerning the Suspension of the National Assembly in 
1976. 
43 Ibid. 
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sovereignty resides in the people, the source of all powers, and that sovereignty 
is exercised in the manner specified in the Constitution. The rest of the pOints 
raised pleaded for restoring the assembly because of its centrality to democratic 
life in Kuwait. 44 
The statement defended the performance of the assembly by arguing that 
despite the existence of some negative aspects to democratic practices, the 
assembly had been able to legislate 60 laws and to convene 66 sessions. Its 
various committees had also been able to convene 250 sessions studying more 
than 362 issues and preparing 202 reports, in addition to accepting quite a 
number of recommendations annexed to the reports of various committees and 
the different issues that were debated in the assembly.45 Considering this, it is 
difficult to accuse the assembly of causing delays and having an ineffective 
relation with the government. The statement also reminded the government of 
the positive role the assembly played in attempting to maintain the unity and 
security of the Kuwaiti citizens through its continuous demands to fight 
corruption, crime, bribery, nepotism and provide equality and justice to all 
citizens. More importantly the statement argued that the assembly had a 
leading role in maintaining national unity and in restraining tribalism and 
sectarianism and in proposing legislation if it was passed would have eliminated 
quickly both sectarianism and tribalism. 46 
Some blame the collapse of the relation between the government and the 
assembly on the opposition group, believing that it went out of its way to be 
combative.47 Regardless of the level or intensity of combativeness, the Amir 
could have made the as being people the judge of the situation by calling for an 
election within two months, especially as that is what the Constitution requires. 
The aim was not just to overcome a difficult period between a combative 
assembly and the executive, as the suspension was more geared towards 
protecting the influence and privilege of the executive who see any sort of 
44 The Statement by National Assembly Members, Addressing to the Crown Prince, Prime Minister 
Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah. Concerning the Suspension of the National Assembly in 1976. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Harb. op.cit. p. 16-+. 
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accountability as damaging to its authority, and subsequently it is unacceptable. 
Within this context it is interesting to note how Sheikh Jaber AI Ahmad, 
describes his vision of the type of democracy that Kuwait should aim for. He 
aimed toward achieving: 
A democracy which seeks to narrow social differences among 
citizens, and which guarantees equal opportunity to all ... A 
democracy which does not discriminate among a city, a suburb, a 
vii/age, or an island in public utilities projects or services... A 
democracy which would reform the state apparatus ... A democracy 
which would result in a representative assembly which represents all 
groups of people ... A democracy in which an assembly member is the 
deputy of all the people and represents the entire homeland, who is 
not restricted to a group or sect to which he belongs. One who works 
for the good of all the people regardless of the wishes of his 
constituents, basing his views on research and serious study, and 
rising above defamation and avoiding the exploitation of his position 
for his own personal interest. 48 
It would be very difficult to find a Kuwaiti who would disagree with Sheikh Jaber. 
However, it is the structures that the state creates and condones that are 
responsible for deepening divisions in the Kuwaiti society, and hindering the 
development of the representative system of governance. These structures are 
the result of a highly restrictive citizenship law and election law that emphasises 
divisions along traditional lines of affiliations, consequently creating an 
institution that represents influential families and tribes, and segmented 
interests of the different social groups in Kuwait. 
Apparently there has been no serious political repercussion to the suspension in 
terms of an activism on the part of the deputies or Kuwaitis against the 
government. Any discontent was expressed in the mildest form of public 
statements. One must take note of the fact that the government had silenced 
the opposition press and dissolved all politically active clubs. That immensely 
48 Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies. Kuwait University. Vol. 11. ~o. 8. October 1976. 
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aided in muting any opposition vOIce. Despite the absence of political 
consequences of the suspension, there have been serious Constitutional 
implications. AI Moqatei summaries the fundamental changes the government 
enforced by its unconstitutional dissolution of the assembly and the suspension 
of some articles of the Constitution: 
an inner-coup undertaken by the government against the people to 
force an extreme change in the Constitution from a democratic 
Monarchy into a Semi-absolute Monarchy where popular 
participation through the National Assembly ceased to exist and was 
replaced by the Amir and cabinet's own decision in state affairs. 49 
Subsequently, during the period between1976-1980, executive power and 
legislative powers were in the hands of the Amir and his cabinet, thus violating 
the enshrined concept of separation of power of the Kuwaiti Constitution. More 
importantly, Moqatei argues that the period between the date of the suspension 
of the Constitution and the announcement of restoring the National Assembly, 
1976-1980, represents a departure from the first period of parliamentary life, 
1963-1976, and a new basis for the legal-political system. The first period was 
based on a contract enacted by the Constituent Assembly and sanctioned by 
the Amir. However the second period was formulated by the Amir and therefore 
could be called a grant (gift) Constitution. 50 This legal position explains why 
some Kuwaitis see the representative system of government as a gift from the 
Amir rather than a right stipulated, and guaranteed in the Kuwaiti Constitution. 
The ability of al Sabah to disregard the Constitutional implications of the 
suspension is due to a great extent to the dependence of the Kuwaiti citizens on 
the state, making it much stronger vis a vis opposition and citizens. The benefits 
the state provides to its citizens are massive and government transfers to the 
private sector are equally important. These transfers occur through three 
mechanisms: current expenditures, land purchases and capital expenditures. 
As seen in Table 5.1 wages and salaries represent the largest single item of 
current expenditures. They have more than tripled over a period between 1974-
49 AI-Moqatei. 1987. op.cit. p.356. 
50 Ibid .. p.358. 
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1980, although their share of total domestic expenditure has declined. That is 
due to an increased importance of land purchases and development 
expenditure. As seen from Table. 5.2, land purchases constituted on average a 
third of capital expenditure. That not only inflates the cost of development 
projects but is also not the most effective mechanism to distribute public funds. 
However, land purchases have been an effective way of amassing enormous 
private fortunes. 51 
The Kuwaiti civil service IS overstaffed due to the government's policy of 
guaranteeing a job in the public sector to its citizens. The number employees in 
the civil service exploded during the seventies and reached more than 48,000, 
as seen in Table 5.3. Within a decade the number of Kuwaitis employed in the 
civil service more than doubled. That excludes those working in government 
institutions that have independent budgets. There are no augmented accounts 
for all those employed in the state sector. Thus, the actual numbers are much 
higher than what the above numbers suggest. More interesting, a look at table 
5.4 indicates that the growth of the number of non-Kuwaitis employed in the civil 
service was actually higher than that of Kuwaitis nationals. 
51 Fakhry Shehab. "Kuwait: a Super Affluent Society." Foreign Affairs. (Vol. '+2. No.3). April 196'+. p . 
.+69-470. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of domestic Expenditure 
(KD millions) 
1973n4 1976m 1979/80 
KD Percent KD Percent KD Percent 
Current Domestic Expenditure 
Wages and Salaries 197.5 44.2% 368.2 26.0% 645.4 28.8% 
General Expenses 66.4 14.9% 314.3 22.2% 453.1 20.3°,0 
Domestic Transfers and 
Unclassified Payments 17.0 3.8% 63.5 4.5% 97.9 4.4% 
Land Purchases 19.4 4.3% 108.4 7.6% 330 14.7% 
Development 70.2 15.7% 353.1 24.9% 650.9 29.1% 
Local Loans 13.7 3.1% 35.2 2.5% 
Contributions to: 
Shares in Local Companies 45.8 10.3% 51.6 3.6% 
Government Financial Institutions 16.6 3.7% 123.5 8.7% 60 2.7% 
Total 446.6 100.0% 1417.8 100.0% 2237.3 100.0% 
Source: Central Bank of Kuwait, Economic Report for 1980. 
Table 5.2 State expenditure on Property Acquisition and Revenue from Sales of State Owned Property 
Years 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969nO 
1970n1 
1971n2 
Expenditure on Property 
Acquisition 
(KD m"lions) 
45.0 
29.2 
10.0 
30.0 
17.0 
10.0 
25.0 
29.7 
Source: Statistical Abstract. 1968 & Statistical Abstract 1972 
Percent of Development 
Expenditures 
(%) 
50.00% 
38.20% 
12.30% 
33.70% 
29.50% 
14.80% 
33.00% 
33.00% 
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Property Sales Revenue 
(KD millions) 
2.5 
1.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.5 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
Table 5.3 Development of Government Post Civil Servants 
Years Total Non-Kuwaiti Kuwaiti 
1965/66 69,520 42,639 26,881 
66/67 76,479 43,842 32,637 
67/68 79,669 44,695 34,974 
68/69 70,325 45,138 25,187 
69170 70,922 44,391 26,531 
70171 77,170 48,282 28,888 
71172 87,032 51,977 35,055 
72173 93,417 54,118 39,299 
73174 95,099 54,855 40,244 
74175 103,951 60,611 43,340 
75176 113,274 67,852 45,422 
76177 128,508 80,387 48,121 
77178 133,653 85,325 48,328 
78179 136,111 87,709 48,402 
Source: Annual Statistical Abstract. Ministry of Planning. 1980. 
Table 5.4 Development Index of Government Post Civil Servants 
(Base Year 1965/66) 
Years Total Non-Kuwaiti Kuwaiti 
1965/66 100.00 100.00 100.00 
66/67 110.00 100.50 121.40 
67/68 114.60 104.80 130.10 
68/69 101.20 105.90 93.70 
69170 102.00 104.10 98.70 
70171 111.00 113.20 107.50 
71172 125.20 121.90 130.40 
72173 134.40 126.90 146.20 
73174 136.80 128.60 149.70 
74175 149.70 142.10 161.20 
75176 162.90 159.10 169.00 
76177 184.90 188.50 179.00 
77178 192.30 200.10 179.80 
78179 195.80 205.70 180.10 
Source: Annual Statistical Abstract. Ministry of Planning, 1980. 
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5.5 The Continued Suspension of the National Assembly 
An important factor that played a role in the continued suspension of the 
assembly has been the regional environment. The mid-seventies and the early 
eighties saw the eruption of three major conflicts: the Lebanese civil war, the 
Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. The Lebanese civil war had a strong 
impact on Kuwait by al Sabah's fear of the similarities they saw in the situation 
of the two countries. The similarities were summarised as follows: 
Both countries are small states, surrounded by strong and competing 
neighbours (Israel and Syria in the case of the Lebanon and Iran and 
Iraq in the case of Kuwait). Each has a strong neighbour with 
historical territorial claims upon it (i.e., Syria in the case of the 
Lebanon and Iraq in the case of Kuwait). 52 
Other reasons for seeing such a parallel includes the fact that both countries 
have a large presence of Palestinians, a vocal press and a parliament, that 
made al Sabah perceive there to be a linkage between the violence that erupted . 
in Lebanon and its liberal democracy and sectarian politics.53 These similarities 
prompted al Sabah to use the Lebanese war as a justification for the continued 
suspension of the assembly, as well as to actively seek a peaceful solution to 
the war and to contribute in Arab mediation. However, the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and its aftermath have effectively ended all 
Arab and Kuwaiti efforts to solve the Lebanese crisis. 54 
The Iranian revolution led to a dramatic change in Arab-Iranian relations, which 
has been characterised by increasing hostility and insecurity.55 For Kuwait, the 
change of the regime in Iran was particularly worrying. During the 1960s and 
1970s the Shah's rule served as a counter force to Iraq and was seen as a 
52 Abdulaziz AI-Fayez. "The National Security of Kuwait: External and Internal Dimension". Ph.D thesis, 
University of Massachusetts, 198..l.p.333. 
53 Abdullah Kalifah AI-Shayeji. "Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for 
Political survival." Ph. D, thesis, University of Texas, Austin, 1988. p. 260. 
54 AI-Fayz, o.cit. p. 335. 
55 Ib'd '")'1'1 I ., p._-_. 
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friendly power and a potential ally in case of an Iraqi attack. 56 Initially, as 
understood by other Arab states, the Iranian revolution was seen as an Iranian 
internal affair deserving a close and cautious attitude.57 This cautious attitude 
was exemplified by the fact that in February 1979 the I ranian embassy in Kuwait 
was the first to recognise the new regime in Iran and in July of the same year, 
Kuwait's foreign minister paid his first visit to the Islamic Republic. 58 By doing 
this, the Kuwaiti government was hoping to keep the revolution as a foreign 
policy issue and not to influence Kuwaiti Shi'ite, and subsequently influence 
Kuwait's domestic politics. AI Sabah relied on the established leading Shi'ite 
families, such as the al Kathimyi, Marifi, Bahbahani and Qabazad, to control the 
Shi'ite community. However, the mass appeal of the revolution and the 
domestic consequences of encouraging sectarianism were underestimated by 
the authorities in Kuwait.59 Slowly the Shi'ite community became much more 
politicised and mosque sermons became more political than theological, and 
lead to the emergence of a new set of leaders. I n response to this the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs ordered prayer leaders to restrict themselves to preach on 
only religious topics and avoid making comments on politics, inter-Arab disputes 
and criticism of people or factions. 
At the start of the agitation of the Shi'ite community, the Kuwaiti government 
maintained the position that Kuwaiti Shi'ite are loyal, and the problems were 
caused by outside agitators who wanted to destabilise Kuwait. However, in 
September 1979 an incident took place, which changed all this. A religious 
leader, Ahmad al Mohri, openly supported the Iranian revolution, which the 
ruling authority in Kuwait took as being a direct threat to its internal unity and 
security. The government subsequently arrested al Mohri and charged him with 
making seditious speeches at a mosque and quickly deported him and his 
family to Iran.50 This was followed by a crackdown on workers that lacked 
56 Ibod "")'11 I ., p. __ 0 
57 AI-Bahrani, op.cit. p.201. 
58 CrystaL 1990, op.cit. pol37. 
59 Crystal, 1992. op.cit.lOO-IOI. 
60 AI-Bahrani, op.cit. p. 162-163. 
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proper documents and thousands of them were deported. 61 The increasing 
hostile tone of the Iranian Islamic regime towards Arab Gulf states and its 
influence on inciting Shi'ite's activism in support of the Iranian regime coincided 
with another development that added a further complication to Kuwait's already 
vulnerable situation. 
The eruption of the Iran-Iraq war on 22 September 1980 represented a direct 
threat to the stability and security of the Gulf region because it involved the two 
most powerful states in the region. It involved political ideological differences; 
religious differences in Sunni-Shi'ite, and nationalistic differences in Arab 
versus Persian. 62 The Iraqi regime's misadventure ended up in causing the 
longest war in the region with costs that have involved millions of lives, several 
million people injured and billions of dollars in damage.63 
The war had senous security and economic repercussions to Kuwait in 
particular, considering its geopolitical position. These are summarised by Assiri 
as: 
1. The war zone was only 150 miles from the centre of Kuwait city; 
bombardment and smoke could be heard and seen in Kuwait 
2. Kuwait needed to walk a tightrope because any position it took would 
potentially alienate either a domestic constituency or regional forces. 
3. Kuwait's economic well being was threatened by the war because of its 
dependence on re-exports of commerce to the two warring states and the 
safety of the shipment of its crude oil. 
4. The fall of Iraq would open the door for Iran into other Gulf states, next in 
line would well be Kuwait. 64 
61 Crystal, 1992, op.cit p.116. 
62 Al-Bahrani, op.cit. p. 203. 
63 Ibid .. p.203. 
64 Abdul-rada Assiri. Kuwait's foreign Policy: City-State in the World Politics. (Colorado: \Vest,iew 
Press. 1990). p. 70. 
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Taking these serious consequences into account, Kuwait, although it officially 
maintained a neutral stand, was supportive of I raq in a variety of ways. It kept 
its commitment to the 1972 and 1978 transit agreements with Iraq, which 
allowed commercial and military equipment to be shipped through Kuwaiti ports 
to Baghdad.65 As part of the Gulf States financial subsidy to Iraq to prop up its 
defences and its economy, Kuwait provided around $13.2 billion of this between 
1980-1988.66 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, when Syria shut the I raqi oil pipelines 
through their territories in 1982, agreed to sell some 300,000-350,000 barrels of 
oil per day from their neutral zone on behalf of Iraq. Kuwait's share of this war 
relief subsidy was estimated to reach around $7.2 billion in total between 1983-
1988.67 On another important front the Kuwaiti media provided one sided 
interpretation of the war in complete support of Iraq. Public support for the two 
warring factions was based on sectarian and ethnic grounds: the Sunnis and 
Arabs supported I raq, while the Shi'ite and some Kuwaitis of Persian origin 
supported or sympathised with Iran.68 The sectarian polarisation of the Kuwaiti 
society deepened. The Arab nationalist movement in Kuwait played a 
significant role in demanding and maintaining such a strong support to Iraq 
because of a fear and belief that Iran will dominate the region not on religious 
ground but on nationalistic grounds, Persian supremacy in the Gulf region was 
unacceptable to them.59 Iraq was to be given unlimited support in order to avoid 
such an eventuality. 
The tense regional and domestic situation was accompanied with an increased 
occurrence of political protests and violence in Kuwait. The relatively peaceful 
period of 1961-1978 was replaced by a tense and violent escalation of 
confrontation with the authorities. As seen from Table 5.5, political protests and 
acts of violence as a consequence of the Iranian revolution escalated. During 
65 Ibid., p.70. 
66 Ibid., p.70-71. 
67 Ralph King. "The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications". Adelphi Papers, (No. 219) (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987). p. 18. 
68 A ., . 73 ssm. Op.Clt. p. . 
69 h' . ')07 ')08 AI-Ba ram, Op.Clt. p. - -- . 
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the period of 1968-1975, Kuwait had eight such incidents in comparison to 70 
during the period of 1976-1981. 
Due to this worrying political and security situation the importance of the 
paramilitary forces and the police force was increased. The police force were 
supplied with the latest anti-riot control equipment, and the National Guard, 
border guard, palace guard and reserve forces were provided with an estimated 
manpower of 15,000-17,000.70 The Ministry of Interior budget increased from 
KD 8.7 million in 1963/64 to KD 49.6 million in 1975/76 and was raised to KD 
70.3 million in 1980/81.71 
On another front, Kuwait attempted to rely on regional cooperation to protect its 
security and sovereignty. During the 1960s and the 1970s, many bilateral and 
multilateral agreements between the Gulf states were concluded in the fields of 
economics politics, social and cultural affairs. In 1976, a meeting in Muscat of 
the foreign ministers of the eight Gulf states failed to reach an agreement on the 
issue of regional security because of differences in their views, especially 
concerning Iran and Iraq.72 In December 1978, Kuwait's crown prince and 
Prime Minister, Saad al Abdullah, visited the six Arab Gulf states to discuss 
issues related to Gulf security. This was followed by an important meeting of 
foreign ministers in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1979. During that meeting, 
the issue of "mutual defence and political stability" was central to the discussion 
as a result of Iranian threats to their prosperity and stability.73 This process of 
consultation culminated on May 25 1981 with the creation of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, GCC, in a meeting of the heads of the six Arab Gulf states 
in Abu Dhabi the GCC was established to a: 
recognition that special relationship, similar characters, and political 
identification bind these states together. Its goal is to generate 
70 A .. . 86 ssm, Op.Clt. p. . 
71 Ibid., p.86. 
72 al-Mustagbal al-'arabi. Vo1.4. No.3!. 1981. p.38. 
73 Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies. Kuwait University. Vo1.5. No. 18. April 1979. p.11-12. 
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coordination in all fields of economic and social spheres, and to 
achieve coordination, integration and linkages in all fields. 74 
Despite this emphasis on all fields of cooepration, the GCC's main focus was on 
developing mutual defence structures including a rapid development force, air 
defence, transport and procurement as well as internal security pacts between 
all member states except Kuwait. This will be elaborated with further details in 
the next chapter. Suffice it is to say that public outrage in Kuwait prevented the 
Kuwaiti government from becoming part of this pact. However, the military 
alliance with the other Gulf States was highly desired by the Kuwaiti 
government to compensate for its limited military capabilities and its small 
population. Kuwait's concern over its military capabilities to meet any challenge 
from its two powerful neighbours focused its attention since the mid-seventies 
on developing its military capabilities. The first seven year Defence 
Development Program, enacted in 1976, had a budget of $1 .5 billion and called 
for the establishment of a naval base, a military college, and authorised arms 
purchases from a variety of sources, plus the expansion of the existing military 
infrastructure in general.75 The Kuwaiti government in the period between1961-
1988 spent around $25 billion on building its military capability.76 
Despite this expenditure Kuwait's military capability remained limited and was 
highly dependent on foreign personal. One expert assessment of its ability to 
fend off against an external threat was estimated to be around two to three days 
until help from outside would arrive.77 The speed with which Kuwait fell to Iraqi 
military attests to this. Cooperation with the GCC was meant to compensate for 
this limited capability. However, it increased Kuwait's dependence on Saudi 
Arabia without being able to provide the needed military protection. 
74 Kuwait News agency, Gulf Cooperation Council. ( Kuwait: KUNA, January,23 1983).p. 6. 
7~ A .. . 77 
. ssm, op.cIt. p. _. 
76 Ibid., p. 78-79. 
77 Ibid .. p. 88. 
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Table 5.5 Examples of Political Protests and Violence In Kuwait for the Period 1979-1981 
1979 
September 26, Sayed Abbas Mohri, 
Khomeini's special envoy in Kuwait, 
and 18 members of his family have 
their citizenship rescinded and are 
deported to Iran. 
November 21, Bomb threat at al 
Hamra movie theatre. 
November 30, U.S. embassy is the 
target of several thousand anti-US 
Shi'ite demonstrations. 
1980 
April 29, Assassination attempt on Iranian foreign 
minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, in Kuwait. 
1981 
March 28, Explosions in 5 different places in Kuwait; no 
casualties. 
1982 
February 26, Kuwaiti airliner hijacked at Beirut 
airport; no casualties. 
May 2, Kuwaiti diplomat shot and wounded in Tehran. March 28, Explosions at the office of the Iranian Shipping March 8, Bomb threat at the Hilton Hotel. 
Co.; 1 person dies. 
May 21, two bombs exploded in front of Iran Air Office in April 30, Kuwaitis seismic research ship Western Sea is May 1, Bomb threat at a high school. 
Kuwait no casualties. confiscated by Iranian authorities; released May 19,1981 
June 1, Bomb explodes at the London Office of Kuwait 
Oil Co.; no injuries. 
June 4, Iranian embassy in Kuwait is damaged by 
explosives; no injuries. 
June13, Three Iranian aircraft attack the Abdali border 
post. 
June 25, Explosions in oil storage facilities in Shuaiba; 
damage estimated at $ 50 million. Fire put out after 2 
June 11, Three Iranian aircraft violate Kuwaiti air space. June 26, An attack against Kuwait embassy in Beirut; 
material damage. 
June 26, attack at the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut; August 25, Bomb threat at Kuwait airport. 
material damage. 
July 24, Two Jordanians hijack Kuwaiti airliner en route August 30, Bomb threat at Kuwait's Telecommunication 
from Beirut; no injuries. centre. 
May 9, Bomb threat at Mubarak al Kabir hospital 
May 10, bomb threat at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
May 17, Bomb threat at Kuwait T.V. station. 
October 28, shi'ite demonstration after an 
Ashura celebration in Kuwait. One Iranian and 
others arrested. Exchange of protests between 
October 30, Bomb explodes in a public park in a 
residential area; little damage. 
September 12, Explosion at AI Rai AI-Aam newspaper 
building; 1 person dies and 6 are injured. Damages 
estimated at K.D 4 million. 
September 1, Bomb threat at Kifan Cooperative Society ( December 9, Explosions at Kuwait Airways 
September 20, Kuwaiti freighter, al-Farwaniah is 
attacked by Iranian machine guns en route from Basra 
to Kuwait. 
a supermarket). office in Athens;, little damage. 
October 19, Iranian aircraft attack a petroleum complex at 
Urn al Eish. 
September 21, Kuwaiti freighter Ibn Abdoun is attacked December, Bomb threat at Kuwait's Central Bank. 
by Iranian guns en route from Basra to Kuwait. 
Source: Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign policy: CIty-state in Word Politics, Westview press, Boulder. 1990.157-159 
The above discussion suggests that the position which al Sabah took during a 
difficult regional and domestic situation proved that political participation and 
stability and security are incompatible. Therefore, the National Assembly can be 
sacrificed for the sake of maintaining stability of the country. This position is 
rather worrying because Kuwait's geopolitical situation is unlikely to change and 
subsequently the most important long term mechanism to guarantee its security 
and stability depends on enhancing the importance of the assembly as a 
national institution that represents the interest of Kuwaiti citizens - regardless of 
their sect, tribe or family, and it will safeguard the independence of Kuwait. 
5.6 The Kuwaiti Diwaniyya 
The suspension of the assembly has illustrated how public political space, 
although protected by the Constitution, can be violated by the state through the 
power of the Amir. More importantly such a violation creates a void in the 
political process that needs to be filled by other means available to the people 
to express political opinions, and debate important issues. In that context, 
alternative forms of protected space become highly significant. Although 
Kuwaitis acquiesced to the suspension of the assembly, their need to express 
their opinions on current domestic and regional issues remained of utmost 
importance to them. 
In Kuwait, there are other forms of protected space which do exist and these, 
according to Tetreault, constitute two types of social places that are protected 
by tradition and law from having any intrusion by the state. The first is the home 
and by extension the family and kin-based institutions and associations such as 
the tribe, the family business and the diwaniyya. 78 The second is the mosque, 
which is a public space but has an extensive protection from state intervention, 
primarily because it is sacred. In the Arab region, the mosque has acquired a 
special place for mass political mobilisation. In this section, it is useful to 
concentrate specifically on the diwaniyya due to its unique place in Kuwaiti 
society, especially in comparison to other Gulf states. The mosque and Islamic 
78 Mary Ann Tetreault. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. (T\ew 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000).p. 62. 
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influence over the politics of Kuwait during this period was still marginal. It 
started to playa much larger and more important role in the late seventies as 
shall be seen in the next chapter. 
One comprehensive definition of diwaniwa has been employed by al Kandari 
who describes it as being an: 
unofficial social group special for men and not woman. It is 
considered a cultural symposium in which all matters concerned with 
daily affairs are discussed. It is a place for expressing opinions and 
exchanging speeches. It deals with all social, literary, sport, pOlitical, 
and scientific matters of the country as well as the outside world. It 
has the status of a parliament, as opinions are frankly expressed and 
officials are evaluated. 79 
Although, as this definition reveals, the diwaniyya has an all encompassing 
importance for Kuwaitis, its true significance lies in its function as an outlet 
through which political debate and opinions can be expressed, especially at 
times during the absence of the assembly and also during national elections. 
The concept of diwan comes from Islamic society. Caliph Omer Ibn al Khattab 
(the second of the four caliphs) was the first to establish the al Diwan as a way 
of providing a link between the Ruler - the Caliph and his citizens.8o This 
concept was adapted to fit the tribal societies of the Arabian Peninsula, and 
diwan became a centre for political leadership and for tribal Sheikhs to meet 
and discuss a broad variety of issues. Diwans have been used in Kuwait since 
it was founded in 1756 by Sabah the first, and acted as the link between the 
Ruler and Kuwaitis. 81 With urbanisation and settlement, merchants began to 
have their own diwaniyyas to discuss commerce and trade. Old Kuwaiti 
diwaniwas were hosted by economically privileged families because of the 
79 Yagoob AI-Kandari. "The Social Function of al-Diwaniyah in Kuwait Society." MA. thesis, Ohio State 
University. 1995. p.22-23. 
80 Ib'd ," 1 "p. __ 1. 
81 Ibid" p.28. 
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expenses entailed in hosting open meetings. Some examples of these families 
include: al Naqeeb, al Othman, al Ghanim, al Bader, al Bahr, al Saqr, al 
Marzouk, al Adasani, al Roumi, al Asqousi, Ma'rahi and others. A general 
estimates would put the number of these diwaniyyas to be 200, although, by the 
end of the fifties, these old diwaniyyas had reduced so that only six survived; all 
on the coast.82 
The increased wealth of the Kuwaiti society allowed the spread of new 
diwaniyyas and made it possible for an increased number of people to establish 
their own. The spread of diwaniyyas took on a variety of forms. Ywsif Ghulum 
presents five major classifications of modern diwaniyyas as follows: 
1. Political diwaniyyas: these are concerned primarily with discussing 
political issues of local, regional and of an international nature. They are 
underpinned by a variety of ideological and political views. They have 
been a catalyst for political upbringing and political awareness and 
encourage people involvement in politics. This type constitutes the 
pnmary centre of gathering for the members of the assembly and 
cabinet. 
2. Socio-economic diwaniyyas: these are linked with the merchant 
community of Kuwait and are concerned with socio-economic issues. 
They have a great influence on the decisions and policies of the 
government. 
3. Government diwaniyyas: this refers to diwaniyyas whose owners are 
government supporters and are primarily concerned with embracing all 
government decisions. 
8~ Ali Ywsif Ghulum. ( Ghuloom. Yoosuf). uTa'thir al-diwaniya 'ala 'amaliyat al-musharakah al-
siyasiya". (The Role of Diwaniyya in the Progress of Political Participation in Kuwait.) (\1Jallat al- 'ulum 
al-'jtima'jyah. Kuwait. \'.24. N. 3. 1996). p.12-13. 
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4. Cultural diwaniwas: they are concerned with cultural and literary matters 
and organise seminars and lectures by people from inside and outside 
the country. 
5. Entertainment diwaniyyas: they are purely aimed at providing 
entertainment, especially to the young, such as playing cards, watching 
TV and discussing sports and other marginal matters. Attendants of these are 
more interested in passing time without having any real concern over political 
events and issues.83 
The expansion of diwaniwas can be attributed also to its increased importance 
as a private political space to debate issues, and for candidates running for 
elections to the assembly to be able to agendas a public air their platform. Also, 
deputies use them to meet their constituencies in order to exchange views and 
discuss various issues. There is a strong belief among Kuwaitis that success in 
the National Assembly elections depends - to a great extent - on the number of 
supporters a candidate can muster from among diwaniwa owners. Because of 
this, candidates frequent the diwaniyyas in their respective constituency before 
elections in order to explain the electoral program and also to enhance their 
personal relation with potential voters.84 After the elections the diwaniyya is also 
used to influence the position of deputies in the discussions inside the 
assembly.8s Sometimes members of the assembly visit diwaniyyas for the 
purpose of finding out opinions on a particular issue that the assembly is 
debating. Many of the meetings, discussions and lectures held in the 
diwaniyyas are a reflection of the subjects raised in the assembly. As soon as 
an issue is discussed in the assembly, the same issue then dominates the 
discussion in the diwaniwas which can play a role in either support or 
rejection. 86 
83 Ibid., p. 77. 
84 d' . 82 AI-Kan an, Op.Clt. p. . 
85 Ibid., p.112. 
86 Ibid .. p.87. 
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Because the diwaniyyas represent the pulse of the Kuwaitis on most issues that 
relate to their lives, the government has the habit of taking into account some of 
the major diwaniyyas and, in particular, those belonging to wealthy influential 
personalities when it makes its major decisions.s7 Diwaniyyas can also be used 
to select state officials. The government encouraged the idea of diwaniyyas 
through the visits paid to them by statesmen. The Ministers' diwaniyya was 
established at the request of the Crown Prince, and Prime Minister, Jaber al 
Ahmed al Sabah, after the dissolution of the parliament in order to allow officials 
and citizens to meet. Among the most important of these was the diwaniyya 
hosted by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. In a way this is an 
acknowledgement on the part of the government of the centrality of the 
diwaniyya to Kuwaitis and the need of contact and consult between ruler and 
ruled even if informally and unofficially. 
The centrality of the diwaniyya to Kuwaitis has been also acknowledged by the 
exemption of diwaniyyas from the law that restricts public gatherings. The 
restrictions imposed on civil associations, public gatherings and the press has 
made the diwaniyya even more significant as a place to express opinions on 
matters that concerns Kuwaitis, and as a place that influences public opinion.s8 
Another very important factor that makes the diwaniyya so popular is the 
personal freedom felt by attendants in expressing their own point of view. The 
non-official structure that the diwaniyya has makes it very amiable to all 
individual freedom and relaxation even in the presence of high raking officials 
during the discussions.s9 
Diwaniyyas serve as a place that enhance and solidify personal relations 
among the members of the same diwaniyya. This is seen by, al Kandari as 
being a strong source of cohesion and homogeneity and unity in the Kuwaiti 
society. However, this has also reinforced parochial loyalties, and emphasised 
87 Khalid Muhammad AI-Maqamis. AI-diwaniya al-kuwaytiya wa-ta'thiruha fi aI-hayah aI-niyabiya. 
(The Kuwaiti Diwaniyya and its Influence on Parliamentary Life). ( Kuwait: n.p., 1986).p. 71. 
88 d' . °5 AI-Kan an, Op.Clt. p.o . 
89 Ibid .. p.122-127. 
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the function of the diwaniwa as a centre for wasta and doing favours. 90 An 
army officer offered an account of his own experience with nepotism: 
The question of nepotism exists, but it is evident that in big 
diwaniwa as well as small diwaniwas, it depends on the people 
who attend them. I, for example, prefer my friend to others. When 
he asks me to do something, I can help him. I have heard requests 
for favours elsewhere, but I refused persons who were from outside 
the diwaniyya. I often help those who attend the diwaniwa in my 
field of specialisation. 91 
Another very similar account indicates that: 
The Diwaniwa helps in the spread of nepotism. For example, an 
officer in the pOlice may do a favour for me, I, in turn do a favour for 
him in some other matter. It is a mutual issue. I have experienced 
these situations. 92 
These accounts confirm the position taken by Farah that diwaniwa is where 
wasta, connections or influence become tangible or are felt ... where 
appointments are decided, contracts settled, introductions made, jobs awarded-
always in subtle understood way. 93 
The role of diwaniwa has changed over time changing from its historical 
character as a meeting place between the ruler and the ruled to then becoming 
the means of highlighting the social status of its owner - be it the head of a clan 
or tribe or a businessman and a privileged person - to becoming the most 
important protected social space for debating and highlighting significant 
political, economic and social issues facing Kuwaitis. 94 It has been a safety 
90 Ibid., p. 134. 
91 Ibid., p.134. 
92 Ibid .. p. 13'+-135. 
91 Farah E. Tawfic. Political Behavior in the Arab States. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983). 
94 Al-Kandari, op.cit. p.136. 
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valve venting out pressure especially at times of the absence of any 
parliamentary life and the restricted freedoms of the press and public 
gatherings. Moreover, it influences the decision making of the government and 
the assembly, and .influences those who stay in or out of the assembly and the 
government. In short, it has developed into becoming a political lobby and a 
place of ideological influence. During the four year absence of the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly between 1976-1980, the issue of democracy and return to 
parliamentary life was major concerns of Kuwaitis and were regularly expressed 
through discussions in the diwaniyyas with common feelings of discontent that 
emerged. This indirectly, put pressure on al Sabah to reconsider its continued 
suspension of the assembly. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The first most important thing that the suspension of the National Assembly 
indicates is the existence of a structural difficulty between accommodating the 
dynastic rule of al Sabah with their accountability and answerability to the 
representatives of the people. The ability of the National Assembly to expose, 
scrutinise, and publicise executive activities, and consequently al Sabah family, 
has put the assembly in direct conflict with the powerful well established ruling 
family. The Constitution has set power sharing arrangements and controls and 
checks to allow for an effective relation between the legislative and the 
executive. However, the problem lies in the lack of acceptance by al Sabah of 
these power sharing arrangements, which they see as, in effect, curtailing their 
authority and power. 
To further Complicate this relation is the fact that the first stage of Kuwait's 
implementation of a representative system of government coincided with a huge 
increase in the economic resources of the state. Such a powerful economic 
base gave the ruling family immense leverage over the society as a whole and 
subsequently over the assembly. Another factor that undermines the assembly 
is the election law that helps in returning deputies based on tribe, sect and 
family affiliations. Segmented interests make it very hard to find any common 
ground in order to build up and develop some effective opposition. AI Sabah's 
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legitimacy has been strengthened with the accumulation of the oil revenues, 
and they are now far less receptive to accommodate any opposition. The lack 
of threat from its citizens indicates the ease with which the suspension was 
carried out with despite it being unconstitutional to even do it. The expanded 
economic opportunities and the prosperity that has positively transformed the 
lives and raised the living standards of Kuwaitis within a very short period of 
time has also made them less concerned about the assembly. The fact that the 
National Assembly was a relatively new institution without a long tradition 
behind it, also made it easier for the population to accept its suspension. 
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Chapter Six 
The Second Stage of the Kuwaiti Representative System of 
Government 1981-1986 
6.1 Introduction 
The dissatisfaction and disgruntlement of Kuwaitis, expressed in their debates 
in Kuwaiti diwaniwas, over the continued suspension of the National Assembly 
put al Sabah and the government under pressure and scrutiny by the 
opposition. Kuwaitis have become so accustomed to the idea of political 
participation, that it is very difficult to maintain the legitimacy of the political 
system during long periods of its absence. 1 
In order to deal with this challenge, the government adopted a strategy based 
on two major orientations. The first was its continued attempt to restrict the 
freedom of the press, limit political activities and provide law and order 
institutions with wider powers to control and restrict undesired political ideas 
and any protest behaviour.2 The second centred on enhancing its alliance with 
the tribal rural segment of the population as well as enhancing the importance 
of the civil and military bureaucracy as being the basis of legitimacy, The 
unprecedented accumulation of oil wealth in the hands of the state was a crucial 
I Yoosuf Ghuloom Ali. "Political Participation in a Development Nation: The Case of Kuwait. Ph. D 
thesis. University of Ohio, 1989. p.47. 
2 Abdo Baaklini. "Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait. 1961-1975." International 
Journal of Middle East Studies. (\'0.1'+. 1982). p.374. 
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factor in the ability of the ruling family to widen and maintain such a basis of 
their legitimacy. 
However, the continuation of this strategy was punctured by the unexpected 
eruption of the Iranian revolution in 1979. The revolution, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, undermined the stability and security of Arab Gulf regimes 
and directly contributed to increased tension between the sectarian divisions 
between the Shi'ite and Sunnis. It also focused and sharpened the Shi'ite long 
hidden frustrations, encouraging them to ralfy behind the Iranian revolution and 
demand equality, just rights and freedoms.3 This in conjunction with the 1979 
seize of the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the fact that the leaflets circulated by 
the rebels were printed in Kuwait and few Kuwaiti's were among the culprits 
refocused the government attention on the issue of political participation.4 
At that point of political turmoil within the gulf region the Amir, Sheikh Jaber al 
Ahmad al Sabah, saw the representative assembly as a counter force to the 
Islamic religious force unleashed in the area by the Iranian revolution, as it was 
a source of internal stability. Another reason is that by 1980 the government 
was running out of time, as the four-year period that the Amir had declared as 
necessary to make amendments to the Constitution was coming to end. The 
decision to restore the National Assembly was not, therefore, a wholehearted 
desire to return to a representative system of government. This explains why 
the government wanted first to revise the Constitution before announcing an 
election date. 
This chapter shall analyse this failed attempt by the government to circumvent 
the assembly through Constitutional changes with it resorting instead to 
amending the election law in order to ensure the return of a pliable assembly. 
However, the discussion will show that despite the government's success in 
controlling the shape of the fifth assembly, issues of accountability and 
criticisms of ministers consistently dogged the assembly. The lack of progress 
on many of these issues and the worsening economic situation due to the 
3 Abdullah Kalifah Al-Shayeji. "Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for 
Political Survival." Ph. D. thesis. University of Texas. Austin. 1988. p.269. 
-l Ibid .. p.269. 
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decline in the oil market created a different and more challenging environment 
by the time the sixth assembly was elected. It is possible to see how that 
particular assembly returned the traditional nationalist opposition who, in 
alliance with the Islamists, created a combative assembly bent on taking the 
accountability of the government seriously. Subsequently, within a year and 
half of the life of the sixth assembly, the Amir ordered the second suspension of 
the assembly, less than five years after its restoration. 
This indicates that the tension between the conflicting visions of the function of 
the assembly is a recurrent theme in the parliamentary experience of Kuwait. 
The executive desires an assembly that will act as a debating chamber rather 
than an institution underpinned by certain powers and functions. It is interesting 
to note that the changing economic conditions created more pressure for 
accountability and Kuwaitis became increasingly more interested in holding the 
government answerable for many of the ills and afflictions of the economy. 
6.2 The Committee for the Revision of the Constitution 
In February 1980 the government formed a special committee to evaluate the 
democratic experience of Kuwait and revise the Constitution. All the thirty-five 
members of the committee were appointed by the government, representing the 
main social groups within Kuwaiti society with the exclusion of the Arab 
nationalist group. The members included six badu, thirteen merchants, three 
Shi'ite and thirteen Sunnis/liberals. Abdullatif al Dueij, commenting on the 
composition of the committee noted that: 
The choice of the 35 members of the Committee merely seems 
based on a fair distribution of Kuwaiti families, parties and tribes-a 
system we thought had been abandoned. One of the negative 
aspects of the former parliamentary life was the division of the 
constituencies according to group and parties, which meant that 
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rather than representing the people, a Deputy symbolised the 
authority of a single family. 5 
Although the government sees the representation of the Kuwaiti society along 
such sectarian lines as democratic, in effect what this does is maintain the 
expression of political interests in narrow frames of familial, sectarian and tribal 
identities to the detriment of developing an overarching national interest to rally 
all groups around. Another criticism of the committee focuses on the fact that 
its formation was unconstitutional.6 Article (174) of the Constitution stipulates 
that either the Amir or one-third of the assembly shall have the right to propose 
the revision of the Constitution and that if the Amir and the majority of the 
members of the assembly approved the principle of revision and it subject 
matter, the assembly should debate the bill article by article. Approval by two-
thirds of the assembly is required to pass the bill. 
The special committee, however, showed independent judgement and rejected 
outright the government's proposed Constitutional amendments. These 
amendments were extensive, comprehensive and significant. Their adoption 
would have led to changes in the political system and influenced the balance 
between the legislative and executive in favour of the latter.? The rejection by 
the appointed committee shows that not only the opposition understood the 
government aims of the revision to mean limiting the power of the National 
Assembly and transforming it into a powerless organ of the state, but also those 
considered loyal and close to the ruling family saw the danger inherent in the 
proposed amendments. The extended discussions inside the diwaniyyas 
influenced public opinion and rallied the Kuwaitis against the revision, putting 
the government in a very difficult position. Consequently, it was forced to 
withdraw its proposal to amend the Constitution and disbanded the committee 
5 Avi Plascov. Security in the Persian Gulf, Modernization, Political Development and Stability. 
(England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1982). p.153. 
6 Sami AI-Manays. AI-tali 'a fi ma'rakat al-dimugratiya. (Al-tali 'a in the Democracy Battle). (Kuwait: AI-
tali 'a, 1984).p.152. 
7 Ibid.p. 152. 
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without making its findings as public knowledge, and proceeded to find another 
way to have a pliable and less critical assembly.8 
To do this was achieved by changing the election law. In December 1980 the 
government announced a new amendment to the electoral law of 1962 which 
became Law no. 99 (1980). As discussed in chapter three, the law redistributed 
Kuwait into 25 districts, instead of the previous ten, with each district returning 
two members, thus maintaining the number of the seats in the assembly at fifty. 
This redistribution had two major consequences; the reduction of the size of 
electoral districts and the reduction of the number of votes that candidates 
needed to win. Both of these consequences meant an increase in the influence 
of family, tribe and sect interests. Through this law the government hoped to 
limit the presence of opposition groups in the assembly, such as the Arab 
nationalists and those with leftist leanings, as well as the Shi'ite who had 
become far less loyal and more radical as a result of the Iranian revolution, 
while strengthening the presence of loyal groups in the assembly, primarily the 
badu. 9 
Feeling confident about the shape that the National Assembly would take, an 
Amiri decree on December 16 set the date of the elections for the new National 
Assembly, as 23 February 1981. This gave little time for the opposition to 
prepare to face the challenges posed by the new election law. 
6.3 Elections for the Fifth National Assembly 
The election of the fifth National Assembly drew a large number of candidates, 
447 in total, contesting 25 districts and competing for 42,008 votes.'o There is a 
suggestion that the reduction of the electoral body, by 11,000 voters in 
comparison to the 1975 election, points to the government's irregularities 
8 Khalid Muhammad AI-Maqamis. Al-diwaniya al-kuwaytiya wa-ta'thiruha fi al-hayah al-nivabiya. (The 
Kuwaiti Diwaniyya and its Influence on Parliamentary Life). ( Kuwait: n.p., 1986).p.71-72. 
9 Kadhim Mahdi AI-Bahrani. "Factors Influencing Ruling Elites Political Participation in the State of 
Kuwait". Ph.D. thesis, University of Denver, 1988. p.78. 
10 1 Sh" . "89 A - aye]!. op.cIt. p. ~ . 
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concerning the dropping of names from the voter register and purposely not 
registering some of the eligible voters who had turned 21." Others have a more 
benevolent explanation, by conceding that there was a lack of interest of the 
young educated Kuwaitis who were completely disenchanted with the system. 12 
Evidence to support this view is that, of those eligible to vote, numbering around 
60,000 Kuwaitis (incidentally, that represents just 4 percent of the total 
population and only 10 percent of all Kuwaiti nationals) only 42,008 registered. 
However, having said that the turn out was the highest in the short history of all 
Kuwaiti elections, by being around 90 percent of those registered. 
Another interesting feature of the election was that for the first time the hadhar 
adopted the badu procedure of carrying out election primaries. This procedure 
had previously been heavily criticised by the hadhar and they had frequently 
demanded the government to put an end to it. The justification that the hadhar 
provided for using the procedure was that the number of candidates was so 
large it was necessary to carry out primaries in order to avoid the scattering of 
votes and to guarantee the success of candidates with having a large number of 
votes behind them.'3 
A bill was submitted by five members of the fifth assembly to prohibit a primary 
election. The bill defines primary elections as follows: 
A primary election ... is an unofficial election held for any reason, 
before the official election provided by election law, attended by any 
number of people on a specified day which includes the organisation 
of a electoral roll, balloting, election committee, the counting of votes 
and the finalising by an announcement of elected people. 14 
II, Abdulratha Asyri. (Assiri, A.) and Kamal Al-Munufi. "Al- 'intikhabat al-niyabiya al-sadisa fi al-
kuwayt. 1985". (The Sixth Parliamentary Elections in Kuwait.). Social Science Journal. (V: 14. n.l 
Kuwait: Spring 1986. p.95-138). p.95-l38. 
12 Al-Shayeji, op.cit. p. 289. 
L1 'Adil AI-Tabataba'i. "Al-sulta al-tashri'iya fi duwal al-khalij al-'arabi". (The legislatIve Authority In 
Arabian Gulf Countries). Manshurat majallat dirasat al-khalij wa al-jazira al- 'arabi\'a. N.14. Kuwait: 
1985. p.389. 
14 Al-Moqatei, 1987. op.cit. p.203. 
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The justification that the deputies gave for wishing to legally ban this procedure 
was that primary elections violate the electoral system by changing it into a 
secondary ballot system, contrary to the present law which provides that an 
election must be held in one step only.15 However, the bill failed to gather the 
support that is required because the more commonly held view promoted 
primary elections. The latter view maintains that primary elections do not 
violate either the law nor the Constitution because the results are not binding 
and there are no legal obligations, while the prohibition by law of primary 
elections violates some articles of the Constitution. In particular Articles 36, 37, 
and 44 are breached as they protect freedom of public gatherings and collective 
associations. 16 One way out of this dilemma was to allow the formation of 
political parties, which will stop or at least limit the usefulness of primary 
elections. 
In terms of the results of the election, they came in total harmony with the 
government's wishes. As seen from Table 6.1, the nationalists failed to win any 
seats, the Shi'ite deputies dropped to only four from their highest point of ten in 
the previous assembly, while the badu increased their seats from 22 to 27. The 
assembly included 26 new comers, capturing more than half the seats 
available. The expansion of education and urbanisation played a major role in 
allowing new faces to enter the political arena for the first time. 17 
6.4 Political Groupings in the Fifth Assembly 
The political shape of the assembly has been determined to a great extent by 
the changes in the election law, thus there was a noticeable increase in the 
influence of the badu and loyal supporters of al Sabah, as well as the Islamists. 
The increased influence of the Sunni Islamists came at the expense of the 
secular nationalist group who failed to win any seats. AI Sabah showed 
15 Ibid., p.203-204. 
16 Ibid., p.204-205. 
17 Dubi Al-Harbi. Man vantakhib man wa-li-madha? wasa'il wa-'awamil al-ta'thir 'ala al-nakhib al-
kuwayti. (Who Elects Who and Why? The Tools that Intluence the Kuwaiti Voter.) (Kuwait: n.p. 1996). 
pAO. 
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considerable cooperation with the Islamists, in order to offset the liberal 
nationalist opposition, especially because these groups are more concerned 
with Shari'a than issues of accountability and the rooting of a representative 
system of government. That is exemplified by their silence on the first 
suspension of the National Assembly and lack of objection to the amendments 
proposed by the government to the Constitution. Although the Shi'ite presence 
in the assembly has been reduced in number, a more politicised group of 
candidates have won seats and those of the old guard, who were loyalists to al 
Sabah, failed to win a seat. This situation is a reflection of the changes that the 
Shi'ite of Kuwait have experienced as a result of the Iranian revolution which 
galvanised them to become more politically active and to act against their 
marginalisation in society. 
The following is a detailed discussion of the actual changes that the election of 
the fifth assembly managed to produce. 
Arab Nationalists: The most noticeable feature of the fifth assembly was the 
absence of the traditional Kuwaiti opposition, the Arab nationalists. The 
absence was attributed to several factors; the most important among them was 
the change in the election law. The nationalists had a very short period of time 
to adjust to the new challenges posed by the amendments. The decline of the 
importance of the Pan-Arab nationalist movement and the marginalistion of 
leftist groups and left-wing tendencies in the Arab world, as a whole, is another 
contributing factor. A third reason was the continued divisions and lack of 
coordination among the nationalists, combined with an unjustified over 
confidence during election campaigning when, in fact, had have grown apart 
from their grass root support over the years. 18 The surfacing of the Shi'ite-Sunni 
tension acted as a catalyst for the defeat of the traditional opposition veteran, 
Ahmad al Khatib, who appeared in a Shi'ite mosque in support of Ahmed al 
Mohri (the sympathiser of Ayatollah Khomeini who the Kuwaiti government had 
stripped of his nationality and deported him with his family to Iran).19 
18 1 Sh" . ")80 A - aye]l, Op.Clt. p... . 
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Table 6.1 the Distribution of the Seats In the National Assembly for the Election of 1981 
District 8adu Merchants Arab Nationalists Shl'lte Sunnl religious Groups Others Total 
1 st. 1 2 
2nd. 2 
3rd. 2 2 
4th. 2 2 
5th. 1 2 
6th. 1 2 
7th. 1 2 
8th. 2 
9th. 1 2 
10th. 2 2 
11th. 2 2 
12th. 2 2 
13th. 1 1 2 
14th. 1 2 
15th. 2 2 
16th. 2 2 
17th. 2 2 
18th. 2 2 
19th. 2 2 
20th. 2 2 
21st. 2 2 
22nd. 2 2 
23rd. 2 2 
24th. 2 2 
25th. 2 2 
Total 27 2 4 4 13 50 
Source; Calculated from data on election results from the Kuwaiti National Assembly 
The /s/amists: In contrast, the Sunni religious groups had waged an organised 
campaign that worked well to discredit the nationalists and gained them four 
seats which reflected their new enhanced importance in Kuwaiti politics. These 
Sunni deputies came from the two main religious groups, three seats went to 
the Society for Social Reform (Muslim Brothers), and one seat was won by the 
19 Ibid .. p. 270. 
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Society for Cultural Revival (Salafiyyin). The Salafiyya movement is an ultra-
conservative group and relatively a recent phenomenon concerned primarily 
with the return to the Qur'an and Shari'a. Its interest in politics is only used as a 
method to advance its religious calling and make the Shari'a the only source of 
legislation in Kuwait. Because of that they have some differences with the 
Muslim Brothers, accusing them as being concerned foremost with pOlitics on 
the expense of Islamic Shari'a. 20 The Salafiyyin perceive their participation in 
the assembly as being solely motivated by their concern over Shari'a.21 Despite 
these differences the two Sunni religious groups became the leading opposition 
block. in the assembly by sponsoring conservative fundamentalist bills such 
calling for the Shari'a to be the only source of legislation, for a ban on Christmas 
celebrations and for new restrictions on women's behaviour in public places. 22 
Part of the reason for the rise of the Islamic influence is related to the 
government's interest in undercutting nationalist-leftist opposition, thus it 
increased cooperation with the Sunni religious groups and promoted them by 
incorporating them into high level political positions.23 AI Harbi also points also 
to other reasons for the spread of these groups in Kuwait. Firstly was the 
dissolution of the assembly and its relatively long absence which helped 
strengthen religious ties and gave religious civil associations belonging to the 
Muslim Brothers, Salafiyyin and the Shi'ite much more influence and it widened 
their base of support. Secondly was the Iranian revolution and its influence on 
the Shi'ite especially in light of the discrimination that the Shi'ite of Kuwait had 
suffered over the years. Thirdly were the Iran-Iraq war and its consequences on 
inflaming religious feelings and divisions. Fourthly was the alienation that some 
educated segments of the population felt due to the speed of urbanisation and 
the change of society that was undermining traditional values and ways of life. 
Lastly was the limited understanding of political activism and parliamentary life, 
20 AI-Harbi. op.cit. p. 53. 
21 Ibid .. p.53-54. 
l~ Abdo I. Baaklini. Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions. 
(Boulder. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). p. 182. 
23 Shafeeq Ghabra. "Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: The Foundations of a new System" \1iddle East 
Journal. 45, no. 2 (Spring. 1991): p. 206. 
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perceiving it as an extension of religious preaching and sermonising and tribal 
status that is linked to extreme religiosity.24 
The mustering of huge financial resources by the Muslim Brothers through a 
variety of channels, was also a very important factor in enhancing their 
influence on society. For one, they control the Kuwait Funding House, which is 
considered to be among the strongest banks in Kuwait. The House is exempt 
from abiding by the laws that govern commercial banks, and the control of the 
Central Bank over it is only of supervisory nature, allowing it great flexibility in 
pursuing its political agenda. They control also the Alms House, the central 
committee of Waqf, and many cooperatives and charities.25 
The increased importance of the Shi'ite religious trend in particular was directly 
related to the establishment of a Shi'ite religious rule in Iran. The Cultural and 
Social Society has represented the interests of the Shi'ite community in Kuwait 
since 1968. However, its significance increased and its Islamic identity 
intensified after the I ranian revolution. It became a major political force within 
the community and was involved in the mobilisation of Shi'ite the candidates for 
the assembly.26 Another contributing reason to the politicisation of Shi'ite in 
Kuwait, as argued by Crystal, was to counter the discrimination and opposition 
that they faced from Sunnis. She notes that: 
Shias ... see politicisation of Shia community as its best defence 
against Sunni opposition. 27 
This pOliticisation is reflected in the shift of the voting pattern of Shi'ite. The 
results of the 1981 election shows that three of the four candidates that won a 
seat represented Shi'ite organisations that had sympathy for Khomeini, while 
the traditional Shi'ite supporters of the government lost votes.28 Despite the 
24 Al-Harbi, op.cit. p. 47-49. 
25 Ibid., p.5l-52. 
26 Ghabra, op.cit. p.208. 
27 Jill Crystal. Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. (Boulder: Westview. 1992).p.lll-112. 
28 Al-Shayeji. op.cit. p. 293. 
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tension and sharp division between Sunnis and Shi'ites, the deputies that 
represented the Shi'ite community had on some issues joined forces with the 
Sunni groups in the assembly. 
The period of the eighties was particularly difficult for Kuwait considering the 
escalation of opposition in the form of a series of violent actions. As seen from 
Table 6.1 acts of violence had been on the increase. On December 12, 1983. 
explosions occurred in seven different places, including the American and 
French embassies as well as in a number of other public institutions. Another 
serious bombing attack took place on May 25, 1985, during the passing of the 
ruler's parade which resulted with injury to the Amir and the death of three of his 
guards. On another occasion, in June 1986, the petroleum complex at the port 
of Mina al Ahmadi was bombed, followed by similar bombs at various Kuwaiti 
portS.29 In 1986 Iran intensified its attack on the Kuwaiti oil sector by targeting 
its oil tankers, and since neither Kuwait nor the GCC had the military 
capabilities to protect these tankers, Kuwait was forced to lease three Soviet 
tankers and to reflag eleven Kuwaiti tankers under US warship escorts.30 
Although the dissidents carrying out such political violence were mostly non-
Kuwaitis, pro-Iranian Shi'ite (Iraqis, Iranians and Lebanese), the government's 
effort to suppress dissent targeted the Kuwaiti Shi'ite community.31 That added 
to the grievances felt by the Shi'ite and increased their sense of becoming a 
besieged community. Among these grievances was the lack of support for 
Shi'ite mosques and religious centres, the government restrictions in 
employment and higher education, private sector discrimination by Sunni 
employers, restriction on Shi'ite non-political gatherings and expression, plus 
the anti-Shi'ite incidents that were committed by some sections of the Sunni 
community.32 The execution of the sixteen Kuwaiti Shi'ites convicted of the 
planting of bombs on the pilgrimage at Mecca added to the feeling of isolation of 
29 Ibid .. p.293. 
30 Fact on File. May 29.1987. p.377-378. 
~l Crystal. 1992. op.cit. p.112-112. 
3~· 1'" 11 "" Ibid .. p.1 _- J. 
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the Shi'ite community especially as they saw that the Kuwaiti government did 
not protect the interests of its citizens. 33 
One of the main casualties of the escalation of such protests, that resorted to 
violent means, was the freedom of expression. In 1982, the National Assembly 
in 1982, objected to the restriction of the press and voted to drop a controversial 
article from the press law which had been introduced in 1976, after the 
dissolution of the assembly. That article granted the government wide powers 
to suspend publications for a long period of time and imprison and fine editors 
and publishers. However, the escalation of political violence caused the 
assembly to reconsider the position on security related restrictions. That 
included the restrictions on public assembly, press restrictions and, most 
importantly, the passing of a strong anti-subversion bill that put heavy penalties 
for the possession of explosions and active political violence, together with a bill 
which set the death penalty for crimes against aviation safety.34 Also, during the 
period, November between 1985 to November 1986, around twenty-seven 
thousand people were deported from Kuwait as a result of the adoption of much 
harsher measures when dealing with immigrant workers, if they were suspected 
of any political agitation and activities.35 
The badu: As the government intended, the badu gained most from the new 
election law. The twenty-seven seats they won gave them a majority share in 
the assembly by 54 percent. Their increased importance was directly related to 
redistributing constituencies since twelve of the newly created districts were 
closed to tribal candidates. In the other two districts of tribal influence the badu 
shared the seats with a Shi'ite in one and with a Sunni Islamist in the other. 
It is difficult to put the blame on the badu for the advantage they gained from the 
redistribution of districts. They benefited from a structure and a system put by 
the government in order to advance its own interests and maintain its power 
over the assembly. Also, this type of redistribution - with the boundaries of a 
district corresponding to the geographic concentration of a particular group -
33 Ibid .. p.I13-114. 
34 Ibid .. p.115. 
35 AI-Bahrani. op.cit. p.164-165. 
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emphasised the phenomenon that developed in Kuwait of "service deputies". 
Deputies, notably among the badu, pledged and petitioned hard to provide 
services to their own districts.36 Their role as legislators and controllers of the 
power and authority of the executive was pushed to the background. The badu 
as group have been traditionally staunch supporters of the ruling family because 
of their dependence on the state. Large numbers of them have been engaged 
in state related employment whether it is army, the police or in the oil sector. 
Sometimes they ally themselves to the opposition in the assembly in order to 
pressurise the government to meet the demands of their constituency. However 
as explained by Peterson, such opposition does not affect their voting patterns, 
as they mostly vote pro-government: 
The rhetoric of assembly debate and statements to the media gave 
the impression that nearly all elected assembly members fell into the 
rank of opposition. Even the tribalist members, staunch supporters 
of the regime, tended to start off assembly sessions with declarations 
of the government's neglect of their constituencies' educational, 
transport, and social services needs. These criticisms did not affect 
voting patterns, however. 37 
8adu deputies are, on the one hand, very sensitive to the demands of their 
constituencies while, on the other, they are sharply aware of their special 
relationship with al Sabah. The balance between the two requires that 
sometimes they join in, at least in the rhetoric, with the opposition in the 
assembly. 
6.5 Issues that Dominated the National Assembly 
The fifth National Assembly was described as an assembly with "no spice", 
primarily due to the absence of the traditional vocal opposition and the presence 
J6 Huda Mitalks ... Al-tajruba al-dimuqratiya fi al-kuwayt". (Democracy Experience in Kuwait) al-si vasa 
al-duwaIiya. (Cairo: Issue N. 120. Aprial, 1990.) p. 28-29. 
37 J. E. Peterson The Arab Gulf State: Steps Toward Political Participation. (New York: Praeger. 1988). 
p.57. 
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of a large number of pro-government deputies.38 However, that did not prevent 
the assembly from engaging in tough debates and adopting challenging 
positions to the government. An example of this was the draft of the proposed 
amendments of the Constitution. The government had a hard time convincing 
the assembly of these amendments, and opposition to it became so widespread 
that the government retreated on the matter. Another serious issue that caused 
some heated debates in the assembly was the collapse of Souq al Manakh, the 
unofficial stock market. The following is a detailed discussion of some of these 
issues that concerned the assembly. 
The passing of laws: During the period of absence of the National Assembly, 
the government decreed a large number of laws and by-laws. The first task of 
the fifth assembly was to look at these laws, in addition to the draft amendments 
of the Constitution that was favoured by the government. On the issue of the 
various pieces of legislation decreed by the government the assembly 
performed submissively and endorsed practically all the 461 Amiri laws and 
decrees except a handful, in order to show some symbolic opposition. 
Among these laws which the assembly had endorsed included the new election 
law which elicited a lot of criticism during the campaign stage of the election. 
Criticisms centred on the fact that 
such bold procedures tampered with democracy and undermined 
Kuwait's electoral procedures and laws as well as the law favoured 
tribal, sectarian, familial and religious sect at the expense of 
platforms and the merits of candidates.39 
The passing of that law by the assembly sealed the fate of the assembly in 
future years. Such a law undermined the very idea of creating a national 
institution where deputies could consider the interests of their constituencies but 
not focus with a such clear cut basis of tribe, sect and family affiliations. Such 
divisions in the assembly also undermined its effectiveness and enhanced the 
38 Interview with Mohammad Alhajeri, Kuwait, November, 2002 
39 Sh" . ""83 AI- aye]l, Op.CIt. p . .;,. . 
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power and authority of the executive. More importantly, if the assembly 
appeared to be ineffective, it would be much easier for the people to lose faith in 
it and even its existence would become for less crucial to them, which is 
something that would serve the ruling family very positively. 
On the issue of the amendments of the Constitution, the assembly proved to be 
far less accommodating for the government. As mentioned before the special 
committee that was formed to study the proposed amendments of the 
Constitution rejected aI/ suggestions. An extended and heated public debate 
ensued concerning these amendments. Seminars and panels were sponsored 
denouncing them, while educating the public about the dangers that were 
inherent in these amendments should they be accepted. Nationalist 
publications and nationalist leaders took it upon themselves to analyse and 
publicise the dangers of the amendments. AI Tali'a published a critical, in-depth 
analysis of the ramifications of these amendments if they were to be approved, 
and al Watan also denounced the amendments. Ahmad al Khatib and Jassim 
al Qitami, in their respective capacity as the chairman of the National Coalition 
and the Chairman of the Democratic Coalition, co-authored a letter addressed 
to the National Assembly. In that letter they explained in depth the perils they 
perceived in the proposed amendments. They particularly emphasised that the 
Constitution: 
was not a gift from the ruling family, or a reward to the people, but 
was the most important accomplishment of al/ Kuwaitis, and it came 
as a natural evolution of Kuwaiti society and its dedication and fierce 
fight for years to achieve such freedoms. 40 
As indicated by al Shayeji, the totality of the amendments to articles 50, 65, 66, 
69, 71,73, 80, 83, 87,91,95, 100, 101, 104, and 112 of the Constitution 
would have stripped the National Assembly of its Constitutional 
legislative power to initiate bills, to override the Amir's veto, to 
function as a safeguard and defender of Kuwait's rights and 
freedoms, and to operate as a check and balance by quizzing, 
40 . , . 71 79 AI-MunIS, Op.Clt. p. - . 
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questioning, and holding the government responsible and 
accountable for its actions. The National Assembly would have been 
intimidated and become and ineffective rubberstamp institution with 
only a fa9ade of power and legitimacy. The government strategy 
was to keep the National Assembly functioning as ineffectively as 
possible, to give the impression that Kuwait has a National 
Assembly. In truth, they wanted the National Assembly in complete 
submission to the government. 41 
In 1982, the assembly voted on the principle of amending the Constitution; 37 
voted in favour while 27 opposed it. The issue dominated the discussions of the 
assembly for about eight months. In the end, the assembly agreed to submit 
the issue to the National Assembly's legal and Constitutional committee for a 
final decision. The government realised the extent of the opposition to the 
amendments and in May 1983 it withdraw the decree from the assembly to 
avoid an inevitable defeat. A defeat would mean that the bill would be openly 
debated in the assembly item-by-item, and the government wanted to evade 
such a high risk debate focusing on the controversial amendments.42 The 
government gave the following as its justifications for the withdrawal: 
The national interests of the country impel us to postpone the 
discussion on revising the Constitution so that the MPs will have 
enough time to study the issue. The pressure of the public opinion 
forced the Assembly to reject the decree. Therefore the Government 
realised the folly of discussing the issue in such an atmosphere. 43 
In fact, the government showed a total retraction on the matter. The crown 
prince, and prime minister, during an interview said, the government has no 
intention to amend any article of the Constitution, and the amendment 
procedure is clear and is stipulated in accordance with Article 172.44 This 
41 AI-Shayeji, op.cit. p. 299. 
4~ Majles AI- 'uma. Halat hul al-barlaman. (Case of the Dissolution of the Assembly). Published by 
Kuwait National Assembly, 1999. p.20. 
43 AI-Qabas Newspaper. Kuwait, 7. May 1983. 
« I Sh·· . '99 A - ayeJl. Op.Clt. p. - . 
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statement supports the stance taken by those who from the start saw the 
government proposal as unconstitutional. 
The failure to revise the Constitution jeopardised the government's ability to 
sign the Gulf Security Agreement. The Kuwaiti interior minister was forced to 
admit that the present agreement conflicts with our Constitution. Kuwait is 
unable to sign the agreement unless some of its articles are changed.45 
Although it was the strength of public opposition to the amendments that forced 
the government to retreat, some deputies thanked the government, giving it 
some credit. Such action gave credence to the belief, prevalent among most 
Kuwaitis that the assembly was a gift from the Ruler and hence, it can be 
dissolved at his discretion rather than it being a constitutionally guaranteed 
institution. 
Women's rights: Women's political rights were first put on the agenda of the 
National Assembly in 1971, during the first Kuwaiti women's conference to be 
held in Kuwait, under the auspices of the Society for the Advancement of the 
Family. The conference presented a petition to the assembly demanding 
political rights in addition to presenting an ambitious programme of social 
reform. The arguments presented about the right of women to vote were based 
on their Constitutional right as the Kuwaiti Constitution stipulated that the 50 
members of the National Assembly shall be elected directly by universal 
suffrage and secret ballot in accordance with the provisions presented by 
Electoral Law.46 
This Constitutional right has been denied for women by the election law, which 
limits the right to vote for only Kuwaiti males. This is in violation of the principle 
presented in the constitution of universal suffrage. The petition emphasised 
other equal rights for women, including employment in all fields, equality with 
promotion, attainment of higher positions, child support and - most 
controversially - the request to restrict polygamy. The latter point was done by 
asking for the second marriage contract to be signed in court and therefore, 
.1' Jerkhi, op.cit. p. 406. 
46 Haya.AI-Mughni, Women in Kuwait: The Politics of Gender. (London: Dar Al-Saqi Books 1993).p.83. 
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barring the husband from gaining child support for his second marriage if his 
first wife had a child.47 The reaction to the equal rights bill was to shelve it for 
almost two years before they, considered it, in 1973. Its consideration caused a 
stormy debate in the assembly, and created a confrontation described as 
follows: 
The tension reached a climax .... when the speaker declared a ha/f-
hour recess in a bid to bring order back to the House, which had 
plunged into complete chaos. Supporters and opponents of the bill 
exchanged the most hurtful charges ever heard in the Assembly. 
The recess, instead of calming tempers, increased them because the 
two groups fought it out in the 10unge.48 
The bill's supporters (the nationalists and a few liberal merchants) argued that 
Islam did not forbid women from political participation and that there was no 
contradiction between Islamic values and heritage and women's political 
participation. However, opponents of the bill focused more on debating the 
issue of polygamy more than the right to vote. The assembly avoided voting on 
the bill and the debate ended with bitter resentment between deputies, pOlitical 
rifts and total confusion as to how to define and circumscribe the rights of 
women. 49 
The second occasion on which the assembly was faced with this controversial 
matter was ten years later in 1981, when deputy Ahmad al Takhem proposed a 
bill to amend Article (1) of the election law to include women voters, while at the 
same time restricting Article (19) of the election law to bar women from holding 
office. This is the position taken by some Islamic groups mainly the Muslim 
Brothers, in contrast to the Salafiyyin and conservative lulama. The Muslim 
Brothers argued that Islam forbade women to rule but did not exclude them 
from politics. Thus, one Islamic deputy put the case forward during the debate 
in the assembly by declaring: 
·17 Ibid .. p.82. 
48 Kuwait Times. 2. December 1973. 
49 AI-Mughni. op.cit. p.86. 
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The Islamic movement in this country will grow because all those 
who are calling for liberties and national issues are members of the 
Islamic trend. Therefore, if we allow women to participate in political 
decisions, this mean the political growth of the Islamic movement. 50 
The Muslim Brothers saw a political advantage and expedience in allowing 
women to vote. The potential impact of women voters would be considerable, 
since women constitute 52 percent of the Kuwaiti citizens, and the majority are 
from either conservative or badu backgrounds. The debate that ensued on the 
issue was unlike the previous one in the fact that it was smooth and finally a 
vote was taken on January 1982. The result showed an incredible opposition to 
grant women the right to vote. The Islamic deputies with support of their 
conservative badu deputies were able to defeat the bill 27 votes against only 7 
in favour, with 16 abstentions.51 
Women organisations in Kuwait lacked a consensus on the issue and the 
elements of conservative women in Kuwaiti society had gradually become more 
organised since early eighties. This was manifested in the formation, in 1981, 
of the first religious organisation for women, Bayader al Salam, which was 
supported by Yousef al Rifaa'y the wealthy merchant, who led the opposition 
movement of the equal rights bill in the early seventies in the assembly.52 
Another religious organisation, supported by the government, was established 
as a counter force to the Bayadar. In 1982, the Islamic Care Society was set up 
and was headed by the Crown Prince's wife, Latifa Fahed al Salem al Sabah. 
The aim of the organisation was to stress Islam but also emphasise national 
identity and loyalty to the state, in contrast to Bayadar which emphasised on 
people's loyalty and obedience to God alone. 53 The growth of the women-
50 Nurya AI-Sidani. Al-masira al-tarikhiya Ii hugug aI-mar' a al-kuwaytiya 1971-1982. (The Historical 
progress of Women's Political Rights, 1971-1982). (Kuwait: n.p.1983), p.162. 
51 Ibid .. p.162. 
52 AI-Mughni, op.cit. p.96. 
53 Ibid .. p.105. 
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Islamists trend rendered the lobbying of women to join their cause as rather 
ineffective, as liberal women are a very small minority group in Kuwait and the 
rise of women's religious organisation's was in harmony with the rise of the 
Islamist tide in general in the Kuwaiti society. Divisions based on class and 
ideology has played a decisive role in women's movements in Kuwait, by 
weakening their support and prolonging the disenfranchisement of women. 
During the eighties, liberal, educated, middle class women were drawn during 
into the religion based-women's organisations and moved away from the more 
secular and Liberal oriented ones.54 
After the defeat of the bill, a petition signed by 1,000 women was sent to the 
deputies in order to thanking them. The petition stated that: 
True believing women support the rejection of the bill and disapprove 
of any debauchery. We ask that the debate on the matter be closed 
for ever ... we all hope that our country will be secure and that 
women's rights will be maintained in accordance with our respected 
Shari'a. 55 
On the other side of the debate, those women who were infuriated by the 
rejection of the bill sent a complaint to the deputies wrote articles on the issue 
and organised seminars to discuss the issue. When their complaint was 
addressed in the assembly, in Feb 1982, a group of them attended the 
discussion to show their annoyance and their determination to follow the issue.56 
In the early eighties the government appeared to be in favour of granting 
women the right to vote. In 1980, Crown Prince, and Prime Minister, Salad al 
Abdullah al Sabah, stated in a televised speech that 
54 Ibid., p.96. 
55 Ahmad AI-Qatan. AI-mar'a fi ai-islam. (Women in Islam). (Kuwait: Maktabat al-sindus, 198,). 
56 AI-Mugnai, op.cit. p.144-145. 
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the time has come to take note of the position of Kuwaiti women and 
their effective role in society, and put forward the matter of the vote 
for study and discussion. 57 
Perhaps the bill of 1981 took its cue from this statement. However, it became 
very clear that the Islamist and conservative element in the society is strongly 
opposed to such a move, including a large proportion of women. 
Souq al Manakh collapse: The third issue that caused a heated debate in the 
assembly was the financial collapse of Souq al Manakh, the unofficial market for 
stock trading, named after the building in which the trading took place. Souq al 
Manakh stock trading developed in Kuwait following the huge growth of oil 
income and the simultaneous development of a large financial sector. The 
initial boom of stock trading occurred in the seventies until the 1977 crash, 
when prices fell and many traders and merchants faced bankruptcy. The 
government responded by bailing them out and, in consultation with the 
Chamber of Commerce, introduced a regulated stock market where, among 
many other restrictions, it restricted the trading in companies registered outside 
Kuwait. As Crystal points out, it was the success of government measures that 
led to the development of the unofficial market that dealt chiefly with companies 
owned by Kuwaitis, but were registered outside Kuwait and which lacked both 
records and assets.58 In other words, many of the traded companies existed 
only on paper. 
This situation was further exacerbated by the manner of in which the market 
operated, which was based on forward dealings; buying stock with postdated 
cheques that were traded at premiums reaching 400 percent.59 Several factors 
contributed to the collapse of the Souq: the economic situation showed signs of 
contracting; the Iran-Iraq war; reduction of oil revenues; and the tightening of 
local credit. However, the crash itself was triggered by something that was 
57 The Middle East, October. 1985. p.9. 
58 Jill Crystal. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995).p.98. 
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totally unexpected - the bouncing of a cheque by Jassim al Mutawwa, one of 
the eight big dealers involved in the Souq.60 
The investigation of the Souq revealed that 28,861 cheques existed with a total 
value of KD26.6 billion ($90.8 billion), but with cross-debts cancellation, their 
value was reduced to $40 billion. 61 An extremely significant amount, more than 
two thirds of the debt was held by eight or nine major dealers with Jasim al 
Mutawwa accounting for half of that.62 The others included Muhammad al 
Ibrahim, Ahmad al Kandari, Basil al Asta, Zayad al Mutawwa', Abdullah 
Muhammd Kabazad, Najib al Mutawwwa' and Humud al Jabri - a member of the 
assembly.63 The assembly laid the blame for the crisis squarely on the 
government and demanded immediate intervention to solve the crisis. The 
religious groups found an opportunity to attack the government on religious 
grounds. The editor of al Mujtama'the mouthpiece of the Muslim Brothers in 
Kuwait wrote: 
Souq al Manakh is a gambling table. This market has made Kuwait 
live for the past five years in a state of financial psychosis. Now the 
fable ethics of the Kuwaiti market have co/lapsed ... Souq al Manakh 
has damaged the religious, social and educational life of this country. 
People have found it easy to do what is prohibited in a religious 
society, which they used to refrain from. 64 
The debate in the assembly centred on decree Act No. 57/1982, which was 
passed while the assembly was in recess. It was presented for approval when 
the assembly reconvened on 5 October 1982.65 One of the major problems with 
the act is that some deputies found it unconstitutional, since it disregarded their 
60 Crystal, 1995. op.cit. p.98-99. 
61 Peterson, op.cit. p.48. 
62 Crystal. 1995, op.cit. p.99. 
63 Fida Darwiche. The Gulf Stock Exchange Crash, The Rise and Fall of the Souq AI-Manakh. (London: 
Croom Helm. 1986) p.107. 
64 Ibid., p.99-100. 
65 Ibid., p.W8. 
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right of litigation before the judicial authority. They argued, including the deputy 
speaker that the Act was only issued to protect major investors as it seemed to 
ignore small scale investors, as it stopped criminal and judicial procedure 
against those that had drawn the cheques.55 Thus, it shifted the burden onto 
those who were left holding the cheques without having the right to apply to 
court in order to secure them. One deputy asked for the resignation of the 
Minister of Commerce, Jassim al Marzuq, due to the inability of the ministry to 
act effectively and speedily to resolve the crisis.57 
The deputies, in their lengthy discussion of the Act, focused on four specific 
points: the necessity to grant the right of litigation to the holders of cheques; the 
preservation of the Constitutionality of any solution; the safe guarding of the full 
rights of citizens; and the application of severe penalties to manipulators and 
others involved in the crisis. 58 In the end, the government and the assembly 
agreed to find a compromise formula to supplement the act and the law was 
finally approved, together with the government's decision to set up a fund, to be 
used as a safeguard for small investors and enable them to recover their 
money.59 
The assembly was angered by another unconstitutional procedure taken by the 
government against one of its members and Hamud al Jabri, one of the major 
debtors in the Souq. The government stripped him of his parliamentary 
immunity in order to allow the Board of Arbitration to confiscate his property and 
forbade him from travelling abroad. The assembly suspended this action, since 
it was unconstitutional and issued the following statement: 
Having seen the procedures taken against a member of the 
assembly during the official recession of the assembly and thereafter, 
the assembly renounces all unconstitutional procedure taken ... 1t 
stressed emphatically that such renunciation does not mean the 
66 Ibid., p.109-11O. 
67 Ibid., p.IIO. 
68 Ibid., p.ll O. 
69 Ibid. p. 111 
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defence of the member but that defence of the Assembly as their 
legislative authority and protector of the Constitution. The Assembly 
urges the necessity of observing duly laid Constitutional procedure in 
respect of the removal of immunity. 70 
The reluctance of the government to interfere and regulate the Souq was 
attributed to seeing the market as beneficial way to redistribute wealth among 
the Kuwaiti population. 71 Another reason was the involvement of members of 
the al Sabah family including Khalifa Abdullah al Sabah, Muhammad Khalifa al 
Sabah and Duaij Jaber Ali al Sabah. The Finance Minister, Abdallatif al 
Hamad, was among the few who wanted to see a tough response by the 
government leading to criminal proceedings and the imprisonment of those 
responsible.72 However, the government's position was the same as the 
suggestion of the Chamber of Commerce, to bail out investors and use 
arbitration boards.73 
This crisis, which had bankrupted many and affected small investors, damaged 
the reputation of Kuwait and its investment climate, and increased the state's 
role, which people such as al Hamad, had embarked upon reducing two years 
earlier. The liberalisation of the economy, by reducing the role of the state and 
expanding the private sector would be an effective way of reducing the power 
that al Sabah holds over the society and its citizens. Economic liberalisation 
can have some benefits to political participation if it is allowed to happen. There 
has been much talk in Kuwait about restructuring the economy but very little has 
actually happened. This could be due to the far too many vested interests by 
many different groups, with competition between those who depend on state 
employment and benefits, those who depend on state lucrative contracts and 
those who depend on the redistributive function of the state in general while, 
notwithstanding, the vested interests of the ruling family itself. 
70 AI-Watan Newspaper. Kuwait. 20 October 1982. 
71 Crystal. op.cit. p. 98. 
72 Ibid., p.98. 
73 Ibid., p. 99. 
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The crisis also presented itself as being an opportunity to re-establish the 
dominance of the old merchant group. As eloquently put by Crystal: established 
merchant families are eager for the stock market nouveau riche to be nailed to 
the wall. 74 The heavy involvement of the Chamber of Commerce and its 
cooperation with the government consolidated their position in the following 
years, as indicated by the protectionist policies that the government adapted to 
their own benefit.75 
6.6 Elections for the Sixth National Assembly 
Some considered that the elections for this assembly represented a new phase 
in the development of the election process, the political platforms, and the 
popular awareness of crucial political issues.76 The reason for this optimism 
was attributed to the type of candidates that the elections attracted. The 
majority of candidates were considerably younger than those in previous 
elections and they also brought with them the method of debates and seminars 
which are organised specifically to discuss issues inside diwaniwas and in 
electoral centres. Because of employing this new method, the number of 
candidates was around 231, which was much lower than in previous years, 
while the change in the members of the assembly was higher, at around 56 
percent. Only 22 members out of 45 candidates from the previous assembly 
won a seat in the 1985 assembly, while some veterans of the parliament won 
seats due to the influence of the diwaniwas.77 The educational level of 
candidates had also improved; around 54 percent of deputies held a university 
degree as compared to 40 in the previous assembly; see Table 6.2. 
74 Ibid., p. 100. 
75 Ibid., p.l00. 
76 AI-Maqamis, op.cit. p.76. 
77 Ibid., p.76-77. 
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Table 6.2 Educational Levels of Members of the Assembly during the Period 1963-1975 
National Assembly 
1963 
1967 
1971 
1975 
1981 
1986 
University Degree % 
18 
10 
34 
42 
40 
54 
High School & Below % 
82 
90 
66 
58 
60 
46 
Source: aI Bahranini, Factors Influencing Ruling Elites: Policies on Political Participallon in the State of Kuwait, Ph.D., University of Denver, 1988, p 262. 
The results of the election, as seen in table 6.3, was marked by a comeback of 
the nationalists capturing 5 seats, as compared to their total defeat in the 
previous election. According to 8aaklini three major factors facilitated such a 
win. Firstly, they ran only one candidate in their strongest districts. Secondly, 
in predominantly tribal districts, they ran a tribal candidate with strong liberal 
leanings. Thirdly, the opposition took advantage of the huge discontent of the 
Kuwaitis over the widespread of corruption in the government, which was 
coupled with the outcry over the collapse of Souq al Manakh and the 
government's handling of the matter.78 As for the rest of the political groups, the 
badu maintained their impressive presence by holding onto their twenty-seven 
seats, the Shi'ite and the Sunni religious groups maintained their four seats 
each, while the independents gained ten seats. 
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Table 6.3 The Distribution of the Seats In the National Assembly for the Election of 1985 
District 8adu Merchants Arab Nationalists Shl'lte Sunnl religious Groups Others Total 
1 st. 1 1 2 
2nd. 2 2 
3rd. 1 2 
4th. 2 2 
5th. 2 
6th. 1 2 
7th. 1 1 2 
8th. 1 2 
9th. 1 2 
10th. 1 2 
11th. 2 2 
12th. 2 2 
13th. 2 2 
14th. 2 2 
15th. 2 2 
16th. 2 2 
17th. 2 2 
18th. 2 2 
19th. 2 2 
20th. 2 2 
21st. 2 2 
22nd. 2 2 
23rd. 2 2 
24th. 2 2 
25th. 2 2 
Total 27 5 3 4 10 50 
Source: Calculated from data on election results available trom the Kuwaiti National Assembly 
6.7 Issues that Dominated the Sixth National Assembly 
With the return of the nationalists and the growing strength of the Islamists, this 
assembly proved to be very assertive and extremely vocal. Also the 
environment of the mid-eighties was more challenging in terms of the I ran-I raq 
war and the economic recession. Hence, there were a variety of issues and 
78 Baaklini. 1999. op.cit. p. 182. 
concerns that the assembly found itself embroiled with, which centred on the 
Souq al Manakh crisis and also government accountability as a result of 
widespread corruption in the country. 
The assertiveness of the assembly was grounded in the unexpected alliance 
between the nationalists and the Islamists, which managed to block government 
bills and sponsor legislation or resolutions against the government. They 
focused on the issue of corruption and accountability of the executive in general 
and exercised their right to question ministers including those belonging to the 
al Sabah family. 
The debate over Souq al Manakh continued to engage the assembly whose 
deputies were very unhappy about its financial settlement and persisted in the 
accusation of a cover-up by the government, because of the involvement of 
influential individuals. The opposition took a firm stand against the government 
having bailed the speculators of the Souq. They also exposed some of the 
wrongdoings of the Fund for the Relief of Small Investors, which was set up to 
compensate small investors who lost money in the crash. 79 One of the 
causalities of this exposure was the Justice Minister, Sheikh Salman al Du'ayj al 
Sabah. 
The assembly forced his resignation in May 1985, once it become apparent that 
his 14 year old son had been classified as a "small investor" and had received 
$4.5 million from the fund largesse.Bo It was the first time that a member of al 
Sabah was interpellated by the assembly, in a highly public and widely covered 
event by the media. Thirty-seven deputies went on record to oppose the 
minister, making his impeachment an assured eventuality.81 Sheikh Salman 
decided to resign to save face of al Sabah and the government. AI Sabah took 
that incident to be very damaging and humiliating to the authority of the family, 
while asserting the power of the assembly. However, beyond causing the 
79 Ibid., p.183. 
80 Peterson. op.cit. p. 49. 
81 AI-Shayeji. op.cit. p. 333. 
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resignation of the Justice Minister the assembly was unable to resolve the crisis 
and was criticised for that failure. 82 
The assembly sought question also the Oil Minister, Sheikh Ali. al Khalifha al 
Sabah, who was targeted because of the failure of the economic policy of the 
government in dealing with al Manakh debacle. He held the finance post jointly 
with Abd al Latif al Hamad, from September 1983 to March 1985, the critical 
period of dealing with the Souq crisis. AI Hamad resigned over the 
government's handling of the crisis. To avert further confrontation with the 
assembly the Oil Minister resigned shortly after the resignation of the Justice 
Minister. However, although his resignation was not accepted by the Prime 
Minister, this did not abate the ever increasing vocal criticism of the 
government. 
The other issue that returned to the discussions of the assembly was that of 
women's rights. The liberal/nationalist candidates during the election 
campaigns, were induced by women's groups to incorporate the issue of 
women's suffrage into their political platforms. Thus following the election, a 
group of deputies brought forward a bill to grant women the vote. In response 
to this bill, the internal committee of the assembly with (three of its five 
members being staunch opponents of women's vote) requested the Ministry of 
Awqaf and Islamic Affairs to rule on the matter. The ministry issued a fatwa 
declaring that the nature of the electoral process befits men, who are endowed 
with ability and expertise; it is not permissible that women recommend or 
nominate other women or men. 83 That quickly put an end to the issue. 
Another issue that caused uproar in the assembly was the debate over the draft 
law of the judiciary's independence sponsored by the assembly. The 
government's request to hold the session behind closed doors resulted with 
twenty-four deputies walking out of the session in protest. Although their 
absence did not affect the quorum needed to hold the session, it asserted the 
desire on the part of the deputies for openness, especially when the matter to 
be discussed was not an extraordinary case or pertained to the country's 
82 Ibid .. p.339. 
8~ . 59 
. Peterson, Op.Clt. p. . 
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security and national interests. The government insisted on a closed-door 
session to avoid further public embarrassment lest the assembly was able to 
pass the law and uphold the judiciary's independence.84 
On foreign policy issues the assembly took on outspoken stance by denouncing 
the I ranian escalation of the war and the US attack on Libya. The assembly 
issued a statement denouncing Iranian aggression because it constitutes a 
grave danger to the whole region and leaves the door wide open for foreign 
intervention. 85 Aid to Syria was another matter that caused huge embarrassment 
to the government, because of the insistence of the assembly to stop the aid 
because of Syria's involvement in Lebanon. 
In the midst of such increased pressure from the assembly to call the 
government to account over such issues, and the deteriorating internal security 
situation and growing external pressures - especially from Saudi Arabia - led the 
Amir to make his the decision to suspend the assembly. This suspension and 
its circumstances shall be the focus of the following chapter. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The above discussion suggests that al Sabah were forced to restore the 
National Assembly due to a combination of domestic and regional factors. The 
longer the assembly remained suspended the more dissatisfied and disgruntled 
Kuwaitis became and the more widespread the discussions become in the 
diwaniyyas, concerning the necessity to restore the representative system of 
government in accordance with the Constitution. The unleashing of Islamic 
fundamentalism as a result of the I ranian revolution increased the relevance of 
the assembly as an institution that can check the tide of Islamists. The mere 
presence of the National Assembly is of immense value to provide legitimacy to 
al Sabah, restore a balance between liberal/secular Kuwaitis and Islamists, and 
is a potent symbol of Kuwait's sovereignty and independence. 
84 AI-Shayeji, op.cit. p. 69. 
85 Ibid., p.14. 
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The eighties were not only a period of changing ideological tendencies in the 
region it was also a period of changing economic conditions and the end of the 
unprecedented boom era of 1973-1982. Thus, despite the change in election 
law and the dominance of loyal deputies, the fourth and fifth assemblies were 
vocal and highly critical of the government on many issues, but especially 
focused on economics. Government mismanagement, widespread corruption, 
and the immense wealth accumulated by the al Sabah family became constant 
targets for the opposition. Because of these serious issues to many Kuwaitis 
the assembly became the instrument through which al Sabah dominance can 
be curtailed and government mismanagement controlled. The seventies' 
relative indifference to the assembly has been replaced by an ever increased 
commitment to it. 
However, although the basis of the power and legitimacy of al Sabah has been 
undermined by the reduction of oil revenues and the decline in the oil market 
that did not necessarily translate automatically into political weakness. They 
have been able to suspend the assembly once more and amend or remove 
some articles of the Constitution without undermining or threatening their rule. 
Such ability attests to the fact that the fragmentation of Kuwaitis along sect, 
tribe and family affiliation, together with the dependency of the merchant 
community, the Kuwaiti badu and middle class Kuwaitis on the coffers of the 
government, make al Sabah the most relevant political force in the country. The 
opposition in Kuwait, either secular or religious, does not present itself as 
genuine alternative to al Sabah. What they aspire for is a share in the decision 
making process and holding the government accountable and being answerable 
to the deputies of the assembly. However, they have been unable to attain 
even that small concession. Its weakness stems from the division of the 
opposition on ideological grounds, its fragmentation along traditional lines of 
association as well as its total ineffectiveness when it comes to translating its 
strong rhetoric into influence on the policymaking process. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Second Suspension of the National Assembly and the 
Interlude before the Iraqi Invasion 
7.1 Introduction 
The second suspension of the National Assembly in 1986 confirms the vulnerability 
of the legislative branch of government to the executive and the persistence in 
difference in the vision of al Sabah and Kuwaitis of the function and purpose of the 
National Assembly. This gives credence to the view held by Sisson that 
legislatures must maintain sufficient autonomy and power, in order to be able to 
influence the course of policy-making. 1 The experience of Kuwait indicates that the 
overarching power of al Sabah have limited the value of the National Assembly by 
reverting to its suspension whenever its influence challenged the authority of the 
ruling family. The autonomy and power granted to the assembly by the 
Constitution appears not to be a sufficient protection against the power of the ruling 
family. 
As shall be seen from the discussion of this chapter, similarities between the first 
and second suspension of the National Assembly attests to the presence of this 
IRichard Sisson. "Comparative Legislative Institutionalization: a Theoretical Exploration". In Comparative 
Perspective (ed.). Allan Kornberg. (New York: David Mckay Company. 1973). 
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structural problem. However, Sheikh Jaber's decision to suspend the National 
Assembly indefinitely was a result of a radically changed economic situation and a 
more challenging domestic and regional environment, with opposition from 
assembly members and Kuwaiti citizens. The suspension, combined with the 
government's imposition of further restrictions on press and public freedoms, 
angered many Kuwaiti citizens and caused the development of what became 
known as the pro-democracy movement. This movement, led by members of the 
National Assembly, reflected the feelings of many Kuwaitis and the willingness to 
challenge the government. The growth and strength of the movement resulted in 
confrontations with the government and its security forces. Although on one level 
this represented a fundamental change in the relation between al Sabah and its 
citizens, on the other, the basic objective of opposition remained the sharing of 
power and not presenting itself as an alternative political force. 
The chapter shall discuss the development of this movement and its inability to 
force al Sabah to restore the National Assembly, which emphasizes that the root of 
this power struggle between the two organs of state power lies in the fact that al 
Sabah combines economic and political power together, by making society heavily 
dependent on the state. That gives the ruling family the ability to be unresponsive 
to either challenges or the demands presented by from its citizens. The second 
suspension of the National Assembly further undermined the institutionalisation of 
democracy in Kuwait while upholding the autocratic rule of al Sabah. 
The chapter shall discuss the period leading up to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait as 
it bears relevance to the study. The absence of a National Assembly during a 
critical period of high tension between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments removed 
from Kuwaiti citizens their right to participate in policies that have a direct impact on 
their livelihood and also the survival of their entire society. However, it is very 
difficult to assume that the outcome of the dispute might have been different if the 
National Assembly was part of the decisions that constituted the overall policy of 
Kuwait towards Iraq during that uncertain period. But, what can be noticed is that, 
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without a suspension, at least the chance would have be given to Kuwaiti citizens, 
through their deputies to debate and influence government policy. 
7.2 The Second Suspension of the National Assembly 
The Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber, on 3 July 1986, issued a decree suspending the 
National Assembly and four articles of the Constitution; 56 (3), 107, 174 and 181. 
When the cabinet resigned on 1 July, many Kuwaitis thought that the Amir would 
have formed another cabinet. As assembly member Ahmad al Rub'i confidently 
said, we expect a new government to be formed in harmony with the assembly.2 
The Amir's suspension of the assembly came as a surprise, perhaps because it 
was Amir Jaber who was responsible for the return to parliamentary life. The 
Amir's address to the nation provided ample examples of the similarities between 
the first and second suspension in terms of the rational reasons given to justify 
them. The Amir expressed his disappointment about the deteriorating situation 
between the assembly and the government in the following words: 
I waited long in the hope that the two authorities would be able to reach 
constructive understanding and dialogue to resolve these issues. 
However, the dialogue changed into arguments and rancour, and the 
articles of laws and bills became an exchange of weapons instead of 
cooperation in arms ... General issues were mixed with personal issues 
and debate became settlements of old scores or plans for new 
perception, and embodiment of stands aimed at propaganda rather than 
information, slandering rather than rectification. 3 
Then he moved on to accuse the assembly of practicing a misguided and distorted 
democracy, which he suggests has intensified divisions in Kuwaiti society and 
undermined the stability and unity of the country. He emphasized that democracy 
means foremost the stability and unity of Kuwait and reminded Kuwaitis of what 
2 Nadim Jaber. "How Democracy went up in Smoke". The Middle East. (1986). p.l4. 
3 The Amiri address by the Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah on 3n/1986. 
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happened to Lebanon, without mentioning the country by name. To that effect he 
declared: 
I have seen the picture of democracy shaking, and the practice slipping 
away, taking with it social conduct and norms, and the cohesion inherent 
in Kuwaiti society disintegrating with it. Responsibility is in disarray and 
has been struck by many hands, and the citizens do not know anymore 
who is responsible for the events which are taking place ... Democracy in 
our opinion is that Kuwait should exist first of all, and we are at its 
service, protecting it with our bodies and souls ... Look what has 
happened to others. Look how dissensions were able to blow up 
countries which were secure and calm and whose livelihood came in 
plenty from everywhere. This is what they have tried to carry out by 
breaking up the Kuwaiti ranks. 4 
The Amir also criticized the interference of the National Assembly in foreign affairs, 
which brought animosity with some Arab states. He indicated that the assembly 
had forgotten the limitation imposed on Kuwait in its dealings in the region, by 
indicating that: 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
We are not content with Kuwait's internal problems, which on their own 
are capable enough of exhausting all efforts, but we have also entered 
into external battles, which are not compulsory for us. Through them we 
have created unnecessary animosities, and some of us have begun to 
say whatever we want to whoever we want, forgetting or pretending to 
forget the size, capabilities, heritage, and interests of Kuwait. Do we 
need all these open fronts? 5 
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The Amiri decree emphasized the seriousness of the internal security situation in 
Kuwait, which was directly related to the Iran-Iraq war, and raised the importance 
of internal unity and stability of Kuwait. In a way, it can be argued that such 
importance can be used to justify sacrificing the assembly and suspending four 
articles from the Constitution: 
The country has faced many ordeals and harsh conditions that it has 
never experienced al/ at once before. Thus, its security was exposed to 
fierce external plots, which threatened souls and almost destroyed the 
resources of this nation and the source of its livelihood. The flames of 
war raging between its two Muslim neighbours have almost reached its 
borders. And it has faced a strong economic crisis. And instead of 
efforts coming together, and al/ parties cooperating in order to contain 
these crises, opinion was divided, and blocs and parties emerged which 
have led to the shattering of national unity and to interruption of work to 
the pOint where the Council of Ministers has become unable to continue 
its task. 6 
The suspension of the four articles freed the Ruler, as was done in the previous 
suspension, from any Constitutional obligations and from any restriction on his 
power and the power of the executive. It also indicated that the Amir intended a 
prolonged suspension of the assembly. Once more in the name of unity and 
stability, political participation was eliminated and some important articles of the 
Constitution were put on hold. In addition, the government followed the 
suspension by applying strict press censorship and for the first time officials from 
the Ministry of Information sat in at each newspaper office, in order to monitor the 
articles written by journalists. 
However, despite the similarities in the manner and reasons of the first and second 
suspensions, this time the suspension was not accompanied by a commitment 
from the government for its future restoration and, more importantly the general 
6 Ibid. 
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mood of deputies and Kuwaitis was far more combative. Before discussing the 
development of the pro-democracy movement in the wake of the suspension of the 
assembly, the following section looks at the overall regional and domestic factors 
that played a role in the Amir's decision. 
7.3 Regional and Domestic Factors Behind the Suspension 
The Amir's explanations for the suspension of the assembly have concentrated on 
the terms of national interest and security and for the sake of maintaining the 
cohesiveness of the society as a whole. However, on the domestic front what was 
really at stake was the assertion of the authority of the assembly by its deputies, 
which has brought them in direct conflict with the ruling family. Perhaps as one 
nationalist deputy put it, we ignored the political reality of the system and of the 
Gulf, and allowed our gains to be lost in a single blow, we should have calculated 
that this was bound to happen. 7 Thus, more than anything it was the assertion of 
the right to participate in the decision-making process and to influence government 
policies that resulted in the dissolution of the assembly. It is this basic structural 
problem in the relation between the assembly and the legislative that was the 
source of contention and conflict between the two state powers. This can also 
explain the difficult and strained relation between the government and the deputies 
despite the fact that citizenship and election laws allowed only the few and most 
loyal supporters of the government to participate in political life. 
The Amir was, at that time, angered and resented the assembly's involvement in 
foreign affairs; a domain that al Sabah considered to be exclusively theirs. One 
immediate result of the dissolution was that the government was able to avoid one 
sticky issue that it found very hard to push through the assembly over the past four 
years; aid to Syria.8 The assembly had been highly critical of Syria's role in 
Lebanon which caused a huge embarrassment for al Sabah. The tension between 
7 The Middle East, August 1986. 
8 Middle East Economic Digest. MEED, July 12, 1986. p. 17. 
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the government and the assembly reached its zenith when the assembly requested 
the formulation of a committee of deputies to look at the financial statements and 
records of the Central Bank. The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court, 
which approved the right of the assembly.9 This kind of accountability was 
unacceptable for the ruling family. Despite the powers granted to the National 
Assembly by the Constitution, al Sabah perceived the assembly more in the view 
of what the following assessment describes, as mentioned by al Naibari: 
Kuwait assembly is more a channel for opposition, criticisms and raising 
voices than a framework for contributing to political decision-making 
process and for guiding public policy. By saying that I do not mean to 
belittle the importance of the assembly, but to emphasize that the 
assembly is a great gain that all efforts must be exerted in order to 
maintain it and develop it. 10 
Not only the domestic situation was difficult, but the regional one was tense and 
unstable, and become fuelled by the Iran-Iraq war. AI Sabah felt vulnerable, and 
the assertiveness of the assembly on both domestic and foreign issues 
exacerbated that vulnerability. Pressure from Saudi Arabia was an influential 
factor in the decision to dissolve the assembly, as it had been in the previous 
dissolutions. AI Sa'ud were persistent in their disapproval of the assembly and 
Kuwait's experiment with parliamentary democracy, especially that the assembly 
continued to be very critical of the Saudi government and its dominance in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Ahmad al Rub'i commenting on the dissolution said that we 
are now really part of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 11 He was basically suggesting 
that Kuwait bowed to the pressures from other Gulf states, primarily Saudi Arabia, 
and also that they were all equally as undemocratic as Kuwait. 
9 Rashid Radi. Hall majlis al-'umma w-al-haraka al-dusturiya. (The Dissolution of the National Assembly 
and the Constitutional Movement). (Beirut: n.p., 1992).p. 16. 
10 Mufid AI-Zaidi. Al-tayyarat al-fikriya fi al-khalij al-'arabi,1938-1978. (Intellectual Trends in the Arab 
Gulf 1938-1971). (Damascus: Arab Unity Centre, 2000).p.138. 
11 Middle East Economic Digest, MEED. July 1986. p.17. 
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Saudi Arabia tried to undermine Kuwait's democratic experience through the Gulf 
Security Agreement. Some parts of the agreement contradicted some of the 
articles of the Kuwaiti Constitution. That meant that Kuwait needed to revise the 
Constitution in order to sign the agreement and that is exactly what al Sabah 
attempted to do. However, the agreement was seen by a large segment of Kuwaiti 
citizens as being very dangerous to parliamentary experience and limited freedom 
in general, in throughout Kuwait. Some of the articles of the agreement prohibited 
any criticism of the ruling regimes in the Gulf and prohibited citizens of the GCC 
from interfering in the public affairs of the council, while giving the council the right 
to detain suspected persons without a trial for an unspecified period of time. The 
agreement went as far as demand that universities and other cultural centres must 
inform all six members of the Council before holding conferences, and that these 
countries must share and exchange information on actual or potential dissenters. 12 
In other words: the agreement was specifically designed to minimize political 
freedoms in Kuwait. 13 
Public reaction in Kuwait was strongly against the agreement and several meetings 
were organized to warn against its dangers. The press, the National Union of the 
Kuwaiti Students, the General Union of Kuwaiti Workers, plus the social and 
cultural centres, all spoke vigorously against the agreement and those who were 
pressurizing Kuwait to sign it. The National Assembly deputy, Abdul-Mohsen 
Jamal, when criticizing the agreement, indicated how a security pact failed to 
mention the external dangers facing the Gulf sates, while perceiving danger to be 
coming from the people of these states. 14 He emphasized that the treaty had been 
designed to crush those who might speak against corruption and misuse of 
authority in the Gulf region. 15 Another deputy, A. al Nifisi, said that the agreement 
12Jasem Mohammad Jerkhi. "The Electoral Process in Kuwait: A Geographical Study". Ph. D, thesis, 
University of Exeter, 1984. p.391-392. 
13 Ibid., p.393. 
14 Ibid., p.511-512 
IS Ibid., p. 512 
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was made to protect the Governments from their people. 16 Because of such 
strong opposition, the Kuwaiti government was unable to make the necessary 
changes to the Kuwaiti Constitution, which would have allowed it to sign the 
secu rity pact. 
The regional instability combined with what appeared to be an overwhelming 
domestic wave of resentment, anger and criticism against the government exerted 
huge pressure on al Sabah. In return they blamed the atmosphere of opposition in 
the country on the boldness of some deputies and the openness of debates in the 
National Assembly, ignoring the fact that the Kuwaiti people and the assembly 
were angered and concerned over concrete issues such as the widespread 
corruption and the government's mishandling of Souq al Manakh and their obvious 
attempts to undermine the Constitution. 
The reaction of Kuwaitis to the suspension was qualitatively different than it was 
during the first suspension. The reason for that was that the eighties had 
presented a far more difficult period, especially economically. The wealth and 
prosperity of the seventies was unparalleled. This time round people were 
extremely resentful of the huge income gap between al Sabah on the one hand 
and the rest of Kuwaitis on the other, and among Kuwaitis themselves, as well as 
being highly critical of the widespread corruption and mismanaged state of the 
economy. All these factors played a role in creating a different response to the 
suspension. 
Following the announcement of the dissolution, members of the opposition bloc; 
Islamist and nationalist deputies in the assembly, issued a statement requesting 
the government to reconsider its decision. A year later a memo signed by 26 
deputies from the opposition bloc was presented to the Amir, reiterating their 
previous request. 17 This initial reaction was considerably muted. However, the 
continued suspension of the assembly resulted in a gradual growth of the 
16 Ibid .. p.512. 
17 Rashid. op.cit. p.19-20. 
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opposition movement emerging from different quarters of the Kuwaiti society. 
One of the most influential opponents of the dissolution were the merchants. They 
had seen their economic dominance being threatened by the expanding 
participation of the younger members of the ruling family in business activities, and 
viewed the assembly as an effective tool to ensure government accountability and 
enforce checks on the ruling family's ability to engage in improper practices. The 
merchants, subsequently, saw its restoration as a mean to check the extension of 
the pOlitical and economic power of al Sabah.18 The merchants, despite their huge 
influence and wealth, never presented themselves as an alternative political force 
to al Sabah. However, increased concentration of political and economic power in 
the hands of al Sabah motivated them to use the assembly as a tool to check that 
dominance but without threatening al Sabah's political power. 
Resentment by the Kuwaitis in general was increased by the accumulated 
evidence of mismanagement, corruption and incompetence of the government and 
the ruling family.19 Also education, urbanization and overall development of the 
society meant that people are less willing to accept autocratic rule. Thus, a 
combination of factors that reflected changes in the society produced what could 
be considered as the first grass root movement in Kuwait to restore the assembly 
and the Constitution. 
7.4 The Pro- Democracy Movement 
Political participation and power sharing arrangements between the ruling family 
and the people of Kuwait, as it was envisioned in the 1962 Constitution, became 
extremely important to Kuwaiti citizens, making it harder to justify the absence of 
the legislative or to pacify citizens, especially when the economic situation was 
very difficult. 
[8 Rashid. op.cit. p.64. 
[9 Abdo I. Baaklini. Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions. 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999). p. 185. 
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The end of the Iran-Iraq war, in August 1988, provided the Kuwaitis with the 
opportunity of reaffirm their commitment to democracy and revive their demands 
for the restoration of the assembly. Essentia"y, the continued suspension of the 
National Assembly; the many restrictions imposed by the government on press and 
freedom of expression; the build up of resentment and hostility towards the 
government's inability to curb the misuse of public funds, the entire Souq al 
Manakh debacle and such widespread spread corruption, all contributed to the 
surge in the demand for a return to the representative system of government. 
Merchants were joined by professionals, inte"ectuals, former assembly members 
and some government officials, leading to the development of a pro-democracy 
movement focused on the reinstatement of parliamentary life and restoration of the 
Constitution. 
Kuwaiti's civil associations (trade unions, business organizations, civic clubs, 
ethnic, religious, and professional groups) all played a crucial role in popularising 
and strengthening calls for the restoration of democratic life in Kuwait. 20 As 
indicated by Ghabra, it was parliamentary experience per se that gave these 
associations a role to play in the political process of Kuwait. He points out that: 
In the context of the emerging parliamentary experience, the 
associational groups gained legitimacy and influence. Debate within the 
parliament gave a special flavour to Kuwait's political culture which was 
characterized by an element of openness and willingness to air 
opposition publicly. 21 
Opposition from these associations has been regarded by the state in a similar 
light as to the opposition that emanates from parliament; as a challenge that might 
20 Shafeeq Ghabra. "Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: The Foundations of a New System" Middle East 
Journal. 45, no.:2 (Spring 1991): p. 199-215.p.199-200. 
21 Ib'd ")0" 1 ., p_ ~. 
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undermine al Sabah's traditional rule.22 The government attempted to limit the 
influence of civil associations on Kuwait's political process by passing several laws 
to restrict their freedom. In the wake of the 1976 dissolution of the National 
Assembly, the elected boards of some associations were dismantled and replaced 
by boards appointed directly by the government. The suspension of the National 
Assembly and several government restrictions affected the activities of many of the 
associations. However, it was these two factors eventually that galvanized Kuwaiti 
associations to lead a movement for the return of democratic life to Kuwait. They 
formed a representative committee of 45 members, hence the name of ''the forty-
five" group, in 1989, to coordinate activities. 
The committee of 45 was representative of all major political groups in the country 
except the Sunni religious groups. The group included eleven nationalists, five 
merchants, twelve badu, three Shi'ite and fourteen liberals. Its major task was to 
prompt Kuwaitis to sign a petition to the Amir calling for the restoration of the 
assembly and return to democratic life as guaranteed by the Constitution. They 
managed to gather thirty-five thousand signatures.23 The government ignored the 
petition and refused to meet the representatives of ''the forty-five" group. 
Coordinating the efforts among the various segments of Kuwaiti opposition led to 
the formation of a larger bloc known as the Parliamentary Bloc. 
The Parliamentary Bloc: The 45 committee was joined by another group of thirty-
two vocal members of the dissolved assembly, which included six nationalists, 
eight liberals, twelve badu, three Shi'ite and three Sunni Islamists. These two 
groups were formalized into a movement called the Constitutional Movement or 
more commonly known as the Parliamentary Bloc. In its first statement the 
movement declared that it was: 
22 Ibid., p. 199-200. 
23 Fahd 'Abdullah Al-Mudyris. (Al-Mudyris). Al-haraka al-dusturiya fi al-kuwayt. (The Constitutional 
Movement in Kuwait). (Kuwait: Dar al-qurtas, 2002).p. 23. 
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A popular Kuwaiti movement that includes al/ Kuwaiti citizens who 
believe in Constitutional legitimacy and the Kuwaiti Constitution as the 
legal frame for the system of government and legislation and as 
representing the foundations of the Kuwaiti society. 24 
In effect, the movement included all the political, ideological and religious 
affiliations in Kuwait; nationalists, leftists, Islamists (Sunni and Shi'ite) and 
independents. It was the first time that the Shi'ite participated in a popular 
movement with the Sunnis. As for the specific objectives of the movement, they 
included the following aims on their agenda: 
1. To regain Constitutional legitimacy. 
2. To hold parliamentary elections according to the existing election law. 
3. To defend the Kuwaiti Constitution and Constitutional legitimacy. 
4. To strengthen the separation of the executive, legislative and juridical 
authorities through a National Assembly that would represent the will of 
the people, and a national government that would be bound by the 
Constitution. 
5. To annul and amend the laws those violate and contradict the public 
freedoms which have been guaranteed by the Constitution. 
6. Raise public awareness and organise Kuwaiti citizens. 
7. The movement shall achieve its objectives through peaceful means. 25 
24 Ibid., p.23. 
25 Ibid .. p.23. 
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The refusal of the government to accept the petition caused, on the one hand, an 
embarrassment to the leaders of the movement, while, on the other, intensified the 
persistence of the Kuwaitis in their demands to restore the assembly. The 
government's staunch refusal to accommodate the demands of the pro- democracy 
movement led to the appearance of Monday Diwaniyyas. 
Monday diwaniyyas: The movement needed a place and a forum to discuss and 
make public its demands and their legitimacy. The diwanniyyas as the traditional 
meeting place of Kuwaiti males fulfilled such a need especially that it was exempt 
from the restrictions imposed on public meetings. These Monday meetings 
became a regular feature in a number of diwaniyyas across the country and a 
source of tension and worry for the government as thousands of citizens 
partiCipated. Many attendants were openly critical of the government and the 
political and informational effects of these gatherings were very positive. Some of 
these meetings were met with closures while others were dispersed by the 
government, such as incidents at al Jahara, Kyfan and Farwaniya which 
heightened the tension between the government and its citizens. 
AI Jahara incident: AI Jahara is a badu district and the pro-democracy movement 
intended to meet there to indicate that pro-democracy feelings are not exclusive to 
urbanised inner districts of Kuwaiti but extend to all areas and segments of the , 
population and especially to the outer districts inhabited primarily by badu. 26 
Around 5,000 Kuwaitis gathered in al Jahara and confronted the security forces 
that prevented them from reaching the diwaniyya.27 Although the government 
succeeded in preventing the main gathering from taking place much smaller 
different gatherings took place and were addressed by some deputies.26 
26 R h'd . 3' as 1 • Op.CH. p. _. 
27 AI-Mudyris. op.cit. p.29. 
28 Rashid. op.cit. p.33. 
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Kyfan gathering: The following meeting in the Kyfan area was distinguished by the 
huge number of attendants especially from the a/ Jahara area in defiance to the 
previous cancellation of their meeting.29 The government was ready with its special 
security forces and circled the diwaniyya so no one could reach it. 30 The gathering 
took place in a street near to the diwaniwa and dispersed peacefully following 
some speeches and the agreement on Farwaniya, an inner district of Kuwait as the 
place for the next meeting on the 22 January 1990.31 
The government on 20 January announced that the Amir would address the public 
that evening. The announcement came in the midst of the intensification of the 
tension between the government and its security forces and the pro-democracy 
movement. The government found itself in a position where it could no longer 
ignore the popular demands of its citizens nor depend on repressive means. 
However, the Amir's speech was seen by some as a great disappointment, since it 
emphasised security and stability of the country and called for opening a dialogue 
with the opposition in order to find a new formula to restore the democratic life and 
prevent a third relapse of democracy.32 The parliamentary bloc and its supporters 
and most of those involved in the pro-democracy movement were hoping for a 
more direct indication of the government's intention to restore the Constitution and 
the National Assembly. 33 
However, in light of what appeared to be an accommodating step by the 
government the movement decided to halt its Monday meetings and to use the 
scheduled meeting in Farwaniya to inform the people. 
29 Ibid., p.33 
30 Jasim Muhammad Karam. "Intikhabat al-majIis al-watani Ii 'am 1990: dirasa fi al-jughrafiyha al-siyasiya." 
(The Kuwait National Assembly 1990: a Study in Political Geography). Annals of the Faculty of Arts. \'. 7 ~. 
150. (Kuwait: Kuwait University, 1996). p.20. 
31 Rashid, op.cit. p.38. 
~~ K . 8 
. - aram, op.CIt. p. . 
:13 Rashid, op.cit. p. 14. 
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Farwaniya meeting: That meeting attracted huge numbers which were estimated to 
fall between 10 to 30 thousand. 34 The security forces closed entrances to the area 
and had a large presence, in addition to helicopters flying over the area and a 
number of military vehicles guarding the area.35 The movement denounced the 
methods of the government but realized the seriousness with which the authorities 
were intent on stopping such meetings. The movement also thought that halting 
the meetings would help by giving the dialogue with the government a chance.36 
I n a public statement the deputies stated that: 
in response to the Amir call for a dialogue and in accordance with our 
principle since 3 July 1987 of the need for dialogue, we have contacted 
the Amir requesting a meeting in order to open this dialogue for the sake 
of national interest. 37 
The dialogue lasted for three months. However, at the end of that period, the 
government made a move which totally ignored the popular demands of the 
Constitutional Movement, as they asked Kuwaitis to participate in the election of al 
maj/is al watani (the national council) as an alternative to the National Assembly for 
a transition period of four years. 
7.5 The National Council 
It came as a great surprise to many Kuwaitis that the Amir decided to ignore the 
strong feelings of Kuwaitis towards their National Assembly and to have opted to 
find an alternative to their constitutionally guaranteed representative body. The 
Amir made a speech on April 22 1990, which delineated the function of al majlis a/ 
watani as follows; 
34 Al-Mudyris, op.cit. p.3!. 
35 Rashid, op.cit. p. 14. 
36 Ibid., p.14. 
37 Ibid., p.43-44. 
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1. To evaluate the democratic experience of Kuwait and study the reasons 
for the lack of cooperation between the executive and legislative 
authorities. 
2. To propose appropriate measures, laws and regulations, in accordance 
with the spirit of Islamic Shari'a, to secure the nation's unity and future 
stability. The Majlis will conduct their investigations in closed sessions 
and report their findings to the Amir who, in turn, will pass it to the 
assembly. 
3. Discuss the bills presented by the government and present their opinion. 
The Majlis would have the right to present bills and pass them to the 
government. However, Laws would only be promulgated after the Amir's 
approval. 
4. The Majlis would have the right to question ministers and keep a check 
on the government. 
5. The Majlis would have the right to relay its concerns to the government 
who, in turn, must give reasons for failing to take these concerns into 
consideration. 
6. The Majlis would have the right to discuses the budget and to give its 
opinion on the matter.38 
The government followed that by the promulgation of the law of al maj/is at watani. 
The law makes it clear that the majlis is a mere consultative council with no 
legislative powers. Opinions differed on the Constitutional status and the validity of 
the Amiri decree, but political opposition to the majlis was very strong. The 
38 K . "')2 aram, Op.Clt.p. - . 
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Constitutional Movement categorically refused the idea of creating a al majlis al 
watani and also rejected the transition period, by emphasizing the following crucial 
points; 
1. The al majlis al watani and the transition period are unconstitutional, and 
violate the 1962 Kuwaiti Constitution. 
2. The law of the majlis would represent a parallel temporary Constitution 
aiming at replacing the 1962 Constitution. 
3. The responsibility given to the majlis would restrict it being just a mere 
consultative council. 
4. The majlis would be unable to act as a check on the executive since it 
would have no right to question ministers, or suggest a no confidence vote 
or form a committee to investigate matters relating to the executive 
branch. In other words, the majlis would have no right to hold the 
government accountable. 
5. The majlis would have no right to determine the budget, but would only be 
able to give an opinion. 
6. The percentage of appointed members in the majlis will be raised to half 
instead of the present ratio of one-third of the assembly. 
7. No procedures of parliamentary immunity of the members would exist. 39 
The Constitutional Movement, with support from the merchants and the Chamber 
of Commerce, issued a statement indicating their intention to boycott the election 
for the majlis, and asked others to join the boycott.4o A large number of civil 
39 AI-Mudyris. op.cit. p.34. 
40 Rashid. op.cit. p.69. 
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associations opposed the creation of the maj/is and the National Union of Kuwaiti 
Students called for the boycott of the election and the maj/is. In addition, a large 
group of influential Kuwaitis issued a statement indicating that any participation in 
the maj/is would be a violation of the rights of Kuwaiti citizens as guaranteed in the 
Constitution and announced the boycotting of the election.41 It is interesting to note 
that the eight prominent personalities from the Muslim Brothers who sent a letter to 
the Amir, dated as 19 May 1990, instead of opposing the very idea of the majlis, 
pleaded with him to shorten the period of the maj/is and speed up the calling back 
of the assembly in accordance with the Constitution in order to maintain national 
unity and the stability of the country.42 In contrast, the Constitutional Movement 
issued a statement calling the citizens to boycott the election, since participation in 
the creation of the maj/is would mean yet another four years of suspension of the 
Constitution and Constitutional democracy.43 
Despite this apparent large consensus that the majlis would be a violation of the 
Constitution, the government still went ahead with its plans. The election was held 
on 10 June 1990. The government estimated an electoral turn out was 62 percent 
- much lower than the 86 percent of the previous election.44 However, the 
Constitutional Movement suggested that the turn out was much lower at 42 
percent, and to obtain this estimate they had used official sources, from the 
Ministry of Justice and the Kuwait news agency.45 The government orchestrated a 
media blackout on all candidate numbers relating to the election, except the 
number of those who had won.46 Even if one was to accept the government 
statistics, in comparison with previous elections it was very low. For example, in 
1981 the turn out was 90 percent, while in 1986 it was 86 percent. Thirteen of the 
41 Karam, op.cit. p.26. 
42 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.36. 
43 Rashid, op.cit. p.69 
44 Ibid., p.70-71. 
45 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.40. 
46 Rashid, op.cit. p.69. 
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fifty elected deputies were former members of the National Assembly, whereas the 
rest were "political unknowns".47 This explains why the description of the slates for 
the election of al majlis al-watani was: dominated by taxi drivers, i.e. non-elite 
Kuwaitis from tribal backgrounds.48 
The success of the government plan in carrying out the election has been 
attributed to two major factors. The first was the cooperation and participation of 
the Islamist groups. According to al Mudyris the government obtained their support 
by appointing a group of young Muslim Brothers in leading positions with in several 
ministries and also in several councils, such as the Planning Council and 
Governorates' Councils. 49 The involvement of the Muslim Brothers in the Pro-
democracy movement was limited to the participation of their deputies, while 
refraining from participation in many of the different forms of protests that the 
movement called for, which aimed to push the government to retract from its plans 
to find an alternative for the National Assembly. 
The other factor was the participation of the badu. The turn out of voters in the 
outer districts of Kuwait was much larger than in the inner districts, because these 
districts were predominantly badu. 50 The government's influence in mobilising 
these areas was immense and it carried out an intensive campaign to lure the 
voters in these areas through promises and pledges to improve their life. The badu 
in these areas did not perceive the assembly as a supervisory authority to hold the 
government accountable, but more as an instrument to be used in order to provide 
the voters with services and respond to their needs. The matter of whether the 
council is Constitutional is secondary to their immediate day-to-day concerns. 51 
Discrepancies in the turn out between badu dominated areas and urban areas 
47 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.40-4I. 
48 Mary Ann Tetreault. "Kuwait's Democratic Reform Movement." \liddle East Executive Report 19:1 
October 1990). p.17 
~9 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p. 40. 
50 K °t 'J,., aram, Op.Cl 0 p. __ . 
51 d 0 0 fl 1 ') AI-Mu yns, op.CIt. p. -+ --+_. 
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were huge. For instance, in the urban area of the seventh district the turn out was 
only 35 percent while in the twenty second district, a badu area, it was more that 
78 percent.52 
The government also took some significant measures to ensure the success of the 
election such as the arrest for a few days of leading members of the pro-
democracy movement such as Ahmad al Khatib, Ahmad Baqar, Abdullah al Nifisi, 
Jassim al Qatami, Abdullah al Niyabari and Ahmad al Rub'i.53 For the first time in 
election history in Kuwait, the radio and television were used as means to publicise 
the election and encourage Kuwaitis to vote and to broadcast nationalist songs and 
carry interviews with supporters of the government.54 The authorities turned a blind 
eye to the practice of buying votes that was done publicly.55 The Constitutional 
Movement accused the government of resorting to rather menacing and ugly ways 
to force people to vote such as insinuating that one might lose a job or retired 
people might have their pension cut, while conscripts were forced to vote.56 
However, after the election, the pro-democracy movement did not take any more 
steps to oppose the majlis. Non-confrontation with the authority has characterised 
the relation between government and the opposition since the first maj/is of 1938. 
Every time there was an escalation of tension, the opposition refrained from a 
show down with the government. As indicated before the opposition in Kuwait 
does not seek to replace al Sabah rule or provide an alternative political force, as it 
is too fragmented and weak for that, and such a goal has not been on the agenda 
of any political group. 
As indicated by Gause, political activity in the Gulf states and demands for 
participation does not threaten the stability and security of these regimes, since: 
52 Karam, op.cit. p.18. 
53 Tetreault, op.cit. p.17. 
54 Ibid .. p.39-40. 
55 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p. 39-40. 
56 Rashid, op.cit. p.7l. 
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The demands... are phrased in the language of loyal opposition _ 
perhaps the word opposition is even stretching a point. But it is clear 
that the public in these countries wants more responsible government 
and greater participatory avenues. 57 
It is this factor that gives al Sabah comfort when it ignores the demands of its 
citizens, in the knowledge that there is not an alternative political force that will 
unite all Kuwaitis behind it and that the opposition will not cross a certain line. It is 
the fragmentation of Kuwaitis into tribes, sects and families that keeps al Sabah the 
most relevant force in the society and which skews the relation in favour of the 
executive despite all the Constitutional guaranties of power-sharing arrangements 
and balances and checks between the two most important state organs. 
The majlis, subsequently, convened for the first time on 9 July 1990, followed by a 
closed session on the 18 of the month to discuss the memo sent by the Iraqi 
government to the Arab League. The majlis rejected the I raqi accusations and 
denounced the Iraqi policy of threats and violence, but was interrupted by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The period leading up to the Iraqi invasion 
created confusion about the strength and the stability of the rule of al Sabah. It is 
possible to suggest that the absence of the National Assembly and the tension 
between al Sabah and the pro-democracy movement together with the imposition 
of the al majlis al watani on Kuwaiti citizens, led the Iraqi regime to see the 
domestic internal problems in Kuwait. This situation, combined with the stalemate 
in the peaceful negotiations for a settlement of the dispute between the two 
governments, was an ideal opportunity to be exploited. Saddam Hussein might 
have even thought that the invasion itself might be welcomed by the Kuwaiti 
population. 
57F. Gregory Gause. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States. (\'ew York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1994). p.118. 
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Some have argued that: while a democratic regime in Iraq would have restrained 
any aggressive tendencies, a democratic regime in Kuwait might have provided the 
personnel to deal with the situation more effectively. 58 The fundamental error made 
by the ruling family was their belief that Saddam Hussein would not invade but this 
raised the question of the government's competence, while the speedy fall of 
Kuwait itself, raised the question of such severe the lack of adequate contingency 
plan and the role of the military leadership.59 It is important in that context to shed 
some light on the period that lead up to the invasion. 
7.6 On the Eve of the Iraqi Invasion 
The period between the cease-fire with Iran in August 1988 and the Jedda meeting 
in July 1990 saw an escalation of hostility and tension on two fronts. The first, as 
discussed above was between al Sabah and the pro-democracy movement and 
the second was between Iraq and Kuwait. The first issue was resolved by al 
Sabah, by ignoring the Constitution and imposing on Kuwaiti citizens an alternative 
body to the National Assembly, through al majlis al watani, while the second issue 
ended up with a much worse consequence for Kuwait and the region as a whole. 
The geographical nearness, unresolved question of border demarcation and the 
unmistakable military imbalance in the relative strength of the two states made 
Kuwait an obvious pressure point for the Iraqi regime. so One might add that the 
internal situation of Kuwait also, played a factor in the Iraqi regime calculation, 
making them believe that Kuwaitis would welcome a change in the regime in 
Kuwait. 
58Gareth Kingdon. No Security without Democracy in the Gulf. 2nd ed. (London: Gulf Centre for Strategic 
Studies, 1991). p.39. 
59 Ibid .. p.39. 
60 Majdy Ali 'Ubaid. Al-mugaddima al-siyasiya li'l-ghazw. (political Preamble to the Invasion.) al-sivasa al-
duwaliya. (Cairo: Issue N. 102. October. 1990.) p. 18. 
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The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), responding to a glut 
in the world market, had laid down quotas for each member and set the price of oil 
at $18 a barrel. Kuwait and the UAE were openly flouting their quotas. For the 
debt burdened Iraqi economy, that translated into huge financial losses, since 
every single dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil, resulted in a $1 billion foreign 
currency loss.61 This led Saddam Hussein to demand an end to quota violations, 
an increase of Iraqi production and a price rise to at least $25 a barrel. 62 That 
angered the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein considered Kuwait's maintenance 
of its oil-production levels as tantamount to a Kuwaiti declaration of lIeconomic 
war". In reference to that he stated: 
War ... is also done by economic means. Therefore, we would ask our 
Arab brothers who do not mean to wage war - I am now speaking only 
as far as Iraqi sovereignty is concerned - I say to those who do not 
mean to wage a war on Iraq: This is in fact a kind of war against 
Iraq ... We have reached a point where we can no longer withstand 
pressure. 63 
Attempts to settle the differences between Kuwait and Iraq and solve the 
intensifying dispute over oil production were futile. Iraq decided to bring the matter 
before the Arab League for consideration and a memorandum was submitted by 
foreign minister, Tariq Aziz on July 15 1990, to the Secretary-General of the Arab 
League, reiterating the Iraqi list of grievances against Kuwait. Foremost among 
them was Iraq's accusation of Kuwait having carried out a deliberate policy to 
undermine Iraq in cooperation with United Arab Emirates, by glutting the oil market 
and exceeding their OPEC's oil production quotas. Iraq argued that this over 
61 Micah L.Sifry and Christopher Cerf (ed.). The Gulf Reader, History, Document, and Opinions. (New Yllrk: 
Times Books, 1991).p. 63. 
62 Ali Musallam . The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein his State and International Power Politics 
(London: British Academic Press, 1996).p. 94. 
63 Sifry, op.cit p.63. 
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production caused a reduction in the price of a barrel of oil from $18 to $11-$13. 
Consequently Iraq estimated it losses to be around $89 billion.54 
In response to this, Kuwait sent its own memorandum to the Secretary-General of 
the Arab League denying all of the Iraqi accusations. It reiterated its position that it 
had provided Iraq with massive financial and logistical support, and thus felt it had 
done enough to support Iraq and was not willing to concede more. However, it 
offered to discuss the demarcation of the frontier, which was rejected by Iraq 
because the frontier treaty of 1963 was not ratified by Iraq.55 Despite these serious 
differences, arrangement, through President Mubarak of Egypt, was made for a 
meeting between the two sides on the 31 July 1990, in Jedda. 
Prior to the scheduled Jedda meeting, Saddam Hussein summoned the US 
ambassador in Iraq, April Glaspie, for a meeting on 25 July 1990. The purpose of 
which was to establish an understanding between the two governments about the 
Iraqi situation and to find out the American position on the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute.66 
An open discussion took place about the price of oil. Saddam proposed a rise to 
$25 a barrel, since the drop in the price to $12 a barrel had resulted in a reduction 
in the income from oil of some six to seven billion US dollars.67 Glaspie's answer to 
that was: we have many Americans who would like the price to rise above $25, 
since they are from oil producing states. 58 Glaspie clearly showed sympathy to 
Iraq's need to maintain the price of oil at a certain level, which corresponded with 
American interests. Considering the tension in the region and the Kuwaiti-I raqi 
dispute, Saddam Hussein indicated to Glaspie that 
64 Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait. Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait: the Truth and the Tragedy. 
(Kuwait: 1990).p.55-65. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Khadduri, op.cit. p.l 02. 
67 Ibid., p.112. 
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We do not want war... but do not push us to consider war as the only 
solution to live proudly and to provide our people with good living. 69 
In response ambassador Glaspie indicated that: we have no opinion on Arab-Arab 
conflict, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. 70 The Iraqi regime must have 
mistook that to mean that the US administration would not interfere in its dispute 
with Kuwait, hence making the option of military action possible. However, Glaspie 
made it very clear to deputy foreign minister, Nizar Hamdoun, prior to her meeting 
with Saddam Hussein that the US: can never excuse settlement of disputes by 
other means than peaceful means.71 Glaspie was reflecting the State Department 
position set clearly in the American policy guidance on the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. 
The policy indicated that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means, not 
intimidation and threats of use of force; Second, the United States takes no 
position on the substance of bilateral issues concerning Iraq and KuwaiC2 Third, 
the policy stated the commitment of the United States to the free flow of oil and the 
independence and integrity of the Gulf countries. 73 Thus, there was no indication 
that the US will go along with Iraq in its plans to occupy Kuwait, and Glaspie's 
instructions were clear about stressing peace and cooperation. However, she may 
have failed to warn Iraq against the use of force in stronger terms. 74 
There was great optimism concerning the Jedda meeting which would be held with 
the objective of reviewing differences and making proposals for a settlement to be 
finalised at another meeting in Baghdad.75 Instead, a deadlock persisted in the 
position of the two governments as indicated by the separate statements made by 
69 Ibid., p.112. 
70 Musallam op.cit, p.95. 
71 Khadduri, op.cit. p.114. 
72 Ibid., p.109. 
73 Ibid., p.109 
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each side. The Iraqis indicated that we have not felt that the Kuwaitis are serious 
about redressing the grave damage inflicted on Iraq as a result of their recent 
behaviour and positions against Iraq's basic in te res ts. 76 However, Kuwaiti officials 
indicated that the talks had: collapsed because Kuwait did not give in to Iraqi 
demands to write off debts and to relinquish some of its territories. n 
Despite the failure of the Jedda meeting no one expected a full-scale invasion of 
Kuwait. Most potential scenarios expected a limited action such as the annexation 
of Ratga, or an attack on the islands of Warbah and Bubiyan.78 Iraq's full invasion 
of Kuwait caught the world by surprise, especially the unprepared Kuwaiti 
government and Kuwaiti military, despite the massing of Iraqi troops on the border. 
Initially, Iraq claimed that its troops marched into Kuwait in support of a domestic 
revolution and announced the formation of a provisional government. However, this 
pretence was dropped when an official declaration of the annexation of Kuwait 
came on 8 August. Events in the first week of the invasion moved very quickly and 
decisively by the Iraqi regime as well as the international community led by the 
United States. The UN Security Council passed resolution 660 in the first hours of 
the invasion demanding an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. This was 
followed by another 11 resolutions within a very short period of time, between 2 
August - 29 November 1990, leading to resolution 678 which authorises the US led 
coalition ''to use all necessary means" against Iraq.79 The subsequent liberation of 
Kuwait and the restoration of the al Sabah rule were based on that resolution. 
76 Ibid., p1l7. 
77 Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, op.cit. p.62 
78 Ibid .. p.62. 
79 Ibid .. p.80. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
The discussion above clearly reveals the constant tension between an assembly 
that carries out its functions and a ruling family that needs the legitimacy the 
National Assembly bestows on its rulership without the challenges that an effective 
and well functioning legislature produces. Because of the nature of the Kuwaiti 
opposition being peaceful and non-confrontational with the government, it is 
relatively easier for al Sabah to resort to unconstitutional methods. Part of this 
weakness of opposition stems from the fact that legitimacy of the al Sabah rules is 
never in question but it is the manner of their governance that has been under 
attack. In addition, all social groups in Kuwait depend heavily on the state and its 
redistributive function. Oil revenues are the basis of the strength of al Sabah rule 
and the source of the weakness of both the opposition and the assembly. This fact 
gives al Sabah security in their rule and allows it to extend the arm of repression 
and ignore the Constitution when it deems necessary in order to maintain the 
absolute power of the ruling family. Despite this dependency Kuwaiti citizens have 
not been completely passive and accepting of the autocratic rule of al Sabah. On 
the contrary the constant tension between the assembly and the government is a 
sign that a more dynamic relation exists between the state and society. Opposition 
in Kuwait is ineffective but it is also not passive, which leaves open the opportunity 
for a change in the system. 
The regional environment in the Gulf adds further pressure to the already delicate 
relation between al Sabah and the assembly. Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi 
Arabia, have seen the Kuwaiti experience as a threat to their autocratic rule, hence 
their desire to suppress the Kuwaiti experience. One can easily say that the lack of 
accountability and participatory system of governance in Arab Gulf states is, by 
itself, a restraining factor for the development of Kuwaiti democracy. The prelude 
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated the disastrous consequences of this 
lack of democratic political systems in the region. 
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On the one hand there was an Iraqi regime which was under massive political and 
economic pressure, while attempting to find a solution to its predicament and using 
all means at its disposal for that purpose. The eight-year war with Iran ended with 
a hollow victory and, more importantly, totally debilitated the Iraqi economy and 
created massive debt. The drop in oil prices further aggravated the Iraqi situation 
and directly influenced the country's income levels. On the other hand Kuwait's 
domestic situation was complicated by the absence of the National Assembly and 
the need of al Sabah to silence all criticism and any opposition to government 
policies. 
It is difficult to speculate whether, during the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, if 
the Kuwaiti National Assembly was actually functioning. However, one thing that is 
certain, is that it would have deprived the Iraqi regime with the pretext that they had 
come in support of a revolt in Kuwait against al Sabah. In addition, the domestic 
situation in Kuwait would not have been interpreted as being rife for a change in 
leadership and that the Kuwaitis would have not welcomed the I raqi regime to take 
over of their country. In that context, with Iraq targeting Kuwait was made far 
easier with the absence of democracy in both countries. That lesson was not lost 
on the Kuwaiti people, who made the issue of democracy and accountability of 
government a prime objective in the period of post-liberation. However, despite the 
loyalty and allegiance that the Kuwaiti people showed to their rulership, al Sabah 
still found it extremely difficult to change their autocratic ways, and the discussion 
in the following chapter will reveal the reasons why. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Representative System of Government in Kuwait Post 
Liberation 
8.1 Introduction 
Discussion of the circumstances of the return to the representative system of 
government in the period following the liberation of Kuwait is of particular 
interest because of its relation to the underlying argument of this study. AI 
Sabah, despite the inability to protect Kuwait and its citizens, remained the only 
relevant political force in Kuwait, which was reflected by the rallying of Kuwaitis 
behind the ruling family while they were in exile in Saudi Arabia. The Jedda 
conference, held in October 1990, saw a gathering of around one thousand 
Kuwaitis representing all Kuwaiti political groups which expressed their support 
and loyalty to al Sabah under the principle of: if we do not hang together, we will 
surely hang separately.1 It was this acknowledgement that there was no viable 
alternative to al Sabah that provides al Sabah such immense power and allows 
them to violate the Constitution, suspend the National Assembly and restrict 
freedoms without fearing any serious backlash from Kuwaiti citizens. 
The hopes raised by representatives of Kuwait at the conference included the 
issue that drastic changes towards establishing a more democratic system of 
1 Paul Aarts. "Post-War Kuwait and the Process of Democratization: The Persistence of Political 
Tribalism" in Abbas Abdelkarim Ahmed (ed.). Change and Development in the Gulf. (Houndmills: 
Macmillan. 1999). p.~ 18. 
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government should take place. These high hopes were based on the promises 
reached between them and the Amir that the Ruler pledges restoration of the 
1962 Constitution. In return for that, the opposition would stand loyal and firm 
behind al Sabah. The representatives hoped that standing by al Sabah in such 
a critical moment would give them some leverage in the post-liberation period to 
carry out the needed reforms for a better functioning representative system of 
government. Although the crisis of occupation had made Kuwaitis far more 
resolute and assertive about their demands to share political power, the 
discussion in this chapter will show that al Sabah had to be forced into keeping 
their promise about a return to the representative system of government by 
Kuwaitis. The excitement and enthusiasm that accompanied the fixing of a date 
for election of the National Assembly and the formation of political groups that 
looked more like political parties was short lived, since the opposition was 
unable to extract anything of any significance from al Sabah. The structural 
tension between a dominant executive and a weak assembly remained 
unaltered, merely because despite the dramatic events of the Iraqi occupation 
of Kuwait, the basis of legitimacy of al Sabah rule had not changed. They still 
maintained their control of state revenues and the oil sector and still led a 
fractured society where no other political or social force had any dominance. 
Opposition vis a vis al Sabah, remained fragmented on many grounds: 
ideological, sectarian, tribal and ethnic, which obviously weakened it 
significantly while al Sabah remained the only political force that united all 
Kuwaitis behind it. 
8.2 Restoration of the National Assembly 
The restoration of the National Assembly had been a key demand of the Kuwaiti 
citizens following its second suspension in 1986. The a/ majlis a/ watani that 
replaced the assembly was seen as being unconstitutional, and against the 
wishes of most Kuwaitis. However, the first thing al Sabah did after liberation 
was impose martial law, possibly as part of a strategy to make minimum 
concessions to democracy and to restore the "old order".2 This situation was 
2 Gareth Kingdon. No Security without Democracy in the Gulf. 2nd ed. (London: Gulf Centre for 
Strategic Studies. 1991).p.41. 
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further aggravated by the fact that the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Salad 
al Abdullah, returned to Kuwait five days after the cease-fire was announced by 
George W. Bush, while the Amir of Kuwait, Jaber al Ahmad, returned two weeks 
later. Many Kuwaitis were angered by the announcement of the Crown Prince, 
Prime Minister, that reconstruction and security should take precedent over 
democratisation, as well as by the formation of a new cabinet incorporating 
most of the members of the previous government who were held responsible for 
the failure in preventing the Iraqi aggression. 3 
These actions indicated that AI Sabah hoped to return to the political system 
that existed before the invasion without making any reforms. After liberation al 
Sabah convened a/ majlis a/ watani in several closed sessions. The most 
important was the session on 24 July 1991 where the Amir presented a/ majlis 
the security pact between the US and the Kuwaiti government. The council 
approved the pact which was a point of contention with opposition groups who 
naturally wanted a have a say in the future security arrangements of the 
country.4 
The Kuwaiti government attempted to soften the political discontent and 
alienation of its citizens by resorting to its old ways of distributing benefits and 
payments to its citizens and by making use of its control over financial and 
economic resources.s These incentives included back-paid salaries for the 
invasion period - the state employs nine out of ten Kuwaitis; they wrote off 
billions of dollars of loans; increased grants and loans by 50 percent to male 
Kuwaitis who would marry Kuwaiti women; increased monthly child benefit 
allowances; increased assistance to all Kuwaiti widows, orphans, and the poor 
by 50 percent of the, and they increased salaries to all public sector employees 
by 25 percent.s The resumption of oil production to pre-war levels helped al 
Sabah to use the wealth of the state to try to placate Kuwaitis. However this 
3 Aarts, op.cit. p.219-220. 
4 Middle East Economic Digest. "Saudi Arabia; Slow Steps Forward". ( MEED). (Special Report: Vol. 
44. 24 March, 2000). p.lO. 
5 Abdullah AI-Shayeji. "Kuwait at the Crossroads: The Quest for Democratization." Middle East Insight. 
8.5. 1992.p. 43. 
6 Ibid,. p.43. 
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powerful diplomacy of the dinar was not enough to stem the tide of democracy.? 
Political concessions were essential and it became impossible for al Sabah to 
continue with its policy of ignoring the demands for the restoration of the 
Constitution and the assembly. 
Kuwait's difficult economic and political situation focused the attention of the 
citizens and opposition groups on the widespread problems in the society of 
corruption, waste and inefficiency as well as the weakness of the traditional 
autocratic system of governing. Moreover, Kuwaitis were incensed by the 
behaviour of the ruling family who had been saved the anguish of the 
occupation, since they sought refuge in neighbouring countries in the Gulf, and 
their legitimacy was maintained through the support of the opposition, while 
they were in exile. Even before the country was liberated, pro-democracy 
groups were circulating a "national manifesto" which called for the immediate 
reinstatement of the National Assembly and to install a competent government 
within which al Sabah would be banned from holding any cabinet posts. 8 
The diwaniyyas, after liberation, put the issue of restoration of the assembly 
back on the Kuwaiti political agenda, emphasising the importance of political 
participation of Kuwaiti citizens in the decision-making process and in running 
the affairs of their country. Meetings, as in the period before the invasion, were 
held regularly among different political groups and members of the dissolved 
assembly in order to coordinate the campaign of pressure on the government. 
Kuwaiti citizens protested first against the inefficiency and incompetence of the 
government in coordinating normalisation efforts and the al Sabah monopoly of 
the state apparatus. These protests intensified during the months of April and 
May 1992. A prominent merchant remainee expressed the feelings of most 
Kuwaiti remainees by stating that: if we conquered our fears of the Iraqis, this 
government is not about to frighten us. 9 
7 Ibid .. p.43. 
R Kingdon, op.cit. p.46. 
9 Jacqueline S. Ismael. Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State. (Florida: Uni\'ersit) of Rorida 
Press. 1993).p. 179. 
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In the post-liberation period a new division emerged among the Kuwaitis 
between those who stayed during the occupation, called a/ Samidoon, or the 
remainees and the a/ Hariboon, or the fleers, who had returned after liberation. 
The tension between the remainees and the returnees was underlined by the 
inability of al Sabah to coordinate the efforts of normalisation in the country. 
These tensions resulted in the death of one outspoken remainee and the 
wounding of another. Another powerful merchant remainee went as far as to 
accuse the ruling family of organising death squads to eliminate members of the 
opposition.10 The main political groups within the community of remainees 
presented the Amir with a petition on 31 March 1992 "A Future Outlook for the 
Reform of Kuwait". It was signed by 96 prominent figures, predominantly 
influential merchants. They demanded the following: 
• commitment of the restoration of the Constitution and the restitution of the 
1985 parliament and a fixed election date; 
• an independent judiciary and free press; 
• freedom of speech and association and 
• appointments to civil services based on merit and corruption, must be 
combated by submitting all state contracts to a review panel composed of 
Kuwaitis known for their honesty and integrity.11 
The response of the Amir to these demands by the opposition was to announce 
that elections would be held sometime in the future with possible electoral 
reforms. This response was received as being totally inadequate and the 
situation deteriorated even further, especially as the cabinet which had resigned 
on 20 March 1992 was not replaced until 20 April with mere cosmetic changes. 
AI Sabah retained the most important posts of Interior, Defence, Oil and Foreign 
Affairs and the cabinet was filled with palace loyalists. Eventually, the 
10 Ibid., p.179. 
II Ibid., p.179. 
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opposition called for a press conference on 22 April, the same day that the US 
secretary of state James Baker was to arrive in Kuwait. The aim of the 
opposition was to focus world attention on the lack of commitment of the Kuwaiti 
government towards any democratic reforms. The government reacted by 
banning the conference. However, while the opposition was contemplating a 
new strategy to escalate their campaign for democratic reforms came the Amiri 
decree in June. The decree announced the ending of martial law by the end of 
June and set the date, October 1992, for a general election for the National 
Assembly, thus signalling the return to the constitutionally guaranteed 
representative system of government. 
The pressure exerted by the US on al Sabah to make sure that their public 
promise to restore the National Assembly actually took place - the Constitutional 
National Assembly, not the al maj/is al watani - played an important role in the 
ruler's decision. Criticisms in the West and the US were rife against a battle to 
save a monarchy which dissolves its elected parliament. 12 This shows that al 
Sabah restored the National Assembly not out of a serious commitment to the 
constitutionally guaranteed representative system of government, but because 
of a combination of domestic and external pressure. This lack of commitment 
still remains to be a major obstacle towards moving Kuwait away from 
autocracy to democracy. 
8.3 Emergence of Structured Political Forces 
One most significant change after liberation was the reshaping of Kuwaiti 
political groups into a more structured form, and the announcement of the 
formation of seven groups, some of which looked more like a party formation. 
These groups differ in their outlooks and ideology, but all share the belief in the 
necessity of creating a more accountable government and a more open system 
of government. However, none of these groups have a wide enough grass root 
support to make either it an alternative political force or a dominant political 
12 The Estimate. "Kuwait Election's Surprise". The Estimate (Vol. XI. 10 May. 1999). 
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force. 13 The Islamists are the one group with, possibly, the widest following but, 
because they are fractured on a sectarian basis, Sunni-Shi'ite, and the different 
ideological basis between the Muslim Brothers and Salafiyyan, their ability to 
dominate politics in Kuwait is limited. Cooperation among these groups 
becomes subsequently very important if they are to make any impact on 
government policies and issues of accountability and transparency. That is why 
the government plays one against the other in order to weaken their 
coordination and effectiveness. These groups are divided and the important 
differences will be discussed in detail: 
8.3.1 The Constitutional Grouping 
The group comprises mostly of the business elite of Kuwait, historically linked to 
the Chamber of Commerce. However, the group is not meant to represent the 
Chamber of Commerce but, on the contrary, the objective is to separate the 
Chamber from the pOlitical arena, since many members of the Chamber are not 
politically active.14 This is indicative of the fact that the merchant community, 
the most powerful economic group in Kuwait, appear not to have any political 
aspiration of its own. As put by one commentator, the Kuwaiti business 
community demand a stronger say in the decision making process; a merit 
based government; and more opportunities for the private sector - but not at the 
price of ruining the al Sabah regime. 15 
The Constitutional group is led by Abdul! Aziz al Saqr, who is a very influential 
merchant and a strong political figure in Kuwait. He played a leading role during 
the Jedda conference in achieving a compromise between the ruling family and 
the opposition. The group does not have a specific political programme or an 
organisational structure, however it does firmly believe in Constitutional 
13 Interview with Dr. 'AbduI-muhsan AI-Mad'aj. Durham, July, 2003. 
14 Fahd Abdullah AI-Mudyris. (AI-Mudyris). Al-tajammu 'at al-siyasiya al-kuwaytiya: marhalat rna ba'd 
aI-tahrir. (The Political Groupings in the Post Liberation Phase). (Kuwait: Dar al-qurtas, 1994). 
15 U. Rabi "The Kuwaiti Royal Family in the Post-Liberation Period: Deinstitutionalizing the First among 
Equals' in Kuwait". in: 1. Kostiner (ed.), Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity. (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). P159. 
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democracy, the official establishment of political parties and the adoption of a 
peaceful means for reform. On specific domestic issues, such as the 
separation of the post of Prime Minister and Crown Prince, they are in favour of 
that, in addition having to a firm belief in the equality among all Kuwaitis, both 
naturalised and original, as well as what they view as the necessity of giving 
women the right to vote. 16 
8.3.2 The Democratic Forum 
The Forum comprises of the liberal nationalist trend that has been eclipsed by 
the rise of the Islamic trend, and by its internal divisions. It includes well-known 
Arab nationalist figures and outspoken critics of the government, such as 
Ahmad al Khatib, Abdullah al Naibari, Ahmad al Rub'i and Jassim al Qatami. In 
its political programme, which was declared on the 5 December 1992, the forum 
acknowledged that the occupation debacle had accelerated the birth of the 
forum since it imposed new reality and the necessity to move popular political 
participation into a more institutionalised frame. 1? Unlike the Constitutional 
group the Forum has an organisational structure, a secretary-general and an 
executive committee, as well as its own publication, Voice of People. This 
publication was the mouthpiece for the group between March 1991-July 1992.'8 
However, the a/ Tali'a, which had previously been the traditional voice of the 
progressive Kuwaiti movement, is now the voice of the Forum. The Secretary-
General of the Forum is also the editor of al Talta. 
The Forum adheres to three basic tenets. The first holds that democracy and 
the respect of human rights is possible through pluralism and fairly elected 
political parties. The second holds that the promulgation of a law for the 
organisation of political parties is essential for any democratic life in Kuwait. 
The third is the importance for reform within the existing structure of the political 
16 AI-Mudyris op.cit. p.30-33. 
17 Ibid .. p.II. 
18 Ibid .. p. 11. 
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system, and political accountability, in accordance with the Constitution. 19 They 
are also in favour of separating between the ruling and governing body; the 
rulership must be for al Sabah but the governing must be placed in the hands of 
the people, hence the Forum advocates the separation of the post of Crown 
Prince and Prime Minister as well as the exclusion of al Sabah from becoming 
key ministers; Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior.20 The most important 
change in the thinking of the group is their embracing of the private sector, thus 
moving away from the socialist commitment that the founders of the Forum had 
previously used to advocate.21 
8.3.3 The Islamic Constitutional Movement 
This is the new name adopted by the Muslim Brothers in Kuwait, who represent 
the moderate Sunni Islamic movement.22 It has a specific political programme 
and an organisational structure. Its programme provides a general view of the 
need to follow Islam and Islamic teachings in order to reform the legal, social 
and political systems in Kuwait, making them more in line with Islamic 
principles.23 It is led by figures such as Ismai'l al Shatti, Mubarak al Duwayla 
and Nasser al San 'a. The movement is against the establishment of political 
parties because it believes that this creates divisions, but they do, interestingly 
support giving women the right to vote although not the right to hold office. 24 
They are in agreement with other groups that the posts of Crown Prince and 
Prime Minister must be separated and they advocate peaceful means of 
reforming the entire political system. In addition to that they also, advocate total 
cooperation with other groups, irrespective of the ideological differences. 
19 Ibid., p.12-13. 
20 Ibid., p.13. 
21 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.13. 
22 Ismael, op.cit. p.180. 
23 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.14. 
24 Ibid., p.16. 
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Despite the wide support of the movement, its credibility over the years suffered 
some what, also to its positive relation with the government and the fact that 
many of its supporters hold important positions in the public sector. 25 The 
fleeing of many of its leaders during the time of the Iraqi invasion and the 
occupation this certainly further undermined its credibility.26 
8.3.4 The Popular Islamic Grouping 
This group is the official political front of the Salafien movement in Kuwait, 
who are much stricter than the Muslim Brothers in their demands for the 
application of Shari'a. This group lacks links with the government and very few 
of them hold government positions, hence they enjoy far more credibility than 
any of the traditional opposition elements in Kuwait.27 Also, most of their 
leaders remained in Kuwait during the occupation and some were detained by 
the Iraqis.28 Its leaders include Jassim al Aoun, Ahmad Baqir and Khalid al Issa. 
The organisational structure of the group is secretive, and neither the founding 
fathers nor the leading figures of the movement are publicly known because of 
their fear of elimination, as what actually happened in Egypt to the Muslim 
Brothers.29 This secretive and underground work contradicts the candour that is 
characteristic of political work in Kuwait and contravenes the principle of 
openness that all other political groups call for. 
The monthly Furqan magazine is the mouthpiece of the group representing their 
views on domestic, regional and international issues. The political programme 
of the group is similar to the Salafien focusing on the establishment of an 
Islamic state according to the Shari'a by peaceful means and emphasising 
gradual reforms as the way forward to achieving that goal. 30 They believe that 
25 Interview with 'Aaydh AI-Barazi, Kuwait, November. 2002. 
26 Al-Shayeji. op.cit. p.44. 
27 Ibid., p.44 
28 Ibid., p.44. 
29 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.21. 
30 Ib'd '1'1 1 ., p._..:... 
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there is a need to legalise political parties, despite the reluctance of Kuwaitis to 
belong to parties and to belong to political groups.31 They hold a similar view to 
other political groups on the issue of separating the posts of Prime Minister and 
Crown Prince. They see it as an adherence to the Constitution where such 
separation is indicated in Article (56) and the explanatory note accompanying 
the Constitution. As for women's rights the group's position is not very clear. 
They claim that there is a need to be patient about giving women the right to 
vote while they stand against the right of women to hold office because, in their 
view, it contravenes with Shari'a. The problem for the group, as well as the 
Islamic Constitutional Movement, is that the Constitution does not separate 
between the right to vote and the right to hold office; they are viewed as being 
equal. 
8.3.5 The National Islamic Alliance 
The emergence of a distinct Shi'ite political group occurred only as recently as 
1981. However, their political presence became more visible in the period after 
the second suspension of the assembly in 1986 and especially during the 1989 
pro-democracy movement. The Shi'ite community was very active in 
community action committees, set up during the Iraqi occupation, and In 
resisting Iraqi occupation. After liberation, the alliance was declared and 
supported the declaration of the "Future Outlook for the Reform of Kuwait". 
The alliance is more a political vehicle for organising the wide range of views 
held by the Shi'ite community and hence, it has no organisational structure or a 
specific programme.32 They adhere to the basic tents of commitment to the 
Constitution the freedom of individuals and total equality, together with the , 
principle of national unity.33 On specific domestic issues, they support the 
separation of the posts of Prime Minister and Crown Prince. They also see no 
contradiction between Islam and giving women the right to vote and nominate. 
31 Ibid., p.23. 
32 Ibid., p.23. 
33 Ibid. p.23. 
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They adhere, like other groups, to reforms and changes through Constitutional 
and peaceful means. 
8.3.6 The Coalition of Parliamentarians 
The roots of this coalition go back to 1989 when 32 deputies met under the 
leadership of Ahamd al Sa'doun to discuss the situation in Kuwait in light of the 
continued suspension of the assembly. AI Sa'doun who heads the group enjoys 
immense credibility among all the various political groups.34 He has been a 
strong critic of the government and a symbol of the opposition struggle for 
political participation. Other figures include Salih al Fadallah, Salad al Tammi, 
Faisal al San'a and Ahmad al Shira'an.35 
The coalition does not have any organisational structure or specific programme 
and includes a variety of political, religious and ethnic trends.36 However, they 
stand firm like other groups on the commitment to the Constitution and the 
maintenance of democratic gains of the Kuwaitis, in addition to supporting 
reforms through peaceful means. They also firmly believe that the development 
of organised political participation can not occur without a legalisation of political 
parties.3? 
As to the principle of separation of the posts of Crown Prince and Prime 
Minister, the coalition does not think this is the real issue. What is more 
important is the commitment to the Constitution, as long as the Prime Minister 
acts acting in accordance with the Constitution; thus, combining the two roles is 
of no significance.38 They firmly stand behind giving women the right to vote 
and nominate through amending the law of election. 
34 AI-Shayeji, op.cit. p.46. 
35 Ibid., p.46. 
36 AI-Mudyris, op.cit. p.31. 
37 Ibid., p.31 
38 Ibid., p.) 1 
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B.3.7 The Independents 
The independents - a loose collection of respected and known individuals with 
no particular ideology or political affiliation - remain an important safety valve, 
balancing among the various political groups present in Kuwait. 39 They share 
some of the basic tenets of the other groups such as commitment to the 
Constitution and the maintenance of democratic gains of Kuwaitis, the rejection 
of confrontation with the authorities, and they favour peaceful means of reform. 
They support the principal of separation of the posts of Prime Minister and 
Crown Prince, but, despite that, they still believe that what is more important is 
the ability to cooperate between the assembly and the government and the 
ability of the assembly to hold the government accountable in accordance with 
the Constitution.40 They support women to have the right to vote and nominate 
and also firmly reject the position of the Islamic groups. 
Other than these formal groups, the badu stand apart to some extent. The 
large constituency of tribal deputies have been loyal supporters of the 
government and vote along government lines and support bills favoured by the 
government. Their legitimacy and local support stems from an ability to provide 
services and respond to the local needs of their constituency. Their control in 
pervious assemblies was large. In the 1992 elections they ran, as usual, 
without any direct association with any political group, following the tribal 
primary elections. Their representation remained high, but a new breed of 
deputies is emerging among the badu constituency; younger, more educated 
and seem to be developing their own agenda and leaders.41 
39 Ismael, op.cit. p.180. 
40 AI-Mudyris. op.cit. p.35. 
41 Interview with Mohammad Alhajeri, Kuwait, November, 2002 
270 
8. 4 The 1992 National Assembly 
A distinguishing feature of the seventh National Assembly was the level of 
cooperation, which had been unseen before, among the various political groups 
during the campaign and elections. They issued a joint statement announcing a 
set of principles regarding the necessity to safeguard the integrity of the election 
and warned the government of the dangers of some of its supporters buying 
votes in an attempt to weaken opposition candidates. In addition, the statement 
focused on political and economic reforms and amending government policies.42 
The various political groupings announced their candidates and the names of 
independent candidates, whom they wanted the constituency to vote for. This 
election had at least 186 candidates classified as independents, the majority of 
which were government supporters. However, there were around sixty who 
supported the forty core candidates of the recognisable political force 
candidates and their ideas.43 These core candidates were united in their 
criticism of the government and in their view of political reforms. Their 
campaign concentrated on political and institutional reforms, the freedom of the 
press and independence of the judiciary.44 
The turn out of voters was high. Out of the 81,400 eligible voters, 67,724 of 
them went to the polls.45 However, the electoral body was still very small, 
around 15 percent of Kuwaiti citizens who were eligible to vote.46 The results 
registered a clear and loud disapproval of the government's performance during 
the Iraqi invasion, and a backlash to the indefinite suspension of the assembly 
42 Shafeeq Ghabra. "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993." Middle East Policy. 
(Vol.3. No.1 1994) p.107. 
43 Ibid., p.107. 
44 Ibid., p.107-108. 
45 Jill Crystal & Abdullah al-Shayeji, The Pro-Democracy Agenda in Kuwait: Structures and Context', in 
Bahgat Korany (ed.). Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World. Vol. 2: ComparatIve 
Experiences (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). p.llS. 
46 Dale Gavlak. "The Kuwaiti 1992 Elections: Rainbow Coalition after a Desert Storm", JIME. 1992.p.17. 
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in 1986 and the subsequent creation of the a/ majlis a/ watani, by giving the 
Islamists and opposition groups, in general, a land slide victory. 
The three Islamic groups won nine seats with another eleven seats having been 
won by independents supported by this trend. That, in total, gave the Islamist 
trend twenty out of the fifty seats. A number of liberal independents won 5 
seats. The low number of independent deputies, as compared to the number of 
candidates, only seventeen won seats out of hundred and eighty four 
candidates. This indicates a new trend in Kuwait's politics, which moves 
towards favouring more organised political blocs. The badu candidates did well 
in winning 16 seats altogether; see Table 8.1. it is interesting to note that some 
opposition candidates and supporters were able to win seats in badu dominated 
districts. 47 The majority of the assembly was subsequently composed of the 
opposition parties, as thirty four of the members of the new assembly could be 
characterised as "opposition". The Prime Minister selected six of the elected 
members to serve in the cabinet. The six represented liberals, fundamentalists, 
Shi'ite and tribal leaders. However, al Sabah still remained in control of the four 
key ministries; Information, Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs. 
47 Ghabra. op.cit. p.112-113. 
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Table 8.1 The Distribution of the Seats in the National Assembly for the Election of 1992 
District Badu The Constitutional The Kuwaiti Democratic The Coalition of The Islamic The Popular The National Independents Independents Total 
Grouping Forum Parliamentarians Constitutional Islamic Islamic I Liberals Iisiamists 
Movement Groue.in9. Alliance 
1st. 1 2 
2nd. 1 2 
3rd. 1 1 2 
4th. 1 1 2 
5th. 1 1 2 
6th. 1 1 2 
7th. 1 1 2 
8th. 1 2 
9th. 1 1 2 
10th. 1 2 
11th. 2 2 
12th. 1 1 2 
13th. 1 2 
14th. 2 2 
15th. 2 2 
16th. 1 2 
17th. 1 1 2 
18th. 2 2 
19th. 1 2 
20th. 2 2 
21st. 2 2 
22nd. 1 2 
23rd. 1 2 
24th. 2 
25th. 2 2 
Total 16 2 6 3 3 3 5 11 50 
Source; Calculated from dalJl on electJon results from the Kuwaiti national assembly 
Despite some of the positive changes that took place in terms of formalisation of 
political groups and the cooperation among the opposition, democracy in Kuwait 
is still only practised along tribal, sectarian and religious lines because a change 
in the shape of the assembly would require amendments in the election law. 
As indicated: 
Democracy, as we understand it, is a way of citizen participation in 
the affairs of society. But, unfortunately, it brings us inexcusable 
behaviour by awakening tribal and sectarian fanaticism. What we 
saw in the 1992 elections for the Assembly, municipal council, and 
cooperatives - voting for tribal and sectarian reasons will fragment 
our society rather than unite it. 48 
The government, in order to offset the powerful liberal critics that were in the 
1992 assembly, formed an alliance with the Islamist trend. In the sixties it 
expanded the role of the badu and increased their presence in the assembly 
and gave them higher prestige in society in order to marginalise its liberal critics 
and the liberal trend in the assembly. In the eighties and even more so in the 
nineties, the Islamists became another group to use in order to undermine the 
efforts of the liberal/nationalist deputies. Despite the alliance with the Islamists, 
the government had its share of disputes with the assembly, especially on 
significant issues such as the massive re-armament which followed the war, the 
misuse of public funds and allegations of corruption. However, the assembly, 
were unable, due to internal divisions, to tackle real and serious problems and 
ended up being devoted to merely marginal issues, such as the veiling of 
women, the segregation of education etc ... 49 The serious programme of political 
and economic reforms that the opposition talked about prior and during the 
election campaigning did not materialise. The 1992 assembly served its term 
and was replaced by a new assembly in October 1996. 
48 Muhammad AI-Raumaihi. "Kuwait: Oasis of Liberalism". Middle East Quarterlv ( September 1994) 
p.14. 
49 Ibid., p. j.t 
AI Shayeji provides a scathing assessment of the Kuwaiti opposition, by 
concluding that 
The Kuwaiti opposition is more a poodle than a pitbull: it barks but 
remains tame. This is an opposition that seems to have been 
opposing for too long. In the process, it has taken on many of the 
characteristics of every government it seeks to challenge, i.e., it lives 
by wheeling and dealing, bargaining and buying, compromising and 
contracting. 50 
Hopes were raised at what had initially appeared to be a new dawn of 
democracy in Kuwait, through the cooperation and announcement of a unified 
manifest by the Kuwaiti opposition. However, it quickly turned out to be more of 
the same and very little significant changes took place in the relation between 
the assembly and al Sabah or the ability of the assembly to execute its duties in 
accordance with the Constitution. One chronic weakness of any opposition in 
Kuwait was augmented: division of opposition groups, which makes real 
democratic changes, seem to be implausible in the short term. In addition, 
political parties are still officially banned and public gatherings need to receive 
prior-approval from the government. 
8.5 The Re-emergence of Key Issues of Democracy at the Centre of 
Political Debate 
The three major issues that delineated the political debate in Kuwait since the 
promulgation of the Kuwaiti Constitution and the institutionalisation of a 
representative system in the government in 1962, re-emerged in the post-
liberation period, becoming most significant in terms of measuring the success 
of the return to the representative system of government. These three issues 
were the accountability of the government, the broadening of political 
participation and the protection of individual freedom of expression and 
association. Together they represent priority areas for the development of 
50 AI-Shayeji. op.cit. p. 46. 
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democracy In Kuwait. The following discussion shall focus on each Issue 
separately. 
8.5.1 Government Accountability 
It is this very important element of a democratic system where government 
ministers are subjected to parliamentary grilling that has over the years. 
generated a political crisis and huge tension between the government and the 
assembly.51 The subjection of government ministries to parliamentary grilling is 
routine in most democracies in the world. In Egypt, to take an example from the 
Arab world, cabinet ministers are regularly questioned - at least 20 grillings 
occur per session - without causing any political commotion.52 In comparison no 
more than 23 cross examinations of ministers have been conducted over the life 
span of Kuwait's nine assemblies.53 These cross examinations have twice led 
to the dissolution of the assembly and twice resulted in the resignation of the 
entire government. Underlying the persistence in the tension between the 
assembly and the cabinet has been the limited view of the ruling family of the 
function of the legislature, as expressed by the Crown Prince, Prime Minister, 
Sheikh Salad: 
the role of the Members of parliament is to discuss bills, which are 
submitted by the government, and not to obstruct the cabinet's 
work. 54 
This limited understanding of the role of the assembly and its deputies 
contradicts with the wide ranging powers granted by the Constitution, including 
casting a vote of no confidence against a minister; to initiate a policy of no 
51 Harnzah S Olayan. "Latest Test of Wills Rocks Kuwaiti Politics". The Daily Star. (May, 15.2002.) 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Sherine Bahaa. "Jaber Keeps Ship a Float." Al-ahrarn Weekley On-line (18-24 June 1998. No. 382). 
www.weekly.ahrarn.org.eg. 
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cooperation with the Prime Minister; questioning ministers and investigating 
government conduct; establishing investigative committees; and discussing any 
issue that it finds appropriate. 55 Differences between the assembly and the 
government became more acute after the liberation because of a very broad 
sense of public discontent with the mismanagement of state finances and such 
widespread corruption. The purchase of arms in particular became a very 
sensitive and highly controversial issue, which prompted some legislators to 
claim that the decision are made according to commission received by top 
officials, rather than any efficiency or competitive prices. The government was 
accused of wasting funds on weaponry that neither suits the needs of the 
Kuwaiti army or enhances the security of Kuwait. 56 Cordesman suggests a 
similar position by indicating that the Kuwaiti government does not pay great 
attention to the over-all standardisation of the Kuwaiti forces in order to equal 
those of other Gulf states, and makes politically motivated purchases with its 
major Western allies. 57 Therefore, the military lacks overall co-ordination and 
any standardisation with those of other Gulf states and there is only partial 
standardisation with the US land and air forces, its major Western military ally. 
This kind of arms' sale policy is extremely costly and rather ineffective in terms 
of defending the sovereignty of Kuwait.58 
The huge military expenditure by the Kuwaiti government has caused disquiet 
among many Kuwaitis and the assembly. In 1992, the government's plan of 
spending around $12 billion on arms over a period of twelve years met with 
direct objections from the national assembly.59 However, the government did 
not wait for the approval of the assembly because it had already spent billions 
by the time the assembly had approved the $12 billion expenditure.6o Such 
levels of expenditure raise the question of Kuwait's continued ability to fund its 
55 AI-Raumaihi, op.cit. p.14-15. 
56 Bahaa, op.cit. p.l. 
57 Anthony Cordesman. Kuwait Recovery and Security after the Gulf War. (Oxford: Westview press, 
1997).p.76-77. 
58 Ibid., p.77. 
59 Ibid., p.76. 
60 Ibid .. p.76. 
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ambitious plans for expanding its military force. 61 During the period between 
1990-1993 Kuwait ranked third in world arms agreements, while it did not 
number in the top ten nations during 1986-1989.62 
Following liberation Kuwaitis felt a great need to critically reassess the run of 
events and to hold the government accountable. This assessment was mostly 
acute in the performance of the military whose total "unpreparedness" had 
raised many questions which especially considered the huge sums of money 
that the government had spent in the past. Serious moral and leadership 
problems emerged after liberation which led a group of senior officers to send 
the Amir of Kuwait a letter calling for the investigation and dismissal of Defence 
Minister, Sheikh Nawaf al Ahmad al Sabah, for having failed failing to take the 
appropriate military action.63 They also called for an investigation of the Interior 
Minister, Sheikh Salem Sabah al Salem, for his failure to make appropriate 
internal security measures.54 Other protests from the military took the form of 
demands for the resignations of top military officers and defence personnel and 
other who were blamed for the "unpreparedness" of Kuwait. There were also 
complaints about the corruption in the military, where officers were promoted 
purely because of either family connections or political reasons, while ignoring 
those who had fought in the resistance. Also complaints were made about 
post-war contracts having been awarded based on favouritism and corruption.65 
AI Sabah needed to take serious action in order to satisfy both the military and 
public opinion. However, they opted for cosmetic changes such as rotating 
ministers in different ministerial positions while retiring a limited number of 
officers.66 
The corruption and misuse of public funds was another area that caused huge 
friction between the assembly and the government and accusations against the 
61 Ibid., 76-77. 
62 Ibid., p.77. 
63 Ibid., p.94 
64 Ibid .. p.94. 
65 Ibid .. p.94. 
66 Ibid .. p.9'+. 
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government were rife. They included several issues: Firstly, a charge against 
some ruling family members for authorising the expenditure of public funds 
which totalled billions of dollars, but without gaining the supervision of the Audit 
Bureau, the legislative watchdog for monitoring state finances. Secondly, the 
government was accused of illegally using public funds to support particular 
candidates in parliamentary election campaigns, in addition to irregularities 
within the Kuwait Investment Authority and the failure to reform the authority 
and other agencies. Last but not least, was the allegation that the government 
was pursuing policies that suit the country's elite while planning to slash social 
security benefits and retirement pension entitlements for the lower class 
Kuwaitis.67 
The assembly was able to debate sensitive issues of power sharing, fiscal 
accountability of the al Sabah family and the topics of corruption and waste, yet 
it failed to take decisive decisions on any of these vital issues. 68 The weakness 
of the opposition remained with its inability to translate its vocal criticism and 
disquiet about the government into any action and effective policy. The ability of 
the ruling family to play the political groups in the assembly against each other, 
as well as to co-opt and incorporate opposition elements, continued to 
undermine the assembly. 
8.5.2 Broadening of Political Participation 
The Kuwaiti franchise remains extremely restricted, as only around 10 percent 
of the population is eligible to vote, which undermines the whole system.69 
Women are still without the right to vote and the issue of the bidoon has, in fact, 
become far more complicated after liberation, as now some naturalised citizens 
have been selectively given the right to vote. 
67 Ibid., p.95. 
68 Ibid., p.64. 
69 The Estimate. "Kuwait's Political System". Part two: Parliament. (Vol. 13. \'0. 13. June 18. 1999) 
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Kuwaiti Women: The exclusion of women from political life does not make 
sense when Kuwaiti women have gained gender equality in education and the 
work force. Kuwaiti women far outnumber male graduates from institutions of 
higher education. About 70 percent of Kuwait University students are female 
while there are more than 10,000 female school teachers in contrast with only 
around 3,000 male teachers.70 Their participation in the work force is also as 
impressive, holding important positions in a variety of fields; the public sector, 
universities, commerce and industry.71 In addition to this, their exclusion 
contravenes the principles of equality of all citizens which is guaranteed in the 
Kuwaiti Constitution. In the initial optimitisic atmosphere after the liberation, 
Kuwaiti women expected in recognition for their services and their sacrifices 
during the Iraqi occupation, that they would gain the right to vote and hold 
office. 
The matter was raised in front of the 1992 National Assembly. A draft bill 
submitted by deputy Hamad al Jou'an in October 1992, proposed in giving 
women the right to vote and called for the creation of a special committee of 
religious and legal scholars to study the issue of women standing as 
candidates. AI Naqeeb, when commenting on the prospect of women gaining 
the right to vote, said: granting women the vote was not anticipated but is very 
welcome. It will change the whole perspective of Kuwait politics if passed .. .it 
will usher in a new dawn of cultural and social openness, new faces, new tactics 
and new elements.72 Women's participation in the electoral process would not 
only boost the number of voters and add a new dimension to Kuwaiti politics, 
but would be a fulfilment of the basic principle of universal suffrage, and an 
important step towards augmenting democracy in Kuwait. However, this bill just 
as other similar bills before it was not passed, and the high hopes for extending 
the vote for women did not materialise. 
Eventually, Kuwaiti women were given the right to vote and to stand for office by 
a royal decree issued by the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah 
70 Ibid. 
71 Luke Phillips. "\Vornen Force their way into Kuwait Polls". The Indian Express. ( July 1. 1999).p.1 
72 Ibid .. p.l. 
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on 16 May 1999. A statement by the cabinet, following a meeting with the Amir, 
confirmed that hid highness had decreed in giving women the right to nominate 
and the right to vote, in his full appreciation of their vital role in building and 
developing Kuwaiti society, their sacrifices and their capabilities in facing the 
many challenges that confronted the country over the future years.73 However, 
these were not the only reasons behind the decree. It came 12 days in the 
wake of the government's dissolving of the assembly on May 16 and the calling 
for new election. It could be argued that it was a manoeuvre aimed to reduce 
the growing influence of the Islamists in the assembly, while making themselves 
represent the: symbol of democratisation and modernity.74 
The legal battle seemed to have been won and women would at last have 
access to a channel in which to voice their concerns and introduce changes in 
civil laws affecting marriage and family. As pointed out by Khaldoun AI Naqeeb 
the decree giving women its rights opens the way for women and their 
supporters to struggle for wider social reform focusing on the antiquated and 
backward civil rights laws. 75 
However, this elation did not last long and the legal and political battle for 
Kuwaiti women still continued. On 23 November 1999 the National Assembly 
rejected the Amir's decree: 41 deputies voted against while 21, including the 13 
cabinet ministers, voted for it.76 It must be noted that this came within the wider 
frame of opposing all the Amir's decrees on a variety of matters that had been 
announced since he dissolved the 1996 elected assembly. According to the 
Constitution, royal decrees are only issued when the National Assembly is not 
in session and only if it is absolutely necessary. To many in the assembly, the 
Sixty decrees that the Amir issued were of no pressing nature, thus issuing them 
undermined the legislative function of the Kuwaiti parliament.77 One can argue 
73 The Estimate, op.cit. p.3. 
74 Ibid., p.3. 
75 Khaldun Al-Naqib (al-Naqeeb, Khaldhun). 'Ara' fi figh al-takhalluf. (Opinions on Doctrine of 
Backwardness). (London: Dar al-saqi, 2002). 
76 Azza Wahbi. 'The Legislative Function of Arab Parliaments: the Case of Kuwait." United Nations 
Development Programme. http://www.pogar.org/publicationsllegislaturelwahbvl/section4b.html. p.4. 
77 AI-Hayat Newspaper, Friday 12 November 1999. 
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that the vote is not a true reflection of the position of the assembly but a move 
that was essential to preserve the integrity of the Constitution and to stop Amiri 
decrees under the guise of an emergency measure.78 
However, there is strong opposition to women's rights that has persisted over 
the years, and every time the issue is presented to the assembly it has failed to 
gain the support it needs. Part of that failure has been due to 
political/ideological differences since, surrounding the issue of the women's 
franchise, the differences between liberals and fundamentalists have been 
clearly visible. Islamists favour segregation of the sexes in education, work, 
sports and travel and they pursue a very conservative view of women in society, 
with the ultimate goal of applying the principles of Islamic law. What made 
Islamists more successful with their approach was their ability to reach out to 
Kuwaiti women and build a solid conservative base among them.79 Also, 
differences exist among the various Islamist political groups as the discussion in 
the previous section showed. Some support the right of women to vote but not 
for them to hold political office, while others support political rights based on an 
interpretation of Islamic law. Some strict Islamists see the political participation 
of women as violating Islamic Sharta and is a part of the Western agenda that 
is invading the Gulf, with its Western ideas and ideals in an attempt to replace 
Muslim culture with a foreign, Western culture. 
Other factors had also played an active role. These included the lack of an 
active women's movement with a wide social base, that could compete with the 
Islamist trend among women. Also, the social conditioning of both men and 
women imposes the traditional notions of inequality, where the men take the 
responsibility of politics and women take the responsibility of the family.8o 
Deputy Saadoun al-Otaibi clearly expressed such a notion by stating: how 
78 Ghabra, op.cit. p.2. 
79 Ibid., p.l. 
80 Bandar AI-Dhifayri. Al-musharaka al-siyasiya Ii 'l-mar'a fi al-kuwayt. (Political Participation of 
Kuwaiti women). (Kuwait: n.p.1995). p.69-71. 
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would you have expected me to feel if a candidate called to tell me, I need to 
speak with your wife and daughter? 81 
Naturalised citizens: Kuwaitis remain very wary of giving full rights to 
naturalised citizens and especially, political rights. The right for naturalised 
citizens to vote and to participate in political life is considered as a fundamental 
basis to the principles of democracy. The second class citizenship status is an 
injustice, to the same extent as women's franchise that needs to be addressed 
in Kuwait.82 However, in terms of numbers, naturalised citizens do not represent 
a significant consequence as women do, because of the extremely restrictive 
nature of the citizenship law in Kuwait, which makes making the number of 
those eligible to citizenship extremely small in the first place. 
However, the 1992 assembly recognised the significance of the democratic 
principle by successfully in broadening the base of the electorate in 1994, by 
passing an amendment to the citizenship law which extends the right to vote to 
the sons of naturalised Kuwaiti citizens. 83 This legislation was passed with ease 
in comparison to the failure to pass a bill in support of women, because the 
enfranchisement of naturalised citizens is much less ideologically and 
emotionally burdened. 
The Bidoon or, as the Kuwaiti government prefers to call to them, "the non-
Kuwaiti nationals" remained a thorny and unresolved issue in Kuwaiti politics. 
As mentioned in Chapter Three their whole situation after deteriorated 
liberation. Thousands of Bidoons, who were stranded outside the country 
during the period of the Iraqi occupation, were not allowed to return. This 
reduced their numbers from 350,000 down to around 122,000.84 Moreover, they 
were accused of collaborating with the Iraqi regime and were blamed for the 
failure of the Kuwaiti military because they had represented a large share of its 
81 Equality now ... Kuwait: The Struggle for Women's Suffrage". January 200l. 
http://www.equalitynow.org/englishiactions/action 1901 en.html 
82 Ismael, op.cit. p.182. 
83 Wahby. op.cit. pA. 
84 Paul Aarts. "Parliamentary Politics in Post-War Kuwait: Withered Euphoria". JI:v1E Review. (Cairo, 
Liaison Office. Winter 1996). p.52-53. 
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rank and file. Consequently, they were dismissed en masse from the army and 
police retroactively, from 2 August 1990, and only a very small fraction were 
allowed to rejoin their posts. 
By focusing on and targeting the Bidoon , the government had, in effect avoided 
dealing directly with the issue of the ineffective performance of the military and 
the need to conduct an overall strategic reassessment of the military 
establishment. At the time of the Iraqi invasion, the entire Kuwaiti military force, 
of around 20,000 men, was a mixture of Bidoon and foreign personnel who 
specialised in technical service, logistic support plus maintenance and training.85 
The foreign personnel included Jordanians, Egyptians and Pakistanis while, 
those working with for the more advanced, Western-supplied military 
equipment, were British, American and French staff as technical teams. 86 
Manpower shortages has always been a persistent constraint on the 
development of the Kuwaiti military. However, this shortage was further 
aggravated during post-liberation, due to the policy of the government that 
excluded certain segments of the population; i.e. members of the Kuwaiti 
resistance, also exclusion of the army of 10,000 badu, mostly bidoons, and by 
not making any attempt to enlist its Shi'ite citizens. 87 In 1996, Kuwait had a total 
force of only 16,000 troops.aa It is still heavily dependent on foreign personnel 
for its technical services, logistic support and the maintenance and training, plus 
its links with the American, British and French military for contractor support 
missions. This puts considerable limitations on any plan to expand and 
enhance its own military capabilities and makes absolutely no sense in its policy 
of excluding several segments of the Kuwaiti population. Naturalising the 
Bidoon, who would have already served in the military and showed their loyalty 
for many years, would make much better sense than simply dismissing them en 
masse. 
85 Cordesman. op.cit. p.129. 
86 Ibid .. p.67 -77. 
87 Ibid .• p.92. 
88 Ibid .. p.94. 
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One must say that even in the assembly, few even among the opposition, 
support granting full citizenship status to the Bidoon. The newly established 
committee in the National Assembly for the Defence of Human Rights has very 
seldom addressed this issue.89 Most deputies seem to prefer a very limited 
process of naturalisation. 
8.5.3 Democracy and Freedom of Speech 
Democracy in Kuwait has always operated and in a very restrictive legal frame 
work which limits the freedom of expression, and violates the freedoms that 
were guaranteed in the Kuwaiti Constitution. The most important legal 
structures that have a direct impact on the development of a culture which 
allows free speech and people's free affiliation and association are the Press 
and Publication Law, the Public Assembly and Procession Law, and the Clubs 
and Public Associations Law. However, these laws create a certain 
environment that puts civil associations in Kuwait under tight scrutiny, which 
leads to fear and self-censorship. This situation does not help in creating an 
atmosphere for a responsible debate on current issues and makes the 
assembly as the only open public political space for legitimate discussion and 
debates. The ability of the executive to pass these laws is another indication of 
the weakness of the opposition and how the shaping of the National Assembly 
is done in a manner that clearly serves al Sabah's interests, by filling it with 
loyalists. This undermined the emergence of any genuinely free culture with the 
free expression of opinions and the association with different political groups. 
The Press Law: Since the sixties the press in Kuwait has witnessed the 
proliferation of newspapers and publications which adhere to a variety of 
positions and have been instrumental in publicising and debating issues. They 
are a source of embarrassment to the government and a source of pressure. 
Over the years, restricting and controlling it became very common feature in 
Kuwaiti political life. The Press law NO.3 (1961) that regulates all published 
material in Kuwait has been amended many times: law No. 29 (1965), NO.9 
(1972), No. 59 (1976), No. 69 (1979), No. 57 (1986), No. 73 (1986) and No. 134 
89 Aarts. 1996. op.cit. . p.53. 
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(1992). These numerous amendments are an indication of the tendency of the 
government to resort to law to impose restrictions and control on the freedom of 
expression when it deems it necessary. The National Assembly has rescinded 
some of these amendments such as Amiri order No. 59 (1976), Amiri order No. 
73 (1986) and Amiri decree No. 134 (1992). 
Among the most restrictive and most contested articles of the law has been 
Article (35). The original Article, in law No.3 (1961), prohibits the cancellation of 
a any newspaper license or the closure of a newspaper except through a 
judgement by the criminal court, and the period of closure should not exceed 
one year. However, in a subsequent amendment to the law in 1965, the cabinet 
was then given the right to suspend or cancel the license of a newspaper, but 
still up to one year. This was rescinded in 1972, by reverting back to the 
original provision in Law No.3 (1961). 
However, in a subsequent amendment in law No. 95 (1976), an Amiri decree 
returned the right back to the cabinet for them right to close a newspaper for up 
to two years and also the right to cancel the licence of a newspaper. The 
amendments in Law No. 73 (1986) added more restrictions on publishing by 
prohibiting the publication of any material without prior approval from the 
Ministry of Information. In addition to that, non-commercial statements or 
announcements were prohibited from publication also without prior approval 
from the Ministry of Information. The Ministry of Information inspectors were 
given the right to enter the premises of newspapers, publishing houses and 
retailers for the purpose of implementing the law. 
Other important restrictions include the prohibition of the publication of any 
material that is perceived to contravene with national interest or that serves a 
foreign country or an authority or that would undermine the political and social 
fabric of Kuwait. Any violation of these prohibitions results in imprisonment for 
up to six months and a financial fine. The law also includes a list of issues and 
material that the press cannot deal with including the prohibition of publishing 
material that would criticise the heads of state or possibly damage Kuwait's 
relations with other Arab and friendly states. In addition, the press is prohibited 
from publishing news that might influence the value of the national currency or 
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any news concerning the bankruptcy of merchants, commercial enterprises, 
banks or currency dealers, unless a permission has been granted from the 
appropriate court. The government, to ensure conformity towards these wide 
ranging restrictions, which extremely limits the role of the media as a source of 
news analysis, as well as holding the government accountable, imposed 
penalties including imprisonment, fines, closures and cancellation of licences of 
newspapers, depending on the offence and any repetition of the offence. 
The Law of Public Assembly and Procession: This is another very useful 
instrument for limiting both the public's political space and their ability to 
organise and publicise issues and differing political positions. This law was 
introduced by the government in 1963, and it controls public meetings, 
processions and associations to a great extent. The law stipulates that 
organisers of public meetings should obtain permission from the Governor of 
the district in which the meeting will be held. The government has given the 
Governors the right and responsibility to prevent public meetings, which may 
disturb security or public order.90 The law also gives the police the power to 
attend public meetings under the pretext of preserving law and order.91 
The stipulations of this law directly contravene with the Kuwaiti Constitution. 
Article (44) guarantees the right of private assembly without permission or prior 
notification, and prohibits the police from attending such private meetings. Due 
to pressure from opposition deputies the law exempted the Kuwaiti traditional 
diwaniyya. Article three of the law stipulates that: Diwanniyyas that take place 
inside or in front of private houses to discuss a variety of issues without a 
specific invitation to discuss a particular public matter, are not considered to be 
public gatherings. 92 
The law was amended in 1976, 1979 and in 1988. The explanatory note. 
accompanying the amended law of 1979, justified the amendments on the 
90 Law of Public Assembly and Procession. No.13. 1963. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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ground that the practical application of the law revealed many flaws and defects 
which made it imperative to reconsider the law and to have a law: that is in line 
with recent developments and in agreement with practice and reality. 93 
However, these amendments, in effect, aimed to make it much harder for 
Kuwaitis to organise public meetings and legally prohibited non-Kuwaitis from 
the freedom of speech and expression. In addition, the law amendments gave 
the government the upper hand in controlling the manner in which Kuwaitis are 
able to express themselves. 
Article (4) of the amended law prevents the organisation and the convening of a 
public meeting without prior approval from the Governor. In addition, it prohibits 
the announcement and the advertising of a meeting, except after getting 
approval and a licence from the Governor. Article (5) stipulates that a request 
for a licence to hold a public meeting must be signed by at least three and no 
more than five, Kuwaiti citizens registered in the voter's register. The request 
must include their names, professions, place of residence, the place and time of 
the meeting and the purpose of the meeting. This combined with the stipulation 
in article (12) that prohibits the participation of non-citizens in public meetings, 
processions and demonstrations, reveals the extent of the discrimination that is 
levied to the majority of the people living in Kuwait. 
The amendments go further to give the Governor through Article (7) the right to 
suspend any meeting if it disturbs security and public order. 94 Such a sweeping 
statement gives the Governor discretionary powers in fact, to stop any meeting 
from taking place under the pretext of interfering with public order. Articles (11) 
and (14) give the right to the police force to attend public meetings under the 
pretext of maintaining law and order, in addition to giving them the right to 
disperse a meeting if requested by the organising committee and/or in order to 
maintain law and public order. 
The Clubs and Public Associations law. This law affects the development of 
civil association and the life of non-Kuwaitis in particular. Law No. 24 (1962) 
9~ Law of Public Assembly and Procession. No.65. 1979. 
94 Ibid. 
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has been amended four times: Law No. 28 (1965); Law No. 75 (1988), Law No. 
12 (1993), and Law No. 14 (1994). The most important restrictive articles of the 
law are articles 4, 6, and 11. Article (4) allows only Kuwaiti citizens to form 
clubs and associations, while Article (11) allows only Kuwaiti citizens to be on 
the boards of clubs and associations. Again, considering the huge non-Kuwaiti 
population in Kuwait, one can imagine the severe limiting nature of the law on 
the many thousands of non-Kuwaiti nationals who work and reside in Kuwait. 
Article (6) of law 24 (1962) forbids clubs and associations to have any: 
interference in politics, religious disputes or incitement of racism, sectarianism 
and factionalism. 95 This gives the government a huge latitude since anything 
could be interpreted as interfering in politics or inciting racism, sectarianism and 
factionalism. 
The other leverage that the government has over public association is stipulated 
in Article (27). The Article gives the Minister of Work and Social Affairs the right 
to dissolve a club and an association and/or should he see fit, the right to 
temporarily replace the elected board by another board appointed by the 
Minister. This Article was amended in law No. 75 (1988) to give the right of 
dissolving clubs and associations to the cabinet, under a blanket stipulation of: if 
that was necessary to protect the public interest and public security. 96 It also 
extended the authority of the Minister of Work and Social Affairs to be able to 
replace the elected board by an appointed one, to remaining office for an 
unlimited period of time. 
The development of democratic practices need to be rooted in the society and 
the only way for that to happen would be to allow public gatherings, civil 
association, clubs etc to develop, without these people being denied the 
opportunity to organise responsible debates and develop action plans. 
95 Clubs and Public Associations Law No.24. 1962. 
96 Clubs and Public Associations Law No.75. 1988. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
Kuwaiti citizens succeeded in the post-liberation period to regain their National 
Assembly and to fulfil a demand that has been reiterated since the second 
suspension of the assembly in 1986. This occurred due to the huge pressure 
exerted on al Sabah by all political groups in Kuwait and not simply as a result 
of al Sabah keeping the promises they had made while they were in exile, 
during the Iraqi invasion. The significance of forcing this concession of al 
Sabah reveal that civil society has room for manoeuvre and this gives hope that 
state power can be curtailed by civil society. 
The main reason why al Sabah were not disposed to concede willingly lies in 
the fact that the basis of their legitimacy and power was not undermined. Oil 
revenues remain the major source of state expenditure and the livelihood of 
Kuwaitis depends on the redistribution of that wealth into the economy. This 
factor combined with the inability of the different political groupings to present 
itself as an alternative source of state power undermine the power of civil 
society vis a vis al Sabah. Nonetheless, most of the sensitive issues about 
government accountability, fiscal control and corruption as well as widening 
political participation and guaranteeing individual freedoms, remain very hot 
topics of discussion and are a source of friction and tension between the 
assembly and the government. 
The Iraqi occupation exposed Kuwait's security and vulnerability to a great 
extent and that became a concern for both Kuwaiti citizens and the ruling family. 
However, the manner which al Sabah took to rectify this was to focus on a very 
narrow understanding of security and to also focus on military expenditure and 
bi-Iateral defence agreements with the West. Kuwaiti citizens, as expressed by 
their aim to achieve democratisation, took the view that deepening and 
expanding participatory politics was the key for maintaining the sovereignty and 
security of Kuwait. Without more cooperation and coordination among all the 
opposition groups in Kuwait very little can be achieved in order to advance the 
case of establishing any genuine democracy in Kuwait. 
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Conclusion 
Three major concluding pOints can be identified from this study about citizenship, 
political participation and the National Assembly of Kuwait. These pOints emphasis 
on the hand that the central problem in realising genuine democracy in Kuwait 
arises from the determination of al Sabah to preserve its power while on the other 
they show the usefulness and the importance of employing the concept of 
citizenship in the analysis of the relation between state and society in Kuwait. In 
that, the study has supported the work being undertaking by a number of writers on 
the Middle East who focus on the citizenship concept including Tetreault, Longva, 
and Butenschon. 
The first point relates to the importance of the strategies used by the ruling family 
to limit any challenge to its authority. Thus, we see in the experience of the Kuwaiti 
National Assembly how the particular mechanisms used by al Sabah to apply the 
stipulations of the Kuwaiti Constitution for the creation of a representative system 
of government allowed, on the one hand the enhancement and the widening of the 
ruling family basis of legitimacy while, on the other hand, caused the emergence of 
a fractured and ineffective model of democracy. The restriction of citizenship to a 
very small proportion of the population created an elite institution of the National 
Assembly, representing the interests of a very small proportion of the population, 
while through election law that elite institution has been fractured along traditional 
lines of affiliations increasing the relevance of family, tribe and sect interests on the 
expense of creating a common attachment to the state. The election law, contrary 
to the stipulated principle of universal suffrage in the Kuwaiti constitution, has 
excluded Kuwaiti women from political participation, despite their involvement in 
many aspects of the economy and the civil apparatus of the state. The problem is 
not the presence of divisions in society, whether they are tribal, ethnic, sectarian or 
ideological, but it is the manner which the state manages these divisions, that is of 
utmost importance. In the case of Kuwait these divisions have been exaggerated 
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in order to maintain the dominance of al Sabah to the detriment of developing a 
common sense of citizenship among the larger population. 
The second concluding pOint relates to the centrality of oil in building and 
maintaining the legitimacy of al Sabah. It is an indisputable fact that oil provided al 
Sabah with the opportunity to widen its base of legitimacy and enhance its 
domination over Kuwaiti's society. However, that factor did not necessarily 
translate into having an autonomous power separated from society. Kuwaiti 
citizens showed immense loyalty to al Sabah, which was exemplified with their firm 
stand behind them during the Iraqi occupation. However, these citizens have not 
been completely passive. On the contrary, Kuwaitis have always been very active 
in political debates, by criticising and exerting pressure and putting demands on 
the executive to create a more accountable government and a better functioning 
representative system of government. The problem lies in their ineffectiveness 
which is partly because of the exaggeration of - and the importance attached to -
the divisions of Kuwaitis along ideological, tribal and sectarian lines. That causes 
friction and rivalries among the opposition and personalises the political process 
but also gives al Sabah the ability to play these diverse groups against each other. 
The third concluding point relates to the prospect of achieving a more democratic 
system of government. Kuwait, like other Gulf states, is not ordained to remain 
authoritarian or have an unstable democracy, since the main reason for the limited 
development of democracy relates directly to the practices of the state and the 
ruling family. However, changing that, as the post-liberation period has shown, 
might not be an easy task, especially in light of the fragmentation of the society and 
the lack of political cooperation and accommodation beyond the limits of family, 
tribe, sect etc... However, it is not impossible. The impact of education, 
urbanisation and a global trends all moves towards political-liberation across the 
developing world. In addition to that, Kuwait has the already experienced changes 
in the political economy due to fluctuation in oil prices, so this on the long run will 
increase pressures from below and create opportunities for a far better functioning 
representative system of government to be established. The writer shares Gerd 
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Nonneman's optimism that there may be potential for further but extremely gradual 
evolution towards more substantial participation by Kuwaitis in the political 
process.1 However this remains highly constrained and problematic in the absence 
of a genuine change in al Sabah's basic determination to retain its power to rule. 
Nonetheless demands to effect the following changes have been a recurring theme 
for opposition groups, and these can open up the possibility of creating a sense of 
common citizenship and a better functioning representative system of government: 
1. The expansion of suffrage through lowering the age of voting to 18 and granting 
women the right to vote in order to create a more inclusive political system. 
2. Solving the persisting problem of bidoons and reducing the restrictions on their 
ability to acquire Kuwaiti citizenship through naturalisation. 
3. Lifting the ban on the formation of political parties, which is essential for two 
main reasons. The first is to lessen the effects of traditional forms of 
attachments and ties and secondly, to raise the political debate to the level 
where discussion revolves around programmes, policies and issues that directly 
influence people's lives, thus deputies are elected not based on personal 
contacts, but because they have clear programmes and a set mandate which 
attract voters. 
4. Decentralisation of the government through establishing elected municipal 
councils thus increasing the accountability of state officials and increasing 
interaction between the people and the government.2 
Changes in the international oil market, due to the construction of the Caspian Sea 
oil pipeline, might well reduce the importance of the Gulf area in the world 
1 See Gerd Nonneman (ed.) Political and Economic Liberalization, Dynamics and Linkages in Comparati\e 
Perspective. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1996). p.59. 
2 Khaldun AI-Naqib. (al-Naqeeb, Khaldhun). Sira' al-qabila wa al-dimuqratiya: halat al-kuwayt. (The Contlict 
between Tribalism and Democracy: the case of Kuwait). London: Dar al-saqi. 1996). p.163 and 171-172 
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economy, and this might create opportunities for a new source of legitimacy for 
Gulf states to emerge, based on representation and accountability. Opposition in 
Kuwait, regardless of the continuation or a shift in the importance of Gulf oil has a 
huge responsibility to move beyond the rhetoric and rise to the challenge by 
coordinating efforts and presenting a coherent and solid front in order to extract 
concessions from the executive branch which will allow for a better functioning 
representative system of government. 
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Appendix A 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT 
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful, 
We, ABDULLAH aI-SALIM al-SABAH AMIR of the State of Kuwait, Being desirous of 
consummating the means of democratic rule for our dear Country; and, Having faith in the 
role of this Country in the furtherance of Arab nationalism and the promotion of world 
peace and human civilisation and, Striving towards a better future in which the Country 
enjoys greater prosperity and higher international standing, and in which also the citizens 
are provided with more political freedom, equality and social justice a future which upholds 
the traditions inherent in the Arab nature by enhancing the dignity of the individual, 
safeguarding public interest, and applying consultative rule yet maintaining the unity and 
stability of the Country; and, Having considered Law Number I of 1962 concerning the 
system of Government during the period of transition; and, Upon the resolution of the 
Constituent Assembly; Do hereby approve this Constitution and promulgate it. 
PART I 
THE STATE AND THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
Article 1 
Kuwait is an Arab State, independent and fully sovereign. Neither its sovereignty nor any 
part of its territory may be relinquished. The people of Kuwait is a part of the Arab Nation. 
Article 2 
The religion of the State IS Islam, and the Islamic Sharia shall be a mam source of 
legislation. 
Article 3 
318 
The official language of the State is Arabic. 
Article 4 
Kuwait is a hereditary Amirate, the succession to which shall be in the descendants of the 
late Mubarak al-Sabah. The Heir Apparent shall be designated within one year. at the latest. 
from the date of accession of the Amir. His designation shall be effected by an Amiri Order 
upon the nomination of the Amir and the approval of the National Assembly which shall be 
signified by a majority vote of its members in a special sitting. 
In case no designation is achieved in accordance with the foregoing procedure, the Amir 
shall nominate at least three of the descendants of the late Mubarak al-Sabah of whom the 
National Assembly shall pledge allegiance to one as Heir Apparent. 
The Heir Apparent shall have attained his majority, be of sound mind and a legitimate son 
of Muslim parents. • 
A special law promulgated within one year from the date of coming into force of this 
Constitution shall lay down the other rules of succession in the Amirate. The said law shall 
be of a constitutional nature and there fore shall be capable of amendment only by the 
procedure prescribed for amendment of the Constitution. 
Article 5 
The flag, emblem, badges, decorations and National Anthem of the State shall be specified 
by law. 
Article 6 
The System of Government in Kuwait shall be democratic, under which sovereignty resides 
in the people. the source of all powers. Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner 
specified in this Constitution. 
PART II 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUENTS OF THE 
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KUWAITI SOCIETY 
Article 7 
Justice, Liberty and Equality are the pillars of Society; co-operation and mutual help are the 
firmest bonds between citizens. 
Article 8 
The State safeguards the pillars of Society and ensures security. tranquillity and equal 
opportunities for citizens. 
Article 9 
The family is the corner-stone of Society. It is founded on religion, morality and patriotism. 
Law shall preserve the integrity of the family, strengthen its ties and protect under its 
auspices motherhood and child hood. 
Article 10 
The State cares for the young and protects them from exploitation and from moral, physical 
and spiritual neglect. 
Article 11 
The State ensures aid for citizens in old age, sickness or inability to work. It also provides 
them with services of social security, social aid and medical care. 
Article 12 
The State safeguards the heritage of Islam and of the Arabs and contributes to the 
furtherance of human civilisation. 
Article 13 
Education is a fundamental requisite for the progress of society. assured and promoted hy 
the State. 
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Article 14 
The State shall promote SCIence, letters and the arts and encourage scientific research 
therein. 
Article 15 
The State cares for public health and for means of prevention and treatment of diseases and 
epidemics. 
Article 16 
Property, capital and work are fundamental constituents of the social structure of the State 
and of the national wealth. They are all individual rights with a social function as regulated 
bylaw. 
Article 17 
Public property is inviolable and its protection is the duty of every citizen. 
Article 18 
Private property is inviolable. No one shall be prevented from disposing of his property 
except within the limits of law. No property shall be expropriated except for the public 
benefit in the circumstances and manner specified by law, and on condition that just 
compensation is paid. Inheritance is a right governed by the Islamic Sharia. 
Article 19 
General confiscation of the property of any person shall be prohibited. Confiscation of 
particular property as a penalty may not be inflicted except by a court judgment in the 
circumstances specified by law. 
Article 20 
The national economy shall be based on social justice. It is founded on fair L'o-operation 
between public and private acti \'ities. Its aim shall be economic development. i JlCr('~l~(' of 
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productivity, improvement of the standard of living and achievement of prosperity for 
citizens, all within the limits of law. 
Article 21 
Natural resources and all revenues there from are the property of the State. It shall ensure 
their preservation and proper exploitation due regard being given to the requirements of 
State security and the national economy. 
Article 22 
Relations between employers and employees and between landlords and tenants shall be 
regulated by law on economic principles, due regard being given to the rules of social 
justice. 
Article 23 
The State shall encourage both co-operative activities and savmgs, and supervIse the 
system of credit. 
Article 24 
Social justice shall be the basis of taxes and public imposts. 
Article 25 
The State shall ensure the solidarity of society in shouldering burdens resulting from public 
disasters and calamities and provide compensation for war damages or injuries received by 
any person as a result of the discharge of his military duties. 
Article 26 
Public office is a national service entrusted to those who hold it. Public officials, in the 
exercise of their duties, shall aim at the public interest. Aliens may not hold public offices 
except in the cases specified by law. 
PART III 
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PUBLIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Article 27 
Kuwaiti nationality shall be defined by law. No deprivation or withdrawal of nationality 
may be effected except within the limits prescribed by law. 
Article 28 
No Kuwaiti may be deported from Kuwait or prevented from returning thereto. 
Article 29 
All people are equal in human dignity, and in public rights and duties before the law. 
without distinction as to race, origin, language or religion. 
Article 30 
Personal liberty is guaranteed. 
Article 31 
No person shall be arrested, detained, searched or compelled to reside in a specified place, 
nor shall the residence of any person or his liberty to choose his place of residence or his 
f 
liberty of movement be restricted, except in accordance with the provisions of law. No 
person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading treatment. 
Article 32 
No crime and no penalty may be established except by virtue of law, and no penalty may be 
imposed except for offences committed after the relevant law has come into force. 
Article 33 
Penalty is personal. 
Article 34 
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An accused person is presumed innocent until proved guilty in a legal trial at which the 
necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence are secured. The infliction of 
physical or moral injury on an accused person is prohibited. 
Article 35 
Freedom of belief is absolute. The State protects the freedom of practicing religion in 
accordance with established customs, provided that it does not conflict with public policy 
or morals. 
Article 36 
Freedom of opinion and of scientific research shall be guaranteed. Every person shall have 
the right to express and propagate his opinion verbally, in writing or otherwise, in 
accordance with the conditions and procedures specified by law. 
Article 37 
Freedom of the press, printing and publishing shall be guaranteed in accordance with the 
conditions and manner specified by law. 
Article 38 
Places of residence shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without the permission of 
their occupants except in the circumstances and manner specified by law. 
Article 39 
Freedom of communication by post, telegraph and telephone and the secrecy thereof shall 
be guaranteed; accordingly, censorship of communications and disclosure of their contents 
shall not be permitted except in the circumstances and manner specified by law. 
Article 40 
Education is a right for Kuwaitis, guaranteed by the State in accordance \vith law and 
within the limits of public policy and morals. Education in its preliminary stages shall be 
compulsory and free in accordance with law. 
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Law shall lay down the necessary plan to eliminate illiteracy. The State shall devote 
particular care to the physical, moral and mental development of youth. 
Article 41 
Every Kuwaiti has the right to work and to choose the type of his work. Work is a duty of 
every citizen necessitated by personal dignity and public good. The State shall endeavour to 
make it available to citizens and to make its terms equitable. 
Article 42 
There shall be no forced labour except in the cases specified by law for national emergency 
and with just remuneration. 
Article 43 
Freedom to form associations and unions on a national basis and by peaceful means shall 
be guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manner specified by law. No one may 
be compelled to join any association or union. 
Article 44 
Individuals shall have the right of private assembly without permission or prior notification, 
and the police may not attend such private meetings. Public meetings, processions and 
gatherings shall be permitted in accordance with the conditions and manner specified by 
law, provided that their purpose and means are peaceful and not contrary to morals. 
Article 45 
Every individual shall have the right to address the public authorities in writing over his 
signature. Only duly constituted organisations and bodies corporate shall have the right to 
address the authorities collectively. 
Article 46 
Extradition of political refugees is prohibited. 
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Article 47 
National defence is a sacred duty, and military service is an honour for citizens which shall 
be regulated by law. 
Article 48 
Payment of taxes and public imposts is a duty in accordance with law which shall regulate 
exemption of small incomes from taxes in such a way as to maintain the minimum standard 
of living. 
Article 49 
Observance of public order and respect for public morals are a duty incumbent upon all 
inhabitants of Kuwait. 
PART IV 
POWERS 
Chapter 1- General Provisions 
Article 50 
The system of Government is based on the principle of separation of powers functioning in 
co-operation with each other in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. None of 
these powers may relinquish all or part of its competence specified in this Constitution. 
Article 51 
Legislative power shall be vested in the Amir and the National Assembly in accordance 
with the Constitution. 
Article 52 
Executive power shall be vested in the Amir, the Cabinet and the Ministers, in the manner 
specified by the Constitution. 
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Article 53 
Judicial power shall be vested in the Courts, which shall exercise it in the name of the Amir 
within the limits of the Constitution. 
Chapter II - The Head of State 
Article 54 
The Amir is the head of the State. His person shall be immune and inviolable. 
Article 55 
The Amir shall exercise his powers through his Ministers. 
Article 56 
The Amir shall, after the traditional consultations, appoint the Prime Minister and relieve 
him of office. The Amir shall also appoint Ministers and relieve them of office upon the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister. Ministers shall be appointed from amongst the 
members of the National Assembly and from others. The number of Ministers in all shall 
not exceed one-third of the number of the members of the National Assembly. 
Article 57 
The Cabinet shall be re-constituted in the manner specified in the preceding Article at the 
beginning of every legislative term of the National Assembly. 
Article 58 
The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Amir for the 
general policy of the State. Every Minister shall also be individually responsible to the 
Amir for the affairs of his ministry. 
Article 59 
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The Law referred to in Article 4 of this Constitution shall specify the conditions under 
which the Amir shall exercise his constitutional powers. 
Article 60 
Before assuming his powers the Amir shall take the following oath at a special sitting of the 
National Assembly: 
(I swear by Almighty God to respect the Constitution and the laws of the State, to defend 
the liberties, interests and properties of the people and to safeguard the independence and 
territorial integrity of the Country.) 
Article 61 
In the event of his absence outside the Country and the inability of the Heir Apparent to act 
as Deputy for him, the Amir shall appoint, by an Amiri Order, a Deputy who shall exercise 
his powers during his absence. The said Amiri Order may include a specified arrangement 
for the exercise of the said powers on behalf of the Amir, or a limitation of their scope. 
Article 62 
The Amir's Deputy shall satisfy the qualifications laid down in Article 82 of this 
Constitution. If he is a Minister or a member of the National Assembly he shall not take 
part in the ministerial functions or in the work of the Assembly during the period he is 
acting as Deputy for the Amir. 
Article 63 
Before assuming his powers the Amir's Deputy shall, at a special sitting of the National 
Assembly, take the oath mentioned in Article 60 of this Constitution with the following 
phrase added thereto (and be loyal to the Amir. ) In case the National Assembly is not in 
session, the Oath shall be taken before the Amir. 
Article 64 
The provisions of Article 131 of this Constitution shall apply to the Amir's Deputy. 
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Article 65 
The Amir shall have the right to initiate, sanction and promulgate laws. Promulgation of 
laws shall take place within thirty days from the date of their submission by the r-\ational 
Assembly to the Amir. This period shall be reduced to seven days in case of urgency. Such 
urgency shall be decided upon by a majority vote of the members constituting the National 
Assembly. 
Official holidays shall not be counted in computing the promulgation period. 
If the period of promulgation expires without the Head of State demanding reconsideration, 
the bill shall be considered as having been sanctioned and shall be promulgated. 
Article 66 
Reference of a bill for reconsideration shall be by a decree stating the grounds therefore. If 
the National Assembly confirms the bill by a two-thirds majority vote of its members the 
Amir shall sanction and promulgate the bill within thirty days from its submission to him. 
If the bill does not receive the said majority, it shall not be reconsidered during the same 
session. If the National Assembly, in another session, confmns the same bill by a majority 
vote of its members, the Amir shall sanction and promulgate the bill as law within thirty 
days from its submission to him. 
Article 67 
The Amir is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He appoints and dismisses 
officers in accordance with law. 
Article 68 
The Amir shall declare defensive war by decree. Offensive war is prohibited. 
Article 69 
The Amir shall proclaim Martial Law in the cases of necessity deter mined by law and in 
accordance with the procedure specified therein. The proclamation of Martial Law shall he 
329 
by decree. Such decree shall be referred to the National Assembly within the fifteen days 
following its issue, for a decision on the future of Martial Law. If the proclamation takes 
place during the period the National Assembly is dissolved it shall be referred to the new 
Assembly at its first sitting. 
Martial Law may not continue unless a decision to that effect is made by a majority vote of 
the members constituting the Assembly. In all cases the matter shall be referred to the 
National Assembly in accordance with the foregoing procedure, every three months. 
Article 70 
The Amir shall conclude treaties by decree and shall transmit them immediately to the 
National Assembly with the appropriate statement. A treaty shall have the force of law after 
it is signed, ratified and published in the Official Gazette. 
However, treaties of peace and alliance; treaties concerning the territory of the State, its 
natural resources or sovereign rights, or public or private rights of citizens; treaties of 
commerce, navigation and residence; and treaties which entail additional expenditure not 
provided for in the budget, or which involve amendment of the laws of Kuwait; shall come 
into force only when made by a law. In no case may treaties include secret provisions 
contradicting those declared. 
Article 71 
Should necessity arise for urgent measures to be taken while the National Assembly is not 
in session or is dissolved, the Amir may issue decrees in respect thereof which shall have 
the force of law, provided that they shall not be contrary to the Constitution or to the 
appropriations included in the budget law. 
Such decrees shall be referred to the National Assembly within the fifteen days following 
their issue if the Assembly is in being. If it is dissolved or its legislative term has expired 
such decrees shall be referred to the next Assembly at its first sitting. If they are not thus 
referred they shall retrospectively cease to have the force of law, without the necessity of 
any decision to that effect. If they are referred and the Assembly does not confirm them. 
they shall retrospectively cease to have the force of law. unless the Assembly approves 
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their validity for the preceding period or settles in some other way the effects arising there 
from. 
Article 72 
The Amir shall, by decree, issue the regulations necessary for the execution of laws without 
amending or suspending such laws or making any exemption from their execution. A law 
may prescribe a less formal instrument than a decree for the issue of the regulations 
necessary for its execution. 
Article 73 
The Amir shall, by decree, issue regulations for public order and health, and regulations 
necessary for the organisation of public services and administration, not conflicting with 
any law. 
Article 74 
The Amir shall appoint and dismiss civil and military officials and diplomatic 
representatives to foreign countries in accordance with law. He shall also accept credentials 
of the representatives of foreign countries. 
Article 75 
The Amir may, by decree, grant a pardon or commute a sentence. However, general 
amnesty shall not be granted except by a law and then only in respect of offences 
committed prior to the proposal of the amnesty. 
Article 76 
The Amir shall confer Orders of Honour in accordance with law. 
Article 77 
Coins shall be minted in the name of the Amir in accordance with law. 
Article 78 
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Upon the accession of the Head of State his annual emoluments shall be flxed by a law for 
the duration of his reign. 
Chapter ITI - Legislative Power 
Article 79 
No law may be promulgated unless it has been passed by the National Assembly and 
sanctioned by the Amir. 
Article 80 
The National Assembly shall be composed of fifty members elected directly by universal 
suffrage and secret ballot in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the electoral law. 
Ministers who are not elected members of the National Assembly shall be considered ex-
officio members thereof. 
Article 81 
Electoral constituencies shall be determined by law. 
Article 82 
A member of the National Assembly shall 
(a) be a Kuwaiti by origin in accordance with law. 
(b) be qualified as an elector in accordance with the electoral law . 
(c) be not less than thirty calendar years of age on the day of election. 
(d) be able to read and write Arabic well. 
Article 83 
The tenn of the National Assembly shall be four calendar years commencing with the day 
of its first sitting. Elections for the new Assembly shall take place within the sixty days 
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preceding the expiry of the said tenn, due regard being given to the provisions of Article 
107. 
Members whose tenn of office expires may be re-elected. 
The tenn of the Assembly may not be extended except for necessity in time of war and by a 
law. 
Article 84 
If, for any reason, a seat in the National Assembly becomes vacant before the end of the 
tenn, the vacancy shall be filled by election within two months from the date on which the 
Assembly declares the vacancy. The mandate of the new member shall last until the end of 
that of his predecessor. 
If the vacancy occurs within six months prior to the expiry of the legislative tenn of the 
Assembly no successor shall be elected. 
Article 85 
The National Assembly shall have an annual session of not less than eight months. The said 
session may not be prorogued before the budget is approved. 
Article 86 
The Assembly shall start its ordinary session during the month of October of every year 
upon a convocation by the Amir. If the decree of convocation is not issued before the first 
of the said month, the time for the meeting shall be deemed to be 9 a.m. on the third 
Saturday of that month. If such day happens to be an official holiday, the Assembly shall 
meet on the morning of the first day thereafter. 
Article 87 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two Articles the Amir shall summon the 
National Assembly to hold its frrst meeting within two weeks of the end of the general 
election. If the decree of convocation is not issued within the said period, the Assembly 
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shall be deemed to have been convoked for the morning of the day following these two 
weeks, due regard being given to the relevant provision of the preceding Article. 
If the date of the meeting of the Assembly falls after the annual date mentioned in Article 
86 of the Constitution, the term of the session specified in Article 85 shall be reduced by 
the difference between the said two dates. 
Article 88 
The National Assembly shall, by decree, be called to an extraordinary session if the Amir 
deems it necessary, or upon the demand of the majority of the members of the Assembly. 
In an extraordinary session the Assembly may not consider matters other than those for 
which it has been convened except with the consent of the Cabinet. 
Article 89 
The Amir shall announce the prorogation of ordinary and extra ordinary sessions. 
Article 90 
Every meeting held by the Assembly at a time or place other than that assigned for its 
meeting shall be invalid, and resolutions passed thereat shall, by virtue of law, be void. 
Article 91 
Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or in its committees, a member of the National 
Assembly shall take the following oath before the Assembly in a public sitting 
(I swear by Almighty God to be faithful to the Country and to the Amir, to respect the 
Constitution and the laws of the State, to defend the liberties, interests and properties of the 
people and to discharge my duties honestly and truthfully.) 
Article 92 
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The National Assembly shall elect at its first sitting and for the duration of its tenn a 
President and a Deputy President from amongst its members. If either office becomes 
vacant the Assembly shall elect a successor for the remainder of its tenn. 
In all cases election shall be by an absolute majority vote of the members present. If this 
majority vote is not attained in the first ballot, another election shall be held between the 
two candidates receiving the highest number of votes. If more than one candidate receives 
an equal number of votes in the second place, all such candidates shall participate in the 
second ballot. In this case the candidate who receives the greatest number of votes shall be 
elected. If there is a tie in this last ballot, the choice shall be by lot. 
The oldest member shall preside over the first sitting until the President is elected. 
Article 93 
The Assembly shall form, within the first week of its annual seSSIOn, the committees 
necessary for its functions. These committees may discharge their duties during the recess 
of the Assembly with a view to submitting their recommendations to it when it meets. 
Article 94 
Sittings of the National Assembly shall be public, though they may be held in secret upon 
the request of the Government, the President of the Assembly or ten of its members. The 
debate on such request shall be held in secret. 
Article 95 
The National Assembly shall decide upon the validity of the election of its members. No 
election may be declared invalid except by a majority vote of the members constituting the 
Assembly. This jurisdiction may, by law, be entrusted to a judicial body. 
Article 96 
The National Assembly shall be the competent authority to accept resignation of its 
members. 
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Article 97 
For a meeting of the National Assembly to be valid more than half of its members must be 
present. Resolutions shall be passed by an absolute majority vote of the members present, 
except in cases where a special majority is required. When votes are equally divided, the 
motion shall be deem to be rejected. 
Article 98 
Immediately upon its formation, every Cabinet shall present its programme to the National 
Assembly. The Assembly may make comments with regard to such a programme. 
Article 99 
Every member of the National Assembly may put to the Prime Minister and to Ministers 
questions with a view to clarifying matters falling within their competence. The questioner 
alone shall have the right to comment once upon the answer. 
Article 100 
Every member of the National Assembly may address to the Prime Minister and to 
Ministers interpellations with regard to matters falling within their competence. 
The debate on such an interpellation shall not take place until at least eight days have 
elapsed after its presentation, except in case of urgency and with the consent of the Minister 
concerned. 
Subject to the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 of the Constitution, an interpellation may 
lead to the question of no-confidence being put to the Assembly. 
Article 101 
Every Minister shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the affairs of his ministry. 
If the Assembly passes a vote of no-confidence against a Minister. he shall be considered to 
have resigned his office as from the date of the vote of no-confidence and shall 
immediately submit his formal resignation. The question of confidence in a Minister may 
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not be raised except upon his request or upon a demand signed by ten members, following a 
debate on an interpellation addressed to him. The Assembly may not make its decision 
upon such a request before the lapse of seven days from the presentation thereof. 
Withdrawal of confidence from a Minister shall be by a majority vote of the members 
constituting the Assembly excluding Ministers. Ministers shall not participate in the vote of 
confidence. 
Article 102 
The Prime Minister shall not hold any portfolio; nor shall the question of confidence in him 
be raised before the National Assembly. 
Nevertheless, if the National Assembly decides, in the manner specified in the preceding 
Article, that it cannot co-operate with the Prime Minister, the matter shall be submitted to 
the Head of State. In such a case the Amir may either relieve the Prime Minister of office 
and appoint a new Cabinet or dissolve the National Assembly. 
In the event of dissolution, if the new Assembly decides by the above- mentioned majority 
vote that it cannot co-operate with the said Prime Minister, he shall be considered to have 
resigned as from the date of the decision of the Assembly in this respect, and a new Cabinet 
shall be formed. 
Article 103 
If, for any reason, the Prime Minister or a Minister vacates his office, he shall continue to 
discharge the urgent business thereof until his successor is appointed. 
Article 104 
The Amir shall open the annual session of the National Assembly whereupon he shall 
deliver an Amiri Speech reviewing the situation of the country and the important public 
matters which happened during the preceding year, and outlining the projects and refonns 
the Government plans to undertake during the coming year. 
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The Amir may depute the Prime Minister to open the Assembly or to deliver the Amiri 
Speech. 
Article 105 
The National Assembly shall choose, from amongst its members, a committee to draft the 
reply to the Amiri Speech which will embody the comments and wishes of the Assembly. 
After the said reply has been approved by the Assembly, it shall be submitted to the Amir. 
Article 106 
The Amir may, by a decree, adjourn the meeting of the National Assembly for a period not 
exceeding one month. Adjournment may be repeated during the same session with the 
consent of the Assembly and then once only. A period of adjournment shall not be counted 
in computing the duration of the session. 
Article 107 
The Amir may dissolve the National Assembly by a decree in which the reasons for 
dissolution shall be indicated. However, dissolution of the Assembly may not be repeated 
for the same reasons. 
In the event of dissolution, elections for the new Assembly shall be held within a period rot 
exceeding two months from the date of dissolution. 
If the elections are not held within the said period the dissolved Assembly shall be restored 
to its full constitutional authority and shall meet immediately as if the dissolution had not 
taken place. The Assembly shall then continue functioning until the new Assembly is 
elected. 
Article 108 
A member of the Assembly represents the whole nation. He shall safeguard the public 
interest and shall not be subject to any authority in the discharge of his duties in the 
Assembly or in its committees. 
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Article 109 
A member of the Assembly shall have the right to initiate bills. 
No bill initiated by a member and rejected by the National Assembly may be re-introduced 
during the same session. 
Article 110 
A member of the National Assembly shall be free to express any views or opinions in the 
Assembly or in its committees. Under no circumstances shall he be held liable in respect 
thereof. 
Article 111 
Except in cases of flagrant delicto, no measures of inquiry, search, arrest, detention or any 
other penal measure may be taken against a member while the Assembly is in session, 
except with the authorisation of the Assembly. The Assembly shall be notified of any penal 
measure that may be taken during its session in accordance with the foregoing provision. 
The Assembly shall always at its first meeting be notified of any such measure taken 
against any of its members while it was not sitting. In all cases, if the Assembly does not 
give a decision regarding a request for authorisation within one month from the date of its 
receipt, permission shall be deemed to have been given. 
Article 112 
Upon a request signed by five members, any subject of general interest may be put to the 
National Assembly for discussion with a view to securing clarification of the Government's 
policy and to exchanging views thereon. All other members shall also have the right to 
participate in the discussion. 
Article 113 
The National Assembly may express to the Government wishes regarding public matters. If 
the Government cannot comply with these wishes. it shall state to the Assembly the reasons 
therefore. The Assembly may comment once on the Government's statement. 
339 
Article 114 
The National Assembly shall at all times have the right to set up committees of inquiry or 
to delegate one or more of its members to investigate any matter within its competence. 
Ministers and all Government officials must produce testimonials, documents and 
statements requested from them. 
Article 115 
The Assembly shall set up, among its annual standing committees, a special committee to 
deal with petitions and complaints submitted to the Assembly by citizens. The committee 
shall seek explanation thereon from the competent authorities and shall inform the person 
concerned of the result. 
A member of the National Assembly may not interfere with the work of either the Judicial 
or the Executive Power. 
Article 116 
The Prime Minister and Ministers shall be given the floor whenever they ask for it. They 
may call for assistance upon any senior officials or depute them to speak on their behalf. 
The Assembly may ask for a Minister to be present whenever a matter relating to his 
ministry is under discussion. The Cabinet shall be represented in the sittings of the 
Assembly by the Prime Minister or by some Ministers. 
Article 117 
The National Assembly shall lay down its standing orders which shall include the 
procedure of the Assembly and its committees, and the rules pertaining to discussion. 
voting, questions, interpellation and all other functions prescribed in the Constitution. The 
standing orders shall prescribe the sanctions to be imposed on any member who violates 
order or absents himself from the meetings of the Assembly or the committees without a 
legitimate excuse. 
Article 118 
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The maintenance of order in the National Assembly shall be the responsibility of its 
President. The Assembly shall have a special guard under the authority of the President of 
the Assembly. No anned forces may enter the Assembly or be stationed close to its gates 
unless so requested by the President. 
Article 119 
The remuneration of the President of the National Assembly, the Deputy President and the 
Members shall be fixed by law. In the event of a modification of the said remuneration, 
such modification shall not take effect until the next legislative term. 
Article 120 
Membership of the National Assembly shall be incompatible with public office except in 
the cases where compatibility is permitted in accordance with the Constitution. In such 
cases the right to the remuneration for membership and the right to the salary of the public 
office shall not be cumulated. The law shall specify other cases of incompatibility. 
Article 121 
During his mandate a member of the National Assembly shall not be appointed on the 
board of directors of a company, nor shall he participate in concessions granted by the 
Government or by public bodies. 
Further, during the said mandate, he shall not buy or rent any property of the State, nor 
shall he let, sell or barter any of his property to the Government, except by public auction 
or tender, or in compliance with the system of compulsory acquisition. 
Article 122 
During their mandate, members of the National Assembly with the exception of those 
occupying a public office not incompatible with the membership of the National Assembly. 
may not be awarded decorations. 
Chapter IV The Executive Power 
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Section I - The Cabinet 
Article 123 
The Council of Ministers shall have control over the departments of the State. It shall 
formulate the general policy of the Government, pursue its execution and supervise the 
conduct of work in Government departments. 
Article 124 
A law shall determine the remuneration of the Prime Minister and the Ministers. 
All other provisions regarding Ministers shall apply to the Prime Minister unless otherwise 
stated. 
Article 125 
A Minister shall satisfy the qualifications laid down in Article 82 of this Constitution. 
Article 126 
Before assuming office the Prime Minister and Ministers shall take before the Amir the 
Oath specified in Article 91 of this Constitution. 
Article 127 
The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers and 
supervise the co-ordination of work among the various ministries. 
Article 128 
Deliberations of the Council of Ministers shall be secret. Resolutions shall be passed only 
when the majority of its members are present and with the approval of the majority of those 
present. In case of an equal division of votes the side on which the Prime Minister has 
voted shall prevail. Unless they resign, the minority shall abide by the opinion of the 
majority. 
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Resolutions of the Council of Ministers shall be submitted to the Amir for approval in cases 
where the issue of a decree is required. 
Article 129 
The resignation of the Prime Minister or his removal from office shall involve the 
resignation or removal of all other Ministers. 
Article 130 
Every Minister shall supervise the affairs of his ministry and shall execute therein the 
general policy of the Government. He shall also formulate directives for the ministry and 
supervise their execution. 
Article 131 
While in office, a Minister shall not hold any other public office or practice, even 
indirectly, any profession or undertake any industrial, commercial or financial business. 
Further, he shall not participate in any concession granted by the Government or by public 
bodies or cumulate the ministerial post with membership of the board of directors of any 
company. 
Further, during the said period, a Minister shall not buy or take on hire any property of the 
State even by public auction, nor shall he let, sell or barter any of his property to the 
Government. 
Article 132 
A special law shall define the offences which may be committed by Ministers in the 
performance of their duties, and shall specify the procedure for their indictment and trial 
and the competent authority for the said trial, without affecting the application of other laws 
to their ordinary acts or offences and to the civil liability arising there from. 
Article 133 
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Law shall regulate general and municipal self-governing bodies in such a way as to ensure 
their independence under the direction and supervision of the Government. 
Section IT - Financial Affairs 
Article 134 
No general tax may be established, amended or abolished except k a law. No one may be 
exempted, wholly or partially, from the payment of such taxes except in the cases specified 
by law. No one may be required to pay any other tax, fee or imposition except within the 
limits of law. 
Article 135 
Law shall prescribe rules for the collection of public funds and the procedure for their 
expenditure. 
Article 136 
Public loans shall be concluded by a law. The Government may grant or guarantee a loan 
by a law, or within the limits of the funds appropriated for the said purpose in the budget. 
Article 137 
General and local self-governing bodies may grant or guarantee loans according to law. 
Article 138 
Law shall lay down rules for the protection of State properties, their administration, the 
conditions of their disposal, and the limits within which any of these properties may be 
relinquished. 
Article 139 
The financial year shall be fixed by law. 
Article 140 
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The Government shall draw up the annual budget, comprising the revenue and expenditure 
of the State, and submit it to the National Assembly, for examination and approval, at least 
two months before the end of each current financial year. 
Article 141 
The budget shall be discussed in the National Assembly Part by Part. None of the public 
revenues may be allocated for a specific purpose except by law. 
Article 142 
Law may appropriate specific funds for more than one year if the nature of the expenditure 
so requires, provided that each budget shall include the funds allocated for that year, or 
alternatively, an extraordinary budget covering more than one financial year shall be drawn 
up. 
Article 143 
The budget law may not include any provisions establishing a new tax, increasing an 
existing tax, amending an existing law, or evading the issue of a special law on a matter in 
respect of which the Constitution provides that a law should be issued. 
Article 144 
The budget shall be issued by a law. 
Article 145 
If the budget law has not been promulgated before the beginning of the financial year, the 
preceding budget shall be applied until the new one is issued and revenues shall be 
collected and disbursements made in accordance with laws in force at the end of the 
preceding year. 
However, if the National Assembly has approved one or more Parts of the new budget, they 
shall be put into effect. 
Article 146 
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Any expenditure not included in the budget, or in excess of the budget appropriations. as 
well as the transfer of any fund from one Part of the budget to another, shall be effected by 
law. 
Article 147 
In no case shall the maximum estimate of expenditure, included in the budget law or the 
laws amending it, be exceeded. 
Article 148 
Law shall specify the general budgets, both independent and annexed, to which the 
provisions regarding the budget of the State shall be applied. 
Article 149 
The final accounts of the financial administration of the State for the preceding year shall 
be submitted, within four months following the end of the said year, to the National 
Assembly for consideration and approval. 
Article 150 
The Government shall submit to the National Assembly, at least once during each ordinary 
session, a statement upon the financial position of the State. 
Article 151 
A financial control and audit commission shall be established by a law, which shall ensure 
its independence. The commission shall be attached to the National Assembly and shall 
assist the Government and the National Assembly in controlling the collection of the State 
revenues and the disbursement of its expenditures within the limits of the budget. The 
commission shall submit to both the Government and the National Assembly an annual 
report on its activities and its observations. 
Article 152 
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No concession for exploitation of either a natural resource or a public service may be 
granted except by a law and for a limited period. In this respect the preparatory measures 
shall facilitate the operations of prospecting and exploration and ensure publicity and 
competition. 
Article 153 
No monopoly shall be granted except by a law and for a limited period. 
Article 154 
Law shall regulate currency and banking and determine standards, weights and measures. 
Article 155 
Law shall regulate salaries, pensions, compensation, subsidies and gratuities which are a 
charge on the State treasury. 
Article 156 
Law shall lay down provisions relating to the budgets and the final accounts of local bodies 
and authorities which have a public legal personality. 
Section III - Military Affairs 
Article 157 
Peace is the aim of the State, and the safeguard of the integrity of the Country, which is part 
of the integrity of the Greater Arab World, is a trust devolving upon every citizen. 
Article 158 
Military service shall be regulated by law. 
Article 159 
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The State alone shall establish armed forces and public security bodies, and that In 
accordance with law. 
Article 160 
Mobilisation, general or partial, shall be regulated by law. 
Article 161 
A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up to conduct affairs relating to defence, to the 
safeguard of the integrity of the Country and to the supervision of the armed forces, in 
accordance with law. 
Chapter V 
Judicial Power 
Article 162 
The honour of the Judiciary and the integrity and impartiality of judges are the bases of rule 
and a guarantee of rights and liberties. 
Article 163 
In administering justice judges shall not be subject to any authority. No interference 
whatsoever shall be allowed with the conduct of justice. Law shall guarantee the 
independence of the Judiciary and shall state the guarantees and provisions relating to 
judges and the conditions of their irremovability. 
Article 164 
Law shall regulate the Courts of various kinds and degrees and specify their functions and 
jurisdiction. Except when Martial Law is in force Military Courts shall have jurisdiction 
only over military offences committed by members of the armed and security forces within 
the limits specified by law. 
Article 165 
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Sittings of the Courts shall be public save in the exceptional cases prescribed by law. 
Article 166 
The right of recourse to the Courts is guaranteed to all people. Law shall prescribe the 
procedure and manner necessary for the exercise of this right. 
Article 167 
The Public Prosecution Office shall conduct penal charges on behalf of society. It shall 
supervise the affairs of judicial police, the enforcement of penal laws, the pursuit of 
offenders and the execution of judgments. Law shall regulate this body, lay down its duties, 
and define the conditions and guarantees for those who assume its functions. 
As an exception, law may entrust to the public security authorities the conduct of 
prosecutions in misdemeanours in accordance with the manner prescribed by law. 
Article 168 
The Judiciary shall have a Supreme Council which shall be regulated, and its duties 
defined, by law. 
Article 169 
Law shall regulate the settlement of administrative suits by means of a special Chamber or 
Court, and shall prescribe its organisation and the manner of assuming administrative 
jurisdiction including the power of both nullification and compensation in respect of 
administrative acts contrary to law. 
Article 170 
Law shall organIse the body which shall render legal advice to ministries and public 
departments and shall draft bills and regulations. Law shall also regulate the representation 
of the State and other public bodies before the Courts. 
Article 171 
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A Council of State may be established by a law to assume the functions of administrative 
jurisdiction, rendering legal advice, and drafting bills and regulations, mentioned in the 
preceding two Articles. 
Article 172 
Law shall prescribe the method of resolving conflicts of jurisdiction or of judgments 
between the various kinds of Courts. 
Article 173 
Law shall specify the judicial body competent to decide upon disputes relating to the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations and shall determine its jurisdiction and procedure. 
Law shall ensure the right of both the Government and the interested parties to challenge 
the constitutionality of laws and regulations before the said body. 
If the said body decides that a law or a regulation is unconstitutional it shall be considered 
null and void. 
Part V 
GENERAL AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article 174 
Either the Amir or one-third of the members of the National Assembly shall have the right 
to propose the revision of this Constitution by amending or deleting one or more of its 
provisions or by adding new provisions. 
If the Amir and the majority of the members constituting the National Assembly approve 
the principle of revision and its subject matter, the Assembly shall debate the bill article by 
article. Approval by a two- thirds majority vote of the members constituting the Assembly 
shall be required for the bill to be passed. The revision shall come into force only after 
being sanctioned and promulgated by the Amir regardless of the provisions of Articles 65 
and 66 of this Constitution. 
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If the principle of revision or its subject matter is rejected, it shall not be presented again 
before the lapse of one year from the rejection. 
No amendment to this Constitution may be proposed before the lapse of five years from its 
coming into force. 
Article 175 
The provisions relating to the Amiri System in Kuwait and the principles of liberty and 
equality, provided for in this Constitution, may not be proposed for revision except in 
relation to the title of the Amirate or to increase the guarantees of liberty and equality. 
Article 176 
The powers of the Amir, specified in this Constitution, may not be proposed for revision 
when a Deputy Amir is acting for him. 
Article 177 
The application of this Constitution shall not affect treaties and conventions previously 
concluded by Kuwait with other States and international organisations. 
Article 178 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette within two weeks of their promulgation and 
shall come into force one month after their publication. The latter period may be extended 
or reduced for any law by a special provision included in it. 
Article 179 
Laws shall apply to that which takes place after the date of their coming into force, and thus 
shall have no effect in respect of that which has taken place before such date. However. in 
other than penal matters, a law may. with the approval of a majority vote of the memhcrs 
constituting the National Assembly, prescribe otherwise. 
Article 180 
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All provisions of laws, regulations, decrees, orders and decisions, in effect upon the coming 
of this Constitution into force, shall continue to be applicable unless amended or repealed 
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in this Constitution, provided that they are not 
contrary to any of its provisions. 
Article 181 
No provision of this Constitution may be suspended except when Martial Law is in force 
and within the limits specified by the law. Under no circumstances shall the meetings of the 
National Assembly be suspended, nor shall the immunities of its members be interfered 
with, during such period. 
Article 182 
This Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force on the 
date of the meeting of the National Assembly which shall not be later than January 1963. 
Article 183 
Law Number I of 1962 concernIng the system of Government during the period of 
transition shall continue to be in force, and the present members of the Constituent 
Assembly shall continue in the exercise their duties specified in the said law, until the 
meeting of the National Assembly. 
Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah 
AMIR OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT 
Issued at the Siif Palace on the 14th of Jumada a! - Thani, 1382, corresponding to the 11th of November. 
1962. 
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Appendix B 
LAW NO. 35 FOR 1962 in regard to 
ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
We, Abdallah aI-Salim aI-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait having considered 
Articles 80, 182, and 183 of the Constitution; the Constituent Assembly having agreed 
upon the Law, the text of which follows, We do hereby approve and promulgate it. 
PART I 
VOTERS 
Article 1 
All male Kuwaitis who have reached the age of twenty--one years are entitled to vote 
except those naturalized persons who have not completed ten years of naturalization since 
the coming into effect of Law No. 15 of 1959 in regard to Kuwaiti nationality. 
Article 2 
Anyone who has been sentenced for felony or for crimes of dishonour or untrustworthiness 
is prohibited from voting unless his case is reconsidered. 
Article 3 
Men of the armed forces and the police may not exercise the right to vote. 
Article 4 
Every voter is to exercise his electoral rights in person in the electoral rights in which his 
residence is. 
The electoral address is the place in which the person normally lives or in which is the 
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dwelling of his family. Should he have a number of residences he must specify the address 
he wishes to use wherein to exercise his electoral rights. 
If the voter should change his address he must notify the Ministry of the Interior in writing 
in order to make the necessary alteration in the electoral roll. If the change of address is not 
notified before summoning the voters, the voter is to exercise his electoral rights in the 
district in which his name was first registered. 
Article 5 
The voter is not permitted to cast his vote more than once at any election. 
PART II 
THE ELECTORAL ROLLS 
Article 6 
Every electoral district is to have one or more permanent electoral roll compiled by a 
committee or committees composed of a chainnan and two members. The distribution, 
composition, and assignment of the location of the committees will be decided by the 
Minister of the Interior. 
Article 7 
The electoral roll is to include the name of every Kuwaiti residing in the electoral district 
on 1 February of each year who satisfies the required conditions for exercising voting 
rights, together with his surname, occupation, date of birth, and address. 
It is not permitted for a voter to be registered in more than one electoral district. 
The rolls are to be compiled in two copies, in alphabetical order, both of which are to be 
signed by the chairman of the committee and the two members: one copy is to be kept in 
the police station in the electoral district and the other in the General Secretariat of the 
General Assembly. 
Article 8 
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The compilation of, or amendments to, the electoral rolls are to be completed during the 
month of February of each year. The annual amendments are to include: 
(a) the addition of the names of those who have gained the qualification stipulated by the 
law in order to exercise voting rights: 
(b) the addition of the names of those who had been incorrectly omitted from former rolls: 
(c) the deletion of the names of those now deceased. 
(d) the deletion, of the names of those who have lost the required qualifications since the 
last review or those whose names had been incorrectly registered. 
Article 9 
The electoral roll for each electoral district is to be displayed in a prominent position in 
police stations and other public places which the Minister of the Interior might specify. 
during the period 1 to 15 March each year. 
Article 10 
Every Kuwaiti living in an electoral district may request that his name be registered in the 
electoral roll belonging to it should his name have been incorrectly omitted from 
registration. Likewise every voter registered in the electoral roll may request the 
registration of the name of anyone incorrectly omitted or the removal of the name of 
anyone incorrectly registered. 
Requests are to be submitted to the official address of the committee in the period 1 to 20 
March and they will, be entered according to the date of their receipt in a special book. 
Receipts will be given to the applicants and any voter is permitted to peruse this book. 
Article 11 
The registration committee is to decide upon the requests for registration or deregistration 
provided for in the foregoing Article by a date not later than 5 April. The committee is to 
hear the testimony of the applicant or he who has applied on his behalf and is to do what it 
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considers necessary as regards investigation and inquiry. 
Article 12 
The decisions of the registration committee are to be displayed in the places referred to in 
Article 9 of this Law from 6 to 15 April. 
Article 13 
Everyone concerned with, and every voter registered on, the electoral roll of the district 
who appeals against the decisions of the committee on an application is to apply to the 
appropriate police station not later than 20 April. In regard to this appeal, the procedures set 
out in Article 10 of this Law are to be followed. It will be passed on immediately to the 
competent Civil Court. 
Article 14 
The final decision on the appeals mentioned in the foregoing Article is to lie with a judge of 
the Civil Court appointed by its President. It is permitted to appoint several judges among 
whom the work will be distributed according to the electoral districts. 
The decision on these appeals is to be rendered not later than the end of June. 
Article 15 
The electoral rolls will be amended to conform with the final decisions which will be issued 
in accordance with the foregoing articles. 
Article 16 
Everyone who registers his name in the electoral roll and has become registered in it will 
finally be given a certificate to that effect which will state his name, his date of birth, his 
registered number on the electoral roll, the date of registration, and the electoral district in 
which he is registered. 
Article 17 
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The final electoral rolls will be considered conclusive at the time of an election and no one 
will be permitted to take part unless his name is registered in them. 
PARTllI 
THE ELECTION PROCEDURES 
Article 18 
The dates of general elections will be appointed by decree and the dates of by-elections by 
the decision of the Minister of the Interior. The decree or the decision must be published at 
least one month before the date appointed for the election. 
Article 19 
It is a condition that whoever is nominated for membership of the National Assembly shall 
have his name registered on one of the electoral rolls. 
Article 20 
Requests for nomination are to be submitted in writing to the police station in the area of 
the electoral district during official working hours in the ten days following the publication 
of the decree or decision for the calling of the election. 
Nominations are to be registered in accordance with the time of their receipt in a special 
book and receipts are to be given for them. All voters are permitted to peruse the book of 
nominations. 
A list of candidates for each district is to be compiled and displayed in the places specified 
above in Article 9 of this Law beginning on the day following the closure of nominations. 
Article 21 
All who wish to be nominated must pay the sum of fifty dinars as a surety which wilL be 
allocated to charitable works to be decided upon by the Minister of Social Affairs and 
Labour should the candidate withdraw from the nomination or if he should not obtain at 
least ten of the lawful votes cast in the election. 
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A request for nomination will not be accepted unless accompanied by a receipt for the 
payment of this surety. 
Article 22 
It is not pennitted for anyone to be nominated in more than one electoral district. If it is 
seen that he has been nominated in more than one district he must give up his nomination in 
all but one district before the close of nominations. If this is not done his nomination in all 
districts will be considered void. 
Article 23 
Every civil servant nominated for the election will be considered, pursuant to the Law, to 
have resigned from his post five days after the closure of nominations unless he should 
have withdrawn his nomination before that time. 
Article 24 
Any candidate who withdraws from nomination is to do so in writing in the police station 
where his request for nomination was made, at least four days before the date of the 
election. The withdrawal will be written down beside his name on the list of candidates. 
Also on the day of the election it will be announced by displaying it on the door of the 
electoral committees in the district. 
Article 25 
If the number of nominations properly submitted in an election district is not more than the 
number required to be elected, the Minister of the Interior shall proclaim the successful 
membership of those nominated without the necessity of holding an election in the district. 
Article 26 
Ballot papers will be printed at the expense of the government in a fonn which will be 
decided by the Minister of the Interior. 
Article 27 
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The conduct of the election is to be entrusted, in each electoral district, to One or more 
committees; one of them is to be a main co and the others are to be sub--committees. 
The committee is to be composed of one person, appointed by the Minister of justice, from 
the judiciary, the office of the Public Prosecutor, or the civil service who shall assume the 
chairmanship, one member appointed by the Minister of the Interior, and a representati ve of 
each candidate. The candidate must submit the name of his representative to the appropriate 
police station at least forty-eight hours before the date of the election. 
If the candidate does not submit the name of his representative or if he does submit it but he 
is not present at the start of the election, and should the number of the members of the 
committee not have reached three, the chairman of the committee is to select one of the 
voters present to be a member of it. 
If the chairman is absent, his place is to be taken by the member he appoints from among 
the members of the committee. 
Article 28 
The committee shall select from its members a secretary who is to compile the official 
report of the election which is to be signed by the chairman of the committee and all other 
members. 
Article 29 
Observance of the regulations at the election is the responsibility of the chairman of the 
committee who for that purpose may, if necessary, request the presence of the police. It is 
not permitted for members of the police or the military forces to enter the election centre 
except at the request of the chairman of the committee. 
Article 30 
Candidates have the right to enter the election centre at any time and for this purpose may 
authorize as his agent any voter in the electoral district. the authorization to be made in 
writing. 
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No one other than the voters and candidates are permitted to be present at the election and 
none of them is permitted to carry a weapon, openly or concealed. 
A weapon, within the meaning of this Article, is considered to be - in addition to a fireann 
- cold steel or sticks which are not personally necessary. 
Article 31. 
The election is to last from 8 am to 5 pm. 
Article 32 
Every voter must produce to the committee, on casting his vote, his certificate of 
registration on the electoral roll. 
Should this certificate be lost, the committee is to accept his vote on the basis of his 
certificate of nationality and the existence of his name on the electoral roll. 
Article 33 
The election is to be carried out by secret ballot. 
Article 34 
The chairman of the committee is to hand a ballot paper to each voter. The Voter is to go to 
a booth in the election centre and enter his vote on the paper which is to be returned to the 
chairman who will then put it in the ballot The secretary will make a mark art the electoral 
roll against the name of the voter who has handed !n his ballot paper. 
A Voter who is unable to record his vote on the ballot paper by himself may record it 
verbally in such a manner as it cannot be heard except by members of the committee; the 
chainnan will enter the vote on the ballot paper and put it in the box. The voter is pennitted 
to whisper his vote to the chairman of the committee and to one other member only. 
Article 35 
At precisely 5 pm the chairman is to proclaim the election to be at an end. If all voters have 
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attended before that time the chairman of the committee shall proclaim the election to be at 
an end after the last voter has cast his vote. 
The election may continue after 5 pm if it is seem that there are voters in the election centre 
who have not voted. In this case, voting is to be confined to these voters only. 
After the proclamation of the end of the election, the committee is to prepare for the 
counting of the votes. 
Article 36 
The sub-committees are to conduct the election in accordance with the above- mentioned 
procedures until the election comes to an end. Then they are all to close the ballot boxes 
and convey them to the headquarters of the main committee where all the ballot boxes in 
the district will be opened and counted in the presence of all the chainnen and members of 
the main committee and the sub committees under the chainnanship of the chainnan of the 
main committee. 
Article 37 
The committee is to decide upon all matters connected with the election and of the validity 
or invalidity of every vote cast by a voter; this is to be without prejudice to the provisions 
laid down in Part IV of this Law. 
Article 38 
The following will be considered invalid: 
(a) conditional votes; 
(b) votes cast for more than the number required to be elected; 
(c) votes cast on ballot papers other than those handed out by the committee; 
(d) votes cast on ballot papers which the voter has signed or on which he has placed some 
sirn or mark which will identify him. e 
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Article 39 
A member of the National Assembly shall be elected by a relative majority of the number 
of valid votes cast. If two or more obtain an equal number of valid votes. the committee 
shall ballot among themselves and the successful member shall be the one who the ballot 
appoints. 
The chairman of the committee is to announce the name of the member elected and is to 
sign, together with all other members of the committee, the official report of the election 
and send it with the ballot papers to the Ministry of the Interior. 
Article 40 
The General Secretariat of the National Assembly shall hand to each member who IS 
successful in gaining membership a certificate of his election. 
PART IV 
APPEAL AGAINST VALIDITY OF MEMBERSHIP 
Article 41 
Every voter may request that the election which has taken place in his electoral district be 
invalidated and so may every candidate in the district in which he was nominated. 
The request, authenticated by the signature of the mukhtar of the area is to be submitted to 
the General Secretariat of the National Assembly within fifteen days of the announcement 
of the result of the election. 
Article 42 
The National Assembly, if it invalidates the election of one or more members, the real facts 
of the result of the election having become apparent, is to proclaim as the successful 
member he whose election it considers to be valid. 
PARTY 
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ELECTORAL OFFENCES 
Article 43 
The following will be punished with imprisonment not exceeding six months and a fine not 
exceeding 100 dinars, or with anyone of these two penalties: 
1- All who intentionally register a name on the electoral roll or omit to register a name in 
contravention of the provisions of this Law. 
2- Anyone 'who knowingly gets his or someone else's name registered without fulfilling 
the required conditions; similarly all who, as above, do not deregister or delete the name of 
someone else. 
3- All who print or publish documents as propaganda for the election without the 
publication incorporating the name of the publisher. 
4- Anyone who casts a vote in the election knowing that his name has been improperly 
recorded on the roll or that he has forfeited the required qualifications to exercise his right 
or that his right is suspended. 
5- All who deliberately vote in the name of someone else. 
6- Anyone who exercises his right in anyone election more than once. 
7- Anyone who divulges the secrecy of an elector's vote without his consent. 
8- Anyone who enters the centre set aside for the election without the right to do so and 
does not leave when ordered to do so by the committee. 
Article 44 
The following will be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine not 
exceeding 100 diners, or with anyone of these two penalties: 
1- Anyone who uses force or threats to prevent a voter from exercising his or another's 
right. to persuade him to vote in a particular way, or to refrain from voting. 
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2- Anyone who gIves, offers, or promises that he will give a voter an inducement for 
himself or for another in order to persuade him to vote in a particular way or to refrain from 
voting. 
3- Anyone who accepts or requests an inducement of this nature for himself or for another. 
4- All who publish or broadcast among voters untrue infonnation about the behaviour or 
morals of a candidate with the intention of influencing the Outcome of the election. 
5- Anyone who enters a place set aside for the assembly of voters and carries a weapon in 
contravention of the provisions of Article 30 of this Law. 
Article 45 
The following will be punished with imprisonment not exceeding three years and a fine not 
exceeding 2,000 dinars, or with anyone of these two penalties: 
1- Anyone who misappropriates, conceals, destroys, or despoils the electoral roll or any 
other document connected with the conduct of the election or changes the outcome of the 
election in any other manner. 
2- Anyone who impairs the conduct or organization of the election by the use of force or 
threats or who takes part in a mob, shouting, or demonstrations. 
3- Anyone who makes off with the box containing the ballot papers or destroys it. 
4- Anyone who insults the election committee or one of its members during the progress of 
the election. 
Article 46 
Attempted electoral offences, as set down above, will be punished with the penalties 
stipulated for the offence itself. 
Article 47 
Public and civil proceedings in electoral offences specified in this Part except the offence 
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specified in paragraph 7 of Article 43 - will be dropped six months after the day of 
proclaiming the result of the election or the final date of action on an investigation. 
Article 48 
If an offence is committed or attempted to be committed III the election centre, the 
chainnan of the election committee is to compile an official report of the incident and order 
the arrest of the accused person and hand niin over to the police for lawful proceedings to 
be taken. 
PART VI 
GENERAL AND PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS 
Article 49 
If a member of the National Assembly accepts a public office, membership of the board of 
directors of a company, or membership of the municipal council he will be considered to 
have resigned his membership of the National Assembly from the date of his acceptance of 
the post or membership of the directing board of the company, or from the date when he 
finally takes up his membership in the municipal council. 
Article 50 
Membership of a member of the National Assembly will be forfeited should a condition 
stipulated for being a member cease to be met or if it cases to light that it was not met 
before the election. The forfeiture of membership shall be proclaimed by a resolution of the 
Assembly. 
Article 51 
The first elections for the National Assembly are to take place in the ten electoral districts 
which formed the basis of the election of the Constituent Assembly except that each district 
will elect five members to the National Assembly. 
Article 52 
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With regard to the first election for the National Assembly, the dates referred in Articles 8. 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 20 of this Law shall be within the discretion of the Minister of 
the Interior in such a manner as to convene the National Assembly not later than the end of 
January AD 1963. 
Article 53 
Ministers are to take appropriate action for the execution of this Law and to act from the 
date of its publication in the National Gazette. The Minister of the Interior is to issue the 
necessary decisions for its execution. 
Amir of the State of Kuwait 
Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah 
Issued on 15 lumada al-Thania AH 1382 
corresponding to 12 November AD 1962. 
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Appendix C 
Nationality Law, 1959* 
Article 1 
Amiree-Decree No. 1511959 
Original Kuwaiti nationals are those persons who were settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and 
who maintained their normal residence there until the date of the publication of this Law. 
Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of 
descendants. 
A person is deemed to have maintained his normal residence in Kuwait even if he resides in 
a foreign country if he has the intention of returning to Kuwait. 
Article 2 
Amiree-Decree No. 15/1959 
Any person born in, or outside, Kuwait whose father is a Kuwaiti national shall be a 
Kuwaiti national himself. 
Article 3 
Amiree-Decree No. 15/1959 
The following shall be Kuwaiti nationals: 
(1) Any person born in, or outside, Kuwait to a Kuwaiti mother whose father is unknown. 
or whose kinship to his father has not been legally established, or whose father is of 
unknown nationality or is a stateless person. 
• Translated by R. H. AI-' Anezi "A Study of the Role of Nation~lity in In~ernational La \1,' with Special 
Reference to the Law and Practice of Kuwait." Ph .D thesis. UnIversity at Cambndge. 1990. 
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(2) Any person born in Kuwait to parents unknown. A foundling shall be deemed to ha\"e 
been born in Kuwait unless the contrary is proved. 
Amiree-Decrce No. 10011980 
The following shall be Kuwaiti nationals: 
(1) Any person born in, or outside, Kuwait to a Kuwaiti mother whose father is unknown. 
or whose kinship to his father has not been legally established. 
(2) Any person born in Kuwait to parents unknown. A foundling shall be deemed to have 
been born in Kuwait unless the contrary is proved. 
Decree-Law No. 4011987 
Kuwaiti nationality is acquired by any person born in Kuwait whose parents are unknown. 
A foundling is deemed to have been born in Kuwait unless the contrary is proved. 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
the Interior to any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born in. or outside. 
Kuwait to a Kuwaiti mother whose father is unknown or whose kinship to his father has not 
been legally established. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children. being 
minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals until they reach their 
majority. 
Article 4 
Amiree-Decree No. 15/1959 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the 
Departments of Police and Public Security to any foreigner of full age satisfying the 
following conditions: 
(1) that he has normally and lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 15 consecuti\"e years 
preceding the submission of his application for naturalization, or for at least 8 consecuti\c 
years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country; 
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(2) that he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been 
convicted of an honour-related crime; 
(3) that he has knowledge of the Arabic language. 
Amiree-Decree No. 2/1960 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the 
Departments of Police and Public Security to any person of full age satisfying the following 
conditions: 
(1) that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 15 consecutive years from the date of 
the publication of this Decree, or for at least 10 consecutive years from the date of the 
publication of this Decree if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The requirement 
of consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves Kuwait on official 
business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business, but retains the 
intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total period of his 
residence in Kuwait; 
(2) that he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been 
convicted of an honour-related crime; 
(3) that he has knowledge of the Arabic language. 
Kuwaiti nationality shall not be granted by virtue of these provisions to more than 50 
persons in anyone year. A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Head of the 
Departments of Police and Public Security, shall select from those who apply for 
naturalization, a number of persons of up to this number who may be naturalized annually 
upon its recommendation for their naturalization. The Committee shall take into 
consideration any technical qualifications needed in Kuwait possessed by any given 
applicant. 
Statute No. 7011966 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
the Interior to any person of full age satisfying the following conditions: 
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(1) that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 15 consecutive years from the date of 
the publication of the Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 or for at least 10 consecutive years from 
the date of the publication of that Decree if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. 
The requirement of consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves 
Kuwait on official business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business. but 
retains the intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total 
period of his residence in Kuwait; 
(2) that he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been 
convicted of an honour-related crime or of an honesty-related crime; 
(3) that he has knowledge of the Arabic language; 
(4) that he possesses qualifications needed in Kuwait. 
Kuwaiti nationality shall not be granted by virtue of these provisions to more than 50 
persons in anyone year. A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Head of 
Departments of Police and Public Security, shall select from those who apply for 
naturalization, a number of persons of up to this number who may be naturalized annually 
upon its recommendation for their naturalization. The Committee shall take into 
consideration any technical qualifications needed in Kuwait possessed by any given 
applicant. 
Decree-Law No. 100/1980 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
the Interior to any person of full age satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 20 consecutive years or for at least 15 
consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The requirement of 
consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves Kuwait on official 
business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business. but retains the 
intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total period of his 
residence in Kuwait; 
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(2) that he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been 
convicted of an honour-related crime or of an honesty-related crime; 
(3) that he has knowledge of the Arabic language; 
(4) that he possesses qualifications or renders services needed in Kuwait. 
A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Minister of the Interior. shall select 
from those who apply for naturalization, the applicants whom it recommends for 
naturalization in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
The number of persons who may be naturalized in anyone year in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article shall be decided by Resolution of the Council of Ministers. 
Statute No. 111982 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
the Interior to any person of full age satisfying the following conditions: 
(1) that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 20 consecutive years or for at least 15 
consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The requirement of 
consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves Kuwait on official 
business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business, but retains the 
intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total period of his 
residence in Kuwait; 
(2) that he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been 
convicted of an honour-related crime or of an honesty-related crime; 
(3) that he has knowledge of the Arabic language; 
(4) that he possesses qualifications or renders services needed in Kuwait; 
(5) that he be an original Muslim by birth, or that he has converted to Islam according to 
the prescribed rules and procedures and that a period of at least 5 years has passed si nce he 
embraced Islam before the grant of naturalization. Nationality thus acquired is ipso facto 
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lost and the Decree of naturalization rendered void ab initio if the naturalized person 
expressly renounces Islam or if he behaves in such a manner as clearly indicates his 
intention to abandon Islam. In any such case, the nationality of any dependant of the 
apostate who had acquired it upon the naturalization of the apostate is also rendered void. 
A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Minister of the Interior, shall select 
from those who apply for naturalization, the applicants whom it recommends for 
naturalization in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
The number of persons who may be naturalized in anyone year in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article shall be decided by an Act. 
Article 5 
[See also Decree-Law No 100/1980, infra, p. 306]. 
Amiree-Decree No. 15/1959 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, Kuwaiti nationality 
may be granted by an Act to any Arab belonging to an Arab country who has rendered 
valuable services of great benefit to Kuwait. 
Amiree-Decree No. 2/1960 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be 
granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree: 
(1) an Arab belonging to an Arab country who has rendered valuable services of great 
benefit to Kuwait; 
(2) an Arab belonging to an Arab country provided that he had resided in Kuwait since 
before 1945 and has maintained his residence there until the date of the publication of this 
Law; 
(3) a non-Arab provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1930 and has 
maintained his residence there until the date of the publication of this Law. 
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Nationality may only be granted by virtue of the provisions of this Article upon the 
recommendation of a Committee of Kuwaiti nationals appointed by the Head of the 
Departments of Police and Public Security. 
Statute No. 7011966 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be 
granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree: 
(1) any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait; 
(2) any person [upon his attaining his majority who was) born in Kuwait to a Kuwaiti 
mother and ho has maintained his residence there until reaching the age of majority and 
whose foreign father Las deserted his mother, divorced her or has died. The Minister of the 
Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to 
Kuwaiti nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority. 
Statute No. 4111972 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be 
granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree 
(1) any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait; 
(2) any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born in Kuwait to a Kuwaiti 
mother and ho has maintained his residence there until he reaches his majority and whose 
foreign father has deserted his mother, divorced her or has died. The Minister of the Interior 
may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti 
nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority; 
(3) any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born in Kuwait and who has 
maintained his normal residence there until reaching the age of majority provided that he 
has been educated in Kuwait and has completed his secondary education at its schools. that 
he is of good character and reputation and that he does not hold any other nationality 
Decree-Law No 10011980 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be 
granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the 
Interior: 
(1) any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait' , 
(2) any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born to a Kuwaiti mother and who 
has maintained his residence [in Kuwait] until reaching the age of majority and whose 
foreign father irrevocably divorced his mother or has died. The Minister of the Interior may 
afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti 
nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority. 
(3) an Arab belonging to an Arab country provided that he had resided in Kuwait since 
before 1945 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree 
providing for his naturalization; 
(4) a non-Arab provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1930 and has 
maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his 
naturalization. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of 
residence of descendants for the purposes of the application of the third and fourth 
paragraphs of this Article, provided that the descendant was born in and is residing in 
Kuwait. Proof of residence shall be effected according to the procedure prescribed by 
Article 21 of this Law. 
The number of persons who may be naturalized in anyone year in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be decided by Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers. 
The grant of Kuwaiti nationality in virtue of the provisions of this Article shall be further 
subject to the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Article immediately 
preceding." 
Statute No. 1/1982 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be 
granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the 
Interior: 
(1) any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait; 
(2) any person [ his attaining his majority who was] born to a Kuwaiti mother and who has 
maintained his residence [in Kuwait] until reaching the age of majority and whose foreign 
father has irrevocably divorced his mother or has died. The Minister of the Interior may 
afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti 
nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority; 
(3) an Arab belonging to an Arab country provided that he had resided in Kuwait since 
before 1945 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree 
providing for his naturalization; 
(4) a non-Arab provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1930 and has 
maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his 
naturalization. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of 
residence of descendants for the purposes of the application of the third and fourth 
paragraphs of this Article, provided that the descendant was born in and is residing in 
Kuwait. Proof of residence shall be effected according to the procedure prescribed by 
Article 21 of this Law. 
The number of persons who may be naturalized in anyone year in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be decided by an Act. 
The grant of Kuwaiti nationality in virtue of the provisions of this Article shall be further 
subject to the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Article immediatel y 
preceding. 
Article 6 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
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A foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of either of 
the two Articles immediately preceding this Article shall not have the right to vote in any 
Parliamentary election or to stand as a candidate for or to be appointed to membership of 
any Parliamentary body within 10 years following the date of his naturalization. The 
provisions of this Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality 
by virtue of naturalization prior to the enactment of this Law. The 10 year period shall be 
deemed to start to run in the case of such persons from the date of the publication of this 
Law. 
Statute 70/1966 
A foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of 
Articles 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall not have the right to vote in any Parliamentary 
election within 20 years following the date of his naturalization. The provisions of this 
Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of 
naturalization prior to the enactment of this Law. The 20 year period shall be deemed to 
start to run in the case of such persons from the date of the publication of this amendment. 
A foreigner to whom this Article applies shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for 
or to be appointed to membership of any Parliamentary body. 
Decree-Law No. 130/1986 
A person who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of 
Articles 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall not have the right to vote in any Parliamentary 
election within 30 years following the date of his naturalization. The provisions of this 
Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of 
naturalization prior to the enactment of this amendment. The 30 year period shall be 
deemed to start to run in the case of such persons from 6 July 1966. 
A person to whom this Article applies shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for or 
to be appointed to membership of any Parliamentary body. 
Decree-Law No. 40/1987 
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A person who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of 
Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall not have the right to vote in any Parliamentary 
election within 30 years following the date of his naturalization. The provisions of this 
Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of 
naturalization prior to the enactment of this amendment. The 30 year period shall be 
deemed to start to run in the case of such persons from 6 July 1966. 
A person to whom this Article applies shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for or 
be appointed to membership of any Parliamentary body. 
Article 7 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
The [foreign] wife of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the 
provisions of either of Articles 4 or 5 of this Law shall become a Kuwaiti national unless, 
within the period of one year from her learning of her husband's naturalization, she decides 
that she wishes to retain her nationality of origin. The children, being minors, of a foreigner 
who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality, shall, ipso facto, themselves be considered to be 
Kuwaiti nationals. They shall have the right to decide whether to retain their nationality of 
origin within a year of their attaining the age majority. 
Should a person to whom this Article applies decides to retain Kuwaiti nationality, the 
provisions of the Article immediately preceding this Article shall apply to such person. 
Decree Law No. 100/1980 
The [foreign] wife of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality shall not ipso facto 
be considered to be a Kuwaiti national unless she declares her wish so to be considered 
within one ear following the date of her husband's naturalization. The children, being 
minors, of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality, shall, ipso facto, themsdves 
be considered to be Kuwaiti nationals. They shall have the right to decide whether to retain 
their nationality of origin within a ear of their attaining the age of majority. 
Article 8 
377 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
A foreign woman who marries a Kuwaiti national shall herself become a Kuwaiti national 
unless she declares her wish within a year of her marriage to retain her nationality of origin. 
Such one year period shall run from the date of the publication of this Law in the case of 
any foreign woman who had married a Kuwaiti national prior to that date. 
Statute No. 7011966 
A foreign woman who marries a Kuwaiti national shall not herself become a Kuwaiti 
national by virtue of her marriage unless she declares, to the Minister of the Interior, her 
wish to acquire Kuwaiti nationality provided that the marriage shall have lasted for at least 
5 years from the date of her declaration. The Minister of the Interior may waive all or part 
of the above requirement as to time or may, during that period, decide not to grant to her 
Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of her marriage. 
Decree-Law No. 100/1980 
A foreign woman who marries a Kuwaiti national shall not herself become a Kuwaiti 
national by virtue of her marriage unless she declares, to the Minister of the Interior, her 
wish to acquire Kuwaiti nationality provided that the marriage shall have lasted for at least 
5 years from the date of her declaration. The Minister of the Interior may decline to grant to 
her a nationality certificate by virtue of her marriage or may waive all or part of the above 
requirement as to time. In the event of such woman's marriage being terminated by divorce 
or the death of her husband, and if a child had been or is born to her by her husband, 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted to her by Decree upon the recommendation of the 
Minister of the Interior, provided that she maintains her residence in Kuwait until the end of 
such five year period. 
Decree-Law 401 1987 
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
the Interior to a foreign woman who marries a Kuwaiti national provided that she declares 
her wish to acquire Kuwaiti nationality and that the marriage shall have lasted for at least 
15 years from the date of her declaration. Allor part of the above requirement as to time 
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may be waived upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. In the event of 
such woman's marriage being tenninated by divorce or the death of her husband, and if a 
child had been or is born to her by her husband, Kuwaiti nationality may be granted to her 
by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that she 
maintains her lawful and normal residence in Kuwait until the end of such 15 year period. 
Article 9 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
A foreign woman who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of either of the two 
articles immediately preceding shall not lose it upon the termination of the marriage unless 
she thereupon re-acquires her nationality of origin or acquires another nationality. 
Article 10 
Arniree Decree No. 15/1959 
A Kuwaiti woman who marries a foreigner shall acquire the nationality of her husband if 
the law of the State of which he is a national so provides; otherwise she may declare her 
wish to retain her Kuwaiti nationality within one year following the date of her marriage. 
Decree-Law No. 100/1980 
A Kuwaiti woman who marries a foreigner shall not lose her Kuwaiti nationality unless she 
acquires the nationality of her husband at her own request. 
Article 11 
Arniree Decree No. 15/1959 
A Kuwaiti national shall lose his Kuwaiti nationality if he becomes voluntarily naturalized 
according to the law of another State. His wife, being a Kuwaiti national. shall also lose her 
Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of her husband's naturalization unless, within the perioJ of 
one year am learning of her husband's naturalization. she informs the Head of the 
Departments of Police al Public Security that she wishes to retain her Kuwaiti nationality. 
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His children, being minors, shall also lose their Kuwaiti nationality if they themselves 
acquire ipso facto the nationality of the Sate according to the law of which their father has 
become naturalized if that law so provides. Such children shall reacquire Kuwaiti 
nationality upon their informing the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security 
within one year following their attaining the age of majority of their wish to do so. 
A Kuwaiti national who has become voluntarily naturalized according to the law of another 
ate shall reacquire Kuwaiti nationality upon request provided that he has renounced his 
other nationality. 
Decree-Law No. 10011980 
A Kuwaiti national shall lose his Kuwaiti nationality if he becomes voluntarily naturalized 
cording to the law of another State. His wife, being a Kuwaiti national. shall not lose her 
Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of her husband's naturalization unless she voluntarily acquires 
the nationality of her husband. His children, being minors, shall also lose their Kuwaiti 
nationality if they themselves acquire ipso facto the nationality of the State according to the 
law of which their father has become naturalized if that law so provides. Such children shall 
reacquire Kuwaiti nationality upon their informing the Minister of the Interior within two 
years following their taming the age of majority of their wish to do so. 
A Kuwaiti national who has lost his Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of this 
Article may reacquire his Kuwaiti nationality by Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
upon the commendation of the Minister of the Interior. provided that he has lawfully 
resided in Kuwait for at less than one year and provided further that he applies for such 
reacquisition and has renounced his foreign nationality. He shall resume his Kuwaiti 
nationality upon the acceptance of is application by the Council of Ministers. 
Article 11 bis 
[See also Decree-Law No 10011980, infra, p. 306]. 
Decree-Law No. 10011980 
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A foreigner who may acquire Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of 
Articles 5,7 or 8 of this Law shall renounce any other nationality he may have within three 
months following the date of his naturalization according to the law of Kuwait and shall 
provide evidence his having done so to the Minister of the Interior. In the event of his 
failure to do so, his naturalization shall ipso facto be revoked and deemed void ab initio. 
Kuwaiti nationality shall be yoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
the Interior. Kuwaiti nationality which may have been acquired by any dependant of any 
such person shall also be revoked. 
Article 12 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
A Kuwaiti woman who has lost her Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of either 
of the two Articles immediately preceding shall reacquire Kuwaiti nationality at her request 
following the termination of her marriage provided that she has maintained her normal 
residence in Kuwait or has returned to reside in Kuwait. 
Decree-Law No. 10011980 
A Kuwaiti woman who has lost her Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of either 
of the two Articles immediately preceding may reacquire her Kuwaiti nationality by 
Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the 
Interior, provided that she has renounced her foreign nationality and that she has 
maintained her normal residence in Kuwait or has returned to reside in Kuwait. She shall 
resume her Kuwaiti nationality from the date of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers. 
Article 13 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
The nationality of a naturalized Kuwaiti national may be revoked by Decree upon the 
recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security in the two 
following cases: 
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1. where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false 
declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such 
person may also be revoked; 
2. where, within 5 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any honour-
related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted person alone may be revoked. 
Statute No. 2111965 
The nationality of a naturalized Kuwaiti national may be revoked by Decree upon the 
recommendation of the Minister of the Interior in the following cases: 
1. where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false 
declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such 
person may also be revoked; 
2. where, within 5 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any honour-
related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted person alone may be revoked~ 
3. where the Committee for Reform of the Administration has resolved to discharge such 
person from public office in accordance with Statute No. 111964 regarding Parliamentary 
Investigation and Reform of the Administration. In such case. the nationality of the 
convicted person alone may be revoked. 
Statute No. 70/1966 
The nationality of a Kuwaiti national naturalized by virtue of any of Articles 4. 5. 7 or 8 
may be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior in the 
following cases: 
1. where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false 
declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such 
person may also be revoked; 
2. where, within 5 years of the grant of naturalization. a person is cOTl\lcted of any honour-
related crime or of an honesty-related crime. In such case, the nationality of the con\ictcJ 
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person alone may be revoked; 
3. where, within 5 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is dismissed from public 
office on disciplinary grounds for reasons relating to honour or honesty: 
4. where the competent authorities have evidence that a naturalized person has 
disseminated opinions which may tend seriously to undermine the economic or. social 
structure of the State or that he is a member of a political association of a foreign State. 
Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also 
be revoked. 
Decree-Law No. 10011980 
The nationality of a Kuwaiti national naturalized by virtue of any of Articles 4. 5, 7 or 8 
may be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior in the 
following cases: 
1. where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false 
declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such 
person may also be revoked; 
2. where, within 10 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any 
honour-related crime or honesty-related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted 
person alone may be revoked; 
3. where, within 10 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is dismissed from public 
office on disciplinary grounds for reasons relating to honour or honesty 
4. where the competent authorities have evidence that a naturalized person has 
disseminated opinions which may tend seriously to undermine the economic or social 
structure of the State or that he is a member of a political association of a foreign State. 
Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also 
be revoked. 
Decree-Law No. 4011987 
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The nationality of a Kuwaiti national naturalized by virtue of any of Articles 3, -f. 5. - or 8 
may be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior in the 
following cases: 
1. where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false 
declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such 
person may also be revoked; 
2. where, within 15 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any honour 
related crime or honesty-related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted person 
alone may be revoked; 
3. where, within 10 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is dismissed from public 
office on disciplinary grounds for reasons relating to honour or honesty; 
4. where the competent authorities have evidence that a naturalized person has 
disseminated opinions which may tend seriously to undermine the economic or social 
structure of the State or that he is a member of a political association of a foreign State. 
Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also 
be revoked. 
Article 14 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
A Kuwaiti national may be deprived of his Kuwaiti nationality by Decree upon the 
recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. in the 
following cases: 
1. where a person has entered the military service of a foreign State and has remained in 
such service notwithstanding an instruction from the Government of Kuwait that he leave 
such service; 
2. where a person has worked for a foreign State which is at war with Kuwait or with which 
diplomatic relations have been suspended; 
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3. where a person is normally resident abroad and he has become a member of an 
association whose objects include objects which may tend seriously to undermine the social 
or economic structure of Kuwait or where he has been convicted of an offence involving 
.... 
breach of his allegiance to Kuwait. In such cases, only the person concerned may be 
deprived of his nationality. 
Article 15 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
Kuwaiti nationality may, by Decree issued on the submission of the Head of the 
Departments of Police and Public Security, be restored at any time to a person from whom 
it was withdrawn or who was deprived of it in accordance with the provisions of the 
Articles preceding. 
Article 16 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
The acquisition, withdrawal, deprivation or re-acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality shall be of 
no retrospective effect, unless express provision to the contrary is made [by the relevant 
Decree or other instrument]. 
Article 17 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
The age of majority referred to in any provision of this Law shall be in accordance with the 
general provision at any time in force of Kuwaiti law. 
Article 18 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
All declarations, notifications of choice and option, application forms and all other forms 
and procedures referred to in this Law shall, where effected in Kuwait. be addressed to the 
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Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. Where effected outside Kuwait, 
they shall be presented to the Consular bodies authorised to attend to them. 
Article 19 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
The Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security shall issue to every Kuwaiti 
national a certificate of Kuwaiti nationality after investigation has been made to establish 
his right to such nationality in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 20 
Amiree Decree No.1 5/1959 
In every case, the burden of proof shall rest upon one who claims Kuwaiti nationality. 
Article 21 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
Kuwaiti nationality as provided for by the provisions of this Law may be proved by way of 
an investigation carried out by Nationality Committees established by Decree upon the 
recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. Such 
Committees may accept documentary evidence as constituting proof of Kuwaiti nationality. 
The Committees may also admit evidence submitted by witnesses considered to be 
trustworthy, and be guided by matters of common repute and any other circumstantial 
evidence as they may consider to be sufficient to substantiate a claim to nationality. 
The Committees shall report to a Supreme Committee to be established by Decree upon the 
recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. ~o 
determination of a Committee shall be valid until it shall have been affinned hv the 
Supreme Committee. 
386 
Membership of all such Committees and rules of procedure to be adopted by them shall be 
regulated by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police 
and Public Security. 
Article 21 bis-A 
Statute No. 30/1970 
A nationality certificate may be withdrawn if it appears to have been obtained by virtue of 
fraud or on the basis of a false declaration or on the basis of false evidence submitted by a 
witness. Such withdrawal shall be effected by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon 
the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Kuwaiti nationality which has been 
acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked. 
Article 21 bis-B 
Statute No. 3011970 
Any person who has made, whether orally or in writing, incorrect statements to the 
administrative authorities responsible for verification of Kuwaiti nationality or to the 
Committees established for that purpose, with the object of seeking to prove his own 
Kuwaiti nationality or that of another, or with the object of seeking to facilitate the 
acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality according to the provisions of this Law and who is not 
proved to have made reasonable effort to determine the truth of his statements, shall be 
liable to either or both of a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years and to a fine of 
not more than 200 Kuwaiti Dinars. 
If such person has furnished statements knowing them to be false. he shall be liable to a 
tenn of imprisonment not exceeding seven years and to an additional fine of up to 500 
Kuwaiti Dinars. 
Article 22 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
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For a period of 2 years from the date of entry into force of this Law, no Kuwaiti passports 
will be issued save to those who have established their Kuwaiti nationality in accordance 
with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 23 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
All passports issued before the date of entry into force of this Law and all passports issued 
during the period of 2 years thereafter as provided by Article 22, to any who does not carry 
a certificate of Kuwaiti nationality as provided for by Article 19, shall cease to be valid on 
the expiration of that two-year period. 
Article 24 
Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall enter into force as from the 
date of its publication in the Official Gazette. 
All Orders for its due implementation shall be issued by the Head of the Departments of 
Police and Public Security. 
Decree-Law No. 100/19801 
Article 3 
Any person who claims that he is an original Kuwaiti national by virtue of the provisions of 
Article 1 of Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 and any foreigner who may wish to acquire 
Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of Article 5, paragraphs 3 and 4 of that Law 
shall apply within one year from the date of the entry into force of this Law. No application 
for confirmation of a claim in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 or for 
1 1. Article 1 of Decree-Law No.1 00/1980 provided for the amendment of certain articles of 
the Nationality Law,1959. 
2. Article 2 provided for the addition of Article 11 bis to the Nationality Law, 1959. 
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naturalization in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of that Law shall be received 
after that date. 
Any application submitted on behalf of a mInor shall be submitted by his legal 
representative but shall be finally determined only upon his attaining the age of majority. 
Should an applicant die before his application for the acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality is 
considered, the applications submitted on behalf of his minor children shall be considered 
forthwith. 
Article 4 
All Decrees granting naturalization and all nationality certificates issued according to the 
Resolution of the Supreme Committee for Nationality of 4 February 1961 whereby any 
person holding a Kuwaiti passport before 15 December 1959 was deemed to be a 
naturalized Kuwaiti national, are hereby declared to be and always to have been valid. 
Any person whose Kuwaiti nationality was acquired by virtue of the above Resolution of 
1961 shall be deemed to have acquired it from the date of the promulgation of the Decree 
providing for his naturalization or from the date of the issue of his nationality certificate. 
No further conferment or acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality according to the provisions of 
the above Resolution shall be made or acknowledged after the date of the entry into force of 
this Law. 
Article 5 
The period prescribed by Article 11 his of Amiree Decree No. 15/1959 referred to in this 
Decree-Law concerning those who had acquired Kuwaiti nationality prior to the date of 
entry into force of this Decree-Law shall run from that date. 
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